

EUROPE AT WAR

A "RED BOOK" OF THE
GREATEST WAR OF HISTORY


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WHY AND HOW EUROPE
WENT TO BATTLE—MEN,
GUNS, FORTS, SHIPS, AND
AIRCRAFT OF THE WAR-
RING COUNTRIES—FOOD
SUPPLY, FINANCES—THE
KAISER AND OTHER
GREAT PERSONALITIES—
STORIES OF ALSACE LOR-
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EUROPE AT WAR



THE ADVANCE OF THE GERMAN FORCES INTO FRANCE

The curved arrows show the general direction of the march of the German armies and the points where hostile country was entered. The heavy black line shows the high-water mark reached by the German forces, before their retreat began.

The Kaiser's forces are, in order from west to east: 1, Gen. von Kluck's army; 2, Gen. von Bülow's army; 3, Gen. von Hausen's army; 4, army under Grand Duke Albrecht of Würtemberg; 5, Crown Prince Wilhelm's army; 6, army under Crown Prince Rupprecht of Bavaria; 7, Gen. von Heering's army.

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EUROPE AT WAR

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AN INTRODUCTORY SURVEY

BY ALBERT SHAW

NO LARGE bodies of men in any European country could have wished for war, any more than they could have wished to have their own cities or provinces swept by Asiatic cholera or devastated by earthquake, fire, or flood. They have been led into the war by the mismanagement of governments.

It would not be just to say that the civil and military powers of the great countries of Europe have intentionally brought harm to their people. But they are not fitted for their responsibilities. Modern humanity demands appropriate public ideals in government policy and action. The real enemies of the European millions are not the peace-loving farmers and industrial workers of neighbor countries, but the false views and methods of their own governments and dominating classes. It had been hoped by real statesmen, as well as by humanitarians, that such opportunities for discussion as might be afforded by recurring peace conferences at The Hague would help to postpone the outbreak of a general war until means for fully averting it could be devised and agreed upon. But the situation for a number of years had been going steadily from bad to worse, until now the costly armaments that nations have built up with the supposed object of protecting them in their hour of need, have been brought into action for reasons that are indirect rather than obvious, and for causes and purposes that no two men can state exactly alike, because they are not definite.

While this great war is without real provocation or excuse, there are historical explanations of it that involve nearly everything that has happened in Europe for a hundred years.

The immediate clash came in the Balkans, and was precipitated by Austria. A long train of evil consequences has followed upon the interference of the other European powers in the settlement of affairs between Russia and Turkey after the war of 1877, in which the Russians were victorious. The Congress of Berlin of 1878 was dominated by Prince Bismarck, representing the new German Empire; Disraeli (Lord Beaconsfield), representing Great Britain; and Count Andrassy, representing Austria.

The arrangements that Russia and Turkey had agreed upon in March, by the treaty of San Stefano, were far wiser than those imposed in June by the other powers. It was Austria that had taken the initiative in the calling of the Berlin Congress. Russia and Turkey had agreed upon a large Bulgaria and upon an enlarged and independent Serbia. Austria wished to have as much as possible of this Christian territory of Southeastern Europe kept under the nominal authority of Turkey, for two manifest reasons. First, Austria feared Russia's influence with the new countries of Serbia, Bulgaria, Montenegro, and Roumania. Second, Austria wished to have as much as possible of all this territory remain Turkish, in order that she herself might wait for future opportunities to obtain parts if not the whole of it for herself.

One of the articles of the agreement adopted by the Berlin Congress of 1878 turned Bosnia and Herzegovina over to Austria for purposes of temporary occupation and management. While it is to be conceded that Austria managed Bosnia very well, no one can deny that her position in Bosnia was that of a trustee and not that of an owner. The people of Bosnia are very closely related by blood, language, and sympathy to those of Serbia. Bosnia, also, lies between Serbia and the sea. It was natural that the Servians should look forward to a future union with Bosnia, and to an outlet on the Adriatic. But after Russia's humiliation and defeat at the hands of the Japanese, which had lessened her prestige in Europe, and after the successes of the Young Turks in reforming the government of their country and the prospect that they might demand the evacuation of Bosnia by Austria, the government at Vienna decided that the time had come to announce annexation.

Accordingly, in October, 1908, the powers that had engaged in the Berlin treaty were informed by the Austrian Emperor that Austria had decided, for her own reasons, to make Bosnia and Herzegovina a part of the Austro-Hungarian empire. The Servians were intensely embittered, because this stood in the way of their ambitions, for Serbia was entirely landlocked. In the two recent Balkan wars, Bulgaria, Serbia, Greece, and

Montenegro joined forces to drive the Turks out of Europe. Austria and others of the larger powers tried to prevent action but the little states made their notable fight. They had agreed in advance upon the division of the territory they had determined to win. But after they had conquered the territory, the great powers, again led by Austria, interfered to deprive the victors of the fruits of their success. The Turkish province of Albania, on the Adriatic, was to have furnished Servia with a large part of her share. This would have compensated her in great measure for having been deprived of her Bosnian hopes. At Austria's instigation, the foolish scheme was devised of creating an independent Albania with a German prince to rule over it.

PROVOKING THE LAST BALKAN WAR

The bitterness of the Servians knew no bounds. Both Servia and Greece demanded of Bulgaria that, in view of changed circumstances, she should give them portions of what had been originally assigned to her. Bulgaria stood on technical rights, and found herself at war with her recent allies, greatly to her loss and disadvantage. This second little war of last year, in which the small Powers, amply entitled to the world's sympathy, were pitted harmfully against each other, was due to Austria's policy, which to many of us seems malign and wrong, while to the most charitable mind it must seem at least to have been mistaken and unwise. Although Servia almost doubled her area by gains to the southward, she remained a landlocked country, with Bosnia, Montenegro, and Albania stretching between her and the Adriatic Sea.

In June came a crisis in the situation between Austria and Servia. The world realized that great events were likely to follow the assassination in Bosnia, on June 28, 1914, of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand, heir to the imperial throne of Austria-Hungary, who had gradually become actual joint ruler with the aged Emperor Franz Joseph (who was nearly eighty-four years old at the time of the death of the Archduke).

The Archduke was murdered by a young Servian fanatic. Austria, for reasons of her own, determined to hold the government and people of Servia responsible for the murder, and on July 23 an ultimatum was presented by the Vienna government to the government at Belgrade, with

demand of immediate acceptance. The Servians acceded to most of the Austrian demands, but asked either further discussion or else arbitration on some points that could not be admitted without question. Austria made this Servian answer the pretext for an immediate declaration of war and a move upon Belgrade. There seems to be sufficient reason for stating the belief that Germany had been informed, both in general and in detail, of the Austrian demands, and had approved of them, although fully aware that this must mean a protest from Russia, which, if disregarded, would compel Russia to come to the aid of a small state with which her relations were close, and which she could not permit to be destroyed.

CRIMES AGAINST THE BALKAN CHRISTIANS

Thus it seems reasonable to hold that if there had been a decent respect for the commendable desire of the Christian peoples in European Turkey to throw off the Turkish yoke and become self-governing states, there could have been no cause of the great war in so far as the Servian question precipitated it. If the great powers of Europe had been sincere and unselfish in their attitude toward the Balkan question, during the past two generations, there could have been developed a series of peaceful and progressive countries as harmless and non-military in their instincts as Switzerland, Holland, and Denmark.

And the proper development of Servia, Bulgaria, and Greece would have been in every way advantageous to all the great powers of Europe and detrimental to the welfare of none. Out of this terrible war, therefore, let us earnestly hope there may come an adjustment of the affairs of South-eastern Europe that will be permanent and non-military. The imperial agglomeration of Austria-Hungary seems to serve no good purpose. A rearrangement of provinces and regions, based largely upon race and language, might create in Southeastern Europe almost a dozen small countries of fixed territory, bound together in a league of peace and arbitration and of general friendship, but not forming a military factor for further aggressions.

THE UNHEALED TROUBLE BETWEEN GERMANY AND FRANCE

A wise treatment of the Balkan problem would have averted the war. But it would not have

ended the overweening curse of militarism, nor removed the distrust and fear upon which militarism feeds and which it naturally promotes. The beginning of the end of European militarism should have come about with a good understanding between Germany and France. Such an understanding would have been arrived at many years ago, if Germany had been wise enough to reopen the Alsace-Lorraine question in the spirit of generosity and at the same time of simple common sense. Everybody who is wise has known this; but pride and arrogance too often blind nations, even as they blind individuals, so that they miss the plain path of wisdom and safety. Almost twenty years ago (in the issue for December, 1894), the *Review of Reviews* published a remarkable article entitled: "On the Threshold of Universal Peace — An American Answer to the Question How to Reconcile France and Germany." It discussed this topic of the "lost provinces." The article was printed anonymously, but it may be stated that the author was a native of Germany though a naturalized American citizen.

A peace congress had been held at Antwerp in August, 1894, just twenty years before the beginning of the war. There was much enthusiasm. Germany and Russia had negotiated the very important commercial treaty which after twenty years of growing value to Germany,—the Russians in 1914 refused to extend. At that moment the young German Emperor had shown marked courtesies toward France, and these had met with appreciation. There had just been favorable action by the United States Senate and the British authorities on a treaty of arbitration.

This conference, meeting on the neutral soil of Belgium, was in a hopeful mood, rightly expressed by the mayor of Antwerp, who declared: "Peace is in the hearts of all men in civilized countries." A number of proposals were made at the conference, having to do with reduction of term of military service, limitation of armaments, curtailment of war expenditure, and so on. The writer of the article in question, however, demonstrated brilliantly and convincingly that universal peace could at that time be assured only in one way,—namely, by an offer on the part of the German Emperor to rearrange the boundary line in Alsace-Lorraine in such a manner that the French-speaking communities should be ceded back to France.

He declared, and with good reason, that such a proposal, if properly set before the German people, would have been accepted by them with enthusiasm. The details of the adjustment would naturally have been made by a joint commission. Both sides could have afforded to be wholly generous in such details, because the large point to be gained,—that of permanent good-will between two great nations,—was of incomparable importance, while the mere details of the boundary line were in themselves of little significance.

Assuredly, a settlement of this question would have made it possible and reasonable to dismantle every fortification along the frontier between France and Germany, and to enter upon a permanent arbitration treaty, such as England and the United States were at that time negotiating. At the time of this Antwerp peace conference, Germany had held the conquered strip of territory about twenty-three years. Twenty years more have elapsed since then. If anything, the French sentiment has grown stronger rather than weaker in the French part of Alsace-Lorraine, and the whole French nation has unitedly, and without wavering, clung to the purpose at some time to rectify that frontier.

It is said that Bismarck never desired to annex more than the parts that were German-speaking. But the German generals desired Metz for what they called strategic purposes. Unfortunately, professional soldiers never seem to understand that in the permanent sense friendship is the only strategical system that can be supported. The settlement of this vexed question some years ago would have redounded to the fame, glory, security, and prosperity of modern Germany. It would have made friends of Germany and France, would have promoted all the finer things of industry, commerce, art, science, and culture, and would have made military alliances unnecessary.

France could have disarmed in large measure; and the sentiment of western and middle Europe could have laid down the law to Russia and Austria in regard to the right settlement of the problems of southeastern Europe. It is needless to expatiate at great length upon what might have been. Yet it must be said that there have been many occasions, since the favorable moment of 1894, when Germany might have taken up this question with France in an open-minded way, and so adjusted it as to save the peace of Europe

for generations to come. In neglecting it, Germany has chiefly wronged herself.

WHAT GERMANY HAS HAD TO ENDURE

The cost of maintaining the feud over Alsace-Lorraine has been almost unbearable for both countries. It has been greatly to the credit of Germany that, with all this economic and moral burden of militarism, she has made such notable progress in the arts of peace during the period since the formation of the present empire, after the victory over France. In spite of a large migration of German people to the United States and other countries, the home population has steadily increased, until it is now 65,000,000, whereas it was about 40,000,000 at the time of the Franco-Prussian War. France at that time had about the same population, and it has remained virtually at a standstill. The condition of the plain German people has much improved. They are better educated and have better opportunities to make a living. From having little manufacturing, Germany has developed vast industries, based largely upon superior scientific and technical training. The cities and towns are beautiful and well governed. Through public savings-banks, and careful systems for giving aid to the sick and the poor, and for pensioning the injured and the aged, Germany has led the world in dealing with the problem of caring for all the people in our new industrial age. Science and philosophy, literature and art, have flourished in Germany, even as industry and commerce have made giant strides. All honor to German brains and effort.

It is possible, however to draw a clear distinction between imperial and military Germany, on the one hand, and the Germany of science and industry on the other. America has much in common with the great German nation, but has little in common with the military caste and the imperial attitude. The German peasant is doubtless in many ways improved by the training of his compulsory two years of service (beginning at the age of twenty). But he goes back to spend his life as a peaceable citizen and worker, though he remains for years afterward a member of the reserves.

THE MILITARY CASTE

It is not this universal training to defend the country that creates German militarism. It is the enormous body of officers, with whom the

army is a life profession, and whose ideals and attitude toward the nation are not those that are in keeping with the intelligent aims of human society in the twentieth century. These officers constitute a military caste that is associated with the surviving institutions of autocracy and feudalism that have come down from bygone centuries. The profession of a trained soldier is not dishonorable; and if men are to be led there must be those prepared to command. But it is a calamity when civil society is so overridden by the insolence of a military guild as that of Germany has been for a long time past. If Germany and France could have settled their differences, and become firm friends, both countries could have proceeded rapidly to throw off the incubus of this offensive and evil militarism.

DID GERMANY INTEND THIS WAR?

It may be a long time before we shall know, as a matter of historical certainty, whether or not Germany brought on the war at this time with definite purpose and intention. We once supposed that Louis Napoleon, rather than Bismarck, brought on the war of 1870. It seems incredible that the German Emperor and those in his councils had deliberately sought war rather than peace. But the minds of men often become obsessed through the constant dwelling upon a subject of fear or dread, with the element of suspense involved.

The strain between Germany and Russia had been growing greater for a good while. The German authorities had felt that a war with Russia was inevitable at some time. The assassination of a great Teutonic monarch (for the Austrian Archduke was virtually a sharer of the throne) seemed to create an occasion that gave Germany the opportunity to fight, without having herself directly precipitated the conflict. Austria's attack upon Serbia was sure to involve Russia. Germany was bound by her alliance to come to Austria's aid. This, the Germans thought, would of necessity bring Italy into the combat as the third member of the Triple Alliance. For Germany seemed to suppose that the world would regard her action as defensive, in view of Russia's alleged movements of aggression.

ITALY'S UNFORESEEN HALT

Italy, however, refused to take this view, and declined to aid Austria in an aggressive Balkan

campaign, regarding herself as justified in remaining neutral under the terms of the alliance. The truth, of course, is that Italy had never been very happy in this association, and had gone into it through a supposed necessity that, if it ever really existed has now for some time been outlived. Italy, as a purely Mediterranean power, has no sympathy with Austria's ambition, and has every need of being on good terms with England and France, which are the great naval powers of the Mediterranean, and which could readily destroy Italy in the maritime sense. Thus Germany miscalculated as respects Italian coöperation.

It is well known that Germany made overtures to England, and did not suppose that the British Government would be drawn into the conflict. But for a number of years the interests of Great Britain and France have been harmonious, and the good understanding had developed into something like a limited alliance. England might, indeed, have kept out of the war on certain conditions. One of these conditions was the promise not to attack the coasts of France that lie near England. Germany was prepared to respect this demand. Without consulting England, however, Germany proceeded with a plan to invade France by way of Belgium. As long ago as 1831 the status of Belgium was fixed in an international conference which resulted in the guaranteeing of that country's independence and neutrality.

Germany's violation of Belgium's position was not only wicked and ruthless, but it was an act of blind folly. The German Government seems to have supposed that a Liberal government in England, with the Ulster question on its hands, could not be provoked to join in a European war. But there are qualities in British character with which it is dangerous to trifle. Under the lead of the Premier, Mr. Asquith, and the Foreign Secretary, Sir Edward Grey, England notified Germany that she must cease to violate Belgian neutrality. Germany would not yield, and England declared war.

BELGIUM'S POSITION AND RIGHTS

Germany had nothing to gain by choosing the Belgian route that could have compensated her for the attack of the great British navy upon her maritime resources. Nor was there anything in the German excuse that France would have marched across Belgium if Germany had ab-

stained. The wickedness of Germany's action lay in the fact that her movement into Belgium, even if acquiesced in by the Belgian Government, would have necessitated a corresponding movement from the French side, thus making Belgium the theatre of war between two great powers.

Nor was Germany well advised in supposing the Belgians could not or would not resist. The heroic resistance of the Belgians, even though unequal and only temporarily successful, added one more to the list of Germany's enemies and gained time for the allies. Germany's plan had been to move very swiftly and strike at Paris before Russia's slow-moving forces could be brought into action on Germany's eastern frontier.

AMERICA AND THE GERMANS

The Franco-Prussian War occurred only five years after the colossal struggle between our American sections had come to an end. Within a few years preceding our war we had received an enormous influx of new population from Germany. Many of these immigrants had received military training before they came. Immigration at that time did not enter the South, and these newcomers were all in the North, St. Louis being the farthest point southward to which they had gone in considerable numbers. Many Germans entered the United States armies and fought valiantly. The head of the French Government in that period was the Emperor Louis Napoleon, who was not well disposed toward the United States, who had been ready to join other powers in thwarting us, and whose conduct in Mexico was regarded as adverse to our interests.

When, therefore, the war came on between France and Prussia, opinion upon the whole regarded Napoleon as the aggressor, and sympathized with the Germans. Our Government was correct in its neutrality, but popular sympathy was unmistakable in its trend. We have since that time received many more people from Germany. Our total population at the time of the Franco-Prussian War was less than 40,000,000. It is now 100,000,000. Considerably more than a third of our population is made up of people themselves born in Europe or of European-born parentage. And fully twenty-five per cent. of all these people are of German origin. Next come the Irish, who are only about half as many as the Germans. We are using the classification of the

United States census, which goes back no farther than the parents in its reckoning of foreign stocks and elements.

These people from Germany are now our American fellow-citizens. Hundreds of thousands of them, if not millions, have friends or relatives in the old country directly affected by the present terrible war. They are loyal to the United States, but their feelings are deeply affected. Very many of them believe that the German Emperor and those in authority have made a great mistake.

It is not for us Americans to argue with any of our fellow-citizens of foreign origin whose sentiments are profoundly agitated. On the other hand, it is incumbent upon them, as adopted American citizens, to put restraint upon their words and acts, and to respect American neutrality. Germany is so great and noble a country that its future eminence in the civilized world is assured in any case.

AMERICAN DOCTRINES NOT OUTWORN

It is time, however, for all Americans to have a new baptism of faith in the old American creed of liberty and popular self-government. Until recently it was not the fashion in this country to approve of the institutions of royalty or of privileged aristocracy. But along with the growth of great fortunes in America there has been evolved a kind of snobbery that has sadly infected some American men and a great number of American women. There has been a shameless and disgraceful readiness to transfer American women plus money to the support of titles and hereditary privilege in Europe. The greatest and best things of England, France, Germany, Austria, and Italy have been won in spite of the heavy handicap of aristocracy and privilege in association with the military caste. The evils of aristocratic systems must not be ignored merely because many individual members of the aristocracy are virtuous, cultured, and worthy members of society. Even the German Emperor, despite his medieval fanaticism and assertion of divine authority, is a most interesting and attractive figure in his great versatility; and he stands out unquestionably, in American opinion, as the most popular of all hereditary rulers. But the systems that he represents do not make for the welfare of modern peoples, nor for their security and peace.

WESTERN LIBERALISM

The French are safer as a republic than they were as an empire, and they would be still safer if neighboring peoples were also self-governing. If there are "two Germanys," there are also two Englands, and the struggle between them has been almost continuous for many centuries. It had begun long before Cromwell's time, and it has had intense manifestations in our own day. The fight that has taken away from the House of Lords a great part of its power has been a chapter in this long conflict. The attempt to make taxation just, as against the landed proprietors, is another chapter. The Irish struggle for Home Rule grew fundamentally out of the evils of landlordism and aristocracy, and the recent defiance of Ulster, however locally sincere, found its real strength in the age-long war of the British classes against the masses.

The liberalizing of British institutions has, however, gone very far; and the people have ample leverage to carry it farther if they so ordain. Germany's lack of political equality and freedom has not much interfered with social progress and efficiency in many directions; but the time has come for political freedom in Germany, and this war will advance that great cause. There are indications, also, that out of the necessities of the situation there may come about in Russia a series of reforms which the whole civilized world would rejoice to see. Out of one period of struggle came the emancipation of the Russian serfs. Out of another came the Duma and the beginning of parliamentary government. Now has come the announcement that Russia means to give Poland a large measure of freedom, and this must be followed by the restoration to Finland of the liberties recently crushed out. It is hoped also that there will follow a complete reform, on Russia's part, in the treatment of her great body of Jewish people; and beyond that there must be a new kind of freedom of speech, of the press, of assembly, of coming and going, of domicile, and of personality.

The Government and the people of the United States desire to maintain cordial and good relations with all the countries unfortunately involved in the great war. President Wilson's statements and proclamations have been admirable in spirit and in phrase. Our Government was prompt in offering its services in the cause of mediation and

peace. Our diplomatic service has been extended in the capitals of belligerents to the guardianship of the interests of nations whose own representatives have been obliged to withdraw. Americans visit Europe in such vast numbers every year that it is not strange that the sudden outbreak of almost universal war should have caused much embarrassment and some hardship. In view of the magnitude of the crisis, these American tourists have fared well at the hands of all governments and peoples.

WILL THE WAR BE LONG OR SHORT

It is probably true that the German leaders expected to find American sympathy definitely on their side. But America wishes peace and harmony, and most Americans believe that the checkmating of Germany would be the quickest and most efficacious way to bring about a lasting peace. Americans feel that England's maintenance of Belgian neutrality was necessary and right. Small powers and homogeneous race elements must be strengthened. German diplomacy seems to have been greatly at fault, while that of England seems to have been more just and praiseworthy. Everyone is asking whether the war will be short or long. It is to be devoutly hoped that it will be brief; but it has borne little likeness to an old-fashioned war of concentrated pitched battles, and its duration might be long.

The superiority on the sea of England and the allies will at once have paralyzed German commerce. Germany's colonial empire will be at the mercy of her enemies. Belgium's resistance has shown how even a small power can fight on the defensive. It would seem hardly possible now for the armies of one great European power easily to reach the capital of another. The more quickly mediation and an armistice can be brought into effect, the better it will be for the peoples of all countries and for the cause of future peace. The Franco-Prussian War lasted about six months. The Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05 continued for about sixteen months. But nothing like the present struggle has ever occurred, and predictions are useless.

JAPAN'S AGGRESSIVE STEPS

Japan's ultimatum to Germany would have seemed to make for a shortening of the war, through a multiplication of the obstacles that

might lead the Germans to seek an armistice and a settlement before their resources were too much exhausted in a contest with the odds greatly against them. Germany seems to have relied on superior preparation, the rapid prostration of France, the slow movement of Russia, the full assistance of Italy, the neutrality of England, a holiday victory of Austria over the little Servian nation, strong American sympathy, and the total unwillingness of Japan to be lined up on the same side with Russia. But it seems that Japan had not only her treaty with England, but had also entered into a more extensive agreement with France and a more definite understanding with Russia than was commonly supposed.

Furthermore, Germany's occupation of the Chinese port of Kiao-Chau and a portion of the province of Shantung, opposite Port Arthur, had always been offensive to Japan. Germany had engineered the combination of powers which ordered Japan out of Port Arthur after her victory over the Chinese in 1895 (ten years before her war with Russia). Subsequently, on the pretext of compensation for the murder of two missionaries, Germany had compelled China to give her Kiao-Chau on a long lease.

On August 16, Japan issued an ultimatum, demanding withdrawal from Kiao-Chau and giving a week for reply. Japan was admittedly acting after full consultation with the British Government. She had assured the American Government that her plans and intentions were in no way detrimental to the interests of the United States. Japan declared the purpose of seeing that Kiao-Chau was eventually returned to China.

AMERICAN INTERESTS IN THE PACIFIC

The authorities at Washington were reticent, but showed no displeasure. One Congressman flared up about Japan, on the floor of the House but he was sidetracked; and nobody else made public criticism. The diplomatic arrangement by which the United States divided up the Samoan group in the Pacific with Germany, if not particularly brilliant, has at least worked peaceably for a good many years. If Germany is not to remain in the Pacific, her Samoan interests ought to be ceded to the United States.

But Japan gave definite assurances that she would not go farther than to expel Germany from the mainland of China and to protect her own

trade and commerce from attack by German cruisers. Since Germany has practically no naval strength in the Pacific, while Japan, England, and Russia have together a vast naval power, it was at once evident that Germany could not hold Kiauchau. A question, however, arose as to China's action, for it seemed likely enough that if the German lease were to be terminated, China would resume possession and not accept the programme of Japan. Some newspaper writers have expressed fear lest the United States should become involved in difficulties in the Far East because of its sovereignty over the Philippines. Although we are in control of those islands, we are giving them self-government quite as rapidly as it is possible for them to exercise it.

When the time comes for intelligent and responsible action on their part, the Philippines will be free to become an independent republic; and every wise man knows that such a position could never have been attained by them without our tutelage and assistance. If anybody supposes that the people of the United States would involve themselves in a great war for the sake of keeping the American flag flying in the Philippine Islands, they are not good judges of sentiment.

The people of this country have moral courage enough not to resort to war when such action would be of no service either to themselves or to the world. Japan has no intention whatever of interfering with our useful exercise of responsibility for the order and progress of the Philippines. We need not be embroiled in war, and we must pursue courses that will not only insure our own immunity but will also help to deliver the world from the hideous obsession of militarism.

As for Japanese action and policy, let us hope that there will be wisdom and moderation. If, as the Japanese and others believe, Germany was prone to grasp advantages ruthlessly wherever she could get them in the development of her ambitious projects of empire, it would be most unfortunate if Japan should fall into the same error and give the world the impression of an undue readiness to seize what can be had in a time of some other power's misfortune.

CANADA'S POSITION

The sympathy and loyalty of the great self-governing British dominions are completely with the mother country. The Canadian Parliament

assembled on August 18, and the Prime Minister, Mr. Borden, was eloquently seconded by the opposition leader, Sir Wilfrid Laurier, in the entire programme of support. Canada not only had money to offer and ships for transport, but prepared to send about 20,000 soldiers. There are questions touching Canada's participation in European wars that bear profoundly upon the policy of the United States. It would not accord with American views to have the theatre of war shifted to this continent, or to have Canada's security in any way molested. But at the present moment these are academic rather than practical questions, because the sea power of the British Empire, together with that of her allies, renders it wholly improbable that Germany could attack either of Canada's ocean seaboard.

We have cause to rejoice that there are no fortifications along the thousands of miles of frontier between the United States and Canada. Nor does European war render us less thankful for the hundred years of peace that have followed the signing of the Treaty of Ghent in 1814. An admirable and timely pamphlet by Dr. Charles H. Levermore tells the story of "The Anglo-American Agreement of 1817 for Disarmament on the Great Lakes." The pamphlet is issued by the World Peace Foundation, of Boston, and it brings the subject up to date. We have happily avoided a war with Mexico, and have no fortifications along our southern boundary line.

CAN WE GAIN BY EUROPE'S CALAMITY?

While nothing has been said in the United States that would indicate a desire to obtain any territorial or "imperial" advantages for this country, very much has been said about the opportunity to gain economic prosperity. Broadly speaking, other people's impoverishment cannot contribute to our wealth. Prosperity can be diffused, while, on the other hand, great disaster and loss cannot be localized. The paralysis of industry and commerce in Europe will cause much poverty and suffering in the United States. Neither American capital nor American labor will be benefited by the annihilation of European capital and the diversion of labor to the destructive business of war.

We will have to bear it as well as we can, praying that the war may be short and less devastating than has seemed probable. The newspaper talk

about the opportunity of wealth through the creation of a vast American merchant marine has been palpably erroneous. American capital has been occupied in enterprises more profitable than the carrying of ocean freight. If, in order to get our surplus commodities to Europe, and to bring back things needful, such as coffee, hides, sugar, and so on, from South America and elsewhere, we are obliged to take our capital out of other enterprises and put it into ocean freighting, it will mean actual loss rather than gain, because we cannot afford to do that business as cheaply as Europe has been doing it for us.

AS TO OUR MERCHANT MARINE

The temporary paralysis of ocean trade, due to a state of war between England and Germany, is very embarrassing, and necessitates emergency action of some kind. That Congress should revise our navigation laws, and make it easier for American-owned ships to fly the American flag, was obviously necessary. It was in mitigation of disaster, rather than in seizure of opportunity. Secretary Lane was justified in calling attention to certain mineral resources, particularly potashes and phosphates needed for fertilizers, that might be opened up through action of Congress, in view of the cutting off of foreign supplies. In incidental and special ways, America may develop new sources of prosperity; and she may in many ways be able to help Europe tide over the period of financial and business trouble. But we must prepare soberly for our own less heavy burden of loss, rather than indulge in hopes of gain that are not only fallacious but also unbecoming. We can even operate government ships but only to meet emergencies.

CONGRESS BECOMES RECONCILED

Trouble, after all, is a relative thing; and the law-makers at Washington were not so disturbed as they had been over the prospect of little or no recess. Comparing their own favorable situation at Washington with the stress and anxiety to which governments and parliaments were subjected in every European capital, they became patriotic, grateful, and amenable. Partisanship ceased to be obtrusive, and there was intelligent and prompt coöperation. Changes in the Aldrich-Vreeland law were made which gave the Secretary of the Treasury authority to support the banks to an almost unlimited extent, after the European crisis and panic at the end of July. Measures were taken by virtue of which the United States was ready to meet any possible emergency in the financial world. Congress also acted in a statesmanlike spirit with respect to the relief of American foreign trade.

Despite the discomforts of a Washington summer, there was no adjournment because of the danger of unforeseen contingencies.

PRESIDENT WILSON IN CRITICAL TIMES

President Wilson's unflinching devotion to public duty, and his wise attitude in the midst of strange and perilous times, did not fail to win admiration and respect. Upon August 6 a great personal bereavement befell him in the death of Mrs. Wilson. The President was sustained in his affliction by the compelling force of his public duties at a moment of unprecedented seriousness in the history of modern nations. Like most of his predecessors, Mr. Wilson has not failed to rise high when great emergencies have afforded a test of character, wisdom, and moral power.

BACKGROUNDS AND MAINSPRINGS OF THE STRUGGLE

BY LOUIS E. VAN NORMAN

FOR the causes of the titanic struggle moving Europe, it is necessary to go back a little into history.

Europe's political development, during the past four or five centuries, has been largely conditioned by what international law writers term the "continental conception." The Holy Roman Empire, with its claim for the dominance of the Emperor and the subordination of the other states, was followed by the independent sovereignty doctrine. This maintained that every nation was not only free and sovereign, but that it was equal to every other nation in the councils of the continent. This conception was succeeded, in the middle of the past century, by the idea of the "concert of Europe." It came to be believed that an agreement of the Great Powers,— which, since 1870, have been Great Britain, France, Russia, Germany, Austria, and Italy,— should determine the policies of the continent and keep the peace. Every dispute between nations, little or big, was considered as a continental matter by this "concert," or general council, which unitedly imposed its will.

THE BALANCE OF POWER DOCTRINE

At the same time there was growing up the condition and doctrine known as the "balance of power." After the Congress of Vienna in 1815, which liquidated the Napoleonic conquests and settled the large lines of the map of Europe for more than half a century, the European nations assumed the point of view that any acquisition of power, territory, or population by any one of them entitled all the others to compensation, so that the relative strength and importance might not be disturbed. Hence we find, after every important war since Napoleon's time, the practise of the European "concert" to take part in the settlement of the terms of peace and so adjust the gains of the victor and the losses of the vanquished that the much-discussed "bal-

ance" might not be upset. Any threatened disturbance of this balance has always had in it the seeds of a general conflict.

The balance-of-power fetish has been one of the four great moving causes of the present war. The other three may be briefly set forth as militarism, with its attendant jealousy and the obstacles it presents to many needed social and economic reforms; the age-long world rivalry between Teuton and Slav; and the struggle of Europe's swarming industrial and commercial nations for the markets of Asia.

The preponderance acquired by Prussia through her victory over France in 1870-71 and its increase by the alliance of the German Empire with Austria and Italy has resulted in those European alliances which have made the alignment in the present conflict.

HOW THE ALLIANCES CAME TO BE

Bismarck's fear of France and his hatred of the Napoleonic tradition as exemplified in Louis Napoleon was the underlying cause. In order to maintain a strong front against the Republic, he brought about the Dual Alliance between Germany and Austria in 1879. This agreement, which was not known to the world until nine years later, marks the beginning of the division of Europe into two hostile camps. In 1882 the Iron Chancellor was able to convince the Italians that they should cast in their lot with the powers of the centre of the continent, and the Triple Alliance, or *Dreibund*, was born. In pursuance of his ideal of a friendless France, Bismarck, before approaching Italy, had attempted, unsuccessfully, to get Russian adhesion to a *Dreikaiserbund* (League of the Three Emperors). England could not be tempted by either side.

In 1890 Bismarck fell from power, and France came to an understanding with Russia. The next year the Treaty of Alliance was signed, which, however, was not made public until 1894.

For a decade the Dual Alliance of France and Russia faced the Triple Alliance of Germany, Austria, and Italy, with the odds in favor of the Dreibund.

During the first years of the twentieth century, however, there came about a shifting of the balance. Italy, estranged from France over the occupation of Tunis in 1881, and because of a vexatious tariff war, became reconciled to her Latin sister in 1901. In May, 1903, King Edward VII paid his memorable visit to Paris. Thanks to the diplomatic exchanges begun by this monarch, Britain and France, in April, 1904, signed an omnibus treaty settling all their differences in Africa. Shortly afterward a secret understanding was arrived at between the two countries which, despite official denials, is now understood to have provided for British aid to France in case of an attack by Germany. This was the famous *Entente Cordiale*, or Cordial Understanding. In 1907 Great Britain and Russia, long at odds over their respective spheres of influence in Persia and other parts of the Near East, made up their differences in a treaty.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE TRIPLE ENTENTE

Meanwhile, the French had begun their pacific penetration of Morocco, and the German Kaiser had made his spectacular visit to Tangier (1905) and demanded that Germany's rights in North Africa be safeguarded. The Moroccan question was supposed to have been settled by the famous conference of Algeciras (1906). This conference, which brought out the support of England to France, proved that the *Entente Cordiale*, which had grown out of the treaty of 1904, approximated the strength of an alliance. When, as has already been said, Russia and England agreed over their Near Eastern interests, the Dual Alliance had expanded into the Triple Entente.

Startling events soon drew the world's attention to eastern Europe. The Turkish revolution, in 1908, found echoes in several of the provinces formerly under Ottoman suzerainty. In February, 1908, Europe was startled by the news that Bulgaria had thrown off the over-lordship of Turkey, and that Austria-Hungary had formally annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina. These provinces had been given to her "for military occupation and administration" by the Congress of

Berlin, which followed the Turco-Russian war of 1877. All Europe was expecting a continental war. The tension was ended in March, 1909, however, by a peremptory intimation from the German Kaiser to the Russian Czar that if his support of Servia's protest against Austria's absorption of the Bosniaks should lead to war with the Dual Monarchy, Germany would "appear in shining armor at the side of her ally."

Russia never forgot this check. The two Balkan wars which amazed and frightened the continent in 1912 and 1913 were regarded by Austria and Germany as having been instigated by Russia in revenge. The Czar, however, has apparently seen these in the light of additional Slavonic checks by the Teuton. Meanwhile, Germany again challenged France in Morocco by her dramatic stroke at Agadir (1911). Britain supported France vigorously, and it was seen that the Triple Entente had solidified into what was virtually an alliance.

THE POLITICAL CHESS BOARD OF EUROPE

The continent is now divided into four groups of nations: (1) The close alliance of the middle European powers, — Germany, Austria, and Italy, — into the Triple Alliance, or Dreibund; (2) the Triple Entente, or understanding approaching an alliance, between Great Britain, France, and Russia (France and Russia being formally allied); (3) the small group of buffer nations whose neutrality and integrity have been recognized or guaranteed, — Denmark, Holland, Belgium, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, fronting on France, Belgium, and Germany, whose neutrality was guaranteed in 1867, and Switzerland; (4) the other countries, more or less isolated, some of them, however, having regional problems of their own. These include the Balkan nations, — Bulgaria, Servia, Montenegro, Greece, Turkey, and Roumania, — formerly a sort of Balkan extension of the Triple Alliance, but within the past year drawn within the orbit of Russia; the Scandinavian nations, — Norway, Sweden and Denmark (the latter, although neutral, still involved in the general fate of Scandinavia), — and the Iberian nations, Spain and Portugal. Any increase of the power of any one of these groups would alone have been sufficient to bring about a European war. This alignment constituted the balance of power.

SOME OF THE PROBLEMS OF THE DREIBUND

Each of the two great alliances now locked in the giant struggle for mastery presents some coherence and consistency and yet a good deal of diversity and internal antagonism. The two bureaucratic, highly centralized, powerful military nations of the centre of the continent, Germany and Austria, are dominated by German-speaking

tria has the problem of Slavs on the south as well as to the east and within her own borders.

Meanwhile a suspicious, unfriendly Italian neighbor and assumed ally, hungering to reclaim *Italia Irredenta*, begrudges her an outlet on the Adriatic. The Austro-Italian question arises from the fact that Austria still possesses the only lands on the European continent inhabited by Italian-speaking people not under the



THE EUROPEAN ALLIANCES AND GROUPS AT THE BEGINNING OF THE WAR

men. Their interests are largely similar. Even the problems of each arise chiefly out of the fact that their governments are more dynastic than national. The Hohenzollerns and Hapsburgs are faced by racial questions of a similar nature, although Austria has them more intensely and to a greater degree than Germany. Both find the Slav within their borders and on their boundaries their chief enemy. Germany has, in addition, British commercial and naval rivalry to the north and French desire for revenge on the west. Aus-

Italian flag. All ancient Italy, from the Alps to the end of the toe of the boot, has been brought under one sceptre, except south Tyrol, Trieste, and the rest of that shore line of the northern Adriatic which Italians call *Italia Irredenta* — Italy unredeemed. To the loss of Corsica to France and Malta to Great Britain the Italian seems reconciled. The government at Rome, however, and the Italian people cannot forget that Austria holds all of continental Italy which is not subject to King Victor Emmanuel, and,

moreover, that she has kept up a constant and vexatious campaign of Austrianization against those portions of Venetia and Lombardy which the Italians regard as their own.

While Germany's and Austria's problems are acute largely within their own borders (Germany's colonies have never been regarded as profitable), Italy's concern for her international position has been intensified by the acquisition of Tripoli. Italians have been very thoughtfully weighing the advantages accruing to them from their alliance with Germany and Austria, such as military assistance, financial promotion, etc., against their traditional friendship with England, their historic love for France, and the ease with which British and French battleships, if unfriendly, might cut off Tripoli and close in the peninsula upon the political, economic, and social revolution which King Victor Emmanuel is reported to have recently said is likely to make Italy the next republic. All of which goes toward explaining why Italy tries her best to remain neutral.

DIVERGENCE IN THE ENTENTE

There is more diversity than agreement in the Triple Entente. Hostility to the Dreibund and fear of its tremendous military power have been the main actuating motives. Government, institutions, and traditions tend to unite the central European powers. But it is exactly government, institutions, and tradition that put the members of the Triple Entente as far apart as the poles. Constitutional, republican England (a monarchy only in name), with her widely extended empire and her unmilitary people, is practically allied to republican, highly centralized France, which has not yet lost her memory of the great Napoleon. France also has a colonial empire, and a navy which is claimed to be second only to that of England. Britain befriends France both because she sympathizes with western liberalism and because she has long feared and suspected the German. Moreover, the German has been crowding her in the race for the world's trade and has built a powerful navy to protect what German merchants have won. It is the German contention that one of the chief causes of the war is jealousy of the commercial success which the subjects of the Kaiser have achieved.

This friendship with the republic across the

channel and a desire to protect her Asiatic dependencies bring Britain into a strange semi-partnership with the autocratic Russian Empire, with which she has naturally nothing in common, with which she is at enmity along many frontiers of the world, and with which she will inevitably have to dispute the prizes of the war, should the Triple Entente be victorious. But France wants back Alsace-Lorraine from Germany, and French bankers hold almost all the huge Russian national debt. To protect her investments in Russia, and to consummate her revenge on Germany for the humiliation of 1870, France cannot break with the Muscovite. Britain needs France for her own protection against Germany. A Germany triumphant over France would mean a Germany within striking distance of English shores. France needs Britain for her national safety. Therefore, French and Russian armies have menaced the German frontiers, and British warships have for years been awaiting the orders, "Find and sink the Germans."

FORCES AND STAYING POWERS OF EACH CAMP

In staying qualities the two great groups, if each maintains its strength undiminished, are about equal. The Dreibund commands better equipped, better trained and more easily handled armies. On the water, however, the Entente has a great advantage. Naval experts are wont to measure sea strength by tonnage, number of guns, and weight of projectiles. Measured by this test, the central European powers are only half as powerful as the combination against them. The figures given for the Entente are, in round numbers, tonnage, 2,000,000; guns, 800; projectile weight, 550,000; those for the Dreibund are: tonnage, 600,000; guns, 280; projectile weight, 200,000. The countries of the Triple Alliance are more compact and will find it easier to supply and move their fighting forces. Both Germany and Austria, however, depend very largely for food supplies upon importation. The government at Berlin announced at the beginning of the war that it could hold out, with blockaded ports, for a year. The bulk of the land fighting forces of the Entente,—the Russians,—are less highly trained and less efficient than the Germans. Britain, moreover, it is said, cannot live more than two months on the food she has within her borders at any one time. On the other hand, France pro-

duces surplus food-stuffs, chiefly wheat, and Russia is a limitless granary. England maintains her mighty fleet to keep her doors open for food. If her ships should destroy the German navy and blockade German ports, the Kaiser's armies may be expected to take their attention from France and devote all their energies to seizing the grain lands of Russia.

THE BLIGHT OF MILITARISM

The blight of militarism has been on Europe since the Franco-Prussian war. More than 16,000,000 trained soldiers in the first lines and in the reserves have wasted the substance of the continent and lowered its productive capacity. The Triple Alliance in times of peace has a million and a half men under arms. In times of war this may be quickly increased to 8,000,000. For purposes of calculation in the present war, Italy is uncertain. Her quarter million soldiers in peace and 1,500,000 in war will not probably be placed with the Dreibund, which can, however, muster for war six million without her. On a peace footing, the *Entente* counts 2,000,000 men; in war it can muster upwards of 10,000,000. The very presence of these armies in times of peace is an incitement to war. Officers look forward to a conflict as their chance of advancement, and the peoples are accustomed to the sight of the paraphernalia of battle. Besides the economic burden of supporting them, these armaments have bred jealousy and have fostered a spirit of caste and autocracy that has kept the peoples of the continent from many of the economic, social, and political reforms of which they are in sore need.

In every one of the six major powers, revolution of varying degrees of seriousness was the seeming alternative to war. In the aggressive powers, those that took the initiative,—Austria, Russia, and Germany,—military oligarchies have for years been facing a social-democratic revolution. Russia is still struggling out of Asiatic barbarism. Germany, with all her civilization, remains a feudalistic autocracy, with a "debating society" for a parliament. Austria is a polyglot bureaucracy, which has held together mainly by desire for protection against Russia and personal loyalty to the Hapsburg family. In none of the three are franchise rights fully recognized. In all of them industry is taxed to the breaking point. Britain, France, and Italy also have their ques-

tions of land, and labor, and Britain has Ireland. Through all of them the "disintegrating ferment" of Socialism is preparing for the fall of monarchy and special privilege. It was inevitable that militarism should force a general war or fall of its own weight. Moreover, militarism has expected this war for twenty years. During the past decade this expectation has been so widespread that one of the aims of taxation in Germany and Austria has been that of providing funds for the contest.

THE STRUGGLE OF TEUTON AGAINST SLAV

Pan-Germanism has baited Pan-Slavism, and Pan-Slavism has challenged Pan-Germanism for half a century. Pan-Germanism, represented by Germany, is a well-defined movement which seeks the common welfare of the Germanic peoples of Europe and the advance of Teutonic culture. Pan-Slavism, championed by Russia, is less clearly formulated, but it, for its part, seeks a union of all Slavonic folk for common welfare. These two aims are irreconcilable and the two propaganda have become the incitement to war. There are in Europe approximately 80,000,000 German-speaking people, of whom 68,000,000 are in the German Empire, and the other 12,000,000 in Austria and Hungary. But there are 140,000,000 Slavs on European soil,—in Russia, Bulgaria, Servia, Montenegro, and in the Polish provinces of Austria and Germany, in Bohemia and the other Slavonic parts of the Dual Monarchy. Russia has always regarded herself as the protectress of the Slav peoples and any attempt to bring Slavs under Teutonic domination is looked upon as a direct challenge to her. From Lapland to the Black Sea the contact between these two virile races, the Teuton and the Slav, is always seething, and there has seemed to be no solution but an appeal to the sword. This bitterness has been intensified by the unnatural political geography which the Berlin Congress,—maker of nations on the map,—forced on Europe. The right of almost every small nation to rule itself has been ignored.

A FIGHT FOR THE MARKETS OF THE EAST

In the last analysis, Europe's fight is a fight for markets. The German Kaiser has been called the best living drummer for German goods. The Teuton's "Drang nach Osten" has been responsible for most of the Kaiser's *weltpolitik*. In the

Near East are the grain fields of Mesopotamia, where the race began, and in the Far East are the vast markets of India and China. The great financial interests of Europe, the powerful bankers and the immense industrial establishments, have been seeking the commercial conquest of Asia for a quarter of a century. This has been behind the Eastern question, with the elimination of the Turk as a factor. Whatever great power possesses Constantinople attains enormous advantages for the domination of Asia and holds the highways of trade to the Near and Middle East. Britain controls the Suez Canal. But German capital has built railroads through Asia Minor. Russia, by patient intrigue, has welded the little Balkan States until a Slavonic wedge from the Black Sea to the Adriatic now bars the German's way to the Orient. Berlin and Vienna have replied by keeping the Balkans at war, by establishing the "open sore" of Albania, and preventing the Serbs, whether Servian or Montenegrin, from being Russia's advance guard on the Adriatic. German finance must have more lands and people to exploit. England threatens the Kaiser's expansion on the sea, while Russia, the largest military empire of Europe, and France, her strongest military republic, close the Germans in on both land sides. Therefore, at any cost must the power of the Balkan league be broken. Therefore, the little Sanjak of Novibazar between Serbia and Montenegro (given to the latter at the end of the Balkan wars) is frantically clung to by the Austrians as the gateway to Salonica and Asia.

HOW THE CRISIS CAME ON

The assassination of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand and his wife, in the last days of June, was the first link in the chain of events which have brought on the great war play for which

Europe has been preparing fearfully for a generation.

Swiftly sketched, the drama moved this way. Austria claimed that Servia, as a nation, was responsible for the assassination. She sent an ultimatum to Belgrade, making demands that the Servians, as a people, determined to maintain their independence, could not admit. She declared war on Servia and moved an army across the Danube. Austria's attack on Servia, in the first place disturbed the delicate balance of power. secondly, it meant the drawing of another people from the Slavonic into the Teutonic system; third, it let loose the flood of militarism which the dikes of reason and civilization had found it so difficult to restrain; fourth, it showed the continent that Germany and Austria still meant to keep open the way to the East, and that German and Austrian goods and German and Austrian capital were henceforth to dominate in the Near East rather than that of Britain, France, and Russia.

Austria felt she must chastise the Serbs for assassinating the heir apparent to her throne; Russia could not see one of her Slavonic wards crushed; France, which holds the Russian national debt and regards the Moscovite as her only hope of recovering Alsace-Lorraine, prepared to support Russia. Germany, threatened on both sides, felt she must strike quickly. In so doing, the Kaiser's strategy ignored the rights of small neutral states, and, invading Belgium, brought his armies within menacing distance of England. And so we have the British fleet and the British troops as the last great factor in the tremendous conflict. Whatever happens,— whichever side or nations be victorious,— it seems inevitable that, as a result, there will be a radical change in the whole social and economic, as well as political and geographical structure of Europe.

WHY THE NATIONS FIGHT

BY ALBERT BUSHNELL HART

(PROFESSOR OF HISTORY, HARVARD UNIVERSITY)

FOR the wreck of this conflict which will increase from day to day, is there any good, clear, inevitable reason? No Napoleon has forced his neighbors to war. No Bismarck has racked Prussia in order to make Germany. No Agadir incident has set off the match. No invincible horde is advancing out

of Asia. Europe got through two Balkan conflicts without general war.

It is no explanation to say that this king or that emperor wants war. No monarch nowadays can go against the spirit of his people. Every country included is united in what is considered a natural war. It is not a war of

dynasties or statesmen. It is not a war of revenge for Archduke Franz Ferdinand.

Questions of trade and markets play a large part in the drama—but it is not the love of money which leads great navies to spend 5,000 million dollars, in order to secure a trade in which the profit cannot be more than 200 millions a year. This is a war of peoples and not of interests.

The military spirit, commercial expansion, desire for territory, and the self assertion of great

the race elements have amalgamated or have ceased to conflict with each other. In this crisis, the Irish in Great Britain and the Walloons in Belgium have sunk their consciousness of race in their consciousness of nationality. Eastern Europe still bears the marks of the successive waves of barbarian invasion out of the heart of Asia. The Hungarians and the Bulgarians are both races that forced their way into Europe where they found the Slavs, the Germans, and the Latins. Then the Slavs received the fearful weight of the Turkish invasion and for centuries lost independence and vitality.

Yet till recently there was no strong race antipathy between Germans and Slavs. Germany and Russia have not been at war with each other since the Czar Peter the Third saved Frederick the Great in 1762. Till forty years ago the Bohemians and Germans got on tolerably well side by side. The race strains which are pulling Europe to pieces at last have showed themselves by rousing country against country; and inside Austria. There the antipathy between Germans and Slavs has grown so bitter that, in the judgment of the Austrian statesmen, the Germans must fight Slavs either outside of Austria or inside of Austria. They have preferred to make the issue perfectly clear by declaring war on the one markedly successful and independent Slav state outside of Russia.

The challenge aroused Russia, but did not directly concern other Powers farther west. Most of them, to judge from the proclamations and official communications, are fighting only in self-defense. In the midst of the appalling misery of the time, there shines out a comic gleam in the exchange of discourtesies about mobilization. As soon as the trouble began, every one of the four Central European Powers began to move troops with all possible speed toward its threatened frontiers, at the same time calling the world to witness that they were not "mobilizing." Every nation threatened every other, hoping thus to frighten its neighbor into giving way without war. The responsibility for the war rests upon no individual and upon no one nation, but upon the interlocking of Europe, commercially, territorially, and racially, so that one Power after another was drawn in the maelstrom. Perhaps statesmen felt that the cleaning time had come at last; and that the rival claims



This outline will aid the reader to see how Austria has restricted Serbia, first by absorbing Bosnia and Herzegovina, then by creating the New Kingdom of Albania. The map shows the Balkan States as they were before the recent wars, and as they are now with the Territories that have been acquired and added to Serbia, Bulgaria, Greece, and Rumania.

nations are things that in the long run may overcome all the checks of Parliaments and statesmen and The Hague conferences. But none of them could have brought about the fearful conditions of the year 1914. The strongest and determining reason for war is the growth of race antipathies. The world has at last realized that the political boundaries of Eastern Europe cut across older and more persistent divisions of race, language and religion, and thus bring conflicts with nations and between them.

Europe is a mosaic of races. In most countries



THE BAVARIANS BEFORE PARIS, 1870 By permission of the Berlin Photographic Company

WORLD BATTLES BEING FOUGHT AGAIN

TRAFALGAR 1805

IN WHICH ENGLAND DEMONSTRATED THE TWO-POWER STANDARD OF HER NAVY AND
KEPT THE SUPREMACY OF THE SEA

WATERLOO 1815

ENGLAND HAS NOW FOR THE FIRST TIME SINCE WATERLOO SENT TROOPS TO WESTERN
EUROPE, LANDING THEM IN BELGIUM TO KEEP THE KAISER OUT OF
ANTWERP AS THEY KEPT NAPOLEON OUT BEFORE

KÖNIGGRÄTZ 1866

THE BATTLE THAT ENDED THE WAR WHICH PRUSSIA BEGAN TO UNIFY GERMANY JUST
AS AUSTRIA-HUNGARY ATTACKED SERBIA TO UNIFY ITS DOMINIONS

BATTLES OF THE FRANCO-PRUSSIAN WAR

TO BE FOUGHT AGAIN ON THE SAME GROUNDS FOR THE SAME STAKE, WHICH IS
ALSACE-LORRAINE AND THE DOMINANT POSITION IN EUROPE




By courtesy of the New York Times

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"THE CONQUERORS"—By PIERRE FRITEL

IN THIS GRIM ALLEGORY OF THE KINGLY POMP AND COMMON MISERY OF WAR, THE CENTRAL FIGURE IS JULIUS CAESAR; ON HIS LEFT HAND IS NAPOLEON AND ON HIS RIGHT HAND, HANNIBAL; AT THE LEFT SIDE OF THE GROUP IS RAMESES II AND BEHIND HIM ATTILA, KING OF THE HUNS, CALLED "THE SCOURGE OF GOD"; AT THE RIGHT SIDE OF THE GROUP, ALEXANDER THE GREAT, AND BEHIND HIS SHOULDER, TAMERLANE



ENGLAND'S TWO-POWER STANDARD 100 YEARS AGO

THE DEATH OF NELSON AT TRAFALGAR, WHERE THE ENGLISH FLEET DEFEATED THE FLEETS OF FRANCE AND SPAIN AND PUT AN END TO ANY DANGER OF INVASION AND OPENED THE SEAS TO BRITISH COMMERCE. ENGLAND HAS THE SAME PROBLEM NOW

By permission of Braun & Company, New York



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THE RETREAT FROM WATERLOO

THE BATTLE IN BELGIUM AGAINST EMPEROR NAPOLEON, A HUNDRED YEARS AGO. FOR THE FIRST TIME SINCE THEN ENGLAND, AGAIN AS ONE POWER OF A GROUP OF ALLIES, HAS TROOPS IN WESTERN EUROPE, THIS TIME TO FIGHT EMPEROR WILLIAM



By permission of the Berlin Photographic Company

KÖNIGGRÄTZ, WHERE FRANCIS JOSEPH FOUGHT PRUSSIA

BISMARCK ATTACKED AUSTRIA-HUNGARY IN 1866 TO UNIFY GERMANY, AS AUSTRIA-HUNGARY HAS NOW ATTACKED SERBIA TO UNIFY ITS DOMINIONS



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THE DEFENCE OF CHAMPIGNY

IN THE FRANCO-PRUSSIAN WAR, WHICH LOST FRANCE ALSACE AND LORRAINE AND GAINED GERMANY AN ENEMY WHICH INSURED THE FRANCO-GERMAN WAR WHICH IS IN PROGRESS NOW



THE FATAL CHARGE OF THE FRENCH AT REICHSHOFFEN

By permission of Braun & Company, New York

IN THE FRANCO-PRUSSIAN WAR, THE WAR IN WHICH NAPOLEON III LOST HIS POSITION AS THE DOMINANT PERSONALITY IN EUROPE AND BY WHICH FRANCE AGAIN BECAME A REPUBLIC



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"THE PIECE IN DANGER"

and pretensions must be settled by the court of war, the only one that executes its own decrees.

Perhaps this war is what Tolstoi thought all wars to be, merely a blind movement of human beings, they know not why, and they know not whither, like a foray of soldier ants. Nevertheless, reasons for war can be found in the make-up of Europe, in the character, in the aims and ambitions of the great Powers. The continent of Europe is divided into ten groups of nations. Four of these are the minor groups of the Balkans; Scandinavia; the neutralized Powers of Holland, Belgium, and Switzerland; and Spain and Portugal. Alongside these and overtopping them in wealth and military strength, are the six great Powers, Italy, Russia, Great Britain, France, Austria-Hungary, and Germany.

Europe has for some centuries been divided between four main religions. The Moslems up to two years ago still counted eight millions of Turks, Bosnians, and Albanians, but there are now only about three or four millions left in Europe. The Protestants, principally Germans, English, Swiss, and Hungarians, are about 100 millions. The Roman Catholics in all the Latin countries, Southern Germany, Croatia, Albania, Bohemia, and in Russian Austria and Russian Poland are about 180 millions. The Greek Catholics include Russia, the Balkan countries, and a few provinces in the Austrian Empire, but by no means all the Slavs. Their number is about 110 millions.

Differences of religion have caused many European wars, but during the last hundred years every European country has been obliged to tolerate churches other than that established by the State. These sects are attached to their country. Protestant and Roman Catholic Magyars are a unit when it comes to a discussion of their place in the Austro-Hungarian Empire; and there is no visible difference between the Catholic Bavarians and the Protestant Prussians in their support of their country in the present war.

Four comparatively small groups of people of Asiatic origin are the Finns, Magyars, Bulgarians and Turks, in all about 14 millions. The Scandinavian group is small, though effective, and the three countries together, Norway, Sweden, and Denmark, have ten and a half million people. The English, Scotch, Welsh, and

Irish, between whom there seems to be no race division in time of national danger are 46 millions. The Latin powers, Spain, Portugal, France, Belgium, and Italy count 106 millions. The 2½ million Greeks are akin to the Latin. The Germans in Germany, German Switzerland, and Austria-Hungary are a compactly situated mass of 79½ millions. The Slavs of Russia, including the Poles and not the Finns together with the Roumanians (who claim to be a Latin race, but seem to have more Slav blood than anything else), the Servians and the various Slavic elements in Austria-Hungary are in all 111 millions.

Before sketching the status of the great powers, the place and influence upon the war of the minor groups must be noticed. The Balkans is an example to the world of the immense difficulty of carrying on states which contain large numbers of people, who in race and in sympathies belong to some neighbor. The second Balkan War in 1913 came about solely because there were so many Bulgarians in Greek and Servian territory and so many Greeks and Servians in Bulgarian territory. No geographical boundary line can be made to fit with these race groups. The effort to adjust the matter by killing off villagers of different race from that of the conqueror of a region was so thorough-going as to shock mankind, but not drastic enough to solve the problem. If the war is primarily a fight between the organized Slavs and the Germans, the Balkans are not much interested, since there are only about five million Slavs south of the Danube. Emperor William last year called for a larger army and a bigger war chest, because he felt that the armies of the Balkans altered the balance of European military power. If the Balkan Powers could have stood together till this year, Austria could not have declared war on Servia. Bulgaria and Greece may easily be drawn into the conflict, particularly if, as seems likely, Turkey makes war on the German side; and when the general peace comes, it must include a settlement of the Balkan question.

The Scandinavian Powers are unwilling sharers in the danger of war because two of them control the natural entrance into the Baltic Sea; and the Swedes are convinced that Russia wants to subvert them. Portugal is an ally of England, and proposes to join in the war. Spain may very likely enter the lists if France seems to need aid.

The three little neutralized Powers, Belgium, Holland, and Switzerland, have already learned what "neutrality" means between desperate nations. The Emperor William a few months ago was much pleased by the Swiss manœuvres, because they prove that he could "spare two army corps." The remark meant of course that neither France nor Germany could safely force a way through Switzerland. It meant also that the Germans intended to use Belgium as their highway into France, treaty or no treaty, international law, or no international law. Holland has no protection from Germany except the troops and ships of the nations that comprise the Triple Entente.

ITALY

Italy joined the Triple Alliance about twenty years ago, because she was then on very bad terms with France. To Germany and Austria the Italian navy and merchant marine were a special attraction.

Italy has three territorial objectives which must largely affect her position: (1) on the other side of the Adriatic Sea, a decided conflict of interest with Austria has developed; (2) Italy desires the extension of her colonies, as Tripoli is at present her only valuable colonial possession. Italy desires to annex Trentino, an Italian-speaking district in the southern Tyrol, and Trieste, the population of which is Italian. But they might as well attempt to pluck out the right eye of Emperor Francis Joseph as to take Trieste for it is the only seaport in the Austrian half of the Austrian-Hungarian Empire.

RUSSIA

Russia has for centuries been a reservoir of compressed political gas, pushing in every direction for an outlet. When Peter the Great came to the throne two centuries ago his country was almost shut off from the Baltic by the Germans and Swedes — and the Tartars cut him off from the Black Sea. War after war was necessary to gain free access to the Black Sea and the Baltic Sea. Meanwhile the Russians pushed into the thinly settled area of North Asia until they reached the Pacific.

The obvious line of approach to the world's commerce for Russia is through the Bosphorus and the Ægean Sea to the Mediterranean. That

route is held by the Turks, who for the last fifty years have been backed up by first the English and French, and then by the Germans.

Russia has gradually torn away fragments of the Turkish Empire along the Black Sea and has aided in building Roumania and Bulgaria out of the ruins of Turkish provinces. In 1878 a Russian army marched till it was in sight of the minarets of Constantinople, but the English under Disraeli compelled Russia to give up the fruits of that victory. As the great Slav Power, Russia is not always keenly interested in the expansion of small Slav Powers; but it has for years urged the policy of pan-Slavism, whatever that may mean. If the issue of Germans against Slav is clearly raised, as it seems to be in this war, Russia could no more keep out of it than she could forbid her subjects to attend the Greek Catholic Church.

It is a singular fact that till 1914 there never had been a serious war between Russia and Austria. Though the Russians were defeated by the French, English, and Piedmontese in 1855, and by the Japanese in 1905, they have in many wars shown military talent and a fine fighting force. Russia is the only nation which without the assistance of allies defeated the great Napoleon.

In case of victory the Russians will certainly demand Constantinople, which means that the Turk would be finally shoved out of Europe. England and France would probably favor that solution of the Near-Eastern question. If Sweden should be involved in the war, Russia may claim part of that country. Some "rectification of the frontier" might be exacted from Austria. On the other hand, if Russia should be seriously defeated, the Finns and the Poles may rise. As late as 1863 there was an insurrection in Poland. Otherwise it is not likely that the great colossus of Europe will be under any circumstances put in a less favorable position than that which she occupied at the beginning of the war.

ENGLAND

England in this contest is not fighting to gain anything new, but simply to hold what she has: first of all her commerce. And there seems a reasonable chance of protecting English merchantmen while German and Austrian must lie in port or be captured. The Japanese have

undertaken to look after English interests in Asia.

The English hope to shut the German navy up in the North Sea, for without a supply of food stuffs from other parts of the world England would be starved out after a few months; while France, Germany, Austria, and Russia can probably feed themselves and their troops. The English colonies scattered all over the world are a bait to the Germans. Canada, Australia, and probably South Africa can take care of themselves, but India is a problem which nobody at present can solve. Germany, Russia, or France can be badly defeated without losing much territory or dropping a place in the scale of nations; but not so with Great Britain. A victory of the German powers would infallibly deprive Great Britain of a part of her colonies, a large portion of her trade; and the prestige of being the greatest sea power in the world.

FRANCE

Of all the great powers France is the freest from internal dissension. The 207,000 square miles of the main country has but 40 millions of population; and the French have been almost in despair because Germany grows so much faster and therefore has so many more recruits. The colonies of France in Africa and Eastern Asia are nearly as large as the United States and its dependencies; but they contain only 41 millions of an indifferent population. Almost the whole population of France, so far as it has religious affiliations, is Roman Catholic.

France is supposed to be the thriftiest large country in Europe, and is able to raise nearly a thousand million dollars a year for national and local public purposes; but the debt is more than six years' national income, and it will be much increased by the war. The country has had a splendid foreign trade of 1,700 million dollars of exports and 2,000 million of imports, and it owns a considerable merchant marine.

If the central powers should get control of the sea it would go hard with the French colonies, which it is supposed the Germans hope to secure. What the French expect from the war is first of all the recovery of Alsace-Lorraine which the school children are taught to consider two French provinces temporarily in possession of a foreign power. It was a tactical

mistake for the Germans to wrest from France provinces which have shown themselves so French in feeling, that they have never been allowed to have a popular government. The French frontier sweeps about within sight of Metz, which is one of the strongest fortresses in Europe. If the French have the physical power, and their allies will back them up, Alsace-Lorraine will be claimed as their reward at the end of the war.

A second important object of France is to wipe out the fearful disgrace of the war of 1870 and 1871. Napoleon the Third put his country in a position to be disciplined; but it was the French nation, the French people, and the French army that were defeated and humiliated. They mean to prove to mankind that they cannot be so treated a second time.

AUSTRIA-HUNGARY

The centre of the crater in European affairs is Austria-Hungary, through which for ages has run the boundary between the German and the Slav races.

The Austrian-Hungarians have but one sea-coast stretching the two ports of Trieste and Fiume, beside the mountainous coast of Dalmatia, which has a Serb population. Nevertheless she has developed a creditable commerce and her ships run to Constantinople, to India, and to New York. A main object of Austria in this war is to push that coastline farther south, wiping out Montenegro and part of Albania; or even to follow out a plan cherished for half a century to obtain a tongue of land between Bosnia and the Ægean Sea, with the port of Salonica.

The three objectives of Austria in the war therefore appear to be: (1) The "execution" of Serbia as a lesson to all Serbs of what will happen to any head that raises itself above the level; (2) the extension of territory southward; (3) the holding of the Slav population partly by force, and partly by trying to bring those people to feel that their country is in danger. For it must never be forgotten that both the Balkan people and the Austrian-Hungarian Slavs if they cannot be independent will at least not be Russian. Probably every group of Slavs inside the Austrian-Hungarian boundary will stay there, rather than incur any such danger.

Whatever happens to any other power, Austria-Hungary is playing a desperate gambler's game

in this war. The Magyars who have long hated and thwarted the Germans, have now united with them to keep their Slav fellow citizens in order. If Austria and Germany are victorious, the empire will be safe for the time; although no one outside the boundaries of that empire can guess the possibility of Slav risings during the war; or the likelihood that the Slavs will take to heart the lesson that they must remain inferior and subordinate in Austrian-Hungarian affairs.

GERMANY

By common consent the most formidable military power in Europe is Germany. In area (209,000 square miles) it is almost exactly equal to France, but the population is 65,000,000 of whom 52,000,000 are Germans, and 2,000,000 are Slavics Poles. With that exception there is nowhere in the land a seriously discontented race element. In its colonies, which are chiefly African, the million square miles contain only 40,000,000 Protestant, 24,000,000 Roman Catholics and half a million Jews.

The national taxes are nearly 1,000 million dollars a year, and the debt is about twelve years' income. The country has a magnificent system of railroads, and canals, and a splendid merchant marine of more than 3,000,000 tons; and an inward and outward trade of 5,000 million

dollars. No country has ever made such efforts to carry on business, government, and military affairs in a scientific and systematic way.

Germany's objects in the war are perfectly clear. First of all, to give notice to all the Germans in Europe, to the Magyars, and to the German, Austrian, and Hungarian Slavs who "stay good," the assurance that Germany will fight for them and with them. In the second place the Slavs outside those two empires are notified that the Germanic power is massed against them. In the third place, if only Germany can get the command of the sea (in which Austria can be of very little aid) the French and English colonies must fall. A decided land victory over the allies in Europe might justify the demand for possession of colonies that had not been taken by the fleet. Germany is not likely to look for Russian territory, except perhaps one of the German speaking provinces on the Baltic; but if she can she will insist upon a free hand in Asia-Minor, either by an understanding with Turkey or by crushing Turkey. Finally, if Germany is able to bring it about, Holland will almost surely be annexed. It is the natural distributing point of German commerce, and with Holland goes a tidy lot of Asiatic islands. A victorious Germany will not go into any peace negotiations congress without bringing home a substantial conquest of colonies.

TEUTON AGAINST SLAV*

BY WILLIAM MILLIGAN SLOANE, L. H. D.

THE European situation seems unreal. We shudder to contemplate a general European war and all its frightful consequences. Americans who are really such feel a much deeper interest in their nearer European neighbors, even though the recently adopted masses are still, at heart, most concerned with the far-off governments and peoples from out of which they have lately come.

But it is absurdly insufficient to look at Europe from the west as we mostly do. Great Britain and France are full of poignant interest for us, Germany to quite the same degree. Their problems, internal and external, and their relations to each other, are fascinating to the extent of

absorption. But we forget that they too have an eastward outlook and that much of the east which to us is far, far away, is for them close by and that their policies cannot neglect what we see but dimly. It is essential to the comprehension of Western politics that we recall how determinative in the arrangement and alignment of powers is a race question which presses upon the older western Europe from behind with the obstinacy of natural law: the oncoming of the Slav, the self-defense of the Teuton. Beside it Franco-German relations are, however weighty, of minor importance.

The European balance of power was as unstable as that of a pyramid poised on its apex. Race, religion, nationality, equality, interest, are the

*Reprinted, by permission, from *The Independent*.

stock terms of politics and not one of them has a definite meaning. Nationality is the most misleading of them all, yet it is this vague concept which is central to the alarms of the present hour. The populations of Europe discriminate between Anglo-, German-, Irish-, Italo-, Slav-, and Afro-Americans with insistence and give portentous reality to these designations because they cannot think in other terms. So far as they think at all they affect contempt for the assimilative process upon which we ourselves rely.

Russia and Greek Catholicism, Germany and Teutonic culture, France and Roman civilization, and British imperial sway, each of these has a planetary system which revolves about it. Language is not strong enough to depict the passion and devotion of the millions upon millions who pay and fight, who sacrifice all that life holds dear, for these undefinable but poignant conceptions. Intertwined with them are all the rest: material prosperity, race supremacy, peace of mind, social order and justice.

The pyramid has long been rocking and toppling; indeed the props and guys were always there in the forms of treaties and alliances. Each of the systems has always been incomplete at the edges and sometimes at the very centre. The Slavs are not all of the Greek confession, nor under Russian sway. A large minority are of the Roman faith and very many are faithful Moslems. The Latins are not all Roman Catholics, many are Protestants and among ecclesiastical adherents are enormous numbers of free-thinkers and indifferent. The number of Roman Catholics among Germans, within and without the empire, is as great as that of other confessions: the counter-reformation is still active throughout western Europe, though quiescent in the central lands.

Accordingly the confessional bond still plays a major rôle, possibly *the* major rôle, on the stage of east European politics. But nationality runs it a hard race for first place. The cross purposes between the two act and react to produce confusion, and dim the vision of observers.

Prolific as Anglo-Saxons once were, and as the Germans still are, no instance is known to history of a natural growth of population like that of the latest years among the Slavs. They now outnumber the Germans nearly three to one. Among the Slavs there are two lines of division: the aristocracy and towns-folk, a relatively very small

number with some veneer of western culture and learning, are separated by an abyss from all the rest, the overwhelming majority of primitive artisans and peasants whose one controlling power is fear, fear of the state, fear of the church. Then secondly straight through the heart of the continent lies Hungary, which divides the north from the south Slavs and makes common cause with the Germans of Austria, as far as a hated necessity requires, to form the Dual Monarchy.

What with the iron sway of Turkey and the stern repression of the Magyars, the south Slav differs slightly from his congener of the north in speech, institutions, tradition and general characteristics. But very slightly, after all. They are a peasant folk, placid when comfortable, savage when roused. Since their emancipation from the Turkish yoke, they have produced no ruling class, and only a handful of native statesmen and administrators. Servia has a worthless native dynasty, Montenegro a strong but rude one; the other states have had foreign princes imposed upon them.

Since the Slavs appeared in history there has been an embittered, remorseless, and often bloody struggle for supremacy between Teuton and Slav. The elements of humanity commingle in warfare to a higher degree probably than in peace; by taking prisoners even more than by merchandising. Whatever order and control has existed in eastern Europe proceeded more or less directly from German sources, and along the broad mark or frontier from the Baltic to the Adriatic upon which the clashes have occurred, there has been some admixture of blood as well as of institutions.

Until lately there were large numbers of German traders in Slavic towns, and in the administration of Russia men with German names were prominent. The University of Dorpat was a distinguished centre of German learning. Within the German lands Slavic laborers were numerous, and men with Slavic names rose to considerable eminence in all walks of life as far westward as the Elbe. Eastern Prussia has large populations of Slavs and its Polish subjects in Posen constitute a Slavic society which defies assimilation. The landed proprietors of Russia's Baltic provinces and the merchants of the Baltic seaboard were and remain German in speech and tradition. On both sides of the frontier there was toleration for the respective aliens.

But within a generation the passion for "nationality" has become fanatical and insensate. Whoever was a subject must become Russian: in Finland the upper classes of Swedish stock and culture as well as the indigenous Finns; in Poland, where all are Slavs, all must become Russian; in the Baltic provinces Germanism must be uprooted and Dorpat was turned into Yurieff with a corps of Russian professors. The same fiery zeal in the reverse sense overmastered Prussia and Hungary for Teutonizing or Magyarizing all the Slavs within their borders. There was from North to South a nationalizing passion which rekindled the fires of hate and fury until to-day the conflagration rages to destruction.

The flames leaped over and set fire to the Balkans. Germanism in Austria-Hungary was put on the desperately defensive alike by Magyars and Slavs. At no time within the historic record was the race and confessional antagonism as savage as it is to-day. Nationality and autonomy are the warcries. "In the name of liberty" is the plea which the combatants shout westward as they arm to the teeth, marshal their enormous armies and commit atrocity upon atrocity in the face of high heaven. The recent Balkan wars have completely upset the military equilibrium of Europe, because they have placed on its military map at least a million disciplined troops with the lust for combat engendered by their war of emancipation and the internecine conflicts for national grandeurs into which it degenerated.

Austria-Hungary is the most extraordinary congeries of unrelated parts ever compacted into a nominal state. On every treasury note the denomination and value are printed in about twelve languages, so that it may circulate throughout the monarchy, and there are some eighteen groups of population that lay claim to "nationality." Within Cis-Leithia, which we know as Austria, lies the kingdom of Bohemia, overwhelmingly Slav and vociferous for recognition as such. Trieste is almost a pure Italian city, lower Tyrol is Italian, and the townsfolk of Dalmatia are Italians. The districts of Carniola and parts of Carinthia are Slav again. Trans-Leithia, which we know as Hungary, is ruled by Magyars, but within its limits are millions of Slavs; and Croatia, which is pure Slav, possesses a would-be autonomous local government standing by treaty in the same or a similar relation to the supreme Hungarian power

as that in which Hungary stands to Austria. Yet the "Hungarian" seaport of Fiume is almost a pure Slav city.

Confessionally the Slav subjects of the monarchy are of the Roman faith, though in certain places there are small congregations of the Greek faith. The recently annexed provinces of Bosnia and the Herzegovina belong to the monarchy as a whole; their populations are pure Slavs, mainly of the Greek confession; though the higher social classes are faithful Moslems, and the immigrant administrators and traders from the monarchy are Roman Catholics. Control is generally Germanic, stigmatized as the sauerkraut and sausage régime.

But all over this unprecedented mosaic of race, religion and language, a German dynasty reigns and the once all-powerful German influence still largely predominates. The German empire in its entirety, whether Roman Catholic or Protestant, exists to-day as it is because Austria was expelled from the German hegemony, but its peoples and its rulers have a deep concern for Austria-Hungary as a bulwark against the ever-rising and surging tide of Slavic numbers and a menacing inundation of lower civilizations.


Within the Triple Alliance of Germany, Austria-Hungary and Italy, the relations of the two former are thus much closer than those of Italy with either. The dominant figure of the triple alliance is of course the German Emperor, and by an overmastering will, backed by military power of portentous strength both afloat and ashore, he has until now kept, indeed commanded, the peace of Europe. This has been to the immense advantage of his people, as they clearly understand, but a peace lord who is a war lord as well has an unenviable task in restraining a military party of great influence straining at the leash when wars are raging and insults fly hurtling through space from defiant foes, increasing yearly in strength and self-reliance.

German socialism, stripped of all its trimmings, is nothing more or less than good old-fashioned American patriotism, a determination to share the offices high and low with the privileged classes and enjoy the social distinctions as well as the emoluments pertaining thereto. Ambition for power and the pomp of power stir the breast of the humble. Thus far German socialism is not international and is not likely to become so. Yet it is a serious weakness in a system so hierarch-

ical as that of Prussia, or even in the other more democratic states of the federal empire.

Had the United States a Russia on one shore and a France on the other, with not one truly friendly power on either side, we could visualize the problem of the German empire, perhaps even

of Germany is the tenure and treatment of Alsace-Lorraine. The truth about this question is at the bottom of the well: the keenest French observers declare that the provinces would be entirely content as an autonomous state in the federal German empire and do not desire reincorporation in



THE RACIAL DISTRIBUTION OF MODERN EUROPE, WHICH HAS BEEN ONE OF THE MOVING CAUSES OF THE PRESENT WAR

(Of the areas left in white, Turkey is non-European, Albania non-European and an insoluble mixture in addition, Hungary probably of non-European origin, and Switzerland, divided up between German, Frenchman and Italian, is so small on this map that an indication of division by race is practically impossible. There are in round figures, 140,000,000 Slavs in Europe, 100,000,000 Teutons (including Scandinavians), 100,000,000 to 110,000,000 Latins, and 45,000,000 Anglo-Saxons)

	TEUTONIC		LATIN		SLAV
	ANGLO-SAXON		GREEK		RUMANIAN

realize it. The vast extent of her land frontier is a decided weakness. Another is over-population; sixty-six millions on a territory about the size of Texas and not comparable in fertility of soil and natural resources. Already by the magic touch of scientific agriculture but little is unreclaimed and most yields to the very limit of its capacity.

Still another weakness is the Polish question, which renders Posen a focus of discontent and exhibits the futility of all efforts at Germanization of unwilling Slavs. But the most serious weakness

France. But France desires it, and cannot condone their loss. The Hohenzollerns have conquered the German home, they desire no world conquest, but they mean to defend to the death what they have secured.

As between Germany and German Austria the bonds of trade and sympathy are many and powerful, but the religious question lies athwart union in any calculable period. Prussia is still a Protestant, intensely Protestant power, although the natural increase of Romanists is in excess of

any other element. In a high sense Prussian policy is German politics, and the majority of Protestants throughout the empire steadily dwindles. The entrance of German Austria would throw them into a hopeless minority. Nevertheless the question is as yet not perilous, for stancher patriotism than that of Bavaria, the Rhineland, and Westphalia does not exist in Prussia proper, or Saxony, or Wurtemberg.

To these elements of strength and weakness possibly another should be added; the prosperity in commerce and industry of all Germany. Based on unprecedented expansion of credit, this is therefore an exceedingly delicate structure. In the alarms of a few years since it was the merchants and bankers who commanded a halt and a return to sanity.

Ultimately the increase of numbers may call for territorial expansion to the eastward or a desperate effort at it, but for the present German policy is easily legible: to maintain what it has, to strengthen Austria-Hungary against the Slav, and to repel the advance of its own eastern neighbors,—perhaps even to drive them far behind their present lines. For success in this she must be strong enough to hold France in check, and to that end she recently enlarged her armaments.

Russian power viewed from without is portentous. With her population of a hundred and sixty-eight millions, it seems as if she could put some millions of troops in the field, overpower all Europe, and constitute herself suzerain of Slavic peoples as well as of the Greek Church—to which position she has long laid claim. But so vast, so unorganized, so inert is most of her empire, that its very weight seems often to threaten a break.

But her most salient weakness is the double question of Finland and Poland, with their sense of outrage and resistance to Russian influence. It was no wonder that she could not coerce Japan, or even conquer Turkey without Roumanian help; howsoever many men she may have under arms, there is always a Polish terror, of major size, and a Finnish nightmare less in dimension but equal in grimness,—at the very door of St. Petersburg, moreover. And the haunting spectre of intestine violence can only be concealed by troops and police. The national territory must be garrisoned against Russian, Polish, and Finnish discontent.

Apparently her Government measures greatness solely by size, so steady is its advance to the eastward in the seizure and occupation of territory or the establishment of influence zones. Quantity is the relentless foe of quality and numbers are the Iscariot of efficiency. The modern world is all astray on this question, and Russia seems the blindest of the blind. Her northern frontiers are fortified by their Arctic position; her others are the weakest possible, the most vulnerable in all their extent. Her policy is not easily legible, but in the Triple Entente, the bonds of which until now appeared very slight, there is of course a threefold understanding which gives some guarantee of her swollen dimensions and assures her a free hand for the defensive if not for the offensive. A hegemony among the Slavs she may secure if she strikes successful blows for the Servian cause, but a protectorate in form never. She has never been able to charm her southern relations, and the great secret service of spies innumerable which she maintains among them exasperates, sometimes intimidates, but never cows them.

Why protect Servia? Why bring all Greek Christians under her religious sway? Why set up a Pan-Slavic federation? Why the pogrom and Jew baiting? Why swell her empire to bursting with zones of influence in Central Asia which belie their name in that they do not bind? Why the browbeating of Armenia and the hounding of Turkey? There seems no sense and little unity in the enormous programme.

If there be any solution of the riddle at all, it lies in her persistence that her door-key may be wrested from Moslems and the exit to the area of world commerce through the Straits as well as through the Baltic be her very own to command. It is not given to outsiders quite to comprehend how everything works together to that end, but we hear it with perpetual iteration and it may be so. Meanwhile we somehow feel that Russia resembles the athlete who ran so far to gain impetus that on the take-off line for the jump he fell in exhaustion. The preliminaries have hitherto been so protracted that accomplishment halted.

Since Russia has had armies on European battlefields their laurels have been those of subsidiaries rather than principals. It was not until Yorck and his Prussians went over to the Russians at Taugoggen in 1813 that the standards of the Czar advanced by self-impulsion. We are told on

good authority that the existing army, entirely regenerated since the Treaty of Portsmouth, longs and even lusts to redeem its good name. Therein lies the danger of the hour.

Should Russia restore to Finland the liberties of which she has been robbed, should she grant autonomy to Russian Poland as a buffer state between the Russian Orient and the German Occident and liberate a nation of twenty-four millions, Roman and romantic in religion and culture, her greatest internal danger would be diminished if not removed. But of this there is little chance, so fanatical is Greek ecclesiasticism and so powerful at St. Petersburg.

The Servian protectorate is ancillary to the broad Russian policy. The writer in his recent book on the Balkans has quite fully explained the genesis and described the distribution of the Slavic stock in the great southeastern peninsula of Europe. It suffices to say here that the Serbs are the purest and most numerous branch of the southern Slavs. They are numerous in Hungary proper round about the city of Temesvar, they are almost exclusively the inhabitants of Croatia, Slavonia, Istria, Dalmatia, Herzegovina, and Bosnia. Of their confessional divisions we spoke in another connection. Within the Austria-Hungarian domain they number about five millions; without, in Servia, Montenegro, and elsewhere about as many more. These last are almost exclusively of the Greek faith, among the former possibly a fifth are also of that profession. Hence the concern of Russia, real or professed, for the orthodox who are anxious before the militancy of Romanism.

Thus divided the independent Serb states have remained insignificant in the power of their political sovereignty and are so still. But they have been impassioned apostles of the Great Servia idea and through a desperate propaganda have infected the Austrian subjects of their own stock. It is the unrest within the dual monarchy which more concerns its government than even the devilish complots which find hospitality in Servia and have found two victims in the Austro-Hungarian heir and hismorganatic wife. The war on Servia may be merely punitive, but it is really a terrible warning to those within Austria-Hungary to cease from troubling.

The dream of a united Illyrian kingdom began with the liberation of Servia from Turkish misrule. But the congress of Vienna and Waterloo quenched

all hope during thirty years. Hungary considered Croatia as a mere province and exasperated the Croats by an effort to Magyarize them. Their Emperor gave them a patriotic Ban or viceroy in 1848, the famous Jellaschich, who in the crisis of his long career turned all his folk in frenzy against Hungary during her struggle for independence and saved the Hapsburg monarchy from extinction. The efforts of Joseph II to Germanize Croatia were vain, but it kept its identity. In 1868 an unsatisfactory "compromise" was forced on it. In spite of Hungarian stubbornness this charter has been several times modified in a sense favorable to Croat aspirations, but the people still cherish resentment. They have as Ban a representative of the Hungarian crown, a national diet in control of local affairs, including courts and schools, and at Buda-Pest they have one member in the ministry with three members of the upper and forty of the lower house. There are endless wranglings and sometimes rebellious outbursts of violence as Hungary seeks to recall more or less of what has been wrenched from her, and Croatia to wrest from her a higher degree of autonomy. The Servians elsewhere sympathize, especially those not in Croatia-Slavonia but directly under Austrian administration. If we may trust our judgment based on personal observation, Austria-Hungary has seized the occasion of the hideous crime so lately committed to secure peace within her own borders by the punishment of Servia.

France has always had a noble sentimentality for the insurgents against any "oppressor" except herself, and claims for herself the liberation of Greece. It is hard that Austria-Hungary should pitilessly monopolize and regulate Servian trade, as she does; the enlarged Greece suspects the dual monarchy of seeking a highway of her own to the Ægean and desires to reserve for herself the transit and outlet for Servian commerce to the Mediterranean. Hence Servia may hope for at least moral and possibly for material aid from France and Greece as well as for the protection of Russia. During the recent wars Servia amazed the world by the regeneration of her army as a fighting machine, and that of any invader, no matter how efficient, is likely to meet with fierce resistance.

Italy still harbors a deepseated distrust of her next-door neighbor in the alliance and their interests clash on the Adriatic. At its head is an

Italia irredenta under Austrian rule, and opposite in both Montenegro and Albania they have conflicting desires. The dynasty of the former is kin by marriage to the House of Savoy, and a German prince, if he of Wied ever gets a firm seat as Mpret of Albania, is not likely to favor Italian interests to any disadvantage for the powerful Austrian Lloyd Steamship Company, for long years the adroit and insinuating queen of the Adriatic, at least on the eastern shore.

Finally there is the movement, inchoate as yet and not very assertive but nevertheless of importance, to combine into a common interest the hitherto disjointed and mutually suspicious policies of the nations which border on the Mediterranean, for protection against the great commercial powers which make it a world's highway, notably Great Britain and secondarily Germany, France, Italy, and Spain are Latin, the new Greece at least classical in its aspirations and maritime to the utmost. From Gibraltar to the great Syrtis Spain, France, and Italy hold the African coast. While Italy alone has hopes of important colonization in its possessions, since the population of the others is stationary, all are engaged in the development of their possessions and the commerce which accompanies it. Each

aspires to expand its Mediterranean importance: all are impatient of British supereminence on its waters. The maintenance of present conditions is manifestly the British policy and the line of her Mediterranean fortresses will not be without the support of her fleets whatever the understanding with France and Russia may be.

The efforts of the British Government, seconded by that of Germany, to keep the peace of Europe or at least localize the war, were as commendable as they were manifestly sincere and to the immediate interest of both. The struggle for the world's carrying trade is not entirely confined to Great Britain and Germany, nor the rivalry in building great fleets to defend it. French and Italian and Austrian, even Russian and Japanese, packets ply many a far distant main. Yet separately or combined they are minor rivals. The great ones can emulate each other in peace for mercantile supremacy. It were well for the world if they had combined to maintain the unstable equilibrium of the balance of power to which reference has been made. The internal politics of both are uneasy and in both there are portents of social upheaval, but their stability and domestic balance are rockfast compared with that of the other great powers.

THE TWO GERMANYS

BY OSWALD GARRISON VILLARD

WHAT attitude shall conscientious German-Americans take toward the war of nations now convulsing Europe and particularly toward the country of their ancestry? The question is one to cause no end of heart-break, not only to them but to numerous Americans as well, who for one reason or other find themselves in debt to German learning or German kindness. Should they imitate the multitudes who are shouting "Germany, right or wrong!" and waive all effort to place the blame by some such conscience-salve as the phrase, "The Kaiser has sources of information not open to the public and knew he had to strike or be overwhelmed"?

There are plenty of other reasons given in defense of the Kaiser. He is a new St. George slaying the Slavic dragon who would destroy the civilization of western Europe. He and his people

are the victims of British envy and jealousy due to their extraordinary conquests on the seas and in the marts of the world. A hatred of forty-three years and a never-quenched desire for revenge explain the actions of the French as well as their alliance with the Czar of all the Russias. Misinformation, ignorance, garbled despatches from French, Belgian, and English sources, and lack of appreciation of the fact that the Kaiser is the true protector of the intellectual aspirations and the superb idealism of his people,—all these are the reasons why public sentiment in the United States is on the side of the Kaiser's enemies. In brief every man's hand has been raised against Germany because, as the Kaiser put it, God has been with her; she has prospered exceedingly and the wicked now rejoice that evil days have come upon her. This and much more is put forth by those who are for "*Deutschland, Deutschland über Alles.*"

What intensifies the difficulty of the German-American is that there are two Germanys. One is that of the Kaiser and of the military autocracy, those who believe in the divine right of rulers, in the mailed fist, in government by aristocracy, in might as against right, and have taught the doctrine that peace can only be assured if all the nations be armed to the teeth. Its adherents are those who see in the *Waffenrock* another hat of Gessler, before which the public must bow. They uphold the officers who cut down lame cobblers or run through civilians at some fancied insult, and applaud those wearers of the uniform who resort to the duel, long since outlawed by the enlightened sentiment of the world. These are the Germans who entrench in power the ennobled and enriched classes; who are without trust in the people and are utterly opposed to any extension of democracy, relying for aid upon a subservient bureaucracy; who support the Prussian Government in its refusal to remove the inequalities among voters within its electorate,—against which 100,000 Prussians protested last year on a single day.

Incidentally they are of the type that gives so much offense to the rest of the world. They are arrogant and supercilious and frankly without faith in anything save the power of the sword. It is they who have dictated the foreign policy which has made friends of practically nobody. It is they who under Bismarck's leadership originally entered in 1882 the game of taking the lands of backward races, in which all their neighbors and we ourselves have indulged. It is they who give the utterly false impression that all Germany has been bent on conquering where it could. It is they who make a large part of the world forget that the Germans are among the most lovable, useful, and enlightened people; that they are bound to us by ties that ought to be indissoluble. Have they not enriched our blood? Did they not come to us by the hundred thousand, fleeing from home because of a noble idealism which they transferred to our country, pledging their faith with their blood upon our battlefields of civil strife,—but always on the side of the Union and human liberty? Surely no German-American who really believes in republican institutions, in popular government, in the ideals of Washington and Lincoln, can uphold this Germany.

But there is another Germany besides this one

of the autocrats,—totally different, infinitely nobler. It is the Germany of the great souls who have really made the spirit of the nation, its thinkers, its teachers, its scientists, its civic administrators, its poets, its glorious musicians, its philosophers, its idealists, its patriots of the wars for freedom and of the lost struggle for liberty in 1848.

OUR DEBT TO INTELLECTUAL GERMANY

To this Germany thousands of Americans owe a debt of never-ending gratitude. From it hosts of our teachers, our professional men without number, and others in every rank of life have drawn their most cherished inspirations. To it we owe in considerable measure our university development; from it came in large degree the impetus toward good civic government which has been one of the glories of our American progress in the last two decades. From this Germany Lloyd-George has plagiarized those plans for the improvement of the welfare of the masses which have made him at once the best-beloved and best-hated man in Great Britain.

In the civic care of its own this Germany has led the world, with all to do it reverence. It has known best how to build the city beautiful and made good and progressive government the birthright of all its urban dwellers. In no other nation has science in the same degree become the partner of commerce and of industry. Nowhere else has there been a keener, if as keen, an intellectual freedom among those whose lives are dedicated to the pursuit of truth, or to the instruction of the young. Nowhere has there been a greater reverence for the aristocracy of intellect or as generous a recognition of its achievements. To sit at the feet of its inspired teachers, men and women have come from all quarters of the globe knowing that in a hundred fields this Germany led the world.

And it is this Germany which to-day lies prostrate before us. It is this Germany which is being slaughtered, whatever the reason or the excuse for the war. On behalf of this Germany any really enlightened ruler must have stood for peace against the world, no matter who might be mobilizing or where. To the support of this kingdom the whole intellectual world would have risen,—it did in England,—had the Kaiser but cried out its need and asked for allies to defend

and not to break the peace. For if any one who realized its moral grandeur and worth ought to have been willing to have abdicated rather than to plunge it into the abyss, the hell of war.

But there it lies to be ravaged by its defenders and its enemies at will. For it there can be no victory, whoever wins. It is not only the laws which are silent between arms; all intellectual and spiritual activities cease when men's sole thoughts are to kill, to destroy, to immolate, to make a mockery of Christianity. A whole generation is

is at an end. A terrible blow has been struck at Germany as the seat of wisdom. International bonds of infinite worth have been sundered not to be reunited for decades to come; the Germany of calm, scientific reasoning has been submerged by the mad rush into a war in which the Kaiser has staked the Empire itself, as well as every achievement of the nation-builders of 1870 and of those who have erected the great commercial edifice which has been the wonder of the world. If there is envy and jealousy now among the other nations, will not these feelings give way to helpless rage, to bitter enmity, to dread and fear if the greatest of military machines should triumph? Will not there be another Napoleon only a shade less dangerous than the overlord of a century ago, to inspire distrust and to court another Waterloo?

And if Germany is conquered and lies prostrate in sackcloth and ashes what endless humiliation will be hers! What dreams of revenge upon all the world may not then fill the minds of those who so gaily set out to humble their sister-nations to east and west? Is it not certain that whatever the outcome, Germany will for decades be the most hated of nations? Every reactionary element in the German Empire, every privileged class, every believer in the divine right of the few who have obtained power, every militarist and imperialistic tendency will have been strengthened at the expense of the liberalism and culture of Germany,—a Germany burdened with a horrible millstone of debt,—of which it can shift only a part, at best, upon the conquered, if it wins.

Here is precisely where a chief wickedness of the war policy lies. Nearly four million of German citizens have enrolled themselves in a party to belong to which the Kaiser declared at Essen a few years ago was to commit treason to the nation. These traitors now have been forced into the ranks, but the evils against which they protested are no less, their devotion to their cause is the same. They have fought imperialism at every turn, only to be bound and delivered now by the old snares, the old teachings that one's country must be upheld in war time; that it is proper to commit murder if one but murder by the wholesale,—teachings that are to-day doing their anti-Christian work in England, France, Russia, and Austria as well. The cause



FRANCO-GERMAN FRONTIER

to be wiped out; the flower of the land between the ages of nineteen and twenty-four is to be sacrificed at a despotic ruler's will; perhaps another Goethe, a Schumann, a Helmholtz, are to be cut off in their youth; all the talents these boys possess is certain to go for naught. Those who survive are to be brutalized by the most frightful spectacle of human carnage the world has ever seen,—by a sudden reversion to the stone age; to preach thereafter the long outworn and blasphemous doctrine that God is on the side of the mightier battalions. If those of the Kaiser prove to be the better drilled so as to kill the greater number of their fellow human beings, intellectual Germany will not profit but will suffer thereby.

A HATED NATION

It is not merely that its spiritual growth has been checked and that the pursuit of knowledge

of liberalism is the chief political hope of Germany as against the rule of the Prussian Junker, the grasping landlords, the insolent tariff barons, a bigoted Catholic clergy as in Bavaria, and the military and the aristocratic castes which do more to recruit the Socialist party than all their own leaders combined. It is not because of such government by the few, as some would contend, but in spite of it that the liberal, the cultured Germany of to-day is what it is. What might it not be if its intellectual freedom were to be typical of the freedom of the masses? Now much greater might not be the spiritual kingdom which it has built for itself under these conditions?

THE GERMAN MASSES ENLIST OUR SYMPATHY

The masses of the Kaiser's empire! To them surely the sympathy of the world must go out as to the poor Belgians who have died about Liège without knowing why, realizing only that a hell of shot and shell had burst without warning upon them as lightning from the sky. On the heads of the German masses lies not the blood guilt. They come from smiling homes, from the castled hills of Thuringia, the vine-clad banks of the Rhine, the plains of Prussia, the popped fields of Bavaria. They and their kind have been rising steadily against fearful odds, helped on by favorable social legislation, held back by the heavy taxes imposed by the military Moloch, and by their three years of army service; hampered in the cities by grinding poverty and checked everywhere by iron castes. Their villages have only just begun to grow, to give signs of a development corresponding to that of the cities; to them have come at least the harbingers of social justice; something of the prosperity of the nation was beginning to be theirs. But now the mother of every son between nineteen and twenty-four years must know her boy upon the firing-line, to destroy the sons of some other mother,—because the "Triple" Alliance demanded it. For these solid

peasants, the backbone of the country, war can bring nothing save woe and debt.

Will it avail to tell them that the Slavic peril must be combated; that in this world-war Destiny speaks and that it had to come sooner or later? Are they not inevitably to count the cost when the slaughter is over? Will they not more than ever turn to the "party of treason," which dictates that such things shall not be? Will they not turn to any one who teaches that it shall be taken out of the hands of one man or a group of men to say whether a nation shall return to barbarism and slay the best that is in it?

For a German-American whose heart goes back to the country that gave him or his fathers birth there should be no difficulty in deciding where his sympathies should lie, if he be truly an American citizen. Sorrow as he must for the German masses if he places reason above emotion and sympathy, he can but withhold his support from the Kaiser who approved in principle the Austrian ultimatum to Servia and made no better than a dicer's oath the solemn promise of the Empire to respect the neutrality of Belgium. If he be loyal to the principles of this republic, the German-American can only hope that absolutism has brought about its own downfall; that this may mark the end of Kaisers, as of great armaments. If he has owed anything to the great minds of Germany, its men of peace, of knowledge, science, and art, let him now pay the debt by being true to their ideals. He might well remember that Goethe himself faced a German army, when it had been beaten by ragged French republicans, to assure it that then and there a new epoch had begun.

The immeasurable sins of the rulers of Europe and their militarists can only be expiated now by the beginning of a new epoch which shall mean that the masses shall be the kings of Europe as they are the rulers with us to-day; that the last vestiges of feudalism shall be swept away to make room for government by and for the peoples.

GERMANY'S FIGHT FOR POWER

BY FREDERIC COURTLAND PENFIELD

NOT a few of the German Emperor's subjects pretend to be amazed by his grandiose utterances, the repeated affirmations of his unshakable will, and his confident appeals

to the divine sanction. But, say his admirers, these are permissible to one regarding himself as the instrument of a great and crowning action which he is to perform for the lasting glorification

of his country. It is admittedly a master will that has raised Germany to the position she holds — that of Britain's foremost rival in sea power and as a constructive nation. A critical study of this dominant person, whose divine right sway has for corollary the rattle of the sabre, compels the belief that William of Germany is to-day the mightiest man in Europe.

*ENGLAND'S GERMANOPHOBIA

The most striking thing viewed by the student of oversea affairs is the steady advance of Germany in commercial and political importance, and to admit this is to proclaim the Kaiser a national upbuilder of matchless ability. Ever since his historic cablegram to Paul Kruger, England has had a worrying attack of Germanophobia. It used to be assumed that almost everything done by Germany was meant to awe and overshadow France, and a generation of Frenchmen had this belief. But practical Germany long ago saw that Teutonic virility and the stationary French birthrate would by 1915 secure two lusty Germans to the earth for every Frenchman. Rivalry with her former foe then ceased, and the brawn and brain of the Fatherland were stimulated to rear a nation worthy of a more conspicuous rival — the true object of German envy — the British Isles, from which a fifth of the globe is ruled.

Upon this nerve-centre was Germany's covetous eye directed. In time the fact dawned upon England, and from that moment she has been in a state of chronic fear, with fright amounting on occasion to panic. From rostrum and editorial column Germany is pointed at as a country whose abiding ambition is the ultimate conquest of England, and it is said often that the Hohenzollern is but biding his time for beginning operations to that end. Once only flippantly regarded, the words "Made in Germany" now bring sleepless nights to industrial Britain.

At his breakfast table John Bull reads that Germany is ordering numberless dreadnoughts. The evening papers have heavy headlines stating that Germany is planning to convert Holland into a province for the undisguised purpose of bringing Germany into striking distance of Great Britain,

by commanding harbors and coastline within easy steaming distance of Albion. Alarmists parade circumstantial facts proving that Germany's activities at Borkum are transforming that Friesian haven into a veritable "Gibraltar," adding thereby to the chain of North German ports bringing the naval power of the Kaiser a hundred miles nearer to England. "Borkum" was the favorite topic of the last "silly season" in London journalism, and all English papers spasmodically prate of the "German peril."

Meanwhile consols have been falling until the lowest value in seventy years was recently reached; and in no similar condition of fear have the British been since the times of the ambitious Corsican. Toy machines flying after dark have been deemed to be airships — undoubtedly German — reconnoitering the country, and every *ignis fatuus* has been the lantern of a German spy collecting information about British defenses. The great mass of Britons have the belief that Germany is their determined enemy.

THE KAISER AS EUROPE'S "TRADE LORD"

The probable fact is that Germany is but a commercial foe, and relentlessly this; and if tireless industry can bring it, the Teuton designs having at no distant time a share of England's manufacturing and carrying trade. The purpose of every patriotic German seems to be to contribute his utmost to dethroning Britain's prestige as a business nation and securing it for the beloved Fatherland. Industrial rivalry can be more drastic than armed conflict, and it is Germany's vigor as applied in workshop and every field of toil that is menacing the British Isles. Battleships and added naval bases are merely means to a purpose — the exploitation of half the world with German products; and the Briton, complacent in the belief that his country is superior to any successful rivalry, can be but dwelling in a fool's paradise.

As a phrase, "The Mightiest Man in Europe," can be defended when it is recalled how the second William has vivified with commerce the political creation of his august grandparent. It used to be the fashion to speak of the Kaiser as the War Lord of Europe, but in only a few uprisings where colonization was being carried out has Germany

*Dr. Penfield's article is so able and striking an exposition of Germany's late position and intentions that it has been included although it was written three years ago. This should be borne in mind as England's "Germanophobia," and, very recently, the Kaiser's love of peace seems to have greatly lessened.—THE EDITORS.

fired a shot in real conflict since the present ruler came to the throne. To a greater extent than any other European monarch is he the exemplar of peace. He knows that the fruits of thrift are better for national stability than the glories of war. Hence the proper description is — and no designation can be more honorable — that he is the Trade Lord of Europe.

Let it be remembered that under his rule nearly every industry has doubled if not trebled, and that the commerce of Germany has grown in a way having no continental parallel. Suez Canal returns prove that the turnstile between Europe and the Orient is used by a growing number of ships under the German flag, while under the British ensign they are yearly falling in number. The Kaiser's people are progressing as the result of determined industry, and it is a splendid fact that the artisan, and not the drill-master, is making the Fatherland great.

William is tireless in getting new markets, and nine times out of ten he captures them from his British rival. He was one of the first to foresee that China could not forever resist the invasion of outside enterprise, and almost under his personal guidance the bankers and manufacturers of his nation have secured a footing in the Middle Kingdom that must grow to have enormous value.

GERMANY OUT FOR THE WORLD'S COMMERCE

Anybody may find reasons why William seeks to make Germany important through commerce. Let it be admitted that he chafes at barriers and that there is a boundlessness to his nature. Whenever he consults the imperial map, he must perceive that the frontiers are precisely those bequeathed by William the Great, and the loftiest ambition of a monarch is to have the national domain expand under his rule. The Kaiser shudders at the crowded condition of the earth in this twentieth century, when most frontiers seem permanently fixed. The Monroe Doctrine prevents his having even a coaling station in the Western Hemisphere. This is, perforce, more than annoying, although the sons of Germany control numerous lines of trade in many South and Central American republics. In his musings over the doctrine it is likely that the Emperor may say to himself: "Revenge I'll have upon the countrymen of Monroe by capturing every sort of trade; yes, I'll make Germany the workshop of the uni-

verse. To perdition with the Doctrine! Keep your territory — I'll get my share and more of the business of your continent!"

The Trade Lord had always known that the East, teeming with humanity like ants, was rich beyond the dreams of avarice, and had packed the coffers of England and given dominance in world power to the Britons. Consequently a legion of trade-getters was hurled five or six years ago upon Asia, and these planted outposts in Ceylon, sent a column of bagmen to India and the Malay States, and placed commercial pickets everywhere in China and Japan.

It was discovered early that England held no title to Eastern commerce, and none that was absolute to that of Australia. Britons following the time-honored custom of selling goods of kinds that they assume foreigners should have, the pliant and patient Germans are glad to furnish what the buyer prefers, and consequently gets many orders. It is understood that the Hohenzollern personally considers every diplomatic and consular appointment to the Celestial Empire, and that commercial aptitude is the prerequisite of assignment — and each official knows that the Kaiser's interest in Chinese business amounts to mania.

A GREATER GERMANY

Germany's colonies are unpopular at home, because of the yearly drain upon the exchequer. This fact, although unimportant, when taken with the impossibility of territorial control on this side of the Atlantic, has had its share in directing energy into channels of trade, for none other was open — and every progressive German knows that national welfare based upon commerce is aggrandisement in its safest form. "We can now only build up our resources," explain Berlin wiseacres, "but the next generation will see a greater Germany, possessing in all probabilities the Netherlands, striking southward to Trieste on the Adriatic, and including Palestine and a considerable area in Asia Minor, as well." A larger Germany seems as inevitable as the recurrence of the seasons, and will probably come when Europe again falls upon war and map-making. Should there be a parceling of Austria following the demise of the beloved Franz Josef, Germany's aspiration of access to the Adriatic may be achieved; and the Germanizing of the

Holy Land may be accomplished whenever the powers finally decide to rend the Ottoman provinces.

With the Germans it is unpalatable to have the mouths of the mighty Rhine controlled by a small and none too friendly neighbor. It is easier to predict that at some time Holland will be governed from Berlin than to state how this is to be accomplished. Invasion would be resented by more than one government, but subtle persuasion might bear fruit. The late Dr. Emil Reich not long since had the temerity to assert that the time is not remote when Holland will be called upon

the defensibility of Holland's coast, while others pretend to have heard of a "fatherly" letter from the Kaiser warning Wilhelmina to put her realm in condition to resist invasion from the sea. Failing to heed the Hohenzollern's advice, these men of prescience claim, the Queen was cautioned that in the event of foreign war Germany might have to take over control of her country.

Germany is not a government only knowing absorption when territory is acquired. Each of her twenty-six states to a considerable extent retains its independence. Bavaria, for example, has her own king, laws, and army. "If Germany proposed to Holland" — wrote Dr. Reich — "to become the twenty-seventh state of the empire, Holland would not be obliged to abandon queen, language, or laws. The Dutch would send deputies to the Reichstag, and Germans would be permitted to enter merchandise free of duties in Dutch harbors. Why should the Dutch consider such a union? To this there has been a strong answer ever since Japan's victory in the war with Russia. The matter borders upon the imperative."

Germany is spending enormous sums in improving her North Sea defenses, is fortifying Helgoland, and converting Emden — near the mouth of the Ems — into a harbor accommodating any fleet, thereby bringing nearer to the open sea the naval strength of the Kaiser. Germany has the amplest right to develop ports and fortifications within her border, certainly without consulting the opinion of England at all in the matter.

BRITISH AND GERMAN DREADNOUGHT FLEETS

It is interesting to watch the "dreadnought game," played by England and Germany. The press has been at it fast and furious since the mammoth fighting machine was perfected. For months the contest has been at white heat, in consequence of which much ink has been shed and many heartburnings occasioned in the British Isles. Believe the newspapers, and England is on the brink of ordering many of these leviathans, with countless guns to go with them. Never mind what the Admiralty says, or what the budget permits, Fleet Street periodically sets out to create a flotilla that will brook no rivalry. Then the German press explains exultantly what the Kaiser is



THE RUSSIAN FRONTIER

to defend her title to vast Java against an Asiatic invader, and must have aid or lose her Eastern colonies. Alliance with Germany, he insisted, would preserve the integrity of the Dutch possessions, and the price would be Holland's acceptance of rule as an individual state of the German Empire.

DUTCH DEFENSES

The proposal that the Dutch spend \$18,000,000 in coast defenses, while the frontier with Germany is undefended, has roused much comment. Some British statesmen have asked who is to benefit by

to do, and the programme always "sees" England and goes a ship or two better, besides increasing the calibre of the guns with each journalistic broadside. When these statements reach Albion the people can almost hear the din of German dockyards, working with "feverish haste" both by day and night.

Each power is fast adding to its sea-strength, and the dreadnought type is in demand, as everybody knows. But construction proceeds normally on both sides of the North Sea. England's fleet is the strongest in the world, while Germany's is but a poor second. Exactly stated, the present power of both navies is this: England has eight dreadnoughts and Germany four. Of battleships of 10,000 or more tons displacement, exclusive of dreadnoughts, England has forty-nine and Germany twenty-two. Of armored cruisers — now regarded as adding very little to fighting strength — England has eighty-four and Germany half as many; and of destroyers England has one hundred and sixty-eight and Germany ninety-one.

The cardinal points of interest in the naval programme of the countries is this: England has ten dreadnoughts under construction, while Germany is building nine, and debating the wisdom of ordering more. Some critics contend that, Great Britain being practically all coast, and with possessions throughout the world, England's force could not be used as a unit, as Germany's might. Hence, reason the experts, Germany already is a match for England. When fighting strength is considered, it is almost overpowering to the intellect to learn that the German-Austrian alliance means that 7,000,000 soldiers receive the word of command in German. And the idea is abroad that this command is given from Berlin.

When William II came to the throne in 1888 the imperial fleet was insignificant. His energy has raised the service to second place among the world's navies. With an army of four million men — several times greater than England's home force — experts claim that in the event of hostilities with Russia or France a fleet would scarcely be required. With Austria, likewise creating a powerful navy, Germany can have no dispute, for the countries are allies.

"What is the purpose then, of the navy that Germany will possess by 1912?" ask English writers. One of these declares that it is meant

only for the North Sea, and there to be a menace to the British Isles. He insists that the ships are built in a manner prohibiting their use in distant waters. "Yes," concludes this alarmist, "Germany's fleet is for the North Sea, and will there remain, and behind it will be everything needed for armament, docking, and repairing." Possessing no water frontier save the North Sea and its connecting bodies of water, an impartial observer might inquire why the German Government should distribute its costly fleet upon seas where the country can have but little interest. But some British publicists pretend to think that only England has a right to the North Sea.

A GROWING COUNTRY

The recent quinquennial census shows the population of Germany to be 65,000,000, indicating an increase of 4,500,000 in five years, and 20,000,000 in thirty years. Dr. Wilhelm Hubbeschleiden predicts that by 1980 there will be 150,000,000 Germans. The present population of the British Isles is 45,000,000, which represents an increase of less than 11,000,000 in thirty years. In Germany the demand for labor has practically checked emigration, while the reverse is the case in Great Britain. As might be expected, partisans of protection point to Germany as progressing by leaps in all material ways, while Free Trade England falls behind — in one there is plenty of work, while the other has an idle class burdensome to the nation. Germany's increase of population will soon be at the rate of a million a year, and it is the purpose of the government to keep every patriotic man and woman at home to toil for the Fatherland's advance. In England the newspapers are filled with advertisements encouraging migration to Canada, Australia, and other colonies. Ten years ago German emigration was about 121,000 souls annually; last year it was scarcely 25,000 persons, and nearly all to America.

Germany's national wealth is now estimated at \$88,000,000,000, while fifteen years ago it was \$55,000,000,000. Recent Prussian statistics indicate that the aggregate taxable incomes of less than \$750 a year have risen from \$775,000,000 in 1895 to \$1,900,000,000 in 1910 — an increase of 150 per cent. in fifteen years. Savings bank deposits have expanded in fifteen years from \$1,125,000,000 to upward of \$3,000,000,000, and it is held that the average wage has risen in ten

years from \$186.50 to \$256.25. This improvement is 38 per cent., while cost of living has advanced about 25 per cent. The income tax in 1895 produced \$38,000,000, while last year it was \$73,000,000.

SUCCESSFUL FARMING

While economic success has been brought about by developing manufacturing, the use of machinery and chemical fertilizers is winning from the soil a bounty greater than a quarter of a century ago, when the country numbered eight or ten million more agriculturists. In many progressive countries the movement of humanity is away from the soil. This is manifested in Germany by the fast-expanding population of urban communities. With its environs Berlin has close upon 3,000,000 inhabitants, and offers advantages that a generation since were unthought of. Hamburg has 1,000,000 people. Here as about Bremen, what were green fields a few years ago are now harbor basins, and the quays of these ports possess every modern appliance for loading and unloading vessels. Munich, Dresden, and Leipsic have 600,000 people each, while Cologne boasts of 500,000. Germany to-day is noisy with industry, with skies overhung with mantles of smoke from the chimneys of furnaces, chemical works, porcelain factories, and manufacturing plants of every kind.

EXPORTS AND IMPORTS

In Prussia the northeastern provinces have largely been deserted by the young of the farmer class for factory employment in the towns. The Rhenish-Westphalian coal and iron district attracts labor from Posen, while thousands of Russian and Galician Poles yearly cross the frontier to secure a summer's work in the eastern provinces. Italians and Croatians are drawn in numbers to Germany, where their toil finds liberal compensation. Rural prosperity in the past twelve years is reflected in a threefold increase in land value. An American economist said recently that if the farmers of the United States could raise crops as prolific as the Germans do, that Uncle Sam would be a billion dollars richer each year. This praise was meant to apply not alone to the soil of Germany but to the intelligence of the husbandman as well.

Germany's exports last year were valued at \$1,750,000,000; a dozen years ago they were

\$701,500,000. Notwithstanding this showing the balance of trade is against the country; for last year's imports were \$914,000,000 greater than those of twelve years ago. It should be borne in mind that as a nation growing in population, whose keynote is manufacturing, the bringing in of raw materials to be fabricated is enormous. Shipping under the German flag has in a quarter of a century developed sevenfold, and 64 per cent. of the sea freight is carried at preferential rates in subsidized bottoms. The realm is hungry for trade, that is apparent to any observer, and is being made rich by the multiplicity of things "Made in Germany."

There is constant discussion as to whether German prosperity is due to the tariff policy of protection. Some English pamphleteers insist that facts are habitually perverted in the Fatherland's statistics. More than one Fleet Street writer, conceding the genuineness of German up-building, mourns because Britain is falling behind owing to her retention of free trade. Others argue that progress in Germany, where every man has been a trained soldier or sailor, is largely due to the conscription rule, while lagging England has volunteer enlistment. The discipline of Germany, argue these critics, permanently rouses industry and enterprise.

SOCIALISTIC PROPAGANDA

Germany's curse seems to be Socialism, spreading so rapidly that many statesmen are apprehensive of the length to which it may go. Its spread in 1910 was greater than ever. During the year the Socialists held thirty thousand meetings, and distributed 23,000,000 leaflets and 2,500,000 pamphlets. The Socialist party has many representatives in the Reichstag who attack any measure deemed to be super-monarchical. In the Prussian Diet a Socialist member has recently said that matters were developing in a way making it possible for the German crown to be swept away in a night, as was the case in Portugal. The German Chancellor has seen fit to warn the more radical exponents of Socialism that they would be held to account for excesses resulting from their teachings.

Save for Socialism, the German nation is homogeneous, while Britain is rent by national indecision and political forebodings. Germany's imperial policy seems remarkably continuous.

Its exponents work consecutively, strenuously, unobtrusively — theirs is the Bismarckian policy of blood and iron, with "ever ready" for its watchword.

BRITISH "MUCK-RAKING" IN GERMANY

The sending of British commissions and delegations to Germany to investigate material conditions has been the fashion. Political parties and leagues and societies advocating this or that have had inquisitors ransacking the Fatherland from frontier to frontier, and their findings have been embodied in tons of reports, some instructive, but most of them unconvincing and stupid.

Hundreds of "Free Trade Leaguers" and "Tariff Trippers" have sought the secret of German prosperity, and their junketings have produced deductions wonderfully expressed. As might have been expected, the predilections of the visitors have found ample support as a consequence of the investigation. Free-traders discovered that Germany was not prospering because of protection, and *vice versa*. Employers of labor invariably learned that the toiling classes were poorer paid and worked more hours than at home. In fact, every investigator seemed to discover what he wished to find. Nearly every delegate published his "report," with the result that England has had a plague of leaflets. Hundreds described what they believed they saw, but one tripper tersely told what he *did not* see, and this was the best report of the avalanche. Here is what he said of Germany: "No unemployed standing at street corners. No drunkenness or brawling. No hooliganism. No slums of poverty as in

England. No discourtesy. No begging or hawking. No deformed persons. No land out of cultivation. No ragged children. No late trains."

The alarming discovery was made that thousands of poor subsist in part on horseflesh, and to prove the horror scores of investigators brought home the public advertisements of horseflesh merchants. These produce an outburst of righteous indignation. About a hundredth part of the meat eaten in Germany is horseflesh. It is sold openly as such, and it is held to be wholesome and palatable, and is rigidly inspected by health officials. Probably every continental country has people who eat horseflesh, on account of its cheapness — in Germany it sells at eight or ten cents a pound. Other British investigators pounced upon the black bread as unfit for human beings, comparing it detrimentally with the armor-coated loaves of rural England.

One cannot know the conditions and ambitions of Germany and Great Britain — each fighting to the point of desperation for power and trade — without perceiving the enormous mutual advantage that would accrue could a treaty of amity and commerce between the two be brought about. Such an alliance, with immediate cessation of expenditure over sea-power agreed upon, would have the greatest material value, besides practically insuring the peace of Europe and Asia for years to come. With the Anglo-Japanese treaty soon to expire, the most brilliant achievement open to British statesmanship would surely be the securing of an alliance with the rival across the North Sea whose progress is astonishing the world — Germany.

HOW THE NATIONS ARE LINED UP

		PEOPLE	WAR ARMY
GERMANY	PEOPLE	65,000,000	300,000
	WAR ARMY	4,000,000	5,500,000
			2,500,000
			300,000
			800,000
and AUSTRIA		45,300,000	45,000
		500,000	200,000
		6,000,000	1,500,000
		53,000,000	

VS.

SERVIA	3,500,000
RUSSIA	171,000,000
FRANCE	39,500,000
BELGIUM	7,500,000
GREAT BRITAIN	45,300,000
MONTENEGRO	500,000
PORTUGAL	6,000,000
JAPAN	53,000,000

ITALY	35,300,000	1,100,000
TURKEY	21,000,000	500,000
GREECE	4,000,000	200,000
ROUMANIA	7,500,000	500,000
BULGARIA	4,500,000	380,000
NETHERLANDS	6,000,000	200,000
SWITZERLAND	3,600,000	300,000
DENMARK	2,700,000	100,000
NORWAY	2,400,000	125,000
SWEDEN	5,500,000	400,000

Neutral at first but
might be drawn into
a war of long duration

ARMIES AND NAVIES OF EUROPE

THE ARMIES OF EUROPE

BY FREDERIC LOUIS HUIDEKOPER

[Mr. Huidekoper, who has followed the principal European armies, is a writer of acknowledged authority on the campaigns of Frederick the Great, Napoleon, and Von Moltke, as well as on military subjects of the day. This article was written a day or two after the actual outbreak of the war. In view of the events which have actually happened, the forecast of Germany's probable course of action, as given in the latter part of the article, is of special interest. — THE EDITORS.]

THE war in which all Europe is embarked will undoubtedly be the most gigantic struggle in the history of the world — so gigantic that even the Napoleonic wars will seem like dwarfs in comparison.

To understand the present situation in Europe one must look at the arms and aims of each country in turn.

Ever since the reign of Ivan the Great (1462-1505), Russia has pursued one policy with extraordinary consistency, her effort being to improve herself by close contact with more civilized nations and to obtain access to the sea, especially in warm waters. The wars which she has waged against Poland, Sweden, the Turks of the Khanate of the Crimea, Prussia, Napoleon, the Turks in 1877-1878, and Japan, her stealthy advance in Central Asia and her intrigues in the Far East, in Persia and the Balkans, are all part and parcel of this policy. She has constituted herself the protectress of the Slavonic people in the Balkans in return for which they may help her to secure Constantinople, the plum upon which she has looked with longing eyes for centuries.

It is an open secret that Russian expansion deliberately plans access to the North Sea over Scandinavia's prostrate nationalism, while at the same time it is reaching for a United Slavic Balkan peninsula, bordering south and eastward on the Adriatic, the Marmora, and the Black Sea, with complete control of their strategic sea-gates, the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles. Germany, geographically inside of Russia's enveloping ambitions is even more resolved upon an expanding empire, which shall extend eventually from Dutch and Belgian ports on the North Sea, clear through what is now Turkey, along the line of the Bagdad railroad to the Persian Gulf.

Moreover, there is the possibility that if the

Austrian Empire breaks up on the death of its present ruler — as has long been expected — the Kaiser or his descendants may become possessed of that territory and the important port of Trieste on the Adriatic. At the present moment, Russia's interests in that part of the continent clash with Austria's. Austria is keenly alive to its need to control the Adriatic, hence her occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1908, her resolution not to permit the Servians to have the port of Scutari, and her recent creation of the Kingdom of Albania. Her recent stand with respect to Servia is based upon her determination to permit no interference with her rights in that part of Europe.

Back of these Austrian ambitions is the Pan-Germanic idea — the German slogan of the famous March to the East — which is diametrically opposed, as already indicated, to a Russianized Balkans, or powerful Slav-Balkan state.

These facts afford a glimpse into the intrigues of these nations and the struggle between Russia, on the one hand, and Germany and Austria on the other, to obtain the upper hand in the Balkans politically, commercially, and by the effort of each one to introduce its system of military training — all which were discussed at such length in American newspapers during the late war, but without any attempt to throw light on the fundamental reasons from which they sprang.

The map of Europe shows Great Britain separated from the continent by a narrow strip of troubled water which has played a rôle in history only equalled by the Mediterranean. Her security is dependent mainly upon the ability of her fleets to prevent invasion. Her land forces are a secondary consideration. Her task is to defend the British Isles; to protect the carrying trade of the world which is in her hands; to keep open communication with her colonial possessions scattered all

over the globe; and to prevent her food supply from abroad from being cut off lest she starve to death.

The main motive in France is revenge for 1870-71 and the reconquest of the lost provinces of Alsace and Lorraine.

European armament and European armies are at the same time the result of these conflicting ambitions, just briefly indicated, and the means by which each nation hopes to satisfy its own territorial hunger at the expense of the other nations.

For the benefit of the uninitiated in military matters, it may be said that almost every great nation has a regular army, and one, two, or three reserves. In time of peace the regular armies are kept on a reduced, or "peace footing." When war is imminent, they are enlarged to their "war footing" by augmenting them to full strength, either by additional men drawn from the reserves or by recruiting, and by organizing, equipping, and supplying them for active operations in the field. This is known as mobilization. Army affairs are administered by a council presided over by the Minister of War, which includes certain high military officers charged with duties necessary to the proper management of land forces. One of these is the Chief of the General Staff who is nearly always the commander-in-chief in time of war. The General Staff prepares all plans of war, sees to the proper coördination of the various branches of the service, and superintends the execution of the plans determined upon. There are two kinds of troops: mobile, and fixed, i. e., stationed in fortifications. The mobile troops are of two sorts: those of the line, i. e., the fighting men which include the infantry, cavalry, and artillery; and those of the staff. Broadly speaking, the infantry is organized as follows:

THE ORGANIZATION OF AN ARMY

INFANTRY

A squad is 8 men under the command of a corporal.

A section is 16 men under the command of a sergeant.

A platoon is from 50 to 75 men under a lieutenant.

A company is 3 platoons, 200 to 250 men, under a captain.

A battalion is 4 or more companies under a major.

A regiment is 3 or more battalions under a colonel, or a lieutenant-colonel.

A brigade is 2 or 3 regiments under a brigadier-general.

A division is 2 or more brigades under a major-general.

An army corps is 2 or more brigades, supplemented by cavalry, artillery, engineers, etc., under a major-general or lieutenant-general.

CAVALRY

A section is 8 men under a corporal.

A platoon is 36 to 50 men under a lieutenant, or junior captain.

A troop is 3 to 4 platoons, 125 to 150 men, under a captain.

A squadron is 3 troops under a senior captain, or a major.

A regiment is 4 to 6 squadrons under a colonel.

A brigade is 3 regiments under a brigadier-general.

A division is 2 or 3 brigades under a major-general.

ARTILLERY

A battery is 130 to 180 men, with 4 to 6 guns (8 in the Russian army) under a captain.

A group or battalion is 3 or 4 batteries under a major.

A regiment is 3 or 4 groups (battalions) under a colonel.

When regiments are combined into brigades, brigades into divisions, and divisions into army corps, cavalry, artillery, and certain other auxiliary troops, such as engineers, signal corps, aeroplane corps, etc., are joined with them in such proportions as has been found necessary. Every unit, from the company up, has its own supply and ammunition wagons, field hospitals, etc.

In Europe almost every man has done compulsory service with the colors, varying from one to four years, and aside from the usual drills and instruction, has received training in manœuvres, great or small, where the endeavor is made to reproduce the exact conditions which will occur in war. At times, however, even the "grands manœuvres" degenerate into what smacks strongly of opera bouffe, despite every effort to the contrary. The writer vividly recollects a charge of five regiments of French cavalry across nearly 800 yards of absolutely open country against a battery, a battalion of infantry, and a regiment of dismounted dragoons in September last, and the unconcealed disgust of one old soldier who had fought in the battles around Metz in 1870 at what he characterized as "crass idiocy." Even more spectacular was the charge of eighty squadrons of Bavarian cavalry, numbering more than 9,000 men, across about 1,000 yards of open ground against a strong position held by a brigade of Saxon infantry and several batteries, led by the German Emperor in person some years ago. The umpires decided that it was successful, whereat the military attachés smiled and remarked, as did Marshal MacMahon of the charge of the Light Brigade at Balaclava, "*C'est magnifique, mais ce n'est pas la guerre!*" (It is magnificent, but it is not war!) Upon another occasion the Kaiser in-

dulged in a similarly preposterous charge, but upon galloping up to the umpires and inquiring, "How's that?" was greeted with the firm but diplomatic answer, "All dead but one, Your Majesty." It must not be supposed that such license is always the case, for the training is often severe, and in the various schools of musketry the utmost attention is paid to good marksmanship — no nation being more thorough in all that relates to military matters than Germany.

To understand the efficiency of European soldiers and the never-ceasing preparation for war, let us examine the systems of the leading continental powers, beginning with the one which has the greatest reputation.

GERMANY

The German army on a peace footing consists of 31,459 officers and 768,540 men, military service being compulsory and universal with certain exemptions. Liability to service (*Wehrpflicht*) begins at the age of 17 and ends at 45; actual service (*Heerpflicht*) commences at 20. With the active army the term of service is seven years, two in the ranks and five in the reserve for the infantry, five in the ranks and four in the reserve for the cavalry and horse artillery. The soldier is permanently attached to some corps, and during his reserve service is twice summoned for training with it for a period limited by law to eight weeks, but in actual practice rarely six weeks and more usually a month. From the active reserve the soldier passes into the *Landwehr* or second line army, composed of two "bans," the first of 5 years for the infantry and 3 for the cavalry and horse artillery; the second "ban" of 6 to 7 years, or 8 and 9, for the cavalry and horse artillery. During the first ban there are two periods of training of 8 to 14 days each, in the second none, while the *Landwehr* cavalry is exempted altogether. The final reserve is the *Landsturm* — a force purely for home defence — in which the men remain until they have reached the age of 45; in other words, about 6 years. The *Landsturm* is composed of two "bans," the first comprising all men between 17 and 39 who for any reason have received no military training; the second includes all men, trained or untrained, between the ages of 39 and 45. The German army admits as volunteers for one year only well-educated young men who pay their own expenses and who serve

to supply all the Reserve and *Landwehr* officers. There are also a considerable number of reserve troops intermediate between the active army and the *Landwehr*, and a supplementary (*Ersatz*) reserve of young men of 20 who are fit for service but in excess of the required number of annual recruits. They are liable for three periods of training, one of 10 weeks, one of 6 and one of 4, stress being laid on non-combatant duties, although they are also available for depot duty. The object of these various reserves is to keep the active regiments up to full strength and to replace the enormous wastage in men that invariably occurs in war.

In the organization of the German army six battalions form an infantry regiment, two regiments a brigade, two brigades a division, and two divisions an army corps. There are 10 divisions composed of 3 brigades each, and in the event of war it is probable that the other divisions will be similarly augmented. Adding the necessary auxiliary troops, viz: an artillery brigade of 12 batteries composed of 6 guns each — or 4 in the case of the horse batteries — a regiment of cavalry of 4 squadrons, an engineer battalion, sanitary troops, etc., a German 3-brigade division at war strength would number about 21,000, and an army corps — to which are further attached 4 batteries of howitzers and a battalion of rifles — about 43,000 combatants. The cavalry division is composed of 3 brigades of 2 regiments each and 2 or 3 batteries of horse artillery, a total of 24 squadrons and 8 to 12 guns. Twenty-five corps constitute the German army, whose war strength is (1) active army, 1,700,000; (2) *Landwehr*, 1,300,000; and (3) *Landsturm*, 1,000,000, a grand total of 4,000,000 men.

The infantry is armed with the Mauser magazine rifle, 1898 model, with a calibre of .311 inches and fires a "spit ball," i. e., one pointed like a pencil. The Mauser has a velocity of 2,700 foot seconds, a point-blank range of about 300 yards, and has adjustable sights for ranges up to 2,000 yards. The cavalry is armed with a Mauser magazine carbine, and all carry lances. The artillery, both field and horse, use a Krupp piece of 1906 model, firing a 15 lb. shell. The field howitzer is a 30-pounder, the heavy howitzer a 94-pounder. The Army Law of 1913 provided for 5 aeroplane battalions numbering 17 companies with about 400 aeroplanes, and that year there

were 24 dirigible balloons in the military establishment.

The German General Staff has the reputation of being the most thorough body of its kind in the world. The writer has been told upon excellent authority that Field Marshal von Moltke used to declare that with the declaration of war in 1870 came his rest. The story is characteristic of the preparedness of the German General Staff, but if the plans to which the Germans are so wedded are upset the result may be different from their calculations. As indicative of the rule-of-thumb from which no digression is permitted, every observer of German manœuvres has been struck by the obligation of troops to take the exact position assigned to them quite regardless of whether circumstances have altered conditions and whether the spot is surrounded by enemies. In war such blind adherence to orders might entail annihilation. Moreover, the training instils into the men a dependence upon others, especially the officers and non-commissioned officers, which tends to rob them of all initiative; and the most casual observer cannot fail to remark upon the difficulty of the leaders to make their men take and keep open order in skirmishes and attacks, quite in contrast to the French, English, and Americans. The loss of life must necessarily be out of all proportion to the results achieved, as was the case when the Prussian Guard attacked the village of St. Privat on August 18, 1870, and suffered a loss of 30 per cent. in twenty minutes.

The German artillery is distinctly inferior to the French as a weapon, and the Mauser rifle has not such a flat trajectory (i. e. the bullet does not carry so far in a straight line) as the French small-arm at distances above 900 yards. The administration of an army that includes the commissariat, the quartermaster's department, the medical corps, etc., which supply the troops with food and all necessary stores, is only slightly inferior to the French; but its officials, whose functions are semi-military and semi-civil, have been subjected for years to the most overweening arrogance on the part of the officers of the line, and it would not be surprising to see revenge play its rôle, especially if the supply system breaks down under defeat.

Germany's railways are admirably situated for military operations in every part of the Empire. There is no lack of arms or ammunition so far as is known, and in the tower at Spandau, near Berlin

an enormous amount of gold has been stored for years as a war chest. German powder is of excellent quality and fully abundant. Supplies are ample for a campaign of months, but if Germany is cut off from the sea difficulty will be experienced in feeding her enormous armies. Her fortifications are of the latest and most approved type, heavily armed and provisioned for months, and, unlike France, she has wisely put her mortars in the first line, the howitzers, the short range guns, in second line, and the high power guns in the rear. Each fortification is provided with a wireless system for communication with other fortifications, thus rendering it possible for garrisons to unite either to harass the enemy temporarily or for prolonged operations — a performance heretofore so hazardous that it has been rarely attempted in the presence of the enemy.

FRANCE

The last few years have witnessed an almost incredible resurrection in the military spirit of the French. Less than two years ago, when Germany increased her standing army, France instantly retaliated by lengthening the term of active service from two to three years without creating so much as a ripple in her internal affairs. She is determined to recover her lost provinces of Alsace and Lorraine, and, if the opinion of military critics is not woefully at fault, she may be counted upon to put up a desperate fight against her German adversary.

The "National Army" of France is composed of the "Metropolitan Army" and the Colonial Army, the former numbering 753,403 and the latter about 116,000 — 46,000 being in Morocco and 39,000 in Algeria — a total of 869,403, exclusive of 25,000 in the Gendarmerie or military police. Military service is compulsory and universal from the ages of 20 to 48, the only exemptions being for physical disability. After 3 years in the active army, the soldier passes to the reserve for 11 years, followed by 7 years in the Territorial Army and 7 in the Territorial Reserve. In the active reserve the conscript undergoes two periods of training and manœuvres lasting for 4 weeks each; in the Territorial Army one period of 2 weeks; in the Territorial Reserve, no fixed period. Unlike the Germans, the French have no one-year volunteers but every encouragement is given for voluntary enlistment for 3, 4, or 5 years, particularly

in the Colonial Army. The length of the reserve service produces more than 2,000 reservists per battalion, so that in case of mobilization the active units can easily be maintained at full war strength and each battalion and regiment forms an additional reserve unit with men left over for the depot. As a necessary precaution, the troops stationed along the German frontier are kept at a considerably higher strength than the others.

In the organization of the French army, two infantry regiments — composed of 6 or sometimes 7 or 8 battalions — form a brigade, 2 brigades a division, and 2 divisions an army corps. To every division is attached a field artillery regiment of 9 batteries of 4 guns each. The corps artillery includes 9 field and 3 howitzer batteries, to which 6 reinforcing batteries are added upon mobilization, so that each corps on a war footing has 144 guns. Furthermore an army corps in the field has attached to it a cavalry brigade of 2 regiments, 1 chasseur (cavalry) battalion, engineer companies, sanitary and service troops, etc. The cavalry divisions are composed of 3 brigades of 2 regiments each — together with 3 batteries of horse artillery. When mobilized the strength of an army corps is approximately 33,000 combatants; a cavalry division 4,700. There is also an aeronautical corps with 334 aeroplanes and 14 dirigibles.

The French army is localized and territorialized. Of the 21 army corps regions, all except Algeria (the 10th) furnishes a complete army corps. The 8 infantry regiments of an army corps are recruited from their respective regimental districts, but the additional regiment is obtained from the region at large. Like the chasseur battalions, these additional regiments are usually stationed near the eastern frontier, so that the 6th Army Corps at Chalons and the 7th at Besançon are augmented to 3 divisions each.

The Reserve Army has two divisions in each region, corresponding to those in the active army. Upon mobilization the 36 reserve divisions contain virtually the same organization and strength as the troops of the first line. The reserves of the regional regiments, engineers and foot artillery can be utilized for garrisoning the various fortresses to which allusion will be made later. The Territorial Army likewise consists of 36 divisions and garrison troops. Upon mobilization the re-

maining men of the Reserve and Territorial armies are summoned to the depots and are available to maintain the field army at war strength. The Customs Corps, the Chasseurs Forestiers, the Gendarmerie (25,000) and the Garde Républicaine (2,992) have also had military training and can be utilized in time of war.

The French field army is composed of 20 army corps, the brigade of 14 battalions stationed at Lyons, and 10 divisions of cavalry. Raised to their full war strength, the active army numbers 1,009,000, the reserves and depots, 1,600,000, the Territorial army 818,000, and the Territorial reserve 451,000, a grand total of 3,878,000. As a matter of fact, France possesses about 5,000,000 trained men, 1,000,000 more than Germany — a thing which not many people know.

The infantry is armed with the Lebel magazine rifle of .315 inches calibre, the cavalry with the Lebel carbine, both excellent weapons. The field piece is a rapid-fire gun of 7.5 centimetres (2.95 inches) of the model of 1907, provided with a shield for protection. The howitzers are of 12 or 15.5 centimetres (1 cm.=.3937 inch).

For many years there existed much uncertainty as to who would command the French army in time of war owing to the fear of a dictator like Louis Napoleon or like General Boulanger attempted to be (February, 1889). In July, 1911, when the Moroccan trouble was at its height and war seemed imminent, it was decided that the power of appointing the commander-in-chief should be taken away from the Conseil Supérieur de la Guerre — which is charged with general military questions under the presidency of the Minister of War — and vested in the Conseil des Généraux, which is composed of the officers commanding the field armies and which has now selected General Joffre for supreme command.

The French artillery is generally admitted to be in a class by itself and the Intendance (commissariat, etc.) is excelled by none other. The infantry is most deceptive in appearance, but the ability of the French to march and attack has never been surpassed. On the other hand, its *forte* is not the defensive, and only last year the writer was struck by the need of firmer discipline and more instruction. The French are peculiar in this respect, but the instant the first shot is fired no soldier rallies quicker to his colors, or is

more desperately in earnest than the Frenchman. The cavalry is first class and will give a good account of itself. Its work will be supplemented by the army aeroplane corps and a volunteer aeroplane corps, the latter of which can be counted upon to furnish about 1,000 aeroplanes, which will prove far more than a match for the German aircraft, and ought to keep the commanding generals fully informed of every movement of the enemy. The Minister of War recently stated that there was no provision for the defense of the fortifications against attacks from the air, and there is also some question as to the efficiency of the wireless apparatus installed in the fortresses. The French naval powder is notoriously uncertain and short-lived, but the same cannot be said of the army powder, and so far as is known abroad, there is no shortage in ammunition. The regimental officers are excellent but the French success will be largely measured by the ability of the generals. If they are able to take and keep the offensive, the French will prove a decidedly tough nut for any army in the world to crack.

RUSSIA

The peace strength of the Russian army is 1,284,000 men, its war strength 5,962,306. Military service is compulsory and universal, beginning at the age of 20 and terminating with the end of the 43d year. Service in the active army is for 3 years in the case of the infantry and artillery, for 4 years in the other arms. The soldier then passes into the reserve (*Zapas*) for 14 or 15 years, during which he receives two trainings of 6 weeks each. After 18 years in the active army and reserve, he is transferred to the Territorial army (*Opolchénié*) for 5 years. This embraces also the surplus of the annual contingent, thus forming a supplementary reserve, and, in the second "ban," all those exempted from service, those not up to standard, and the older classes of surplus men. There also exists a modified system of volunteers for one year who supply the bulk of officers required for the reserve upon mobilization.

Owing to the enormous extent of the Russian empire, its army is divided into three forces, the army of European Russia, the army of the Caucasus, and the Asiatic army. The Russian battalion contains 1,000 men; 4 battalions constitute a regiment, 2 regiments a brigade and 2 brigades

a division. The field batteries are composed of 8 guns, the horse batteries of 6. The ordinary army corps is made up of 2 divisions, a howitzer division and one battalion of sappers, and has a fighting strength of approximately 32,000 men. The rifle brigades form separate organizations of 8 battalions with 3 batteries attached. The Cossacks, who hold their lands by military tenure, are liable to service for life, and provide their own equipment and horses. At 19 their training begins; at 21 they enter the active regiment of their district, at 25 the "second category" regiment, and at 29 the "third category" regiment, followed by 5 years in the reserve. After 25 years of age, their training is 3 weeks per annum. In European Russia the field army consists of the Imperial Guard and Grenadier Corps, 27 line army corps and 20 cavalry divisions; in the Caucasus of 3 army corps and 4 cavalry divisions. The Asiatic army is composed of Russians with a few Turkoman irregular horse (*jigits*), and is mainly stationed in East Siberia. Since the Russian-Japanese war these forces have been increased and re-organized into a strong army which would mobilize as 5 Trans-Baikal corps and 2 to 4 Cossack cavalry divisions, numbering, together with auxiliary troops, more than 200,000 men.

The system of recruitment is territorial, that is each army corps draws its recruits from a fixed district and is usually quartered in garrisons there. In European Russia the majority of the army is stationed west of the longitude of Moscow, so that mobilization is slower under ordinary circumstances than in France or Germany because the recruits and reservists have long distances to travel particularly as many are consigned to corps outside Great Russia. The Czar cannot mobilize 300,000 of his troops within any theatre of operations under three weeks, although four times that number could be assembled one week later. The comparative dearth of railways is a great handicap in the matter of supplies.

The small-arm of the infantry is the "3-line" rifle of the 1901 model. It has a magazine holding 5 cartridges, a calibre of .299 inches, a muzzle velocity of 2,035 foot seconds, and is sighted to 3,000 yards. The arm of the cavalry and Cossacks has a barrel $2\frac{3}{4}$ inches shorter but uses the same ammunition, and is provided with a bayonet which no other mounted troops use. The field piece is a Krupp rapid-fire, shielded gun of

the 1902 model with a muzzle velocity of 1,950 foot seconds, the shell weighing 13½ lbs.

Ordinarily speaking, the standard of the Russian army is distinctly below that of the French and German. Their small-arm is slightly better than our old Krag-Jorgensen, their field piece is inferior to the French and their movements slower except in the case of the Cossack cavalry which is no match for other European mounted troops. On the other hand, the Russian has always been a capital fighting man, and too much stress cannot be laid upon the value of actual experience in war. It is highly doubtful that the Russians will encounter any harder fighting than they did in Manchuria, and it must be remembered that a great many of the officers and men who fought against the Japanese will participate in the present war. The Russian army will therefore be a potent factor in any equation.

AUSTRIA-HUNGARY

Austria-Hungary's peace establishment is 472,716, the war strength of her regular army 1,360,000. Military service is universal and compulsory, beginning at the age of 19 — but more usually at 21 — and ending at 43. Service with the "Common" or active army lasts for 2 years in the case of the infantry and 3 for the cavalry and horse artillery: in the Landwehr (first reserve) 10 for the infantry and 7 for the cavalry and horse artillery, followed by the Landsturm (second reserve) until the soldier's 42nd birthday. Hungary possesses a separate and distinct Landwehr (Honvéd) and Landsturm (Népfölkelés), which constitute the Hungarian national army. There is also an Ersatz (supplementary) reserve intended to maintain the units of the Common army at full strength. The Ersatz reservists receive 8 weeks' training in their first year and are subsequently liable for the same service as the other reservists of the army corps to which they belong.

The Empire is divided into 16 army corps districts, each presumed to furnish a complete army corps of 2 divisions to the active army. Every infantry division is composed of 2 brigades of 8 battalions each, 1 artillery brigade of 10 batteries of 6 guns, a regiment of cavalry, a jäger (rifle) battalion, etc. The army corps also contains a regiment of field artillery or howitzers, a pioneer battalion, a pontoon company, etc.,

and numbers about 34,000 combatants. There are 6 permanent cavalry divisions, each consisting of 2 brigades (24 squadrons), 3 batteries of horse artillery and a machine-gun detachment numbering about 4,000 men. It is estimated that Austria's land forces raised to their maximum war strength would be as follows: Common or active army, 1,360,000; Austrian Landwehr, 240,000; Hungarian Landwehr, 220,000; Landsturm, 2,000,000; Ersatz reserve, 500,000; grand total, 4,320,000.

The infantry is armed with the Mannlicher magazine rifle, calibre .315, 1895 model; the cavalry with a carbine of the same make. The field gun, a Krupp, uses a shrapnel of 14½ lbs. the field howitzer is a 10.5 cm. piece weighing 1,000 lbs. and firing a 30 lb. shell. On a peace footing all batteries have 4 guns, on war footing 6, except the mountain batteries which are provided with 4 guns.

The Hungarian cavalry is admirable; the rest of the army is undoubtedly a good force but scarcely comparable to the French or German armies. It has not fought single-handed since 1866 when it was decisively defeated by the Prussians and their allies at Königgrätz.

ITALY

The Italian army on a peace footing numbers 250,860 officers and men, exclusive of the troops in Africa. Service is compulsory and universal, beginning at the age of twenty. Two years in the permanent army are followed by 6 years in the reserve, 4 years in the mobile militia, and 7 years in the territorial militia. In the reserve they receive from 2 to 6 weeks' training which may be extended over several years; in the territorial militia, 30 days' training. Each division consists of 2 brigades composed of 2 regiments, each of 3 battalions, together with a regiment of field artillery (5 batteries) and has a war strength of 14,156 officers and men and 30 guns. Four regiments divided into 2 brigades and 2 horse batteries comprise a cavalry division. Each army corps has 2 divisions — save the IXth which has 3 — a regiment of field artillery (36 guns), 2 or 3 heavy batteries, a regiment of cavalry and one of Bersaglieri (light infantry). Aside from the Carabinieri or military police and the usual auxiliary troops including the aeronautical corps with 7 companies, 30 aeroplanes, and 9 airships, are the Alpini, fron-

tier troops organized for the defense of the mountain passes, consisting of 8 regiments (26 battalions) of Alpine infantry and 2 regiments of 36 mountain batteries. The field army comprises 12 army corps and 3 cavalry divisions, its war strength is about 2,600,000, divided as follows: active army 700,000, mobile militia 400,000, territorial militia, a large part of whom are only partially trained, 1,500,000.

The Italian infantry is armed with the Mannlicher Carcano magazine rifle of 6.5 millimetres calibre, but the territorial militia still uses the old Vetterli rifle. The field artillery is now being rearmed with the De Port gun with a calibre of 7.5 centimetres of the model of 1912.

The Italian army has recently been engaged in war in Africa, and has doubtless profited by its experience.

It is a compact force and well trained.

GREAT BRITAIN

Apart from the Indian Army and the Local Forces in the various colonies, the military establishment of Great Britain consists of the Regular Army and the Territorial Army, both being recruited by voluntary enlistment between the ages of 18 and 25. The enlistment is for 12 years, with permission under certain circumstances to prolong it to 21 years. Three to nine years is the period with the colors, and the remainder with the Army Reserve, most men electing to serve 7 years with the colors and 5 in the reserve. Upon mobilization the existing deficiencies are supplied from the Army Reserve, or to a lesser extent, from the Special Reserve of troops not permanently incorporated but who serve as depot troops, or in fortifications, their term of service being for 6 years. The recruits are subjected to 5 months' training and each year are called out for 3 weeks, supplemented by 6 days' musketry practice for the infantry.

The Home Army consists of 9,740 officers and 172,610 men, the Army Reserve of 147,000, the Special Reserve of 80,120, and the Territorial Army of 315,485, a total of 724,955. Raised to war strength these forces would number 29,330 officers, 772,000 men and 2,072 guns, the batteries being of 6 guns, except the heavy batteries and those of the Territorial Army which have 4. The casual reader will probably be surprised at these figures, but he must remember that during the

Boer War England put more than a million men in the field. The United Kingdom is divided into seven "commands" and the London district, all of which include from 2 to 3 territorial divisions and 1 to 4 territorial cavalry brigades in addition to detachments of varying size from the Regular Army. Two nearly full divisions are stationed at Aldershot and in Ireland, one complete division in the Southern and one in the Eastern "command." There are also 6 aeroplane squadrons, each with 18 aeroplanes.

The Lee-Enfield rifle, calibre .303, is the arm of the infantry and cavalry. In the Regular Army the field artillery has an 18-pounder Armstrong gun, the horse artillery a 13-pounder, the field howitzers are 40-pounders, and the heavy batteries are armed with 60-pounders.

The British army got a severe handling in the Boer War, and profited greatly thereby. The Territorial Army is a force of distinctly uncertain value at present, being very much akin to the American militia, and could scarcely be expected to distinguish itself if pitted against the French or German regulars.

The Belgian army has a peace footing of 3,542 officers and 44,061 men, with a war strength variously estimated at from 300,000 to 350,000. The infantry is armed with the Mauser rifle, the artillery with a shielded Krupp quick-fire piece of 7.5-cm. calibre.

In 1913 the Netherlands had in its Home Army 1,543 officers and 21,412 men and 152 guns. On a war footing it could probably be raised to about 270,000 men. The small arm is the Mannlicher rifle and carbine, the field gun is identical with that of Belgium.

Servia has 10 divisions divided into 4 army corps, with a peace footing of 160,000, and a war strength of more than 380,000. The rifle is the Mauser model of 1899, with a calibre of 7 mm. of which there are not nearly enough to arm the reserves; the field piece a quick-firing gun of the French Schneider-Canet system.

Bulgaria has a peace establishment of about 3,900 officers and 56,000 men, armed with the Mannlicher magazine rifle, calibre .315, the Mannlicher carbine, the Schneider quick-fire gun of 7.5 cm., and a light Krupp of the same calibre for the mountain batteries. On a war footing she could muster 4 army corps and about 550,000 men.

Roumania's army on a peace footing is about 5,460 officers and 98,000 men, on a war footing 5 army corps and approximately 580,000 men. The infantry uses the Mannlicher magazine rifle, .256 calibre, the cavalry the Mannlicher carbine. The field and horse batteries are armed with the Krupp quick-fire 75 mm. gun of the model of 1903.

In 1912 Greece had a peace establishment of 1,952 officers and 23,268 men, but the recent war has caused her to augment them to 3 army corps and her war footing is not far from 250,000 men. The infantry is armed with the Mannlicher-Schönaauer rifle of the 1903 model and the field artillery with Schneider-Canet quick-fire guns.

Few people realize how strongly the frontiers of the Powers of central Europe are fortified — in fact the whole continent bristles with fortifications. Beginning at the point where France, Switzerland, and Germany meet, the eastern frontier of France is guarded by fortresses of the first class at Belfort, Épinal, Toul, and Verdun in the first line, reinforced by Besançon, Dijon, Langres, Rheims, la Fère, and Maubeuge in the second line, with smaller fortifications (forts d'arrêts) close to the German frontier at Remirement, Luneville, Nancy, and other points. Along the Italian frontier are the strong places of Grenoble, Briançon, and Nice, with Lyons in the rear. All her naval harbors are fortified and the defense of Paris consists of 97 bastions, 17 old forts and 38 new advanced forts, the whole forming entrenched camps at Versailles and St. Denis.

The German frontier facing France is guarded by the fortresses of Neu-Breisach, Strassburg, Metz, and Diedenhofen, in the first line, with Rastatt, Bitsch, and Saarlouis in the second line, and Gernersheim in the rear. Mainz (Mayence) is situated opposite Luxemburg, Coblenz, and Köln (Cologne) opposite Belgium, and Wesel opposite Holland. The northern coast is strongly fortified from Wilhelmshafen to Memmel, the latter forming the extreme end of the cordon of fortresses which guard Germany's eastern frontier, and which consist of Königsberg and Allenstein in the first line, Danzig, Dirschau, Graudenz, Thorn, and the Vistula Passages in the second line. South of this point are Posen, Glogau, and Breslau facing Poland. Beginning at Neisse the defense against Austria consists of strong fortifi-

cations at Glatz, Torgau, Ingolstadt, and Ulm, and the approaches to Berlin are guarded by Magdeburg, Spandau, and Küstrin.

Russia is protected against attacks from the Germans by the fortresses of Libau on the Baltic, Kovna, Ossovetz, and Ust-Dvinsk (formerly Dünamünd) in the Vilna district, and in Poland by Novo-Georgievsk, Warsaw, and Ivangorod on the Vistula, and Brest-Litovsk on the Bug — four strongholds known as the Polish Quadrilateral. Guarding St. Petersburg, or Petrograd, as we must now name the Czar's capital, are the weaker fortifications of Kronstadt and Viborg, with Sweaborg midway down the Gulf of Finland near Helsingfors. On the Black Sea are Sebastopol and Kertch in the Crimea and Otchokov near Odessa.

Austria's fortifications consist of the strong places of Cracow and Premysl on the road to Lemberg in Galicia, facing Poland; in Hungary she has Gyula-Fehérvár (Karlsburg) and Arad on the Maros River guarding the approach from the angle of Roumania, while on her frontier facing Servia are Alt-Orsova and Pétervárad (Peterwardcin) on the Danube, and Sarajevo in Bosnia, with Temesvár and Komorn blocking the approach to Vienna from the southeast. On the Adriatic are Cattaro on the edge of Montenegro, and the naval arsenals of Pola and Trieste. All the Alpine passes of the Tyrol are fortified, but neither Vienna nor Budapest has any defenses.

Italy's fortifications, aside from those on her coasts, extend in a line from Venice, through Verona, Mantua, and Piacenza to Alessandria and Casale which face the French frontier.

GENERAL MILITARY SITUATION

"Strategy consists in getting there first with most men," according to the statement ascribed to General Forrest, a Southern partisan leader, and a better definition it would be hard to give. Germany and Austria being in the centre of Europe have shorter distances to traverse to reach any given point on their frontiers than is the case with their adversaries who are separated by these two empires. They can also mobilize their forces more quickly than their opponents — with the exception of the French — and their combined armies are more homogeneous than are the allies. On the other hand they are inferior in numbers to their adversaries, Germany having 4,000,000, and

Austria 4,320,000, a total of 8,320,000, against 3,878,000 French, 5,962,000 Russians, 500,000 Servians, and 350,000 Belgians, a total of 10,690,000. Napoleon declared that "the strength of an army, like the amount of movement in mechanics, is estimated as the mass multiplied by the rapidity," and he demonstrated the proper method to pursue in situations almost identical with those of to-day. Falling with the utmost rapidity and all the forces he could muster upon one of his adversaries, he inflicted a crushing defeat. Leaving a "containing force" at that point, he then turned with all his strength against the other adversary, repeating his successive blows in one or both directions until his opponents were destroyed. So long as he kept them asunder their superior numbers availed them nothing, and his own success was assured; once they were permitted to combine, his defeat was certain. In such manœuvres the forces must be kept closely united and moved with all possible rapidity, otherwise the advantage conferred by "interior lines" will be wholly lost.

If the Germans and Austrians are to escape being crushed by the mere weight of numbers they must pursue a similar course. If they elect to attack the French and Belgians, strategic wisdom would require their leaving on their eastern frontiers forces of sufficient strength to be able, in conjunction with their fortifications, to prevent the Russians and Serbs from penetrating in their rear. If they prefer to attack to the east the operation must be reversed. In either case they ought to be able to outnumber their adversaries on the east or those on the west, but if they attack in both directions at the same time, they are sure to be defeated by superior forces.

The indications are that a first stroke to the east would produce the greater results, since the Russians cannot mobilize under twenty-six days at least, and nearly a month must elapse before they are fully ready to begin a forward movement in any great force. It would therefore be possible, if the Germans and Austrians act quickly to inflict a crushing blow upon them before they are ready. This might open the road to Petrograd — which is no farther from Königsberg than Berlin is from Paris — and so long as the German fleet commands the Baltic, the troops could be largely supplied from transports at several points en route. This operation while possible

under certain conditions, would be extremely hazardous. On the other hand, in an advance to the west, the most advantageous lines of advance are from Coblenz up the Mosel and through Luxemburg, or from Cologne through Belgium, issuing either through Sedan or through the valley of the Meuse into France, at a distance of about 140 miles from Paris. The violation of Belgium's neutrality and the opposition of her forces is not to be compared to the advantage this conferred. Furthermore the French fortifications guarding these lines are not so strong as they ought to be, whereas those from Epernay south to Belfort will not be easy to break through if reinforced by the French armies. In this connection it may be observed that Germany's frontier from Basle to Luxemburg is 242 miles in length, Luxemburg adds 111 miles, and Belgium 70 miles. With several million men packed into this space, and resting on a line of powerful modern fortifications, the difficulty of either side to break through will be apparent, especially if the troops resort to field entrenchments, as they undoubtedly will do. Under the circumstances, it is difficult to see how Germany could realize her boast that she would crush France and be in Paris in three weeks, particularly since Victor Emmanuel has not given his adhesion and Italy cannot be utilized for a diverting attack against southern France. To violate the neutrality of Switzerland would stir up a veritable hornet's nest, for the Swiss have 500,000 well trained men.

On the eastern frontiers the fortifications — German, Austrian, and Russian — present analogous difficulties but in a far lesser degree. Russia cannot issue from western Poland without exposing her right flank to a German attack from East Prussia, and her left to an attack from Galicia, or Bohemia. The roads into Germany north of Poland are strongly guarded by fortifications, so that it is probable that she will invade Galicia between Cracow and Lemberg, in the effort to crush the Austrians, or to separate them from the Germans. An advance from any of the Balkan states would be less hazardous but, on the other hand, less productive of results.

Should Italy indefinitely join England, France, and Russia, her 12 army corps in conjunction with Serbia's 4 corps could probably neutralize in a large measure Austria's 16 corps and prevent their rendering any material assistance to

Germany either by holding the Russians in check or by joining in an attack against France.

Broadly speaking such are the most probable operations to be attempted during the first stage

of the war. When the terrific struggle has terminated, the map of Europe — perhaps of certain other portions of the globe — may be materially changed.

THE NAVIES OF THE GREAT POWERS AT WAR

THE present war is an exception to the general rule that dominion is won or lost by the preponderance of sea-power or its opposite. At the moment of this writing the navies of all the great Powers except Italy are involved in the struggle. On one side those of Great Britain, France, and Russia; on the other, Germany and Austria. The preponderance of force is thus very great against the Germanic Powers.

Great Britain has political dominion over nearly 35 per cent. of the habitable land of the globe and over 27 per cent. of its population, the total of which is estimated by one of the best authorities at 1,623,300,000. No such empire has ever before existed, and it is for the looking after of these tremendous and wide-scattered interests that the great navy of Britain exists. For all her high-ways of communication are across the seas. For this duty she has, now completed, 60 modern battleships, 9 battle-cruisers, 34 armored cruisers, 17 heavy protected cruisers, 70 light cruisers, 232 destroyers now ready and 16 building, 59 torpedo boats (and 50 old ones), and 75 submarines, besides 52 sea-going auxiliaries of the fleet, such as mother ships for destroyers, mine-layers, distilling ships, oil ships, repair and hospital ships.

The following are the details of this great fleet, the types in each class being separated into groups:

The first group, completed between 1895 and 1898, includes the following battleships: *Magnificent*, *Majestic*, *Prince George*, *Victorious*, *Jupiter*, *Caesar*, *Mars*, *Hannibal*, and *Illustrious*.

They are all of 14,900 tons displacement, 12,000 horse-power, and 2,000 tons coal capacity. They have a speed of 17.5 knots, 9 inches of armor belt, and from 10 to 14 inches protection for the big guns. The armament consists of 4 12-inch, 12 6-inch rapid fire, 16 3-inch rapid fire, 12 3-pounder rapid fire, 2 light rapid fire, and 2 machine guns. They have one torpedo tube above water and two under water.

The next class includes six battleships completed between 1900 and 1902: *Canopus*, *Ocean*, *Goliath*, *Glory*, *Vengeance*, and *Albion*.

They are of 12,950 tons displacement, 13,500 horse-power, and 2,300 tons coal capacity. They have a speed of 18.25 knots, 6 inches of armor belt, and from 8 to 12 inches protection for the big guns. The armament consists of 4 12-inch rapid fire, 12 6-inch rapid fire, 10 3-inch rapid fire, 2 light rapid fire, and 2 machine guns. They have 4 torpedo tubes.

Then come eight ships, finished between 1901 and 1904: *Formidable*, *Irresistible*, *London*, *Bulwark*, *Venerable*, *Implacable*, *Queen*, and *Prince of Wales*.

They are of 15,000 tons displacement, 15,000 horse-power, and 2,000 tons coal capacity. They have a speed of 18 knots, 6 to 9 inches of armor belt, and from 8 to 12 inches protection for the big guns. The armament consists of 4 12-inch, 12 6-inch rapid fire, 16 3-inch rapid fire, 2 light rapid fire, and 2 machine guns. They have 4 torpedo tubes.

During 1903 and 1904 also were finished the *Albemarle*, *Duncan*, *Exmouth*, *Russell*, and *Cornwallis*.

They are 14,000 tons displacement, 18,000 horse-power, and 2,100 tons coal capacity. They have a speed of 18 knots, 6 to 9 inches of armor belt, and from 6 to 11 inches protection for the big guns. The armament consists of 4 12-inch, 12 6-inch rapid fire, 12 3-inch rapid fire, and 2 machine guns. They have 4 torpedo tubes.

In 1904 the smaller *Triumph* and *Swiftsure* were launched.

They are 11,800 tons displacement, 12,500 horse-power, and 2,000 tons coal capacity. They have a speed of 19 knots, 3 to 7 inches of armor belt, and from 6 to 10 inches protection for the big guns. The armament consists of 4 10-inch, 14 7.5-inch rapid fire, 14 14-pounder rapid fire, 4 6-pounder rapid fire, 2 light rapid fire, and 4 machine guns. They have 2 torpedo tubes.

Between 1904 and 1906 eight battleships

were launched: *Dominion*, *King Edward VII*, *Commonwealth*, *Zealandia*, *Hindustan*, *Britannia*, *Africa*, and *Hibernia*.

They are of 16,350 tons displacement, 18,000 horse-power, and 2,150 tons coal capacity. They have a speed of 18.5 knots, 6 to 9 inches of armor belt, and from 8 to 12 inches protection for the big guns. The armament consists of 4 12-inch, 4 9.2-inch, 10 6-inch rapid fire, 14 3-inch rapid fire, 14 3-pounder rapid fire, and 2 machine guns. They have 4 torpedo tubes.

In 1907 came the famous *Dreadnought*, with its 17,900 tons displacement, 23,000 horse-power (turbine), 21 knots speed, and 2,700 tons coal capacity. Her armor belt is 11 inches and the big gun protection from 8 to 11 inches. She has 10 12-inch guns, 24 3-inch rapid fire, 5 machine guns, and three torpedo tubes.

In 1908 the *Agamemnon* was launched, and in 1909 the *Lord Nelson*.

They are of 16,000 tons displacement, 16,750 horse-power, and 2,500 tons coal capacity. They have a speed of 18 knots, 4 to 12 inches of armor belt, and from 8 to 12 inches protection for the big guns. The armament consists of 4 12-inch 10 9.2-inch, 24 3-inch rapid fire, and 5 machine guns. They have 5 torpedo tubes.

In 1909 England launched three battleships, *Bellerophon*, *Téméraire*, and *Superb*.

They are of 18,600 tons displacement, 23,000 horse-power (turbine), and 2,700 tons coal capacity. They have a speed of 21 knots, 11 inches armor belt, and from 8 to 11 inches protection for the big guns. The armament consists of 10 12-inch, 16 4-inch rapid fire and 5 machine guns. They have 3 torpedo tubes.

In 1910 three more ships followed: *St. Vincent*, *Collingwood*, and *Vanguard*.

They are 19,250 tons displacement, 24,500 horse-power (turbine), and 2,700 tons coal capacity. They have a speed of 21 knots, 9.75 inches of armor belt, and from 8 to 11 inches protection for the big guns. The armament consists of 10 12-inch, 20 4-inch rapid fire, and 6 machine guns. They have 3 torpedo tubes.

In 1911 there were four ships launched, three of them, the *Neptune*, *Colossus*, and *Hercules* of one type.

They are 20,000 tons displacement, 25,000 horse-power (turbine), and 2,700 tons coal capacity. They have a speed of 21 knots, 11

inches of armor belt, and from 8 to 12 inches protection for the big guns. The armament consists of 10 12-inch, 16 4-inch rapid fire, and 6 machine guns. They have 3 torpedo tubes.

The *Orion*, launched in 1911, and the *Conqueror*, *Thunderer*, and *Monarch*, of 1912, formed the next type.

They are of 22,500 tons displacement and 27,000 horse-power (turbine). They have a speed of 21 knots, 12 inches of armor belt, and from 8 to 12 inches protection for the big guns. The armament consists of 10 13.5-inch, 16 4-inch rapid fire, and 6 machine guns. They have 3 torpedo tubes.

The *King George V*, of 1912, and the *Centurion*, *Ajax* and *Audacious*, of 1913, form the next class.

They are of 23,000 tons displacement, 31,000 horse-power (turbine), and 3,700 tons coal capacity. They have a speed of 21.5 knots, 12 inches of armor belt, and from 8 to 12 inches protection for the big guns. The armament consists of 10 13.5-inch, 16 4-inch rapid fire, and 6 smaller guns. They have 3 torpedo tubes.

This year there are two types. In the first are the *Iron Duke*, *Marlborough*, *Emperor of India*, and *Benbow*.

They are of 25,000 tons displacement, 39,000 horse-power (turbine), and 4,000 tons coal capacity. They have a speed of 22.5 knots, 12 inches of armor belt, and 8 to 12 inches protection for the big guns. The armament consists of 10 13.5-inch, 12 6-inch rapid fire, and 6 smaller guns. They have 5 torpedo tubes.

The second type for this year includes the *Queen Elizabeth* and *Warspite*.

They are of 27,500 tons displacement, 58,000 horse-power (turbine), and 4,000 tons oil capacity. They have a speed of 25 knots, 13.5 inches of armor belt, and from 8 to 13.5 inches protection for the big guns. The armament consists of 8 15-inch, 16 6-inch rapid fire, and 12 3-inch rapid fire guns. They have 5 torpedo tubes.

The four last, though possibly not yet ready for service, are due for completion this year and will of course under the circumstances of war be hastened to completion. There are also building the *Valiant*, *Barham*, and *Malaya* of the same type as the *Queen Elizabeth*, and the *Royal Sovereign*, *Royal Oak*, *Resolution*, *Ramillies*, and *Renown*, of 29,000 tons, 44,000 horsepower turbines, and of the same armament as the *Queen*

ARMÉE DE TERRE ET ARMÉE DE MER

**ORDRE
DE MOBILISATION GENEBALE**

THE FRENCH ORDER OF MOBILIZATION

The mobilization of France's armies was made in a much shorter time than the rest of Europe expected, and this celerity, with the additional time gained by Belgium's spirited resistance to the German invasion, resulted in the assembling of prac-

tically all the Republic's forces on her frontier before the Germans had actually reached French territory. The French heavy artillery is generally believed to be the best in the world. The infantry shown in these pictures has the new uniform.



Photograph by International News Service, New York

FRENCH TROOPS AT LYONS, ABOUT TO ENTRAIN FOR THE GERMAN BORDER



THE FRENCH ALGERIAN TROOPS (TURCOS)



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FRENCH INFANTRY MOBILIZING NEAR PARIS



Bain News Service

FRENCH SOLDIERS RESTING AFTER A MARCH



FIELD GUNS OF THE FRENCH ARTILLERY



FRENCH INFANTRY IN ACTION

Copyright by the International News Service



AN ENGLISH FIELD BAGGAGE TRAIN



BRITISH CAVALRY



BRITISH FIELD ARTILLERY



THE COLDSTREAM GUARDS IN SERVICE KIT



ENGLISH INFANTRY

THE BRITISH REGULAR ARMY CAN BE COUNTED ON, BUT THE EFFICIENCY OF THE TERRITORIALS, WHICH CORRESPOND TO AMERICAN MILITIA, IS PROBLEMATICAL.



GERMAN INFANTRY IN THE FIELD

EVERY DETAIL OF EQUIPMENT AND OF CARRIAGE, FROM THE MARTIAL LOOKING HELMET TO THE ARTIFICIAL "GOOSE STEP" GAIT USED ON PARADE, EMPHASIZES THE STUDIED UNIFORMITY AND PAINSTAKING PRECISION OF GERMAN MILITARY SCIENCE



"AN ARMY THAT RUNS LIKE CLOCKWORK"

THE GERMAN ARMY IS THE MOST THOROUGHLY DRILLED OF ALL ARMIES, AND ITS COMMANDERS PUT THEIR FAITH IN ITS MASS EFFICIENCY DIRECTED BY THE GENERAL STAFF ALONG MINUTELY AND CAREFULLY PLANNED LINES



ALL GERMAN CAVALRYMEN ARE ARMED WITH LANCES

AN AMERICAN MILITARY AUTHORITY HAS CRITICIZED THESE WEAPONS AS OBSOLETE, BUT ADMITS THAT THEY WILL BE EFFECTIVE AT CLOSE QUARTERS



NEWS GATHERERS FOR THE GENERAL STAFF

BICYCLE, MOUNTED, AND AEROPLANE SCOUTS BRING NEWS TO THE GERMAN STAFF, WHICH IS THE MOST THOROUGH ORGANIZATION OF ITS KIND IN THE WORLD



GERMAN ARTILLERY IN ACTION

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THE GERMANS BELIEVE THE KRUPP GUNS FAILED IN THE BALKANS ONLY BECAUSE THEY WERE NOT PROPERLY HANDLED



"A CARAVAN LOADED WITH DEATH"

GERMAN FIELD ARTILLERY MARCHING THROUGH A MOUNTAIN VILLAGE. A PART OF THE KAISER'S 4 MILLION MEN



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GERMAN OFFICERS MINING A BRIDGE



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GERMAN SAPPERS SETTING TORPEDOES




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THE GERMAN EMPEROR WITH HIS MILITARY STAFF IN THE FIELD



RUSSIAN CAVALRY ON THE MARCH

Copyright by the American Press Association



CONSCRIPTION IN RUSSIA. DRAWING LOTS FOR MILITARY SERVICE



Photographed by James F. J. Archibald



"THE BEAR THAT WALKS LIKE A MAN"

A FAMOUS DESCRIPTION OF THE RUSSIAN SOLDIER, THAT SUGGESTS HIS MERITS AND HIS DEFECTS. RUSSIAN FIELD ARTILLERY



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FIRST REGIMENT BELGIAN CHASSEURS AT LOUVAIN



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BELGIAN TROOPS LINED UP IN THE PUBLIC SQUARE IN LIÈGE



TYPES OF AUSTRIAN SOLDIERS SHOWING THE VARIETY OF RACES MAKING UP THE MILITARY FORCES OF THE DUAL EMPIRE

UHLAN (LANDWEHR); AUSTRIAN (LANDWEHR); BOSNIA RIFLE-MAN; AUSTRIAN RIFLE-MAN; HUNGARIAN INFANTRY-MAN; TYROLESE SHARP-SHOOTER; BOSNIAN INFANTRY; HUNGARIAN INFANTRY; HUNGARIAN HUSSAR; HUSSAR (LANDWEHR); HUNGARIAN RIFLE-MAN; MOUNTED RIFLE-MAN; BOSNIAN DRAGOON; MARINE. NOT ALL OF THE FIFTEEN UNIFORMS ARE PICTURED HERE BUT ENOUGH ARE SHOWN TO INDICATE THE GREAT VARIETY IN SERVICE



AUSTRIAN FIELD ARTILLERY AND AUSTRIAN CAVALRY

THE AUSTRIAN ARMY HAS NOT BEEN THOROUGHLY TESTED SINCE ITS DEFEAT BY PRUSSIA IN 1866; THEORETICALLY ITS EFFICIENCY IS HIGH



ITALIAN INFANTRY CROSSING A DANGEROUS PASS



Photograph by James F. J. Archibald



AUSTRIAN INFANTRY AND MOUNTAIN ARTILLERY



ENEMIES OF AUSTRIA—MONTENEGRIN TROOPS



SERVIAN GUNS ON THE MARCH— THE REALITY WITHOUT THE POMP OF WAR

Elizabeth. These last eight ships will not be ready until next year.

Great Britain thus has afloat and ready for service sixty battleships, twenty of which are of the *Dreadnought* or big gun type. In addition to these there are ten battle-cruisers, equal to taking their place in the line of battle, of which nine are now ready and the other nearly so. They are the *Inflexible*, *Indomitable*, *Invincible*, of 17,250 tons displacement and 41,000 horse power (turbine), the *Indefatigable*, of 18,750 tons displacement and 43,000 horse-power (turbine): the *New Zealand*, of 18,800 tons, and the *Australia*, with 19,200 tons displacement, both with 44,000 horse-power developed by turbine-engines. All these ships have a speed of 25 knots, 8 inches of armor belt, 10 inches big gun protection, and a coal capacity of 2,500 tons. Their armament is 8 12-inch, 16 4-inch quick fire, 5 machine guns and 5 torpedo tubes.

The *Lion* and the *Princess Royal*, launched in 1912, and the *Queen Mary*, of 1913, are alike, except that the *Queen Mary* has 27,000 tons displacement and 75,000 horse-power.

The other two have 26,350 tons displacement, 70,000 horse-power, and 3,500 tons coal capacity. They have a speed of 28 knots, 9.75 inches of armor belt, and 10 inches protection for the big guns. The armament consists of 8 12-inch, 12 4-inch quick fire and 5 machine guns. They have 2 torpedo tubes.

This year's battle-cruiser, the *Tiger*, has 28,000 tons displacement, her turbines develop 110,000 horse-power, she has a speed of 30 knots, 10.75-inch armor belt, and 11-inch protection for the big guns. Her coal capacity is 4,000 tons. She has 8 13.5-inch, 12 6-inch quick fire, and 5 machine guns.

Following these are thirty-four armored cruisers of high speed, which may be called general service ships, to be used for scouting or fighting as the case may be. They have neither the armament nor protection to enable them to take a place in the line-of-battle, but their speed is sufficient to evade action with all battleships now in actual service. The list is as follows:

Completed between the years 1901 and 1904 are the *Cressy*, *Sulley*, *Aboukir*, *Hogue*, *Bacchante*, and *Euryalus*.

They are of 12,000 tons displacement, 21,000 horse-power, and 1,600 tons coal capacity. They

have a speed of 21 knots, 6 inches of side armor, and 6 inches protection for the big guns. The armament consists of 2 9.2-inch, 12 6-inch rapid fire, 12 3-inch rapid fire, 5 smaller rapid fire, and 2 machine guns. They have 2 torpedo tubes.

In 1902-3 the *Drake*, *Good Hope*, *Leviathan*, and *King Alfred* were launched.

They are of 14,100 tons displacement, 30,000 horse-power, and 2,500 tons coal capacity. They have a speed of 23 knots, 6 inches of side armor, and from 5 to 6 inches protection for the big guns. The armament consists of 2 9.2-inch, 16 6-inch rapid fire, 14 3-inch rapid fire, 3 smaller rapid fire, and 2 machine guns. They have 2 torpedo tubes.

In 1903-4 were launched *Kent*, *Essex*, *Monmouth*, *Berwick*, *Donegal*, *Lancaster*, *Cornwall*, *Cumberland*, and *Suffolk*.

They are of 9,800 tons displacement, 2,200 horse-power, and 1,600 tons coal capacity. They have a speed of 23 knots, 4 inches of side armor, and 5 inches protection for the big guns. The armament consists of 14 6-inch rapid fire, 8 3-inch rapid fire, 5 smaller rapid fire, and 8 machine guns. They have 2 torpedo tubes.

In 1905 the *Antrim*, *Carnarvon*, *Hampshire*, *Devonshire*, *Roxburgh*, and in 1906, the *Argyle* were launched.

They are of 10,850 tons displacement, 21,000 horse-power, and 1,800 tons coal capacity. They have a speed of 22.3 knots, 6 inches of side belt, and from 5 to 6 inches protection for the big guns. The armament consists of 4 7.5-inch, 6 6-inch rapid fire, 24 small rapid fire, and 2 machine guns. They have 2 torpedo tubes.

The *Black Prince*, *Duke of Edinburgh*, *Cochrane*, and *Natal* were launched in 1906, and the *Achilles* and *Warrior* in 1907.

They are of 13,550 tons displacement, 23,500 horse-power, and 2,000 tons coal capacity. They have a speed of 22.3 knots, 6 inches of armor belt, and 6 inches protection for the big guns. The armament consists of 6 9.2-inch, 10 6-inch rapid fire, 22 small rapid fire, and 8 machine guns. They have 3 torpedo tubes.

In 1908 came the *Shannon*, *Minotaur* and *Defence*.

They are of 14,600 tons displacement, 27,000 horse-power, and 2,250 tons coal capacity. They have a speed of 23 knots, 6 inches of armor belt, and 8 inches protection for the big guns. The armament consists of 16 6-inch rapid fire, 12

3-inch rapid fire, 14 smaller rapid fire, and 2 machine guns. They have 5 torpedo tubes.

The details of the actual fighting ships of importance are completed with the following seven-teen heavily protected cruisers:

Edgar (1893), *Endymion* (1893), *Hawke* (1893), *Grafton* (1894), *Theseus* (1894), of 7,350 tons displacement.

They have 12,000 horse-power and 1,250 tons coal capacity. They have a speed of 19.5 knots, 5 inches of protective deck, and 6 inches protection for the big guns. The armament consists of 2 9.2-inch, 10 6-inch rapid fire, 17 smaller rapid fire, and 2 machine guns. They have 2 torpedo tubes.

The *Gibraltar*, *Crescent*, and *Royal Arthur*, of 7,700 tons, have the same speed, armor, and coal capacity. Their armament, however, is 1 9.2-inch, 12 6-inch rapid fire, 19 smaller rapid fire, and 2 machine guns, and 2 torpedo tubes.

The *Terrible* in 1898 was in a class by itself.

She is 14,460 tons displacement, 25,000 horse-power, and 3,000 tons coal capacity. She has a speed of 22 knots, 6 inches of protective deck, and 6 inches protection for the big guns. The armament consists of 2 9.2-inch, 16 6-inch rapid fire, 16 3-inch rapid fire, 14 smaller rapid fire, and 2 machine guns.

Between 1899 and 1902 twelve heavily protected cruisers were built, all of 11,000 tons displacement. The *Diadem*, *Europa*, *Niobe*, and *Andromeda* had 16,500 horse-power, the *Amphitrite*, *Argonaut*, *Ariadne*, and *Spartiate*, 18,000 horse-power.

Each has 2,000 tons coal capacity; a speed of 20.5 knots, 4 inches of protective deck, and 6 inches protection for the big guns. The armament consists of 16 6-inch rapid fire, 12 3-inch rapid fire, 14 smaller rapid fire, and 2 machine guns. They have 2 torpedo tubes.

The first eight of these ships are comparable to our *Saratoga* and *Brooklyn*. The others are larger, but have not higher speed than these two. They could not stand for a moment before any of the classes preceding them.

Following these are eight of 3,600 tons displacement which should be ready this year. They were designed for scouts. They have 37,000 horse-power turbines, and a designed speed of 30 knots. They carry only the light armament of 2 6-inch rapid fire, 6 4-inch rapid fire, and 2

machine guns. Eight more of 8,740 tons of 40,000 horse-power, and 30 knots, with the same armament, the same fuel capacity (of 750 tons of oil) will not be ready until next year. All have a belt of 3-inch steel and 4-inch protection for the guns. They are, of course, in no sense fighting ships, but their rôle is of the utmost importance; that of supplying information regarding the whereabouts of an enemy.

Of the seventy protected light cruisers now ready (twenty-eight of which antedate 1900), varying from 2,135 to 5,880 tons, there are twenty-six with a speed of 25 knots. None carry heavier than 6-inch guns and can be reckoned, for war, chiefly as scouts. No one of them has more than 1,225 tons fuel capacity, and most of them much less. Their radius of action is thus moderate.

One hundred and thirty-four of the 232 completed destroyers are of ocean-going type, and nearly all these are oil-burners and of from 30 to 35 knots. All exceed 700 tons displacement; 70 exceed 800 tons; 40 are about 1,000 and 16 are from 1,200 to 1,350 tons. One, the *Swift*, launched so long ago as 1907, has a displacement of 2,170 tons, 30,000 horse-power, and a speed of 36 knots. All are armed usually with 4-inch guns not exceeding four in number, and the majority carry 21-inch torpedo tubes. Such torpedoes of the best type have a range of more than five sea miles (say six land miles) at an average speed of 24 knots. Great Britain has 75 destroyers and 22 building.

In addition to the ships mentioned, England has at command 3 merchant steamers of more than 25 knots; 4 of from 22 to 25; 11 from 20 to 22, and 29 from 18 to 20. These can all be utilized for cruising, but they can play no real part in the present war except as against like vessels of Germany, which latter is almost equally well off in this respect.

FRANCE

The French navy, though fourth in rank of naval Powers, naturally comes after that of England as an ally. There are on the list eighteen battleships of the older types which can be considered serviceable, ranging in dates of launching from 1894 to 1909. As generally in France not less than four, and often five, years passed from the time of "laying down" to completion, it will be seen that most of these eighteen are by

no means modern. Four up-to-date modern ships are, however, completed and are ready for service.

The *Carnot* was launched in 1896. Her displacement is 11,954 tons, her horse-power 15,000 and her coal capacity 700 tons. Her speed is 18 knots, her side armor 17.75 inches, and her big gun protection 13.75 inches. Her armament, like that of the *Masséna*, launched in 1898, is 2 12-inch, 2 10.8-inch, 8 5.5-inch rapid fire, and 28 smaller guns, and 2 torpedo tubes above water, and 2 below. The *Masséna's* displacement is 11,735 tons, her horse-power 13,500, and her coal capacity 800 tons. Her speed is 18 knots, her side armor is 17.75 inches, and the big gun protection from 8.5 to 16 inches.

In 1898 France also launched the *Charlemagne*, and *Gaulois*, and in 1900 the *St. Louis*. They are of about 11,000 tons displacement, 14,500 horse-power, and 1,100 tons coal capacity. They have a speed of 18 knots, 14 inches of side armor, and from 8 to 13 inches protection for the big guns. The armament consists of 4 12-inch, 12 5.5-inch rapid fire, 8 3.9-inch rapid fire, 20 smaller guns. They have 4 torpedo tubes.

The *Bouvet* (1898) of 12,000 tons, has 14,000 horse-power, and 800 tons coal capacity; 18 knots speed, 16 inches side armor, and 8 to 14.75 inches of protection for the big guns. She carries 2 12-inch, 2 10.8-inch rapid fire 8 5.5-inch rapid fire, and 19 smaller guns. She has 2 torpedo tubes above water and 2 below water.

The *Suffren* (1903), of 12,527 tons, has 16,200 horse-power, and 1,820 tons coal capacity; 18 knots speed, 11 inches side armor, and 9 to 13 inches of protection for the big guns. She carries 4 12-inch, 10 6.4-inch rapid fire, 8 3.9-inch rapid fire, and 30 smaller guns. She has 2 torpedo tubes above water and 2 below.

The *République* (1906) and *Patrie* (1907), of 14,635 tons has 18,000 horse-power, and 1,825 tons coal capacity; 18 knots speed, 11 inches side armor, and 9 to 13 inches of protection for the big guns. She carries 4 12-inch, 18 6.4-inch rapid fire, and 28 smaller guns. She has 2 torpedo tubes under water.

The *Démocratie*, the *Justice*, and the *Vérité* were launched in 1908.

They are of 14,640 tons displacement, 18,000 horse-power, and 1,825 tons coal capacity. They have a speed of 18 knots, 11 inches of side armor,

and from 9 to 13 inches protection for the big guns. The armament consists of 4 12-inch, 10 7.6-inch rapid fire, and 28 smaller guns. They have 2 torpedo tubes.

In 1911 came the *Danton*, *Mirabeau*, *Diderot*, *Condorcet*, *Voltaire*, and in 1912 the *Vergniaud*.

They are of 18,027 tons displacement, 22,500 horse-power (turbine) and 2,100 tons coal capacity. They have a speed of 19.25 knots, 10 inches of side armor and from 9 to 12 inches protection for the big guns. The armament consists of 4 12-inch, 12 9.4-inch rapid fire, 16 3-inch rapid fire, and 8 smaller guns. They have 2 torpedo tubes.

The *Jean Bart* and the *Courbet* were launched in 1913, and the *France* and *Paris* in 1914.

They are of 23,095 tons displacement, 28,000 horse-power (turbine), and 3,000 tons coal capacity. They have a speed of 20 knots, 10½ inches of side armor, and from 9 to 12 inches protection for the big guns. The armament consists of 12 12-inch, 22 5.5-inch rapid fire, and 8 smaller guns.

There are building, to be completed in the next two years, eight more ships of about the same displacement as the last four, six of which are to have one knot more of speed with 11 and 12½ inches of side armor and the last five with 9 to 17 inches of big-gun protection. Three of these ships are to carry 10 13.4-inch guns, and the others 12. None are now ready.

France has no battle-cruisers but has nineteen armored cruisers, one of which, the *Pothuau*, is of but 5,374 tons; one the *Jeanne d'Arc* of 11,092; three, the *Gueydon*, *Montcalm*, and *Dupetit Thouars* of 9,367; three (completed in 1903), the *Dupleix*, *Desaix*, and *Kléber* of 7,578 tons four the *Marseillaise*, *Gloire*, *Aube*, and *Condé* of 9,856 tons; three (completed in 1904-1906), the *Léon Gambetta*, *Jules Ferry*, and *Victor Hugo* of 12,351 tons; two (1908 and 1909) the *Jules Michelet*, and *Ernest Renan* of 12,370 and 13,427 tons; and two (1910 and 1911), the *Edgar Quinet* and *Waldeck Rousseau* of 13,780 tons. The heavier of these ships has a designed speed of 23 to 23½ knots, 6 to 6¾ inches side armor, and 8-inch protection to their larger guns. They carry from 2,100 to 2,300 tons of coal. Their main batteries are generally of 2 7.6-inch rapid fire, and 8 6.4-inch rapid fire. The *Gambetta* class, however, carries 4 7.6-inch with 16 6.4-inch, both rapid fire. The

Edgar Quinet and *Waldeck Rousseau* carry 14 7.6-inch rapid fire.

Two protected cruisers, the *D'Entrecasteaux* and *Guichen*, and 10 light cruisers of no fighting importance complete the list of French ships.

France is, however, strong, so far as numbers go, in destroyers, torpedo boats, and submarines, having ready 84 of the first with displacements from 276 to 804 tons and speeds of 28 and 31 knots. She has 135 torpedo boats and 78 submarines, but many of these are of small size. One hundred and one of her torpedo boats are of but about 95 tons, and 20 of the submarines have a displacement of but 67 tons. They can hardly cut any figure except for purely local defence. Thirty-three of the submarines, however, have a surface displacement of 390 tons; 2 of 410; 6 of about 550; 2 of 785, and 7 of 830. The surface displacement is usually (roughly) about 70 per cent. of the submerged. These larger submarines carry from 6 to 8 torpedo tubes. Twelve now building of 520 (surface) tons displacement have Diesel motors of 2,000 horse-power. They are expected to have a surface speed of 17½ knots and a speed of 8 knots submerged. This last class will carry four small guns.

There are attached to the fleet 16 auxiliaries as mine layers, submarine destroyers, and aeroplane mother ships, of from 300 to 7,898 tons; half, however, are under 1,000 tons.

RUSSIA

Russia, since her fateful struggle with Japan, has diligently labored to reestablish her fleet, but she has not as yet made any great actual headway. But three of her old battleships were left from the wreck of the war, the *Tri Sviatitelia*, the *Panteleimon*, and *Czarevitch*.

The *Tri Sviatitelia*, of 1896 (in the Black Sea), has a displacement of 13,318 tons, 10,600 horse-power, a speed of 17 knots, and coal capacity of 1,000 tons. Her side armor is 16 inches and the big gun protection from 12 to 16 inches. She has 4 12-inch, 10 6-inch rapid fire, and 4 4.7-inch rapid fire guns and 2 torpedo tubes above water.

In the Black Sea also is the *Panteleimon* (1902), of 12,480 tons, has 10,600 horse-power, and 1,250 coal capacity, 17 knots speed, 7 to 9 inches of side armor, and 10 to 12 inches of protection for the big guns. She carries 4 12-inch, 16 6-inch rapid

fire, 14 3-inch and 28 smaller guns. She has 5 torpedo tubes under water.

The *Czarevitch* (1902), of 12,912 tons has 16,300 horse-power and 1,360 tons coal capacity; 18 knots speed, 10 inches side armor, and 8 to 11 inches of protection for the big guns. She carries 4 12-inch rapid fire, 12 6-inch rapid fire, 20 3-inch rapid fire, and 28 smaller guns. She has 2 torpedo tubes under water.

The *Slava* (1906), of 13,516 tons, has 16,000 horse-power and 1,250 tons coal capacity; 18 knots speed, 10 inches side armor, and 8 to 11 inches of protection for the big guns. Her armament is the same as that of the *Czarevitch*.

The *Ivan Zlatoust* (1910) and the *Elstaf* (1911) are both in the Black Sea.

They are 12,733 tons displacement, 10,600 horse-power, and 1,400 tons coal capacity. They have a speed of 16 knots, 7 to 9 inches of armor belt, and from 10 to 12 inches protection for the big guns. The armament consists of 4 12-inch, 4 8-inch, 12 6-inch rapid fire, 14 3-inch rapid fire, and 8 smaller guns. They have 5 torpedo tubes.

In 1911 the *Andreas Pervozvanni* and the *Imperator Pavel I* were launched.

They are of 17,200 tons displacement, 17,600 horse-power, and 3,000 tons coal capacity. They have a speed of 18 knots, 6 to 11 inches of side armor, and from 10 to 12 inches protection for the big guns. The armament consists of 4 12-inch, 14 8-inch, 20 4.7-inch rapid fire, and 14 smaller guns. They have 5 torpedo tubes.

There are altogether six armored cruisers, none of which are in the Black Sea.

The *Rossia* (1898), of 12,130 tons has 18,000 horse-power and 2,500 tons coal capacity; 20 knots speed, 5 to 10 inches side armor, and 2 inches of protection for the big guns. She carries 4 8-inch, 22 6-inch rapid fire, 12 3-inch rapid fire, and 36 smaller guns. She has 5 torpedo tubes above water.

The *Gromoboi* (1901), of 12,336 tons, has 18,000 horse-power and 2,500 tons coal capacity; 20 knots speed, 6 inches side armor, and 2 to 6 inches of protection for the big guns. She carries 4 8-inch, 22 6-inch, 20 3-inch, and 31 smaller guns. She has 2 torpedo tubes above water and 2 below.

The *Rurik* (1907), of 15,170 tons, has 19,700 horse-power, and 2,000 tons coal capacity; 21 knots speed, 6 inches side armor, and 8 inches of protection for the big guns. She carries 4 10-

inch, 8 8-inch, 20 4.7-inch rapid fire, and 18 smaller guns. She has 2 torpedo tubes under water.

The *Admiral Makharoff* was launched in 1907, and the *Pallada* and *Bayan* in 1911.

They are of 7,900 tons displacement, 16,500 horse-power, and 1,020 tons coal capacity. They have a speed of 21 knots, 4 to 8 inches of side armor, and from 3 to 7 inches protection for the big guns. The armament consists of 2 8-inch, 8 6-inch rapid fire, 20 3-inch rapid fire, and 7 smaller guns.

There are eight cruisers, of from 3,100 to 6,700 tons, of no fighting value however. These are the *Askold* (at Vladivostok), *Diana*, *Aurora*, *Kagul* (Black Sea), *Oleg*, *Pamyat Merkurya* (Black Sea), *Zemtchug* (Vladivostok), and *Almaz* (Black Sea).

Russia has but 14 torpedo boats, all small and of little value. She is, however, fairly well off as to destroyers and submarines. She has 91 of the former, 34 of which exceed 500 tons in displacement, and ten are more than 1,000. About thirty of these destroyers are in the Black Sea and six at Vladivostok. Of the 55 submarines built or building, 37 are completed. Twenty-two, however, are under 135 tons surface displacement; twelve are of 360 tons or more, rising to 500.

GERMANY

Turning to the three Powers of the other alliance (though Italy at the moment of writing is not yet involved in the war), Germany of course has easily the lead, with 36 battleships, 5 battle-cruisers, 9 armored cruisers and 43 cruisers, as her sea fleet. She also has, complete, 130 destroyers and 27 submarines. Her 16 torpedo boats are too small to be of value, her attention being given, very wisely, to the destroyer instead. The following is the list of her battle fleet:

The *Kaiser Friedrich III* (1898), *Kaiser Wilhelm II*, (1900), *Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse* (1901), *Kaiser Karl der Grosse* (1901), *Kaiser Barbarossa* (1901) form the first type.

They are of 10,614 tons displacement, 13,000 horse-power, and 1,050 tons coal capacity. They have a speed of 18 knots, 12 inches of side armor, and 10 inches protection for the big guns. The armament consists of 4 9.4-inch, 14 5.9-inch rapid fire, 12 3.4-inch rapid fire, and 20 smaller guns. They have 5 torpedo tubes.

The second type includes the *Wittelsbach*,

Wettin, *Zähringen*, launched in 1902, and the *Schwaben* and *Mecklenburg* of 1903.

They are of 11,643 tons displacement, 14,000 horse-power, and 1,450 tons coal capacity. They have a speed of 18 knots, 9 inches of side armor, and 10 inches protection for the big guns. The armament consists of 4 9.4-inch, 18 5.9-inch rapid fire, 12 3.4-inch rapid fire, and 20 smaller guns. They have 1 torpedo tube above water, and 5 under water.

In 1904 the *Braunschweig* was launched, the *Elsass*, *Hessen*, and *Preussen* in 1905, and the *Lothringen* in 1906.

They are of 12,997 tons displacement, 16,000 horse-power, and 1,800 tons coal capacity. They have a speed of 18 knots, 9.75 inches of side armor, and 11 inches protection for the big guns. The armament consists of 4 11-inch, 14 6.7-inch rapid fire, 12 3.4-inch rapid fire, and 20 smaller guns. They have 1 torpedo tube above water and 2 below.

In 1906, 1907, and 1908 Germany built the *Deutschland*, *Hannover*, *Pommern*, *Schlesien*, and *Schleswig-Holstein*.

They are of 12,997 tons displacement, 16,000 horse-power, and 1,800 tons coal capacity. They have a speed of 18 knots, 9.75 inches of side armor, and 11 inches protection for the big guns. The armament consists of 4 11-inch, 14 6.7-inch rapid fire, 22 3.4-inch rapid fire, and 8 smaller machine guns. They have 6 torpedo tubes.

In 1909 and 1910 Germany built two ships a year, the *Nassau* and *Westfalen* in 1909 and the *Rheinland* and *Posen* in 1910.

They are of 18,600 tons displacement, 20,000 horse-power, and 2,700 tons coal capacity. They have a speed of 19.5 knots, 9.75 inches of side armor, and 11 inches protection for the big guns. The armament consists of 12 11-inch, 12 5.9-inch rapid fire, 16 3.4-inch rapid fire, and 2 smaller guns. They have 6 torpedo tubes.

In 1911 three ships were launched, the *Ostfriesland*, the *Helgoland*, and the *Thuringen*. In 1912 there was but one, the *Oldenburg*.

They are of 22,440 tons displacement, 25,000 horse-power, and 3,000 tons coal capacity. They have a speed of 20.5 knots, 11 inches of side armor belt and 11 inches protection for the big guns. The armament consists of 12 12-inch, 14 5.9-inch rapid fire, 14 3.4-inch rapid fire, and 2 smaller guns. They have 6 torpedo tubes.

In 1913 there were five battleships: the *Friedrich der Grosse*, *Kaiser*, *Kaiserin*, *König Albert*, *Prinz Regent Luitpold*.

They are of 24,310 tons displacement, 28,000 horse-power (turbine), and 3,600 tons coal capacity. They have a speed of 21 knots, 13 inches of side armor, and 11 inches protection for the big guns. The armament consists of 10 12-inch, 14 5.9-inch rapid fire, 12 3.4-inch rapid fire, and 2 smaller guns. They have 5 torpedo tubes.

For 1914 there are the *Markgraf*, the *Grosser Kurfürst*, and the *König*.

They are of 26,575 tons displacement, 35,000 horse-power (turbine). They have a speed of 22 knots, 13 inches of side armor, and 13 inches protection for the big guns. The armament consists of 10 14-inch, 14 5.9-inch rapid fire, 12 3.4-inch rapid fire, and 2 smaller guns. They have 5 torpedo tubes.

The *Von der Tann* (1910), of 19,400 tons, has 43,000 horse-power (turbine), and 2,800 tons coal capacity; 25 knots speed, 4 to 6 inches side armor, and 8 inches of protection for the big guns. She carries 8 11-inch, 10 5.9-inch rapid fire, and 16 3.4-inch rapid fire guns. She had 4 torpedo tubes.

The *Moltke* (1911) and *Goeben* (1912), of 22,640 tons, have 52,000 horse-power (turbine), and 3,100 tons coal capacity; 25.5 knots speed, 4 to 8 inches side armor, and 8 inches of protection for the big guns. They carry 10 11-inch, 12 5.9-inch rapid fire, and 12 3.4-inch rapid fire guns. They have 4 torpedo tubes.

The *Seydlitz* (1913) is the same as the *Moltke*, except its displacement is 24,610 tons and its horse-power 63,000.

The *Derflinger* (1914) of 28,000 tons has 100,000 horse-power (turbine), and 30 knots speed; 9 $\frac{3}{4}$ inches of side armor. Her armament is unknown except that she has 6 torpedo tubes.

The *Fürst Bismarck* (1900) of 10,570 tons, has 14,000 horse-power and 1,250 tons coal capacity 19 knots speed, 4 to 8 inches side armor, and 8 inches of protection for the big guns. She carries 4 9.4-inch, 12 5.9-inch rapid fire, 10 3.4-inch rapid fire, and 18 smaller guns. She has 1 torpedo tube above water and 2 below.

Prinz Heinrich (1902) of 8,759 tons, has 15,000 horse-power, and 1,500 tons coal capacity; 20 knots speed, 2 to 4 inches side armor, and 4 to 6 inches of protection for the big guns. She carries 2 9.4-inch, 10 5.9-inch rapid fire, 10 3.4-

inch rapid fire, and 14 smaller guns. She has 1 torpedo tube above water and 2 below.

The *Prinz Adalbert* (1903) and *Friedrich Karl* (1904) of 8,858 tons, have 18,500 horse-power, and 1,500 tons coal capacity; 21 knots speed, 3 to 4 inches side armor, and 4 to 6 inches of protection for the big guns. They carry 4 8.2-inch, 10 5.9-inch rapid fire, 10 3.4-inch rapid fire, and 14 smaller guns. They have 1 torpedo tube above water and 3 below.

The *Roos* and the *Yorck* (1905), of 9,350 tons have 19,000 horse-power, and 1,600 tons coal capacity; 21 knots speed, 3 to 4 inches side armor, and 4 to 6 inches of protection for the big guns. They carry 4 8.2-inch, 10 5.9-inch rapid fire, 16 3.4-inch rapid fire, and 14 smaller guns. They have 4 torpedo tubes.

The *Scharnhorst* (1907) and *Gneisenau* (1908) of 11,420 tons, have 26,000 horse-power, 22.5 knots speed, 4 to 6 inches side armor, and 6 to 6.75 inches of protection for the big guns. They carry 8 8.2-inch, 6 5.9-inch rapid fire, 20 3.4-inch rapid fire, and 18 smaller guns. They have 4 torpedo tubes.

The *Blücher* (1909), of 15,550 tons, has 32,000 horse-power, 24 knots speed, 4 to 6 inches side armor, and 6 inches of protection for the big guns. She carries 12 8.2-inch rapid fire, 8 5.9-inch rapid fire, 16 3.4-inch rapid fire. She has 4 torpedo tubes.

The *Magdeburg*, *Breslau*, *Strassburg*, and *Stralsund* were launched in 1912.

They are of 4,478 tons displacement, 22,300 to 25,000 horse-power (turbine), and 1,200 tons coal capacity. They have a speed of 26.75 knots, 4 inches of side armor, and 3 inches protection for the big guns. The armament consists of 12 4.1-inch rapid fire, and 2 machine guns. They have 2 torpedo tubes.

The *Karlsruhe* and *Rostock* were launched in 1913. They are of 4,820 tons displacement, 30,000 horse-power (turbine), and 1,300 tons coal capacity. They have a speed of 26.75 knots, 4 inches of side armor, and 3 inches protection for the big guns. The armament consists of 12 4.1-inch rapid fire, and 2 machine guns. They have 2 torpedo tubes.

Though these are reckoned by an English authority as armored cruisers, their armor, and particularly their gun protection, is too slight to bring them properly in the category. They

are really scouts and of a high quality, as on their trial they were nearly a knot to two knots above their designed speed, the *Strassburg* showing 28.8. Some of the next class, the protected cruisers, 39 in number, have practically equal value as scouts, the *Kolberg*, *Mainz*, *Köln*, and *Augsburg*, of 4,281 tons, with turbines of 19,600 horse-power, showing on trial from 26.32 to 27.23 knots, and 28 of them from 21 to 24.

Germany is unusually strong in destroyers, of which she has 143. Forty-two of these are from 350 to 413 tons; 5 of 480; 13 from 530 to 560; 47 of about 650; 36 of 840 and 900 tons. Along with these are 27 submarines, 16 of which have a surface speed of 18 knots and 12 under water. What is known as the type U21, one of which passed into service last year, has a length of 213 feet 8 inches, and 20 feet beam.

AUSTRIA

Austria, Germany's supporter, has nine battle-ships ready, all which have been completed since 1905, as follows:

In 1906 the *Erzherzog Karl* and *Erzherzog Friedrich* were launched, and in 1907 the *Erzherzog Ferdinand Max*.

They are of 10,433 tons displacement, 14,000 horse-power, and 1,315 tons coal capacity. They have a speed of 19.25 knots, 6 to 8.25 inches of side armor, and 9.5-inches protection for the big guns. The armament consists of 4 9.4-inch, 12 7.6-inch rapid fire, 14 3-inch rapid fire, and 16 smaller guns. They have 2 torpedo tubes.

In 1910 came the *Erzherzog Franz Ferdinand*, and in 1911 the *Radetzky* and *Zrinyi*.

They are of 14,268 tons displacement, 20,000 horse-power, and 1,200 tons coal capacity. They have a speed of 20 knots, 9 inches of side armor, and 9.75 inches protection for the big guns. The armament consists of 4 12-inch, 8 9-inch, 20 3.9-inch rapid fire, 6 smaller rapid fire, and 2 machine guns. They have 3 torpedo tubes.

In 1912, the *Viribus Unitis* was launched, in 1913 the *Teggethoff* and the *Prinz Eugen*.

They are of 20,000 tons displacement, 25,000 horse-power, and 2,500 tons coal capacity. They have a speed of 20 knots, 11 inches of side armor, and 11 inches protection for the big guns. The armament consists of 12 12-inch, 12 5.9-inch rapid fire, 18 14-pounder rapid fire, and 4 smaller guns. They have 4 torpedo tubes.

The *Kaiserin Maria Theresa* (1895), of 5,187 tons, has 9,000 horse-power and 740 tons coal capacity; 19 knots speed, 4 inches side armor, and 4 inches of protection for the big guns. She carries 2 7.6-inch rapid fire, 8 6-inch rapid fire, and 22 smaller guns. She has 4 torpedo tubes above water.

The *Kaiser Karl VI* (1900), of 6,151 tons, has 12,000 horse-power and 820 tons coal capacity; 20 knots speed, 8.5 inches side armor, and 8 inches of protection for the big guns. She carries 2 9.4-inch, 8 6-inch rapid fire, and 28 smaller guns. She has 2 torpedo tubes above water.

The *St. Georg* (1906), of 7,185 tons, has 12,300 horse-power and 1,000 tons coal capacity; 21 knots speed, 6.5 inches side armor, and 5 to 8 inches of protection for the big guns. She carries 2 9.4-inch, 5 7.6-inch rapid fire, 4 6-inch rapid fire, and 17 smaller guns. She has 2 torpedo tubes.

The ten light cruisers of Austria, varying in size from 1,506 tons to 3,966, call for no particular remark excepting the two last completed: the *Admiral Spaun*, of 3,500 tons, 20,000 horse-power, and 27 knots, and the *Saida*, of the same tonnage, but of 25,000 horse-power and (probably) 28 knots. Both have turbine engines. Their chief value in war could be only as scouts.

There are 18 destroyers; 12 of 384 tons with 28½ knots. These latter carry 4 12-pounders and two 21-inch torpedo tubes. They have oil fuel.

The six submarines are of but moderate size, ranging from 216 to 235 tons at the surface.

HOW EUROPE TAKES THE FIELD: MOBILIZATION

BY T. LOTHROP STODDARD

THE idea underlying all modern Continental armies is universal military service, — that compulsory instruction of every able-bodied citizen which has resulted in the "Nation

in Arms." In itself this idea is very old. It prevailed in the city-states of Ancient Greece and in the Roman Republic. But throughout the Middle Ages it almost dropped out of sight, while the

subsequent rise of despotic monarchies apparently gave in its death-blow. At the close of the Eighteenth Century European armies were invariably small bodies of highly trained professional soldiers (largely foreign mercenaries), officered by noblemen inspired by feudal loyalty to their royal over-lord, the king. Such an army was pre-eminently the "King's Own"; it was quite out of touch with the nation at large whose chief military contribution in peace or war was the payment of taxes for the support of the king's army.

The French Revolution gave this military system its death-blow and laid the foundation for the existing order of things. With the overthrow of the French crown the old "king's army" went to pieces, but since France was assailed by all Europe she was forced to improvise an army or die. The army was found through the new principle of the "levée en masse," — the rising of the nation to resist the invader. The levée en masse produced enormous masses of men, entirely untrained, of course, but full of fanatical courage, and since their opponents were small armies of professional soldiers too valuable to be rashly risked by generals possessing no adequate reserve forces, the French succeeded in beating off their enemies, and when a campaign or two had turned these raw levies into veteran soldiers the vast French armies overran all Europe. True, the levée en masse had to be supplemented by the "conscription" (the taking of a certain percentage of available men by lot), yet even under the First Empire the French armies were more "national" than the old "king's armies" had ever been.

PRUSSIA'S SYSTEM, — "THE NATION IN ARMS"

However, neither the levée en masse nor the conscription produced the "nation in arms" of the present day. The volunteer or conscript of the French Revolution and Napoleonic Empire became in his turn a professional soldier and the exempted majority of the nation remained as untrained and unmilitary as before. The next step toward the modern system was taken by Prussia. In the Eighteenth Century Prussia had been Europe's military teacher and possessed the most perfect "king's army" of the day. But the war with Napoleon in 1806 revealed the helplessness of the old order in face of the new French system. Once beaten at Jena, there were no

reserves to reform the shattered army and resistance absolutely collapsed. However, in the very depth of her humiliation Prussia found her salvation. Napoleon had limited the Prussian army to a merely nominal figure, but the Prussians cleverly turned the difficulty by making this small force consist largely of officers and under-officers, passing the entire youth of the country through the ranks in quick relays of intensive training, while at the same time possessing in the abnormally large number of officers and subalterns the permanent framework of a large army whenever the trained privates should be recalled from civil life to the colors. Here at last was the germ of that short-term, universal military service which has produced the modern "nation in arms."

Nevertheless, nearly half a century was to elapse before the new system came into general use. The importance of the Prussian innovation was not realized by other nations, while in military matters as in everything else the political reaction following Napoleon's overthrow brought about a partial return to Eighteenth Century conditions. The "nation in arms" had a very uncongenial sound to absolute monarchs menaced by popular discontent; accordingly, long-service professional armies again became the rule, even Prussia showing no signs of military progress for some time. But the troubled period after 1848 and the cry for German unity spurred Prussia to action, and under the guidance of that brilliant galaxy of military talent personified by Von Roon and Moltke Prussia perfected the system which in essence prevails to the present hour.

The proposition of the "nation in arms" once assumed as a theoretical necessity, three problems were bound up with its successful realization. These were: (1) Classification for future military service of the trained citizens returned to civil life; (2) their rapid assemblage at the required moment (3) their effective handling upon the theatre of hostilities. These three problems are best summed up in the words "Reserve," "Mobilization," and "General Staff."

THE "THREE-LINE" RESERVE SYSTEM

The Reserve problem is clearly the first for solution. Here is the entire able-bodied citizenship of a large state liable to military service during a long period of years, — generally between the ages of twenty and forty-five. How does this

work out in practice? The first step is self-evident. Every year all the able-bodied young men of twenty are called to the colors and pass a certain length of time (generally two or three years), in acquiring their military training. Thereafter they return to civil life. It is obvious that in course of time millions of trained men may be available in case of war. But it is equally obvious that they should be recalled for war-service not en masse but by degrees, with due regard for maximum military fitness and minimum disorganization of the social and economic fabric of society.

All this was worked out by the Prussians in their generally adopted "three-line" system of "Active Reserve," "Landwehr" and "Landsturm." The Active Reserve is composed of those citizens only two or three years out of their military service. In wartime these join their old regiments of the peace-army at once, and since these regiments always possess an abnormally large proportion of officers and under-officers, the army which takes the field immediately after the outbreak of war is automatically doubled without being diluted, since the framework is fully equal to the increase in the ranks, while the reservists have not had time to lose the knack of their military duties. The next step is the calling out of the "Landwehr," or second line, — citizens in the prime of life, generally about equal in numbers to the field army. These second-line reservists have already been enrolled in separate Landwehr regiments, with their own framework of officers and under-officers. They are at first used exclusively for garrison duty, guarding communications, etc., although after they have gotten back into shape many of them are sent to the front to repair the wastage of the field army. The third line, or "Landsturm," is not called out except as a last resort. It is obvious that these men of middle life, with settled positions and large families, will be relatively incapable of performing good military service, while their call to the colors will produce the greatest hardship and disorganization in the civil life of the nation. In any event they are used only for home duty.

REGIONAL MOBILIZATION

Having thus organized and classified a nation's trained citizenship, the next step is to assemble it in the hour of peril. This process is known as "mobilization." Applying as it does to millions

of individuals scattered over a whole country, mobilization is naturally an extremely complex and delicate affair, yet rapid mobilization is absolutely necessary, for since modern warfare has become more and more a matter of initial crushing blows followed up relentlessly to the end, it is quite plain that the nation which mobilizes more quickly and smoothly than its opponent is already half assured of victory. The key to the riddle was found by the Prussians in their "regional army-corps" system, whereby the army is divided into army corps, each corps permanently located in a certain region and recruiting therefrom. This works well in both peace and war. The youth does his military service near home, mobilization generally finds the reservist within call of his barracks, and everyone goes to war surrounded by comrades of his own kind. The chief military objection to regional mobilization is the possibility of a smaller but long-service professional army smashing suddenly into the midst of the process, but as all the continental states to-day have the same system, this objection is of no practical importance. After mobilization comes "concentration," or the transport of the assembled army corps to the theatre of hostilities and their junction therein as an articulated fighting machine. To-day this is largely a railroad problem, and strategic railway lines cover the map of Europe.

THE GENERAL STAFF

The third problem solved by the Prussian theorists of the mid-Nineteenth Century was raised by the enormous size of modern armies and by the extensive area of battlefields consequent upon the introduction of long-range rifles and artillery. Only a century ago the commander-in-chief, seated upon an adjacent hill, could overlook and direct the whole course of a battle. This has now become impossible. Accordingly, to ensure smooth coördination, the directing group of officers must be previously trained, not merely to think, but to *feel* alike, so that a few broad general orders will ensure harmonious development of a major operation extending over a wide theatre of action. This has been effected by the "General Staff," the keystone of the modern edifice of war.

Such are the three solutions which enabled the Prussians to crush the old long-service, professional armies of Austria and France in 1866 and 1870, together with the French "levée en masse" of

1871. Prussia thereupon became the military schoolmaster of Europe, exactly as she had done a century before, after the victories of Frederick the Great. All the continental armies are today patterned on the Prussian model, albeit they differ sufficiently in numbers, composition, and organization to warrant a brief comparative analysis.

ARMY STATISTICS

Before proceeding to our detailed examination of the various European military establishments, one word of explanation seems necessary. The press just now is full of statistics giving the impression that nearly 20,000,000 soldiers are engaged in the present struggle. Now the true figures are tremendous enough, but they are certainly far below the current "estimates." There is no doubt that the contending nations possess 20,000,000 able-bodied men, all of whom might ultimately see service should the war prove to be of long duration. But the frightful, economic strain involved in the present conflict, together with the very nature of modern warfare itself, combine to make a European war extending over two or three years a highly improbable contingency. Everything points to the conclusion that this struggle will be decided in one or, at most, two campaigns. It has, therefore, seemed advisable to give only the net figures of trained troops available for field service during this period.

We must never forget that modern warfare is a highly technical science demanding expert knowledge of those engaged in its pursuit. Its very instruments are useless in unskilled hands. To train even a private soldier is a process of months, especially in the cavalry and artillery branches, while the production of capable officers and under-officers requires years. Furthermore, modern warfare has become to such an extent a matter of artillery practice and the consumption of these slowly produced objects is so rapid that the size of an army is practically restricted by its quota of gun batteries and reserve material. When we add the complications of transport, for the feeding and supply of these vast masses of men, we can readily see the practical limitations imposed upon the size of field armies. Every military expert knows that to send hosts of half-trained infantry commanded by virtually untrained officers and without the proper proportion of cavalry, artillery, and allied technical branches, would be sending

of so many lambs to the slaughter. And since this is an experts' war, such blunders will assuredly not take place. With these preliminary remarks in mind, let us begin with the common archetype, — the German army.

GERMANY'S EFFECTIVE MILITARY STRENGTH

During the last few years the German army has been greatly strengthened, but not to such an extent as to make the theoretical universal military service a matter of actual practice. Germany's great population of nearly 70,000,000 gives her a superfluity of men, and only half the able-bodied youth of the Empire actually do service with the colors, the other half being assigned to the so-called "Ersatz-Reserve," where they get a light militia training. In war time, however, these "Ersatz" reservists are called up, the younger to the active army regimental depots to be drilled like ordinary recruits for service in the field, the rest apportioned according to age among the Landwehr regiments or in the Landsturm. This assures Germany a plentiful supply of recruits in the critical period two or three months after the beginning of war without the disorganization of the Landwehr units by drafts for decimated field regiments. The peace strength of the German field army (deducting permanent garrison units, depot troops, etc.) is about 800,000 with 650,000 active reservists called to the colors at once and with 400,000 young, able-bodied Ersatz reservists training in the regimental depots and fit for service in a short time. The Landwehr is subdivided into two "bans," according to age, each ban numbering about 600,000. The trained portion of the Landsturm, some 400,000 strong, consisting of men between thirty-nine and forty-five years of age, would be fairly effective for home-guard and garrison duty. The untrained portion, slightly more numerous, would probably not be called out in any event. Here, then, in round numbers, is the effective military strength of Germany in the present crisis:

<i>Field Army</i> (peace strength and active reserves)	1,450,000
<i>Ersatz Recruits</i> (available for active service in a short time).....	400,000
<i>Landwehr</i> (1st ban) (fit for field work after a time if necessary).....	600,000
Total effective field forces.....	2,450,000
<i>Landwehr</i> (2nd ban) (for garrison and covering duty).....	600,000
<i>Landsturm</i> (trained) (for garrison and home duty only).....	400,000
Grand total effective forces.....	3,450,000

AUSTRIA'S THREE-FOLD ORGANIZATION

Turning next to Germany's ally, Austria-Hungary, we find a state of things very different from the highly unified German military machine. The peculiar constitution of the Dual Monarchy is reflected in its army. Austria-Hungary has, in fact, three separate military establishments: the common Imperial-Royal army ("Kaiserliche Koenigliche"), the Austrian "Landwehr," and the Hungarian "Honved." These last two terms must not be confused with the German Landwehr, or 2nd reserves. In the Dual Monarchy the annual classes coming up for military training are apportioned among the three establishments and ever after remain subject to service only in the particular establishment to which they have been originally assigned, each establishment having its own reserve organization. The result of all this is a highly complex system which makes mobilization both slow and difficult. Fortunately for the striking power of Austria-Hungary, the Imperial-Royal army is far stronger than the other two establishments put together, its peace strength being 340,000 effectives, whereas the "Landwehr" and "Honved" number only 48,000 and 36,000, respectively. As no official figures of reserves or Landsturm are published, the war strength of Austria-Hungary is somewhat problematical. The best estimates of the effective field army are somewhat as follows:

<i>Imperial-Royal Army</i> (with reserves)	600,000
<i>"Landwehr"</i> and <i>"Honved"</i> (with reserves) . . .	230,000
<i>Ersatz Reserves</i> , etc. (available for active service later)	220,000
Total effective field forces	1,050,000

UNIVERSAL SERVICE IN FRANCE

Having thus considered the fighting power of Germany and Austria-Hungary, let us now examine the military strength of their opponents. First of all, France. The stationary population of the Republic (to-day only 39,600,000) has made France the classic example of absolutely universal military service. France's desperate efforts to maintain a field army as large as that of her German neighbor have resulted in the enrolment of every Frenchman not positively unfit for military service. Indeed, even men with slight physical defects are required to serve in the non-combatant branches of the army. In principle the German three-line reserve system is in force,

though with a different classification. The Landwehr and Landsturm are here combined into the so-called "Territorial Army," with a complete organization of its own, the Landwehr classes composing the Territorial first-line, the Landsturm classes forming the Territorial reserve. Another point to be noted is that since France possesses a large colonial empire, she maintains a distinct colonial army of the old professional type, it being composed of long-service troops, obtained mainly through voluntary enlistment and consisting of vigorous men in the prime of life.

These "regulars," seasoned by actual foreign service, should prove of high fighting power, since the long-service regular, man for man, is normally superior to the ordinary short-term citizen soldier. Again, in addition to this white colonial force, France possesses a considerable native army recruited among the Arab-Berbers of Algeria and the warlike blacks of Senegal. The white colonial army numbers 47,000, the native troops 93,000, but it is evident that not much more than half these forces could be spared from the colonies for European service.

The effective fighting strength of France is therefore as follows:

<i>Peace Establishment</i> (metropolitan army)	800,000
<i>Reserves</i> (active, available at once)	500,000
<i>Colonial and Native Troops</i> (for European service)	80,000
Total field army immediately available . . .	1,380,000
<i>Reserves</i> (2nd line) (fit for field work if necessary)	600,000
Total effective field forces	1,980,000
<i>Territorial Army</i> (active) (for garrison and covering duty)	500,000
<i>Territorial Reserves</i> (trained) (for home duty only)	300,000
Grand total effective forces	2,780,000

RUSSIA'S SLOW MOBILIZATION

From France let us turn to Russia. Certainly, at first sight, the eastern member of the Triple Entente looks formidable enough to meet both Germany and Austria-Hungary single-handed. Russia's vast population of nearly 180,000,000 together with her huge size, covering one-sixth of the entire land surface of the globe, apparently imply overwhelming armies of soldiers. However, as a matter of fact, the very vastness of the Russian Empire involves such problems of distance and multiplicity of interests that much of its strength can never be brought to bear on any

one given point, while its wretched roads and inadequate railway system prevent the effective development of all the forces possessed by even the European portion. These drawbacks become most apparent during the Russian mobilization, which is far slower than that of any other great power. Reservists often have to walk great distances to arrive at their military depots, and the inadequate train service correspondingly hinders the concentration of the mobilized army corps. So keenly has Russia felt her handicaps in this respect that she to-day makes no serious effort to hold Russian Poland, stretching so temptingly between East Prussia and Austrian Galicia, but is mobilizing far to the eastward, which will mean a very long-delayed advance. The Russian peace establishment is certainly enormous, numbering, as it does, about 1,200,000, but of these 200,000 are in Asia (Siberia, Turkestan, and Manchuria), while 100,000 are in Transcaucasia, and neither of these armies can be safely denuded for the European theatre of war.

Also, the huge population of European Russia can be drawn upon only to a certain point, since Russia possesses neither the artillery nor the permanent framework of officers and subalterns required for the effective employment of such vast masses of men. The actual strength of the Russian field army which will be employed against Germany and Austria-Hungary will probably be about as follows:

<i>Peace Establishment</i> (European army)	900,000
<i>Reserves</i> (active) (immediately available)	600,000
<i>Second Reserves</i> (available after some time)	1,100,000
Total effective field forces	2,600,000

ITALY'S MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT

Before discussing the peculiar military establishment of the British Empire, the third member of the Triple Entente, it may be as well to cast a glance at the one great European power still holding aloof from the present struggle, — Italy. The first thing that strikes one's attention is the fact that despite Italy's large population of 36,000,000 its army is smaller than might be anticipated. Italy's poverty does not permit it to train even half the annual quota of its able-bodied youth, the majority thus relieved from service with the colors receiving either a brief militia training or no military education at all. Furthermore, mobilization is handicapped by three un-

favorable factors. In the first place Italy's peninsular shape makes a strict regional distribution of its army corps a strategical impossibility; the bulk of the army must be kept at all times in the extreme north in close proximity to the land frontiers.

Also the still imperfect fusion of Italy's diverse populations has led the government to mix men from every province of the country in the same regimental units, in order to hasten the break-up of local particularism and further Italian Unity. In war-time, however, these combined factors spell a slow and complex mobilization, many reservists having to travel great distances in order to rejoin their regiments. Another unfavorable military factor is the extensive Italian emigration, which deprives the country in a sudden emergency of hundreds of thousands of its most vigorous reservists and entirely disorganizes many military units. As nearly as can be estimated the actual effective strength of the Italian army is as follows:

<i>Peace Establishment</i>	270,000
<i>Reserves</i> (active) (immediately available)	250,000
<i>Mobile Militia</i> (available for field duty after some time)	300,000
Total effective field army	820,000
<i>Territorial Militia</i> (trained) (for garrison and home duty)	700,000
Grand total effective forces	1,520,000

THE BRITISH ARMY — A SURVIVAL

Looked at from the Continental point of view the British army is in every respect a "peculiar institution." Unlike any of the great European military establishments, it is in fact a survival of the old Eighteenth Century system. A small army of long-service professional soldiers, officered by aristocrats, the British regular army has owed its continued existence to England's insular position and to the fact that until the recent rise of German sea-power the English fleet afforded an absolute guarantee against any possible invasion by a Continental "nation in arms." The British regular army establishment on a peace footing numbers only 156,000 effectives, partly stationed abroad, and though many of the time-expired soldiers are enrolled in a reserve organization, the British army on a war footing is numerically less imposing than that of several minor European states. True, the last few years have seen the formation of the "Territorial Army," a volunteer organization now numbering about 250,000, but

military experts everywhere have been a unit in declaring that such militia could not stand the shock of anything like an equal number of disciplined Continental troops. Of course the British regulars, as might be expected of long-service professionals, are undoubtedly better than any other large body of European soldiers, but the "Territorials," with their imperfect equipment and their glaring lack of trained officers and under-officers, will long be incapable of standing in a Continental line-of-battle.

The same is true of the various contingents now being offered by the various Dominions of the British Empire. The native Indian Army is of course of high fighting quality, but its remoteness from the European theatre of war and the dangerous ferment of discontent in India would seem to preclude the drafting of any considerable portion of it for European service. The so-called "Expeditionary Force" which England has reckoned upon sending to the Continent in the event of what is now actually taking place has never been placed higher than 160,000 men, and some writers have maintained that even this would strip the home defense of the British Isles in dangerous fashion so long as the enemy's fleet remained undestroyed. The following table shows England's present effective military strength. No mention is made of the Indian Army for reasons above stated, and the Dominion contingents have likewise been omitted, since so many months must pass before these volunteer organizations can be equipped, trained, shipped and fitted for European battlefields that it is unlikely that they can figure much in the present campaign; and since modern wars tend to be of brief duration, the first campaign of the present struggle will very likely prove to be the last as well.

<i>Regular Army</i> (peace footing; partly stationed abroad)	156,000
<i>Regular Reserve</i> (available at once)	146,000
<i>Special Reserve</i> (rapidly available)	63,000
Total Regular Establishment	365,000
<i>Territorial Army</i>	251,000
Grand total effective forces	616,000

BELGIUM, HOLLAND, SWITZERLAND

Since the present war is nothing short of a general conflagration which may ultimately involve every European state, it will not be amiss to devote some space to a brief survey of the

military establishments of the minor powers. First and foremost, a few words about that Belgian army that has shown prowess. Belgium has never adopted the principle of universal military service, but retains the older system of conscription. Her regular army on a peace-footing numbers about 45,000, the trained reserves giving a total of 170,000 effectives in time of war. Alongside this regular establishment there is a local militia, the "Garde Civique," numbering some 45,000. A few of its élite corps rank as high-grade militia, but most of its units are without serious military value.

The neighboring state of Holland, though maintaining a good-sized Colonial Army, has little more than a militia organization for home defense, relying as Holland does upon its dikes to drown the invader's path. A knot of 20,000 regulars forms the nucleus about which would gather the Dutch militia to the number of perhaps 150,000. The third "neutral" state of Western Europe, Switzerland, is much better prepared to maintain its neutrality and would prove a formidable antagonist for the most powerful invaders. Switzerland has long adopted the principle of universal military service; not in the sense of a large standing army fitted for instant attack, but with an entire population of well-trained and organized militiamen, ready for stubborn defense. The warlike nature of its hardy people and the strong barriers of its mountains would make an invasion of Switzerland a dangerous undertaking. In a supreme emergency Switzerland could place nearly 500,000 men in the field.

THE BALKAN STATES

Lastly, there remains a brief consideration of the military strength possessed by the several Balkan peoples. The recent Balkan wars were so destructive of both men and matériel that the effective fighting power of these countries (Roumania excepted), must be largely a matter of conjecture. According to latest estimates, Servia and Montenegro together can put 300,000 men in the field, Greece another 300,000. The Turkish and Bulgarian matériel captured by these states in the late Balkan wars should have largely solved the problem of equipment for the present struggle. Bulgaria is in bad shape, disorganized by defeat, semi-bankrupt and very deficient in artillery. She could probably not put more than 250,000

effective troops in line of battle. Roumania, with her untouched resources of men, equipment and supply, is to-day the strongest of all the Balkan powers. She could put about 350,000 effectives into the field. Turkey, like Bulgaria, is still under the shadow of defeat, and cannot have yet repaired her enormous losses of war matériel nor reformed that shattered framework of trained officers and under-officers so vital to the modern army. Since

Turkey's entry into the present struggle would necessarily entail a war with Greece, she would be obliged to station large forces in Western Asia Minor to guard against a Greek invasion and a rising of the dense Hellenic population of the Ægean shore. It is therefore doubtful whether Turkey, despite her new strategic railways, could ever throw more than 400,000 men on European soil, and even these might be of questionable value.

LAND AND NAVAL FORCES AT WAR

LAND FORCES

	Comp. Service	Standing Army	Infantry	Cavalry	Artillery	Other	First Reserve	Second Reserve	Total
Germany	Yes	790,000	505,000	86,000	126,000	73,000	460,000	2,600,000	3,850,000
Austria-Hungary	Yes	424,000	197,000	47,000	37,000	143,000	396,000	1,400,000	2,220,000
Russia	Yes	949,000	627,000	116,000	138,000	68,000	1,838,000	2,488,000	5,400,000
France	Yes	750,000	361,000	73,000	97,000	219,000	700,000	700,000	2,150,000
Servia	Yes	24,000					246,000	80,000	*350,000
Great Britain	No	254,000	96,000	15,000	33,000	110,000	206,000	463,000	898,000
Belgium	Yes	58,000	27,000	6,000	10,000	15,000	112,000	170,000	*34,000
Japan	<i>a</i> Yes	250,000					250,000	1,000,000	1,500,000
Portugal	<i>b</i> Yes	30,000					90,000	140,000	*260,000
Montenegro	Yes	4,000					41,000		45,000

a Service compulsory in either army or navy

*Doubtful

b Exemption may be purchased by paying tax.

Kaiser's Forces	Standing Armies	Total Strength on Land
(Germany and Austria)	1,214,000	6,070,000
Allies	2,319,000	10,637,000
	3,533,000	16,707,000

NAVAL FORCES

	Modern Battleships	Cruiser Battleships	Older Battleships	First Class Cruisers	2nd & 3rd Class Cruisers	Gunboats	Destroyers	Torpedo Boats	Submarines	Total Ships	Officers and Men	
Germany	19	7	20	9	45	7	141	47	30	325	67,000	The Kaiser's Forces Ships 439 Men 85,000
Austria-Hungary	4	0	9	3	9	3	18	53	15	114	18,000	
	23	7	29	12	54	10	159	100	45	439	85,000	
Russia	9	4	8	6	9	8	105	23	48	220	52,000	The Allies Ships 1,437 Men 308,000
France	17	0	15	18	13	6	87	173	90	419	61,000	
Servia	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Great Britain	29	10	38	42	70	10	227	58	85	569	138,000	
Belgium	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Japan	9	5	13	12	19	5	60	54	15	192	51,000	
Portugal	0	0	1	0	6	19	2	7	2	37	6,000	
Montenegro	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
	64	19	75	78	117	48	481	315	240	1437	308,000	

Navies at War
Ships 1,876
Men 393,000

AIR FLEETS OF THE NATIONS

[Reprinted, by permission, from the New York Evening Post's "War Gazetteer."]

FOR the first time warfare on a large scale may be expected in the air. With air fleets varying in size from the huge dirigible establishment of Germany and the well-manned aeroplane squadrons of France and Great Britain to the tiny equipment of such a state as Servia, which has one or two unreported lighter-than-air machines, the nations are ready to embark in a new region of conflict. What will be accomplished in return for the vast sums expended in preparation for battles in the air is necessarily a matter of conjecture. Both dirigible and aeroplane have yet to be tried out under the severe conditions imposed by modern warfare, not the least of which is the type of gun devised to cope with flying objects high overhead.

That much is expected from their air strength by the Powers of Europe is evidenced by the fact that they are said upon good authority to have expended collectively within the last six years something like \$117,000,000 upon this arm of their service. Of this huge outlay, in round numbers, Germany has spent \$28,000,000; France, \$22,000,000; Russia, \$12,000,000; Italy, \$8,000,000; Austria, \$5,000,000, and England, \$3,000,000.

Popular support of national funds added \$3,500,000 to Germany, \$2,500,000 to France, \$1,000,000 to Italy, and \$100,000 to Russia. Furthermore, appropriations of the Governments for 1913 were: France, \$7,400,000; Germany, \$5,000,000; Russia, \$5,000,000; England, \$3,000,000; Italy, \$2,100,000; Japan, \$1,000,000, and Mexico, \$400,000, as against \$125,000 by the United States, making additional expenditures of \$24,025,000 during the current year. It is now believed that the appropriation made by Germany of \$37,000,000 to be expended during 1914-18 may be drawn upon for immediate war emergencies.

France has a far smaller equipment of dirigibles than her enemy, Germany, but the disadvantage is believed to be offset in part by the formidable array of aeroplanes in the French service. All told, France, is believed to have an air force of nearly 800 aeroplanes and 1,200 airmen. She has an aeronautical corps organized in 3 territorial groups. Each group consists of from 2 to 4 companies, with from 2 to 5 detached sections with troops.

There are 27 sections, each having 8 aeroplanes; 10 cavalry sections, each with 3 aeroplanes; 11 fortress sections, with 8 aeroplanes each — a complete establishment of 334 aeroplanes. The aeronautical corps is also in charge of 14 dirigibles.

Most of the French air fleet is said to be assembled at the great flying camps of Rheims, Verdun, Toul, Épinal, and Belfort, where they are of invaluable use as scouts against the army of invasion. They are also looked upon to increase greatly the power of artillery by careful reconnaissance.

In general the aeroplanes are without guns, although some are known to carry light machine guns, and therefore suffer by comparison with the big air battleships, which are well armed. The smaller craft can, however, carry something like 200 pounds of explosives in the shape of bombs, and can be counted upon to use their cargo with considerable effect in the case of sustained sieges. International usage, with so little precedent as to the regulation of air fighting, leaves much to be desired. Undoubtedly some sort of code will develop from present hostilities. No prohibition attaches to firing upon aircraft, nor upon the return of the attack from above. The airman is prohibited, however, by a Hague convention against bombarding undefended towns and villages where no army is quartered. On his side he is similarly protected from being treated as a spy should he be captured in the performance of his air duties.

German dirigibles are all well housed, most of them in the revolving airship sheds specially designed. Their distribution is governed by the needs of German boundary defence. Friederichshafen, Strassburg, Metz, and Cologne are provided with dirigibles. Others are stationed at Frankfort, Gotha, Thorn, Hamburg, Cuxhaven, and on the Island of Helgoland. These will be especially useful in resisting British advances on the North Sea coast. Still others at Königsberg, Posen, and Breslau will assist in the defence of the Russian and Austrian frontier.

Under the law of 1913, Germany set about forming 5 aeroplane battalions, 17 companies in all. Her establishment last year was 173 officers, 4,446 other ranks, with 24 dirigibles in military charge.

Great Britain has given enthusiastic support to her aviation department under the leadership of Winston Churchill, since the whole air service of army and navy airship sections is under the Admiralty. At certain places on the coast the air service has replaced the coast guard. In the army wing the Royal Flying Corps is about completed to the number of 8 aeroplane squadrons, making nearly 300 officer fliers. There are four sea-plane stations in England — at Calshot, near Portsmouth, Grain Island, Felixstowe, and Yarmouth. Two more are about completed in Scotland at Dundee and at Fort George, near Cromarty. Four more are contemplated to carry the line northward, and Dover and Plymouth, to the south, are to be equipped. The naval flying school and headquarters are at Eastchurch, and the army wing at Salisbury Plain and Farnborough. With airships good progress has also been made. Three ships of fifteen tons have been ordered, but as yet the country is without a suitable shed for a ship as large as twelve tons.

Austria-Hungary has been without the means to go in extensively for airships. She has three small sheds, and it has been reported that the German Government gave the Zeppelin Company permission before the war to sell six ships to Austria. Austria-Hungary has a small naval

service of hydro-aeroplanes, the station being at Pola. The two types of aeroplanes constructed in Austria, Etrich-Taube and the Lohner-Daimler, are both good machines.

Russia is without completed battle airships as yet; some are building, and she has thirteen of the smaller scouting class. She is credited with having eight airship sheds of good size. There are seaplane stations at Petrograd, Reval, Sevastopol, and Cronstadt. The Curtiss type is largely used. Russia's most important element of strength in heavier-than-air machines is the machine designed by the Russian designer Sikorsky. This machine is driven by four independent 100-horsepower motors, and has carried as many as sixteen passengers. The Russian Admiralty was said to have ordered five some time ago to be fitted as seaplanes, and the army has likewise arranged to secure some machines of the Sikorsky type.

Italy's aeronautical service consists of a "specialist" battalion of 5 companies and an experimental section; a flying battalion of 2 companies, and about 30 field squadrons of 7 aeroplanes each. She has besides some small airships.

Belgium recently formed an aeronautical company, consisting of the aeronautical school and a number of sections of 4 aeroplanes each.

RESOURCES AND STAYING POWERS OF THE NATIONS

EUROPE'S FOOD SUPPLY IN WAR TIME

BY JAMES MIDDLETON

READERS of history are fond of detecting a resemblance between the present European situation and that which prevailed a century ago. Then the greatest European Powers were united in a struggle against one country — France; now they seem united against another common enemy, Germany. Now, as in 1814, all the forces of Europe are determined to humiliate one overweening personality. In one respect, however, and this is a fundamental one, the situation is entirely different. A hundred years ago practically every great European Power was an economic entity. Each one could have built a Chinese Wall about itself and lived indefinitely. Each one, that is, raised on its own soil enough of the essential foodstuffs to support itself. Even England, in the Napoleonic wars, was largely an agricultural community. It raised both cereals and meat in sufficient quantities to stand an indefinite siege. Even as late as the Crimean War, in 1853, England could go cheerfully to war with no fear of national starvation.

If, as some one has said, an army travels upon its stomach, the same statement may be made of a nation itself at war. Clearly, any people that has its supply of food cut off would immediately have to submit to any humiliating terms proposed. Its position would be that of a huge beleaguered fortress. And there is at least one of the nations engaged in the present struggle, England, that faces this contingency; and another, Germany, that certainly has reasons for apprehension. A remarkable development of the present international situation is the dependence of one nation upon others for its food supply. There is no country of importance that does not import large amounts of food from almost every other. The United States, huge as are its foodstuffs, adds millions of dollars' worth to its supply from other sources. Even China, content, as we have supposed, with its staple rice, pur-

chases immense quantities of American canned goods, especially salmon. Looking over the statistics, one is forced to conclude that there is no longer any such thing as a national taste in foods; each nation is rapidly picking up all the good things of another. The extent to which almost the entire world depends upon one or two countries for its coffee and tea — foods which, in the Middle Ages, were practically unknown in Europe — sufficiently illustrates the growth of this international taste.

In the present conflict, however, these special foods will cut no particular figure; the great staples of life are the important considerations in an international war. In this struggle, wheat, not cotton, promises to be king. What, then, is the situation of the several nations in this respect? How are they to feed not only the huge armies in the field, but their own peoples? Unquestionably this is the first time in history when war has presented precisely this problem to the peoples involved.

THE NATIONS THAT CAN SUPPORT THEMSELVES

Beside little Montenegro, there are seven nations, at this writing, immediately involved. These are England, Germany, France, Russia, Belgium, Austria-Hungary, and Servia. We can immediately clarify the situation by arranging these countries in two classes: those that raise the essential food materials in sufficient quantities to support themselves, at least in time of peace, and those that do not. This division, as accurately as can be determined from available statistics, is as follows:

COUNTRIES SELF-
SUPPORTING
Russia
France
Austria-Hungary
Servia

COUNTRIES NOT SELF-
SUPPORTING
England
Belgium

DOUBTFUL
Germany

Of these Russia, next to the United States, is the largest wheat growing country in the world. Seven eighths of all the peasants are tillers of the soil. Two thirds of all the lands are sown with cereals. The nation raises not only enough to support its own enormous population, but exports large quantities. France, most investigators are surprised to learn, ranks third — next to Russia and the United States — as a wheat growing land. The thrifty French farmers, with their comparatively small acreage, raise more wheat than the Argentine, British India, or Canada — all of them usually regarded as huge granaries. They produce 100,000,000 more bushels than the whole of South America. France grows about 315,000,000 bushels a year — almost half as much as does the United States in normal years; it imports about 22,000,000 bushels. Clearly, with strict economy enforced by war conditions, France can easily furnish its own wheat supply without calling on outside nations. Austria-Hungary and Servia are similarly situated. When we come to England, Germany, and Belgium, however, the conditions are different. The United Kingdom raises about 65,000,000 bushels of wheat every year and imports 217,000,000. Belgium raises 14,000,000 bushels and imports 49,000,000. The situation in Germany is not so acute as this, but still, with importations shut down, the wheat situation might become embarrassing. The empire raises 149,000,000 bushels a year and imports 67,000,000. Clearly the sudden wiping out of these importations, while they might not produce an actual wheat famine, would so considerably reduce the food supply as to amount to a distinct military disadvantage. Germany's situation is considerably better than that of England, but inferior to that of France and Russia. Russia raises all of its wheat and more; France raises ninety per cent.; Germany raises sixty per cent. On the other hand Great Britain and Belgium raise only about twenty per cent. each. On the theory that a nation that raises only sixty per cent. of its most important article of food can hardly be regarded as entirely self-supporting, Germany is included, in the classification given above, as in a more or less precarious position. The Germans are not rich enough to be guilty of much over-feeding and if two fifths of their ration were to be taken away their efficiency would be greatly impaired.

ENGLAND ENTIRELY DEPENDENT ON OUTSIDE SOURCES

From the standpoint of food supply in case of war, England, of course, presents the most interesting problem. There was a time when English statesmen worried little over this situation. The supremacy of England's sea power was regarded as a fixed, determined fact. The fleet was so immeasurably superior to other navies, and, indeed, to all of them combined, that England went on serenely developing a huge industrial state within, and depending upon other nations for its food. About fifteen years ago, however, Englishmen began to be nervous on this point; since then there have been periodical scares. The building of other formidable navies, especially that of Germany, began to cause general alarm. The last of these great searchings-of-heart was in 1903. Parliament then appointed a Royal Commission, of which the Prince of Wales, the present king, served as chairman, to investigate the question. This Commission collected a large array of facts, most of them alarming. It found that the precariousness of England's food supply was about as black as it had been described. England imports four fifths of all its food. Most of it comes from far distant countries — from North and South America, British India, and Australia. It gets large quantities of butter, eggs, bacon, poultry, fruit, and potatoes, and other vegetables from France, Denmark, and the Baltic ports.

A certain amount of grain comes also from Russian-Baltic ports — and from the Black Sea region. For the larger staples, however, like wheat and meat, England has to go several thousand miles. It always has a comparatively small supply of food on hand. The swiftness of the modern steam vessel has made any large storage system unnecessary. Of butter it has normally only a seven or ten days' supply; of cheese only a month's supply; of eggs — England consumes 80,000,000 a week — only four or five weeks' supply. Its resources in wheat vary through the year; it has the highest supply in September, when it has enough for seventeen weeks, and the lowest in August, when it has enough for only six and one half weeks. England has a larger supply, however, than that stored up in its own larder. There is always an immense amount floating in ships — in thousands of English vessels, crowding

the trade routes in all parts of the world. This usually amounts to from three to seven weeks' supply. An interesting fact herein disclosed is that England's lowest stock on hand is reached in August — the very month in which she has gone to war. The whole food situation was well summed up in a formal declaration made to the Royal Commission by the most influential members of the wheat trade in London: "We, the undersigned, concur in the opinion that, if Great Britain should become involved in a European war, the country must be prepared to see bread at practically famine prices."

THE UNITED STATES SENDS LITTLE WHEAT TO ENGLAND

From 1870 until 1902, the United States did the larger part in feeding the British Isles. We not only had a large surplus of food stuffs, but the shortness of the voyage gave us an advantage over competitors. The enormous increase in our population forces us now to keep the larger part of our food, especially wheat, to feed our own stomachs. Although we are still the world's largest wheat producer, we send comparatively little of it abroad. England now draws its supply from Russia, Canada, the Argentine, British India, and Australia. The figures for 1911 are as follows:

PRESENT SOURCE OF ENGLAND'S WHEAT SUPPLY (Hundredweights)

British India.....	20,161,518
Russia.....	18,106,100
Argentine.....	14,748,600
Canada.....	14,373,700
Australia.....	13,910,720
United States.....	12,939,229

England likewise imports two thirds of all its meat. It gets a small supply fresh killed from Holland and Denmark and a far greater amount in the shape of live animals from Canada and the United States. Its frozen carcasses come mainly from the Argentine and Australia. It usually has about one month's supply of all kinds of meat on hand.

SEA POWER ENGLAND'S ONE SALVATION

The practical question that has agitated England for many years has been: How are we to protect our food supply in case of war? Some authorities have advocated the building of huge

granaries that would hold a large reserve supply. There are many practical objections to this proposition and it has never enlisted popular approval. Most Englishmen who have had the courage to face the situation have reached the same conclusion: that there is only one way of protecting the food supply, and that is the navy. Even with England in command of the sea, there would be certain difficulties in feeding the nation; without this control, most people agree that the game would be fairly up. With a hostile navy blockading the important ports and so shutting out the foodships, England could undoubtedly be starved into submission in a few weeks. The Royal Commission, which investigated this subject, came to this conclusion. The enormous navy which England maintains in the North Sea, therefore, has ample justification.

England will probably control the sea in the present conflict; there are other problems, however, that she will have to solve. Many ships are drawn from the mercantile marine for the use of the admiralty; inasmuch as there are thousands of English ships, however, this probably will not seriously interfere with transportation facilities. Nor does there seem much danger that the German and Austrian navies will prey to any extent upon English shipping. The days of the privateer are over; the steamship, involving the difficulty of coaling, has practically made impossible this old fashioned roving of the sea. Nor is Germany likely to send any of her rapid cruisers to prey upon English trade; she will weaken her fleet, already considerably over-matched, by doing so. Neutrals ought not to suffer, especially as the Declaration of London has settled the fact that food, unless intended for military purposes — such as the feeding of armies and fortresses — is not contraband. Some English ships unquestionably will be captured; but there will be few in comparison with the depredations that seem likely to be made on German commerce. One consideration that especially protects England's food supply is the fact that it is not drawn from any one country, but from five — the United States, Canada, Argentine, Russia, and British India. It comes over three great trade routes — the North Atlantic, the South Atlantic, and the Mediterranean. The first has its most important port in New York, the second in Buenos Ayres, while the third leads to Bombay and Aus-

tralian depots. There seems no likelihood that Germany can control these three transportation routes, or any one of them. When the Royal Commission made its investigation, the Mediterranean route was the one that gave the greatest anxiety. The *entente cordiale* was then not a factor in European politics; and war with France was not an impossibility. The Republic's naval strength in the Mediterranean, in that event, would have endangered such of England's food supply as came by way of Suez. The present European alignment makes this same Mediterranean route perhaps better protected than either of the other two routes.

UNITED STATES AS A FOOD SOURCE IN WAR TIME

With an English fleet victorious on the sea, therefore, the English food supply seems abundantly safeguarded. In all probability, if the war lasts any time, the United States will largely increase its exports. Our natural position should make us the largest storehouse of the Englishman's food. The route to the river Plata is 6,500 miles; that to Bombay is 6,250 miles by the Suez Canal, and 10,500 by the Cape. New Zealand and Australia are 10,000 miles away; the distance to American ports, however, is only 3,500 miles. Moreover the ships coming this short distance can carry more than those sailing on the other routes. The longer the voyage, the more coal the ship has to carry, and, proportionately, the smaller is its cargo. Inasmuch as England will naturally import from the places whence the food will come quickest and in the largest amount, it should naturally draw first of all upon the resources of the United States. It will do this particularly this year, as our grain crop is unusually large and that of the other agricultural nations unusually small.

When we look to Germany, however, the opportunities for food importations do not seem so reassuring. In all probability German ships will not be able to use the North Sea. With both the French and the British fleets in the Mediterranean, there is apparently no hope of obtaining supplies from that source. It is even probable that the larger part of the mercantile marine which Germany has been building up at such enormous cost will be swept from the sea. That scurrying to friendly ports that marked

the first days of war will probably develop into little less than a stampede. Moreover, while the blockading of the English coast is a difficult problem, owing to its character and extent, the blockading of the German North Sea sealine presents comparatively few problems to a victorious fleet. Germany will find some embarrassment also in the fact that she has gone to war with the country that furnishes the larger part of her additional food. This is Russia. She takes from the Czar's empire large quantities of wheat, barley, oats, and corn every year. In fact she imports foodstuffs from about the same countries as England herself. The following table, showing her importations of wheat, illustrates this point:

GERMANY'S IMPORTATIONS OF WHEAT (Tons) 1912

Russia.....	558,422
Argentina.....	546,439
Canada.....	269,530
United States.....	446,512
Australia.....	322,590

The Germans, therefore, use the same trade routes as the English ships. With the English and French commanding the sea, however, the Germans can not draw much wheat from these sources.

GERMANY'S LARGE SUPPLIES OF MEAT

The cutting off of these foreign supplies would not affect Germany to the same extent that a similar scarcity would embarrass England. In the British Isles such a calamity would mean starvation; in Germany it would mean a severe scarcity of food. For Germany still produces the larger part of what it eats. Although in the last forty years the empire, like England, has become a great industrial state, with the consequent shifting of the population from town to city, the imperial policy has still promoted agriculture. Agrarianism has long been a political issue. As part of its monarchical system, the ruling forces have used the powers of government to sustain the landlord class. The junker aristocracy has been the mainstay of the throne and the prevailing social system. The government has, therefore, protected its interests by placing high tariff duties upon agricultural and meat products. As far as food is concerned the

empire has been in about the same position as England before the passage of the corn laws; it does not raise food enough for its own purposes, and has difficulties in importing it. Especial restrictions have been placed upon the importation of meats. As a result, large supplies are grown in the empire itself. Germany produces almost one third as many cattle as does the United States — about 20,000,000 to our 70,000,000 — and stands second to the United States in the growth of hogs. In times of peace this protective policy has great disadvantages. As one result meat famines have become almost chronic. In recent years to supply the need, the municipalities have themselves erected slaughter houses and swineries. The increased cost of living has been an even more acute problem in Germany than here, and has figured largely in politics. All popular appeals for the removal of restrictions, however, have failed. And in times like these the policy has certain compensations. For it has furnished Germany a large supply of meat; in all likelihood it can worry along for an indefinite time without any imports.

A crisis of the most serious character for the German farmer arose in the "four years of gloom" from 1896 to 1900. The competition of

agricultural exporting countries, such as the United States, Argentina, and Uruguay caused a drop of more than 25 per cent. in prices. Mortgages increased, market value of land decreased, and in those four years alone the indebtedness of the farms increased by hundreds of millions of dollars.

Irretrievable ruin faced the German agriculturists and immediate steps were taken to save the situation. The protectionist policy was made more rigid, railroad rates were lowered on behalf of the home producer to enable him to meet foreign competition more successfully, government education of advanced agricultural methods was widely used, and a widespread system of credit in the agricultural department was organized.

The other three great countries, as already said — France, Austria-Hungary, and Russia — are practically self-supporting, so that their provisioning will involve no particular problem.

Their embarrassment will come only from the destruction to crops that is incident to war, and to the removal of large masses of cultivators to face the cannon. No one can estimate, of course, to what extent these circumstances will affect the food situation.

EUROPE'S FINANCIAL PREPARATION

BY CHARLES F. SPEARE

THREE incidents in European financial history since 1911 illustrate how definitely the Powers have been preparing for war. As we look back at them we wonder why the world has been overwhelmed with surprise and terrorized by the sudden oncoming of the conflict.

In 1905 Germany was all but mobilized against France. The money lords in London, Paris, and Vienna stepped between the rival nations and the Algeciras conference patched up their differences. Again in 1911 Morocco was the sore point between Germany and France, and the Kaiser upset Europe by his "sword-rattling" speech. The affair of the *Panther* caused the British lion to growl. Germany was then much over-extended in all of the international money markets. It has been estimated that she was conducting 90 per cent. of her commercial affairs on borrowed money. This figure is probably

much exaggerated. But certainly she owed several hundred millions to Paris and nearly as much to London. New York was then, too, a large creditor and so was Russia.

HEAVY PERSONAL TAXES IN GERMANY

Quietly Paris began drawing down her balances in Berlin. London and New York followed. German bankers were startled and made protest but their loans were called from all directions. Then they tried to borrow in those countries politically hostile to them and offered high rates of interest to attract the American market. But the lenders were in concert on this one point that no funds would be advanced without the personal guarantee of the Kaiser that they would be used for "legitimate purposes"; that is, not against the lenders. A little later when the German bankers were asked by Emperor William

if they were in a condition to meet the chances of war they were obliged to respond in the negative. Then came the famous command: "Gentlemen, when I next call on you I shall expect you to be ready." This is the first suggestion that war was brewing.

Two years later rumors of war loans in Germany began to filter through the money markets of the Continent and Prussian bonds began to decline. In the midst of a congestion of investments unparalleled in recent times, and with government securities in every part of the world lower than during this generation a huge Prussian loan was precipitated and it failed. The proceeds of this loan were, in large part, to meet the cost of the new military programme that had recently been promulgated. Subsequent to this fiasco there was proposed a tax on capital and incomes for the expenses of the army so onerous that only an impending war could have justified it. This laid an impost on all incomes of both sexes as low as \$250 per annum and on all fortunes from \$2,500 upward. Kings and princes were taxed in the same ratio as clerks and small storekeepers. The Kaiser on his personal fortune of \$35,000,000 had to pay a tax of \$500,000, and on his income of \$3,500,000, an 8 per cent. tax of \$440,000. So his contribution to the war chest was nearly \$1,000,000. The Krupps are said to have been assessed \$3,000,000.

Economists agree that a tax on capital is a dangerous financial expedient and only warranted by extreme conditions. France, Spain, and Austria have all tried it in revolutionary times. That Germany should have come to it as recently as last January, when the law went into effect, was the second incident plainly showing that one portion of Europe, at least, was maneuvering for war.

THE FRENCH BOND ISSUE

The third suggestion of war came from Paris. The new military service laws in France were favorably reported in July, 1913, about a week after similar enactments had been made in Germany. The French Cabinet was at its wit's end how to finance the tremendous new military budget, as investment markets were sluggish and the portfolios of Paris bankers were filled with the I. O. U's of the Balkan states and with rapidly depreciating securities of Mexico, Brazil,

and Argentina. The utter inability of Paris to float a government loan of \$200,000,000 to \$250,000,000 was obvious. Economic conditions ruling then were sufficient without the Socialists' opposition to defeat such a flotation. Pending at that time in Europe were loans aggregating \$1,500,000,000. Of those assigned to Paris alone 50 per cent. or \$350,000,000, were to repair the ravages of war in the Balkans or to augment armaments on the Continent.

It was only when in her desperation Paris, by government order, closed her doors to all foreign loans, thus throwing away her proud title of "bankers of the nations" held since the Boer war, that she was able to meet her pressing domestic needs. The Viviani Ministry practically duplicated the plan of its predecessor in proposing an issue of \$360,000,000 $3\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. bonds, redeemable in twenty-five years in distinction to the perpetual 3 per cent. rentes, and subject to a 4 per cent. income tax. I was in Paris when preparations for this loan were going on and found there none of the enthusiasm for it that I had witnessed before the "wickets" of the great credit banks of France when other government loans were being offered. It has since been announced that the loan was many times oversubscribed; but it appears likely that the government gave strong underwriting support. The French public was not keen to pay additional war taxes.

EXPEDIENTS OF OTHER NATIONS

While Germany and France have been preparing against the day when ambassadors should be peremptorily dismissed, other members of European alliances have not failed to see the trend of events and be forehanded. In June, a year ago, we read what seemed then to be blustering words from the Belgian Premier, but which were instead prophetic. In announcing the government's intention to raise \$62,800,000 for military expenses he said: "We do not intend meekly to supply again a battleground for Europe. In the event of the breaking out of war Antwerp will be found an impregnable fortress."

Only a fortnight before the Archduke of Austria-Hungary was assassinated, the Russian Minister of Finance had informed the Budget Committee of the Duma that his country in the next five years must spend \$3,700,000,000 for the army and navy. This year's budget for military and naval

defense was \$500,000,000. In the period since 1908 approximately \$2,600,000,000 has been expended for similar purposes. This does not include the cost of those strategic railroads to the German frontier, of which Russia is so much in need, to meet the capacity of the Germans who have three times as many railway lines available for mobilization purposes as has the Czar. Austria has a mobilization capacity at the Russian frontier twice as great as that of her adversary.

As we know, Great Britain has been building dreadnoughts and maintaining her balance of naval power, out of the pockets of the British tax-payers who have been squeezed a little harder each year and have cursed a little louder at the unfairness of imposts on income.

Not so palpable a war measure as the loans described has been the bolstering up of the gold reserves of the great European banks in the last three years. There was some cause for this apart from financial strategy working with militarism. When it was explained as an economic necessity to meet the new competition for gold by India, China, and South America the world at large let it go at that. There were times even then when it was difficult to understand why Paris was paying such a price for American gold when she had the largest hoard of it in the Bank of France's history, or why the yellow bars took such circuitous routes as they did in going from New York to Berlin.

In consonance, therefore, with loans for war has been the addition to the gold reserves of Continental Europe. These are now \$500,000,000 greater than in 1911 when the Kaiser commanded his bankers to prepare. A large percentage of this gain has taken place in the past eighteen months.

So far as is known Germany is the only one of the nations at war that has a specific war fund. The famous fortress at Spandau is said to contain \$30,000,000 in gold to be employed solely for war's needs. This would not finance the routine requirements of an army such as the German Empire can put in the field for more than a fortnight; but its instant availability in case of unexpected attack would make it of double value.

EMERGENCY MEASURES

Governments, like corporations and individuals, have a way of anticipating loans and of

creating floating debts against them so the proceeds are absorbed in paying off old bills and not in establishing reserves against future requirements. Undoubtedly a large portion of the capital secured by Europe in recent years for naval and military purposes has by this time been translated into the fixed forms of battleships, fortresses, cannon, guns, aeroplanes and a multitude of minor agencies through which troops are mobilized and cared for when in active service. Even before England declared war on Germany the House of Commons had voted her \$525,000,000 for "emergency purposes," and two days later \$500,000,000 more was granted by the British Parliament. These two items increased the national debt by about 28 per cent. The first of seventy-seven emergency bills authorized by the Reichstag,—immediately after war on Russia, France, and England was declared,—was for a loan of \$1,325,000,000, an amount which, in itself exceeded by 10 per cent. the existing debt of Germany and added 30 per cent. to the outstanding debt of the German Empire. France would like to borrow \$200,000,000 in this country, but the State Department has indicated that it would not be good politics to encourage this desire. A credit of \$540,000,000 as a war fund has been authorized by the French State Council.

WHO WILL BEAR THE BURDENS

Obviously the costs of war must be borne by the man with property or a going business and by the wage-earner. The latter can adjust his month-to-month expenses so that the tax on him will be relatively small as war chests in war time are usually lined by receipts from taxes on spirits, beer, tobacco, tea, coffee, and other non-essentials, as well as on documents and contracts with which the man with small income has little to do. Germany is already proposing a severe tax on all property in excess of \$7,500,000. Another unique German scheme which can hardly be credited is to commandeer the savings-bank deposits of the Empire, estimated to be worth \$4,000,000,000, and use them as a war fund, giving depositors government interest-bearing script in payment. This would obviate the necessity of a loan, but it might be found difficult for the banks to produce that amount of currency on demand. In order to do so they would have to liquidate their securities. This is impossible in these times of

"moratoria" and closed stock exchanges. The savings-bank and postal deposits of the fighting nations are about \$9,000,000,000.

To fight the Boers, England issued \$1,000,000,000 in consols. She has recently been buying back at 70 some of the bonds which she placed at a premium. Even this huge sum was not sufficient and extra taxes had to be imposed. In the Russo-Japanese war Japan, between March and November, 1905, issued \$425,000,000 in war loans, of which London took \$157,500,000; New York, \$141,500,000; Berlin \$66,000,000 and Paris \$60,000,000. It is an interesting fact that Japan was able to float a loan at a lower interest rate at the end of the war which had enormously increased her national debt and placed a mortgage on her remunerative government tobacco monopoly, than when she first started to fight Russia. In the same war Russian attempts at loans were failures as they always seemed unhappily to coincide with some reverse in Manchuria or on the seas. The Balkan Allies and Turkey have so far failed to pay the indebtedness they incurred in the bloody wars of 1912-13. Before Austria gave her ultimatum to Servia both countries were prostrated industrially and financially.

War always brings out the fact that the resources of individuals are far greater than suspected and that wonderful vitality underlies what may seem impoverished surfaces. Witness Mexico in the past two years, ridden by revolution, 60 per cent. of her transportation system out of commission, all but one of her eastern ports and gateways for commerce closed, and agriculture and mining abandoned in the northern states, and still supporting a great army with every money market of the world opposed to her. Bismarck never believed that France could pay the \$1,000,000,000 indemnity in 1870; but from every stocking in the empire came a tithe and the debt was liquidated in a few months. If the figures presented by the American Society for Thrift are approximately correct, the people of this country spend each year for intoxicants, soft drinks, tobacco, candy, chewing gum, automobiles, theatres, moving pictures and other extravagances the sum of \$4,000,000,000. This is about what different economists have reckoned to be the total cost of the present European war. Europeans are not so careless of their money as

Americans, but they are not 50 per cent. more thrifty than we. The population of the nations engaged in war is four times that of the United States. So, if we estimate that 25 per cent. of all males may be drawn into the struggle and the earning capacity of another 25 per cent. be affected by it we can see where enforced economy would supply the reserves for many war bills.

The cost of war does not stop with the countries waging it. There is now before the Congress at Washington a series of taxation measures to relieve the United States from embarrassment due to the sudden stop to customs revenues. Of our import trade of \$1,850,000,000 as much as \$500,000,000 is with nations directly or closely involved in the war. A large part of this commerce is in the highest tariff-yielding articles. It is believed, therefore, that taxes will have to be imposed on American tax-payers to the amount of \$100,000,000 as a minimum to help defray the cost of the war abroad.

The public debt of the countries at war and the debt per capita follows:

	Public debt.	Debt per capita.
France.....	\$6,283,000,000	\$157
United Kingdom.....	3,500,000,000	80
Russia.....	4,550,000,000	30
Belgium.....	760,000,000	100
Germany, including Prussia	5,000,000,000	75
Austria-Hungary.....	3,750,000,000	80

The wealth of these same countries, to be drawn on to meet the cost of war, according to latest figures, is:

	National wealth.	Wealth per capita.
France.....	\$65,000,000,000	\$1,625
United Kingdom.....	80,000,000,000	1,800
Russia.....	40,000,000,000	250
Belgium.....	9,000,000,000	1,235
Germany, including Prussia	60,500,000,000	930
Austria-Hungary.....	25,000,000,000	500

The nations of the Triple Entente have an aggregate wealth of \$194,000,000,000 to which may be added the moral support of Italy and Portugal with a combined wealth of \$22,500,000,000. The members of the Triple Alliance, or Dual Alliance, as it turns out to be, have a national reserve wealth behind them of \$85,500,000,000. But, as money power has, in this instance, failed to prevent war, so it may be ineffective in bringing war's successes.

FINANCIAL STATISTICS

A FINANCIAL COMPARISON OF THE POWERS AT WAR IN MILLIONS OF DOLLARS

	Wealth	National Debt	Annual Revenue	Army Budgets	Navy Budgets	Exports	Imports
Germany	60,500	1,200	1,027	265	115	2,132	2,545
Austria-Hungary	25,000	3,972	1,085	125	30	555	722
Russia	40,000	4,423	1,779	389	121	735	533
France	65,000	6,510	1,075	287	104	1,281	1,535
Servia		132	26	1	0	22 ⁴ ₅	22 ² ₅
Great Britain	80,000	3,581	972	141	232	2,371	3,624
Belgium	9,000	742	161	20	0	753	899
Japan		1,247	293	50	49	261	308
Portugal	2,500	637	85	11	0	39	75
Montenegro		22	2 ¹ ₆	9 ⁹ ₁₀	0	3 ¹ ₂	1 ¹ ₃

a Figures of 1912

PERSONAGES IN THE WAR

THE KAISER — A SELF DRAWN PORTRAIT

WORLD-POWER

AS A result of my reading of history, I have pledged myself never to strive after an empty world-rule. For what has become of the so-called world-empires? Alexander the Great, Napoleon, all the great heroes of war swam in blood, and left behind them subjugated nations which rose on the first opportunity and brought their empires to ruin. The world-empire that I have dreamed of would consist in this: that, above all, the newly-created German Empire should on every side enjoy the most absolute confidence as a tranquil, honorable, peaceful neighbor, and that if history should one day tell of a German world-empire, or of a Hohenzollern world-rule, it should not have been based on conquests with the sword, but on the mutual trust of nations striving toward the same goal."

Despite the fact that he pointed out the futility of the great conquerors, the Kaiser made it plain that Germany's world-power aspirations were not to be balked by a peace-at-any-price policy. At the launching of the warship *Wittelsbach*, he announced: "The ocean teaches us that on its waves and on its most distant shores no great decision can any longer be taken without Germany and *without the German Emperor*. I do not think that it was in order to allow themselves to be excluded from big foreign affairs that, thirty years ago, our people, *led by their princes*, conquered and shed their blood. Were the German people to let themselves be treated thus, it would be, and forever, the end of their world-power; and I do not mean that that shall ever cease. To employ, in order to prevent it, the suitable means, if need be extreme means, is my duty and my highest privilege."

Throughout his speeches three ideas appear consistently and continuously: the ambition for world-power, for ships and a navy to defend them; the belief in the German army by its preponderance and preparedness as the guarantor of Europe's peace; and the divine right and the infallibility of the Hohenzollerns.

Soon after ascending the throne the Kaiser said:

"The ancestor for whom I have the most liking, and who always shone before me as an example in my youth, was the Great Elector." He so admired this particular ancestor because the Great Elector was the first Hohenzollern who saw the importance of promoting trade and industry, acquiring colonies, shipping by which to trade with them, and a navy to defend the shipping. This policy, which languished for a long time, has been thoroughly revised and enlarged by William II. As far back as 1896 the Kaiser himself said at Berlin:

"The German Empire becomes a world-empire. Everywhere in the farthest parts of the earth live thousands of our fellow-countrymen. German subjects, German knowledge, German industry cross the ocean. The value of German goods on the seas amounts to thousands of millions of marks. On you, gentlemen, devolves the serious duty of helping me to knit firmly this greater German Empire to the Empire at home."

At Aix, in 1902, in comparing the Holy Roman Empire with the present German Empire, he said:

"Now another Empire has arisen. The German people has once more an Emperor of its own choice, with the sword on the field of battle has the crown been won, and the imperial flag flutters high in the breeze. But the tasks of the new Empire are different: confined within its borders, it has to steel itself anew for the work it has to do, and which it could not achieve in the Middle Ages. We have to live so that the Empire, still young, becomes from year to year stronger in itself, while confidence in it strengthens on all sides. The powerful German army guarantees the peace of Europe. In accord with the German character we confine ourselves externally in order to be unconfinéd internally. Far stretches our speech over the ocean, far the flight of our science and exploration; no work in the domain of new discovery, no scientific idea but is first tested by us and then adopted

by other nations. This is the world-rule the German spirit strives for."

Despite the guarantee of peace which the power of the German army offered, William II did not neglect to warn his own people and others that peace might be disturbed. He said to the chief burgomaster of Karlsruhe in 1904, when Japan and Russia were at war:

"I hope our peace will not be disturbed and that the events that are now happening will open our eyes, steel our courage, and find us united, if it should be necessary for us to intervene in world-policy."

"Imperial power means sea power and sea power and imperial power are dependent on each other." . . . "Our future lies on the water."
 . . . "The trident should be in our hand."
 . . . "We stand under the star of commerce."

"We demand our place in the sun."

These phrases contain the essence of the doctrine which the Emperor enlarged in many places as, for example, at Hamburg in 1899:

"A strong German fleet," he said, "is a thing of which we stand in bitter need." And he continued: "In Hamburg especially one can understand how necessary is a powerful protection for German interests abroad. If we look around us we see how greatly the aspect of the world has altered in recent years. Old-world empires pass away and new ones begin to arise. Nations suddenly appear before the peoples and compete with them, nations of whom a little before the ordinary man had been hardly aware. Products which bring about radical changes in the domain of international relations as well as in the political economy of the people, and which in old times took hundreds of years to ripen, come to maturity in a few months. The result is that the tasks of our German Empire and people have grown to enormous proportions and demand of me and my Government unusual and great efforts, which can then only be crowned with success when, united and decided, without respect to party, Germans stand behind us. Our people, moreover, must resolve to make some sacrifice. Above all they must put aside their endeavor to seek the excellent through the ever more sharply contrasted party factions. They must cease to put party above the welfare of the whole. They must put a curb on their ancient and inherited weakness—to subject

everything to the most unlicensed criticism; and they must stop at the point where their most vital interests become concerned. For it is precisely these political sins which revenge themselves so deeply on our sea interests and our fleet. Had the strengthening of the fleet not been refused me during the past eight years of my government, notwithstanding all appeals and warnings—and not without contumely and abuse for my person—how differently could we not have promoted our growing trade and our interests beyond the sea!"

When the Kaiser ascended the throne the German fleet amounted to practically nothing. Despite the Kaiser's ever active advocacy, the Reichstag would not vote large naval appropriations. The present navy really began with the appointment of Admiral von Tirpitz as Minister of Marine in 1899. Now the German Navy is second only to that of Great Britain. Its creation has been the main bone of contention between the English and German people. These relations the Kaiser discussed in 1908, in his famous *Daily Mail* interview, as follows:

"You English," he said, "are mad, mad, mad as March hares. What has come over you that you are so completely given over to suspicions quite unworthy of a great nation? What more can I do than I have done? I declared with all the emphasis at my command, in my speech at Guildhall, that my heart is set upon peace, and that it is one of my dearest wishes to live on the best of terms with England. Have I ever been false to my world? Falsehood and prevarication are alien to my nature. My actions ought to speak for themselves, but you listen not to them but to those who misinterpret and distort them. That is a personal insult which I feel and resent. To be forever misjudged, to have my repeated offers of friendship weighed and scrutinized with jealous, mistrustful eyes, taxes my patience severely. I have said time after time that I am a friend of England, and your Press—or at least a considerable section of it—bids the people of England refuse my proffered hand, and insinuates that the other holds a dagger. How can I convince a nation against its will?"

"I repeat," continued His Majesty, "that I am the friend of England, but you make things difficult for me. My task is not of the easiest. The prevailing sentiment among large sections of the middle and lower classes of my own people is

not friendly to England. I am, therefore, so to speak, in a minority in my own land, but it is a minority of the best elements, just as it is in England with respect to Germany. That is another reason why I resent your refusal to accept my pledged word that I am the friend of England. I strive without ceasing to improve relations, and you retort that I am your arch-enemy. You make it very hard for me. Why is it?"

Thereupon the interviewer ventured to remind His Majesty that not England alone but the whole of Europe had viewed with disapproval the action of Germany in allowing the German consul to return from Tangier to Fez, and in anticipating the joint action of France and Spain by suggesting to the Powers that the time had come for Europe to recognize Mulai Hafid as the new Sultan of Morocco.

His Majesty made a gesture of impatience. "Yes," he said, "that is an excellent example of the way in which German action is misrepresented. First, then, as regards the journey of Dr. Vassel. The German Government, in sending Dr. Vassel back to his post at Fez, was only guided by the wish that he should look after the private interests of German subjects in that city, who cried for help and protection after the long absence of a consular representative. And why not send him? Are those who charge Germany with having stolen a march on the other Powers aware that the French consular representative had already been in Fez for several months when Dr. Vassel set out? Then, as to the recognition of Mulai Hafid. The Press of Europe has complained with much acerbity that Germany ought not to have suggested his recognition until he had notified to Europe his full acceptance of the Act of Algeciras, as being binding upon him as Sultan of Morocco and successor of his brother. My answer is that Mulai Hafid notified the Powers to that effect weeks ago, before the decisive battle was fought. He sent, as far back as the middle of last July, an identical communication to the governments of Germany, France, and Great Britain, containing an explicit acknowledgment that he was prepared to recognize all the obligations toward Europe which were incurred by Abdul Aziz during his Sultanate. The German Government interpreted that communication as a final and authoritative expression of Mulai Hafid's intentions, and therefore it considered that there

was no reason to wait until he had sent a second communication before recognizing him as the *de facto* Sultan of Morocco, who had succeeded to his brother's throne by right of victory in the field."

The interviewer suggested to His Majesty that an important and influential section of the German Press had placed a very different interpretation upon the action of the German Government, and, in fact, had given it their effusive approbation precisely because they saw in it a strong act instead of mere words, and a decisive indication that Germany was once more about to intervene in the shaping of events in Morocco. "There are mischief makers," replied the Emperor "in both countries. I will not attempt to weigh their relative capacity for misrepresentation. But the facts are as I have stated. There has been nothing in Germany's recent action with regard to Morocco which runs contrary to the explicit declaration of my love of peace which I made both at Guildhall and in my latest speech at Strassburg.

His Majesty then reverted to the subject uppermost in his mind—his proved friendship for England. "I have referred," he said, "to the speeches in which I have done all that a sovereign can to proclaim my good will. But as actions speak louder than words, let me also refer to my acts. It is commonly believed in England that throughout the South African War Germany was hostile to her. German opinion undoubtedly was hostile—bitterly hostile. The Press was hostile; private opinion was hostile. But what of official Germany? Let my critics ask themselves what brought to a sudden stop, and, indeed, to absolute collapse, the European tour of the Boer delegates who were striving to obtain European intervention? They were fêted in Holland; France gave them a rapturous welcome. They wished to come to Berlin, where the German people would have crowned them with flowers. But when they asked me to receive them—I refused. The agitation immediately died away, and the delegation returned empty-handed. Was that, I ask, the action of a secret enemy?

"Again, when the struggle was at its height, the German Government was invited by the governments of France and Russia to join with them in calling upon England to put an end to the war. The moment had come, they said, not only to save the Boer republics, but also to humiliate England to the dust. What was my reply? I

said that so far from Germany joining in any concerted European action to put pressure upon England and bring about her downfall, Germany would always keep aloof from politics that could bring her into complications with a sea power like England. Posterity will one day read the exact terms of the telegram—now in the archives of Windsor Castle—in which I informed the Sovereign of England of the answer I had returned to the Powers which then sought to compass her fall. Englishmen who now insult me by doubting my word should know what were my actions in the hour of their adversity.

“Nor was that all. Just at the time of your Black Week, in the December of 1899, when disasters followed one another in rapid succession, I received a letter from Queen Victoria, my revered grandmother, written in sorrow and affliction, and bearing manifest traces of the anxieties which were preying upon her mind and health. I at once returned a sympathetic reply. Nay, I did more. I bade one of my officers procure for me as exact an account as he could obtain of the number of combatants in South Africa on both sides, and of the actual position of the opposing forces. With the figures before me, I worked out what I considered to be the best plan of campaign under the circumstances, and submitted it to my General Staff for their criticism. Then I dispatched it to England, and that document, likewise, is among the state papers at Windsor Castle, awaiting the serenely impartial verdict of history. And, as a matter of curious coincidence, let me add that the plan which I formulated ran very much on the same lines as that which was actually adopted by Lord Roberts and carried by him into successful operation. Was that, I repeat, the act of one who wished England ill? Let Englishmen be just and say!

“But, you will say, what of the German Navy? Surely that is a menace to England! Against whom but England are my squadrons being prepared? If England is not in the minds of those Germans who are bent on creating a powerful fleet, why is Germany asked to consent to such new and heavy burdens of taxation? My answer is clear. Germany is a young and growing Empire. She has a world-wide commerce, which is rapidly expanding, and to which the legitimate ambition of patriotic Germans refuses to assign any bounds. Germany must have a powerful fleet to protect

that commerce and her manifold interests in even the most distant seas. She expects those interests to go on growing, and she must be able to champion them manfully in any quarter of the globe. Germany looks ahead. Her horizons stretch far away. She must be prepared for any eventualities in the Far East. Who can foresee what may take place in the Pacific in the days to come—days not so distant as some believe, but days, at any rate, for which all European Powers with Far Eastern interests ought steadily to prepare? Look at the accomplished rise of Japan; think of the possible national awakening of China; and then judge of the vast problems of the Pacific. Only those Powers which have great navies will be listened to with respect when the future of the Pacific comes to be solved; and if for that reason only Germany must have a powerful fleet. It may even be that England herself will be glad that Germany has a fleet when they speak together on the same side in the great debates of the future.”

The Chancellor von Bülow admitted in the Reichstag that the Kaiser's version of the war plan was not quite accurate, but there is no doubt that the German people were bitterly hostile to England, a hostility which was not at all lessened when English warships seized German ships along the African coast. England apologized for the act, but that did not satisfy German feeling and when Admiral von Tirpitz presented a bigger naval programme in 1900 than had ever been presented before, the hitherto parsimonious Reichstag suddenly became generous toward the navy. The new law provided for the first time a high-seas battle fleet, and the accompanying memorandum stated:

“To protect Germany's sea trade and colonies, in the existing circumstances, there is only one means: Germany must have a battle fleet so strong that, even for the adversary with the greatest sea-power, a war against it would involve such dangers as to imperil its position in the world.”

As much as the Kaiser loves his navy, the army is still more dear to him. “The soldier and the army,” he said, in 1891, paraphrasing Bismarck's famous “blood and iron” epigram, “not parliamentary majorities and decisions, have welded together the German Empire. My confidence is in the army—as my grandfather said at Coblenz: ‘These are the gentlemen on whom I can rely.’”

At the completion of the first ten years of his reign he addressed his bodyguards:

"The most important legacy left me by my grandfather and father is the army, and with joy and pride have I accepted it. To the army my first decree was issued on ascending the throne. To the army I now again address myself on entering upon the second decennium of my reign.

"Rarely, I believe, has so trying a time passed over the head of a ruler as over mine during these last ten years—I, who saw my grandfather and father die, to my deep sorrow, within so short a space of time. With grave anxiety I placed the crown upon my head. Everywhere I met doubt, and the whole world misjudged me. But one had confidence in me; but one believed in me—that was the army. And relying upon the army, and trusting in God, I began my reign, knowing well that the army is the main tower of strength for my country, the main pillar supporting the Prussian throne, to which God in His wisdom had called me."

On January 1, 1900, the Kaiser addressed the assembled corps of officers:

"The first day of the new century sees our army—that is, our nation in arms—grouped around their banners, bending the knee to the Lord of hosts. And truly, if anybody have special cause to bend down before God, it is our army.

"A glance at our flags here suffices for explanation, for they embody our history. How did the dawn of the past century find our army?

"The glorious soldiers of Frederick the Great had fallen asleep on their laurels, ossified in the trivial details of a senseless, antiquated drill; led by superannuated, unready, and unwarlike generals; their officers no longer used to serious work, and degenerated by luxury, sloth, and blind self-glorification. In a word, the army no longer sufficed for its task. It had forgotten it. Severe was the punishment meted out to it by Heaven, a punishment which likewise chastised our people. Thrown into the dust were we. Frederick's fame paled, and his glorious banners were broken. In the seven long years of our hard servitude God taught our people to gather new strength. Under the iron pressure of the insolent conqueror's heel, our people in bitter travail of spirit conceived the high thought that it is the greatest honor to devote life and property in military service to the fatherland.

"My great-grandfather gave form and substance to this conception. New laurels crowned the new-born army and its banners. But it was through my grandfather, our great, our dead Emperor, that general military service became a full, a living reality. In quiet, persistent labor he drafted his system of reorganization, out of which, despite all opposition which misapprehension caused, grew our army of to-day. Victorious campaigns, however, crowned his labors in unexpected fulness.

"His spirit pervaded the rank and file of his armies, and his trust in God led them on to matchless victories. With this, his own creation, he at length drew together again the tribes of Germany, and he gave us back longed-for German unity. To him we owe it that through this army the German Empire, honored by all, once more occupies its destined and appropriate position in the council of nations. It is your part, gentlemen, to manifest during the new century the old qualities by which our sires have made the army great and invincible—simplicity and plainness in your style of living, absolute devotion to the service of the King, fullest utilization of all your strength and gifts, both of body and soul, in ceaseless toil for the development and drilling of our troops.

"And as my grandfather did for the army, so, too, I mean to continue for my navy, in spite of all discouragement and misconceptions, the work of development, in order that the navy shall be, side by side with my army, of equal power and strength, and thus achieve for the German Empire at home and abroad that position which we as yet have not attained.

"Jointly with both I hope to be one day in condition, trusting fully in the aid of God, to realize the saying of Frederick William I: 'If one wishes to decide something in this world, it is not the pen alone that will do it if unsupported by the power of the sword.'"

Even on his many peace trips from capital to capital, the Kaiser almost always gives as an example of the friendliness between Germany and the country in which he is visiting, some joint action of their armies. In England, for example, he reminds his hearers:

"At Malplaquet and Waterloo, Prussian and British blood has been spilled in a common cause."

In Russia:

"We are carried back to the days when my grandfather, now resting in God, but then a young officer, received before the enemy, on the battlefield, the Order of St. George, and won in the rain of bullets the chieftaincy of the Kalnga Regiment (conferred by Czar Alexander I on William I of Prussia). I remind you of these facts in order to drink to the glorious and joint reminiscences and traditions of the Russian and the Prussian armies. I drink to those who, in patriotic and heroic defence of their country, fought at Borodino, who with us bled at the victorious battles of Acre-sur-Aube and Brienne. I drink to the brave defenders of Sebastopol and the dauntless fighters of Plevna."

On the Kaiser's famous visit to Palestine in 1898 he made a speech at the tomb of the Sultan Saladin in which appeared some sentences which caused much comment then, and may be well remembered now.

"Deeply moved by this imposing spectacle and likewise by the consciousness of standing on the spot where held sway one of the most chivalrous rulers of all times, the great Sultan Saladin, a knight *sans peur et sans reproche*, who often taught his adversaries the right conception of knighthood, I seize with joy the opportunity to render thanks, above all, to the Sultan Abdul Hamid for his hospitality. May the Sultan rest assured, and also the three hundred million Mohammedans scattered over the globe and revering him, their caliph, that the German Emperor will be and remain at all times their friend."

At another time in Austria he said:

"My people and my army keep steadfast and true to the federated compact concluded between us, and the army is fully conscious of the fact that to preserve the peace and its blessings for our countries it must maintain it and would fight, shoulder to shoulder, with the brave Austro-Hungarian army, if that should be the will of Providence."

And again, in 1910, the Kaiser referred to his action two years previous in sustaining Austria-Hungary in its annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, against Russia's protest, as "the action of an ally in taking his stand in shining armor at a grave moment by the side of your most gracious sovereign."

At his silver wedding anniversary, in 1906, he

said again: "My first and last care is for my fighting forces on land and sea."

DIVINE RIGHT

In March, 1890, in a speech of the Kaiser's to the men at Brandenburg, occurred this passage:

"I look upon the people and nation handed on to me as a responsibility conferred upon me by God, and that it is, as is written in the Bible, my duty to increase this heritage, for which one day I shall be called upon to give an account; those who try to interfere with my task I shall crush."

A few months later he voiced the same sentiments in these words:

"It is a tradition of our House, that we, the Hohenzollerns, regard ourselves as appointed by God to govern and to lead the people, whom it is given us to rule, for their well-being and the advancement of their material and intellectual interests."

Four years later, at Königsberg, the ancient crowning place of the Prussian kings, William II said:

"The successor (referring to himself) of him who of *his own right* was sovereign prince in Prussia will follow the same path as his great ancestor; as formerly the first King (of Prussia) said, 'My crown is born with me,' and as his greater son (the Great Elector) gave his authority the stability of a rock of bronze, so I, too, like my imperial grandfather, represent the kingship by God's grace."

Again, in 1897, the same idea crops up in his speech about his grandfather at Coblenz:

"He left Coblenz to ascend the throne as the selected instrument of the Lord he always regarded himself to be. For us all, and above all for us princes, he raised once more aloft and lent lustrous beams to a jewel which we should hold high and holy—that is the kingship by God's grace, the kingship with its onerous duties, its never-ending, ever-continuing trouble and labor, with its fearful responsibility to the Creator alone, from which no human being, no minister, no parliament, no people can release the prince."

Again within the last few years at Königsberg he reiterated his belief:

"Here my grandfather," he said, "placed, by his own right, the crown of the Kings of Prussia on his head, once again laying stress upon the fact that it was conferred upon him by the grace

of God alone, not by Parliament, by meetings of the people, or by popular decisions; and that he considered himself the chosen instrument of Heaven and as such performed his duties as regent and as ruler. Considering myself as an instrument of the Lord, without being misled by the views and opinions of the day, I go my way which is devoted solely and alone to the prosperity and peaceful development of our Fatherland."

The Kaiser is a very devout Christian. He often impresses it on his army that without Christianity no man can be a good soldier. Whenever he is on board his yacht, the *Hohenzollern*, on Sunday he conducts services himself. In 1899, when his troops were in China at the time of the Boxer uprising, he preached the following sermon:

"Text: 2 Mos. 17th chapt. 11th verse: But as long as Moses held up his hands, praying, Israel prevailed; but when he lowered his hands, Amalek prevailed. Amen."

"An imposing picture it is which to-day's text presents to our souls. There is Israel, making its way through the desert, coming from the Red Sea and on toward Mount Sinai. But of a sudden the heathen Amalekite people stop their progress, and a battle ensues. Joshua leads the young men of Israel into the fray; swords rattle and meet, and a hotly contested, bloody struggle sets in, down in the vale of Rephidim. But see, while the battle moves hither and thither, those devout men of God, Moses, Aaron, and Hur, climb up the mountain-side and stretch out their hands toward Heaven; they pray. Below in the valley the warring throng; up on the mountain the praying three. That is the warlike picture of our text.

"And who to-day does not understand what lesson it conveys? For again the pagan spirit of Amalek has stirred in far Asia, and with great cunning and power, with fire and murder, they seek to hinder the triumphal march of Christian morals, of Christian faith, of European commerce and education. And again God has ordered: 'Choose men; go forth and fight against Amalek!' A grim, a terrible struggle has begun. Already many of our brothers there are in the combat; many more are now on their way to the hostile coasts. You have seen them, those thousands who, answering the call, 'Volunteers to the front! Who will protect the Empire?' are now gathering, and who will soon join in the fight with flying banners.

"But we, remaining behind here at home, restricted by other and sacred duties—do we not hear the words of God, spoken to us, saying: 'Go up on the mountain-side! Lift up thine hands to the Most High!' The prayer of the just accomplishes much if it be but said with all our strength and faith!

"Well, then. Far away the ranks of warriors, and here at home the ranks of the praying—let that also be the holy battle-picture for to-day! Let this peaceful morning hour remind us of the sacred duty of prayer, of the sacred power of prayer.

"The sacred duty of prayer.

"Certainly it is an inspiring moment when a ship heaves anchor with a youthful crew on board! Have you not seen the eyes of the young warriors shining? Have you not heard their thousand-voiced hurrah?

"But when the coasts of our native land dwindle and vanish, when the ship enters the torrid heat of the Red Sea, or when she plunges into the mighty waves of the ocean, how often does enthusiasm vanish, too, and how often does strength depart!

"Certainly an inspiring moment when, after a long journey, are seen, far in the distance, the straight lines of the German forts, and the black-white-red flag of the German colony becomes visible, and when brothers-in-arms are awaiting your arrival ashore, shouting welcome in the mother-tongue! But later on, when begin endless marches under a fiery sun, and interminable nights, camping out in the rain, how easily then joy and courage ooze away!

"Certainly a longed-for moment, that in which the drum beats to storm and the trumpets shriek to attack, when the order is shouted, 'On upon the enemy!'

"But when, in the midst of thundering cannon and in the midst of sputtering, screaming shells your comrades are mowed down to right and left, and when the enemy's batteries will not be silenced, how often even a brave heart begins to tremble!

"Christians! To enable your brothers out there to remain of joyful heart, to persist in their duty even when it is hardest, not to lose courage even in the greatest danger, it needs more than ammunition and good weapons, more than bravery and enthusiasm—it needs approval and encouragement from on high, else they cannot achieve victory. And this heavenly world can be



BRITAIN'S STRONGHOLD IN ASIA

HONG-KONG, CHINA, WHERE THE BRITISH FORCES IN THE EAST MOBILIZED TO PROTECT THEIR POSSESSIONS



GIBRALTAR, THE KEY TO THE MEDITERRANEAN SEA

BRITAIN'S MOST IMPORTANT FORTRESS. THE FAMOUS ROCK-CHAMBER BATTERIES APPEAR IN THE PICTURE



"THE MASTERY OF THE SEAS"

BRITAIN'S NAVAL STRENGTH IS NEARLY TWICE THAT OF GERMANY, HER NEAREST RIVAL



THE "MOLTKE," A GERMAN DREADNOUGHT

OF ABOUT THE SAME CLASS AS THE FRENCH "COUBERT," AND ONE OF THE FASTEST BATTLESHIPS AFLOAT, BEING CAPABLE OF MAKING 28 KNOTS



THE BRITISH HOME FLEET STEAMING THROUGH THE SOLENT
FROM LEFT TO RIGHT, THE "KING GEORGE," "THUNDERER," "MONARCH," AND "CONQUEROR"



ONE OF FRANCE'S BIG BATTLESHIPS
THE DREADNOUGHT "COUBERT," WHICH HAS A DISPLACEMENT OF 23,400 TONS AND CARRIES TWELVE 12-INCH GUNS AND
TWENTY-TWO 5½-INCH GUNS



BRITISH COAST GUARD MANŒUVRES
TRAINING THE DEFENCE FORCE WHOSE DUTY IT IS TO REPEL INVASION



CLOSING A BRITISH PORT TO FOREIGN WARSHIPS
THESE HUGE BOOMS, MADE OF HEAVY TIMBERS ABOUT THIRTY FEET LONG, LASHED TOGETHER WITH STEEL CABLES, KEEP OUT DESTROYERS AND OTHER SMALL HOSTILE CRAFT




A NIGHT VIEW OF THE BRITISH HOME FLEET



AN ARMORED TRAIN FOR THE DEFENCE OF THE ENGLISH COAST



THE GERMAN FLEET WHOSE OFFICERS HAVE OFTEN TOASTED "THE DAY"
MEANING THE DAY WHEN IT SHOULD DISPUTE WITH GREAT BRITAIN FOR THE OVERLORDSHIP OF THE SEAS



POSSIBLY THE DECISIVE WEAPONS OF THE WAR

GERMAN SUBMARINES IN PORT AT WILHELMSHAVEN, THE GERMAN NAVAL BASE ON THE NORTH SEA. SOME EMINENT AUTHORITIES BELIEVE THAT SUBMARINES HAVE MADE BATTLESHIPS OBSOLETE




A FLOTILLA OF GERMAN DESTROYERS
IN PRACTICE MANEUVERES IN A HEAVY SEA



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GERMANY'S FOES ON THE WATER

FRENCH AND ENGLISH SAILORS FRATERNIZING ON A FRENCH WARSHIP; AND A GROUP OF RUSSIAN SAILORS



AN AIRSHIP ON A SEA SHIP

A SCOUTING HYDRO-AEROPLANE AND LAUNCHING PLATFORM ON THE DECK OF A BRITISH WARSHIP

unlocked solely by prayer. Prayer is the golden key to the treasure-chamber of our God. But whoever has it has also the promise that he who prays will also receive.

"Or, indeed, are we to let our hands lie idly in our laps? Woe to us if we are to remain idle and impassive while they are doing their hard, their bloody tasks! Woe to us if we are to be but curious spectators behind the bars of the great arena while they struggle tensely in the grip of death! That were the spirit of Cain, saying cruelly, 'Am I my brother's keeper?' That were treachery toward our brave brothers who are risking their lives!

"No—thrice no! We will not only send out battalions of warriors. No! We will also aid them by a holy band of praying allies.

"And how much, how many things, we have to ask God for our brothers going into the field of battle! They are to be the strong arm with which to punish the assassins. They are to be the mailed fist with which to set aright the murderous disorder. Their sword is to fight for our holiest treasures.

"Let us, therefore, accompany them with our prayers upon the deep sea, upon their weary marches, into the thunder of battle, and into the quiet of the hospital. And we will ask God, our Lord, to let them remain strong and manful in their duty, so that they will fight the foe heroically and undauntedly, that they will bear their wounds bravely and without complaint, and God will give a blessed end to those who fall under fire, and will reward them—in short, He will make heroes of our warriors, and conquerors of these heroes, and will lead them home again into the land of their fathers, the laurel wreath around their helmets, and the medal of honor on their breasts.

"The sacred power of prayer.

"Or do we not believe in the sacred power of prayer? Well, then, what says our text? 'As long as Moses held up his hands, praying, Israel prevailed!' The fervent prayers of Moses made the swords of the enemy dull, enabled his men to penetrate the hostile ranks like a phalanx, thus causing them to break and run, and pinned victory to the flying banners of Israel. And if the prayers of Moses accomplished this, is it to be thought that our prayers will prove of no avail? God has not taken back a single syllable from His promises. Faithful prayer can throw even to-day

the dragon banner into the dust and plant the cross upon the walls.

"And Moses was not the only one whose prayer was heeded. Look, up on the heights of Sodom is Abraham, interceding with his God, and with his prayer he saves Lot from the burning city. Should it, then, be impossible for our prayers to rescue our fighting comrades from the dangers of battle?

"Look again, and in Jerusalem ye will see the young Christian community on their knees. Their leader, their father, lies a prisoner in jail. Yet with their prayers they summon the angel of God into jail, and he leads forth Peter, unscathed.

"Are we, then, to suppose that our prayer will not be potent enough to open again the doors for those in need, for the prisoners, for those pursued, and to place at their side a guardian angel?

'Oh, the power, unseen unheard,
Of a saintly pray'r!
By the strength of faith and word
Deeds are wrought fore'er.'

"Yes, the Lord liveth! Our great Ally still reigneth. Our God liveth, the God who will not allow sin and crime to triumph, but who will conduct His holy cause against a wicked people. God Almighty, who can seize upon the strongest walls as if they were cobwebs, and who can scatter the mightiest armies like heaps of sand; the compassionate, the faithful God, who bears upon His heart the weal or woe of every one of His children, and who hears every sigh and feels with us every sorrow. Pious prayer opens His fatherly hands, and they are filled with blessings. Fervent prayer unlocks His fatherly heart, and it is filled with love. Yes, faithful, incessant prayer brings down God Himself from Heaven, and places Him in our very midst. And if God is for us, who can be against us?

"Well, then, up in the Tauern Mountains, high above all, marvelous bells are hanging! They are not rung by human hands. Still and silent they hang in sunshine. But when storms arise they begin to swing, they begin to ring, and their ringing is heard far down the valley.

"God our Lord has hung prayer-bells in every human heart. But, alas! in the sunshine and happiness of life they are mute and motionless. But when the storms of misery and disaster overtake us, how they do begin to ring! And many a comrade who had forgotten how to pray learns

out there how to fold his hands once again. Misery teaches us how to pray. And thus, too, it shall be at home. Let the dark days now upon us, let the war clouds that have overwhelmed us, set the prayer-bells in rhythmic swing. Let us pray for our struggling brothers. And not only on festive occasions. No! No! let us pray at all times. Just as our fathers during war times caused the bells to ring every evening, baring their heads when the sound struck their ears, and praying, 'Remain with us, O Jesus Christ, since night is coming on!' so in like manner let never a day pass without interceding for your brothers at the throne of the Most High. Moses held up his hands on high until the sun went down and Joshua had smitten Amalek with the sharp edge of the sword. Our own battle is not fought within a single day. But do not weary. Do not let your hands sink until victory is won. Let our prayers be a wall of fire around the camp of our brothers.

"And how it will strengthen, inspire, encourage them, the thought: Thousands—nay, millions—at home bear us in their praying hearts. The King of all kings calls 'Volunteers to the front! Who will pray for the Fatherland?' Oh! if we could say: 'The King called, and all, all came. Let not a single one of us miss the summons. He is a man who knows how to pray.'

"History some day will describe the battles of these present days. However, man sees but what is before his eyes, and he can but tell what the wisdom of the leaders, the courage of his men, the sharpness of the weapons have done. Eternity however, will disclose to our gaze more than that, will show how the hidden, unseen prayer of the faithful and believing has been a great power in these battles, and how once more the promise of old has been fulfilled: 'Call upon Me in thine distress, and I will save thee.'

"And therefore: Cease not in your prayers."

On the first of August, 1914, the Kaiser appeared on his balcony and commended the German people to a militant God in the approaching war:

"A fateful hour has fallen for Germany. Envious peoples everywhere are compelling us to our just defence. The sword has been forced into our hands. I hope that if my efforts at the last hour do not succeed in bringing our opponents to see eye to eye with us and in maintaining the peace, we shall, with God's help, so wield the

sword that we shall restore it to its sheath again with honor.

"War would demand of us an enormous sacrifice in property and life, but we should show our enemies what it means to provoke Germany. And now I commend you to God. Go to church and kneel before God, and pray for His help for our gallant army."

A few days later he opened the Reichstag with these words:

"The world has been a witness of the indefatigable manner in which we stood in the front rank during the worries and troubles of recent years in the endeavor to spare the nations of Europe from a war between the great Powers.

"The greatest perils which had arisen owing to the events in the Balkans appeared to have been overcome, but then the assassination of my friend, the Archduke Francis Ferdinand, opened up a great abyss.

"My ally, the Emperor Francis Joseph, was compelled to take up arms for the protection of his empire against the dangerous agitation existing in a neighboring state. In pursuing its interest the Russian Empire stepped in the way of Austria-Hungary.

"Not only our duty as an ally called us to the side of Austria-Hungary, but the great task was cast upon us at the same time, with the ancient community of culture of the two empires, to protect our own position against the attack of unfriendly forces.

"It was with a heavy heart that I was compelled to mobilize my army against a neighbor with whose troops mine had fought side by side on so many fields of battle, and with sincere regret I saw the breaking of a friendship to which Germany had been so faithful.

"The Imperial Russian Government, giving way to an insatiable nationalism, has stepped to the side of a state which, through a criminal act, had brought about the calamity of this war.

"That France also placed herself on the side of our opponent was not surprising to us. Only too often had our efforts to bring about more friendly relations with the French Republic come into contact with the expression of old hopes and with long-standing malice.

"The present situation arose not from temporary conflicts of interest or diplomatic combinations, but is the result of ill-will existing for

years against the strength and prosperity of the German Empire. We are not pushed on by the desire of conquest. We are moved by the unbending desire to secure for ourselves and those coming after us the place on which God has put us.

"My Government and, above all, my Chancellor, tried until the last moment to prevent the worst happening. In enforced self-defense, with clear conscience and clean hands we grasp the sword.

"To the peoples and races of the German Empire my appeal goes forth to stand together fraternally with our allies in defense of that which we have created in peaceful work.

"Following the example of our forefathers, firm and faithful, earnest and chivalrous, humble before our God and ready to fight when in face of the enemy, let us confide ourselves to the everlasting Almighty, who will strengthen our defense and conduct it to a good end."

THE KAISER AND THE "MAILED FIST"

THERE is an explanation of the "blood and iron" policy of Germany, of the "mailed fist" of the Kaiser, of what Mr. H. G. Wells calls "that tramping, drilling foolery in the heart of Europe that has arrested civilization and darkened the hopes of mankind for forty years — German imperialism and German militarism." The explanation is in the history of the rise of Prussia. Bismarck lifted Prussia from a second rate member of the German Confederation, which was dominated by Austria, to a first place among the German states and then formed around it a new nation — Germany, and made that nation one of the great powers of the world. Bismarck believed in autocracy, he believed in "blood and iron," in the "mailed fist." He achieved his success by war, deliberately planned, prepared for and efficiently carried out.

Look closely at the lessons of war and diplomacy which Emperor William inherits from his grandfather and the Iron Chancellor.

In 1862, Emperor William I, the grandfather of the present ruler, was struggling to get the Prussian Diet to grant him money to double the size of his army. He had been unsuccessful in this effort. He was about to give it up when as a final experiment he consented to invite into his ministry the then young reactionary leader, Otto von Bismarck. Bismarck's political ideas centred around the belief in the Prussian monarchy. It had been the Prussian kings, not the Prussian people that had made Prussia great. Bismarck believed in the king and disbelieved in the people. He hated democracy. He also believed in war as a means of national progress. In the most famous speech of his life in 1863 he announced "Not by speeches and majority votes are the great questions of the day decided

— but by 'blood and iron.'" These are the views of the man from whom the present Emperor learned his statecraft.

In 1863, Prussia and Austria went to war, a war chiefly of Bismarck's contriving, against Denmark and took the duchy of Lauenburg and the provinces of Schleswig and Holstein, in which the Kiel Canal and the German naval base is now. Austria was to administer Holstein and Prussia, Schleswig. Prussia paid Austria \$1,800,000 for the duchy of Lauenburg. Bismarck approved this whole arrangement because he thought it would lead to war with Austria, and it was a part of his "blood and iron" policy that a German nation under Prussian domination could come only after a war with Austria. There was not room in a German Confederation for both Austria and Prussia — "one or the other must bend." Within a year after the division of Schleswig-Holstein, Bismarck had obtained a promise from Napoleon III to remain neutral if Prussia attacked Austria. He also made a treaty with Italy providing that Italy would join Prussia in a war on Austria if Prussia began the war within three months for the sake of reforms in the German Confederation. The enemy was thus isolated, and Prussia was prepared to use both "blood and iron." Bismarck immediately and quite unexpectedly introduced into the Diet of Frankfort, the governing body of the German Confederation, a new plan for the federation of German states. With this as a background, to satisfy the Italian treaty, Bismarck picked a quarrel with Austria over its administration of Holstein, declared the old confederation dissolved, attacked Austria, and invited the other German states to do likewise. None of the other important states sided with Prussia. Four of

them stood with Austria. But Prussia was prepared, trained and ready for war. In seven weeks Austria was defeated and soon after all Germany was at the mercy of the Prussians.

Prussia now annexed the kingdom of Hanover, four duchies and the free city of Frankfort, bringing under the Prussian king practically all the peoples and land along the north coast from the Russian border to the border of Holland. There was no thought of having the people of these states vote on the question of annexation as had been done in Italy. They were annexed by the right of conquest on decrees issued from Berlin, where one king who ruled by "divine right" deposed two or three others whose thrones were similarly bolstered up. Thus increased, Prussia became the leader in a new German Confederation which included all but four German states and from which Austria was excluded.

The "blood and iron" policy had triumphed. Prussia had humbled Austria and become the dominant power in Germany. Yet Germany was not united. The four southern states still were outside the Confederation. So there was need for more "blood and iron." Bismarck believed a war between France and Prussia inevitable and (Hazen's "Europe Since 1815," pp. 289-290) "in his opinion it was desirable as the only way of completing the unification, since Napoleon III would never willingly consent to the extension of the Confederation to include the South German states. All that he desired was that it should come at precisely the right moment, when Prussia was entirely ready, and that it should come by act of France, so that Prussia could pose before Europe as merely defending herself against a wanton aggressor. In his "Reminiscences" he avows that he entertained his belief as early as 1866. 'That a war with France would succeed the war with Austria lay in the logic of history;' and again 'I did not doubt that a Franco-German war must take place before the construction of a United Germany could be realized.' The unification of Germany being his supreme aim, he was bound by logic and ambition to see that that war occurred."

He explains frankly in his "Reminiscences" how he brought the war about. There was a delicate diplomatic situation between Prussia and France in 1870 which arose over the succession to the Spanish throne. The King of Prussia was

at Ems. The French ambassador went to see him and made certain demands. The Emperor telegraphed these to Bismarck saying that he could use his discretion about publishing them. Von Moltke and Roon, the great Prussian soldiers, were with Bismarck when the telegram came. They were in a dejected mood for they saw no chance of war. Then, says Bismarck, "I reduced the telegram by striking out words but without adding or altering. . . . After I read out the concentrated edition to my two guests Moltke remarked: 'Now it has a different ring; it sounded before like a parley; now it is like a flourish in answer to a challenge.' I went on to explain: 'If in execution of his Majesty's order I at once communicate this text, which contains no alteration in or addition to the telegram, not only to the newspapers, but also by telegraph to all our embassies, it will be known in Paris before midnight, and not only on account of its contents, but also on account of the manner of its distribution, will have the effect of a red rag upon the Gallic bull. Fight we must if we do not want to act the part of the vanquished without a battle. Success, however, essentially depends upon the impression which the origination of the war makes upon us and others; it is important that we should be the party attacked, and this Gallic overweening and touchiness will make us if we announce in the face of Europe, so far as we can without the speaking tube of the Reichstag, that we fearlessly met the public threats of France.' He adds that 'this explanation brought about in the two generals a revulsion to a more joyous mood, the liveliness of which surprised me'"

The trick had its desired effect. France declared war against Prussia. The ever ready "blood and iron" were loosed again.

Everything was as Bismarck wished. The South German states joined Prussia. The French were defeated quickly and completely. In less than six months after the opening gun was fired, on January 18, 1871, King William the First was crowned Emperor of a united Germany, the four southern states had joined the Empire, and Alsace and Lorraine had been annexed to Prussia.

In less than ten years the great Chancellor had turned a second rate German state into an Empire, a first class power among the nations of the world. He did it by "blood and iron,"

by unscrupulous diplomacy backed by the best trained army in Europe, and by unhesitatingly throwing the country into war where the army could be used.

The present Emperor inherited German militarism and German imperialism, a belief in the divine right of kings and the strength of the German army. The lessons of the history of his country and of his family are plain. Germany was built by "blood and iron."

On his accession to the throne, in the speech he made to the army and navy three days before his speech to the people, he reiterated Bismarck's doctrine in these words:

"The soldier and the army, not parliamentary majorities, have welded together the German Empire. My confidence is placed on the army."

At the centenary of the firm of Krupp, at Essen, the Emperor said:

"The history of this firm is a piece of Prussian and German history. Krupp guns have been with the Prussian lines and have thundered on the battlefields which made ready the way to German unity and won it at last."

William II broke with the great Chancellor, not because he believed more in the people than Bismarck, but because he believed so much in the rule by divine right that he was unwilling even to be overshadowed by the Chancellor who had made the Empire.

Bismarck's use of "blood and iron" made Germany the strongest nation on the European continent. But he recognized very clearly that "blood and iron" was a policy to be used with great care. Before every one of the three wars he precipitated he was careful to do two things: (1) to isolate the country he was going to attack by arrangements that would keep other nations from interfering with his war and (2), be certain that his army was better prepared than the enemy.

This was the game that Bismarck played by which he achieved the great ambition of his life — the unification of Germany.

Emperor William has an even larger vision. "Our future is on the water," he announced. "The more the Germans go upon the water the better it will be for us." This announcement was in 1901. But the date of the first naval programme was 1893, three years after Bismarck's retirement. The Kiel Canal was opened in 1895. To further

his imperialism, the Emperor has used the "mailed fist," the threat of his army rather than the army itself. It is interesting to see what the Kaiser's imperialism, backed by the "mailed fist," has achieved, and its influence in the present crisis.

In 1895, the year in which the Kiel Canal was opened, Germany joined France and Russia in a demand upon Japan that it give up Port Arthur, which it had just taken from the Chinese. The interest of Russia and therefore of its ally, France, was plain enough. Russia wanted the port itself. Germany's interference seemed entirely uncalled for and provoked much resentment in Japan. This combination against Japan threw that country upon England and resulted in the Anglo-Japanese alliance which now gives the Japanese fleet an excuse to attack the German port of Kiao-chau.

In 1896, the day after the Jameson raiders were captured by the Boers, Emperor William congratulated President Kruger that it had been done "without appealing to the help of the friendly powers." This direct slap at England was met by the formation of a flying squadron and by calling attention to the London Convention reserving supervision of the foreign relations of the Transvaal to England. Later the Emperor snubbed Kruger and was very friendly to England, but the incident served to set English public opinion against the Kaiser almost until the rise of the German navy gave England a renewed feeling of coolness.

In 1898, after Admiral Dewey had defeated the Spanish Fleet in Manila, Admiral Diedrich with a German fleet entered the harbor and sounded the English Admiral, who arrived about the same time, as to what his attitude would be were Germany to try to force the American fleet to give up Manila. The answer was sufficient to prevent any move on the part of the German admiral but not to prevent a feeling against the German Government.

In 1905, the Emperor in person landed in Morocco, where France felt it had particular claims. As a result of this visit the Sultan refused to accept the French programme and asked for a conference with representatives of the leading powers to advise him. M. Delcassé, the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, protested that France would attend to the matter alone. The German Chancellor, Von Bülow, used threat-

ening language. France gave up, M. Delcassé resigned. The "mailed fist" had been successful and another country was provoked against Germany.

In 1908 Austria took over Bosnia and Herzegovina, England and Russia protested that this was against the stipulations of the treaty of Berlin. Russia intimated that the annexation of Slav provinces might lead to its interference. The German Emperor responded with a threat of instant mobilization. Russia had not recovered from its Manchurian campaigns, and the Czar had to back down. Again the "mailed fist" was successful and another nation was given a grievance against Germany.

In 1909 an agreement was made with France concerning Morocco. All was seemingly satisfactory when on the first of July, 1911, the First Secretary of the German Embassy called upon the French Foreign Minister to inform him of Germany's decision to send a warship to Agadir. The cruiser *Panther* served as the "mailed fist" this time. She failed of her mission. France was not intimidated as before, but the incident was fresh fuel to the French feeling against Germany.

In July, 1900, at the launching of the *Wittelsbach*, William II declared that the "ocean was indispensable to German greatness":

"The ocean teaches us that on its waves and on its most distant shores no great decision can any longer be taken without Germany and *without the German Emperor*. I do not think that it was in order to allow themselves to be excluded from big foreign affairs that thirty years ago our people, *led by their princes*, conquered and shed their blood. Were the German people to let themselves be treated thus, it would be, and forever, the end of their world-power; and I do not mean that that shall ever cease. I intend to employ in order to prevent it, the suitable means, if need be."

The Emperor has carried out his policies. Germany has not been excluded from big foreign affairs. No great decision has been taken without Germany and the German Emperor. But the net result of the activity has been to leave Germany nearly isolated when the great war came — in the very predicament in which Bismarck used to manœuvre the enemies of Germany before provoking war. Moreover, he has forgotten Bismarck's maxim that "success essentially depends upon the impression which the origina-

tion of the war makes upon us and others; it is important that we should be the party attacked."

Whatever the provocation in this war, Germany actually declared war first on Russia, France, and England.

There is another policy or rather belief which Emperor William inherits. It is exemplified in the speech he made as late as 1910, in which he said:

"Considering myself as the instrument of the Lord, without heeding the views and opinions of the day, I go my way."

Against the spread of democratic principles the Kaiser stands as the first defence. Behind him are the Emperor of Austria and the Czar. But the German Emperor, the champion of Teutonism against the Slav, is the defender of autocracy of which the Czar is the best exponent. The German Emperor's insistence on his divine right has lost Germany the sympathy of the democratic countries of the world.

At the Oxford Commencement this year the German Ambassador to England was given an honorary degree, and in giving it the college authorities dwelt upon the fact that the strained situation between England and Germany that was acute in 1911 had been entirely relieved. A few days later six English battleships were in the friendly harbor of Kiel during the great Kiel Week. Officers of both nations danced gaily on the decks of the British dreadnought *Ajax*.

Five weeks later the *Ajax* with a great fleet was in the North Sea "to capture or destroy" their hosts of but a short time before.

The German Emperor cut short his yearly visit to Norway. President Poincaré hurried back from Russia to France, Earl Kitchener was stopped at Calais on his way to Egypt and brought back to organize England for war. Germany's threat prevented Russia from disturbing Austria's Balkan policies once before. The "mailed fist" had worked against almost every country in Europe and yet no war had occurred. Then suddenly it fails, Germany's threat of mobilization is met by mobilization elsewhere and the Emperor finds himself isolated, fighting half the world and with little sympathy from the other half. With him is only Austria, which precipitated the struggle and to whose assistance he went, and perhaps Turkey, which sees a chance to regain in the *mêlée* some of the ground which it has recently lost.

OTHER PERSONAGES

SIR EDWARD GREY

SIR EDWARD GREY has been at the head of the British foreign office for nine years.

He has been in the British public service thirty years, in Parliament, as under Secretary of State under Gladstone, and in his present position. The striking fact about him — that which makes Englishmen of both parties place in his hands the fate of the nation with implicit confidence — is the honesty and frankness of his every public action.

He is not a diplomat in the old sense of the word. He has no tricks or wiles. He is entirely straightforward. With all the cards on the table, he conducts the foreign affairs of the British Empire in much the same way as other business is conducted.

He has had the least possible hand in the intrigues, compacts, plots, plans, and stratagems of the European diplomatic arena. As far as her situation would permit he endeavored to realize for England the venerable American policy of a friendship for all, entangling alliances with none! The other day in the House of Commons he made it clear that England was under no agreement or contract to fight for France or Russia.

His natural disposition to avoid the complications of the continental game of empire, may be clearly seen in a speech he made in January, 1912.

"Let me put you on your guard against people who, as I think, are very bad advisers with regard to foreign policy. There is a certain section, I have no doubt, in the Liberal Party, which think we do not interfere nearly enough, especially in certain parts of the world, in Asia. Mongolia, I think, was the last selected as a part in which we should take an active interest. Believe me, if you are going to pursue a foreign policy of that kind, and this country is going to interfere actively in Central Asian questions far beyond our own Indian frontier, you are going to incur, not only the very heavy naval expenditure which we have already, but a vastly increased military expenditure as well; and the people who press upon me a different foreign policy to that which

is now being pursued are, it seems to me, people who are really advocating as a foreign policy the maximum of interference in the affairs of the world at large and the minimum of friendship; because the policy, if it were carried out, would soon leave us without a friend in Europe."

The policy of not meddling with other nations and provoking their hostility seems well repaid when in a crisis like this the long expected German-English war comes and finds England with many allies and Germany almost isolated.

COUNT BERCHTOLD

COUNT LEOPOLD BERCHTOLD, whose aggressive policy toward Serbia precipitated the war of the world, is the second Austrian statesman with a foreign policy more active than playing "a brilliant second" to Germany. In 1908 Count d'Aehrenthal, who, as Ambassador to Russia, had feared the revolutionists, risked starting a European war by annexing Bosnia and Herzegovina to Austria. Berchtold took the same risk this year in undertaking to discipline Serbia. But this time Russia had recovered from the Japanese War!

Count Berchtold is an intellectual and courteous diplomat, of unmilitary training.

He succeeded d'Aehrenthal not only at the Foreign Office in Vienna but previously at the Austro-Hungarian Embassy at St. Petersburg. He was known as a protégé and to some extent a disciple of d'Aehrenthal. He was a young Ambassador in St. Petersburg when he was sent there in 1907 by d'Aehrenthal — apparently under forty — of a tall and exceptionally graceful figure, long limbed but not athletic. A healthy pallor lent distinction to regular features, and scant, soft, brown hair of an indefinite tone added to the height of a broad brow and gave an intellectual cast of countenance. An aristocrat to the finger tips, at home, like his predecessor, rather in the drawing room and the cabinet than in the field. Berchtold has shown the same calculating daring — intellectual rather than physical.

It is not to be supposed that Austria's ultimatum to Serbia on July 26, 1914, was made with any less knowledge of consequences by Berchtold than the annexation of Bosnia-

Herzegovina by d'Aehrenthal in 1908. If any foreign diplomat to-day knows the aims of Russian diplomacy, it is Berchtold. When, in February, 1913, Prince Gottfried Hohenlohe reached Petersburg, the bearer of a letter from Francis Joseph to the Czar, with powers to negotiate if necessary the menacing situation in the Balkans, Berchtold showed an appreciation of the possibilities of friendly diplomacy, for Hohenlohe is not only intimate with the most powerful of the Grand Dukes but is also in favor with the Emperor. The upshot of Hohenlohe's mission must ultimately have been ineffective; but Austria's aims at the Sanjak of Novibazar and an outlet on the Ægean are established as well known. Her foreign policy to-day is the consistent development of the aggressive turn given to it by d'Aehrenthal. It is now directed by a man of supple and intellectual force rather than physical vigor and from the plane of an aristocrat who still regards national development as a thing entirely dynastic and aristocratic. The preservation and power of the Austrian Empire is the goal, and at the same time the stake.

The price of success cannot be too high.

VON BETHMANN-HOLLWEG

A PHILOSOPHER and academician, Theobald Von Bethmann-Hollweg, by a sudden upheaval of destiny, inherits the "blood and iron" tradition of Bismarck on the outbreak of world-wide war. He is tall and gaunt; a quiet yet compelling presence. When he speaks it is straightforwardly, simply. His sincerity is rather more than German, his thoroughness entirely German. Gravity is the essence of him. But, commanding and persuading as is his physical presence, Germany has not hitherto found him a dominating figure.

Von Bethmann-Hollweg comes from an old Prussian merchant family ennobled in 1840. He is 57 years old and has been Imperial Chancellor since 1909. He and the Kaiser were students together at the University of Bonn, and the Kaiser's confidence in him and friendship for him date back to those early years. Nevertheless he has risen to the highest appointive office in the Empire not by favoritism, but through the stereotyped grades of German officialdom, each step in his career patiently gained and creditably administrated.

Bethmann-Hollweg studied law at Göttingen, Strassburg, and Berlin, from 1875 to 1879, and after following the legal profession for the next six years, he was appointed judge at Potsdam. Here, again, he enjoyed the intimacy of the royal heir.

His appointment to the chancellorship came when the Empire was thought to be facing a crisis. Certain elements in the Reichstag were trying to make the chancellor a responsible officer; a financial bill, which committed the Empire to the expenditure of \$100,000,000, stood in danger of being defeated. Von Bülow had lost the confidence of the Reichstag through his cynicism, and that of the Kaiser through hinting to the latter to be more careful about public utterances. Everyone wondered who the "next man" would be.

The appointment of Bethmann-Hollweg came as a great surprise. Yet it has been fairly justified, for although the Chancellor is a "Kaiser-man" who sinks his personality into the shadow of his Emperor, he has conducted his office with credit.

HERBERT HENRY ASQUITH

THE Right Honorable Herbert Henry Asquith, Prime Minister of England, and First Lord of the Treasury, is a Yorkshireman of Puritan stock, who, without family influence or fortune, has worked his way up from the bottom until he stands to-day in the powerful position held by Gladstone — a position which is one of the directing forces behind modern civilization.

Born at Moreley, Yorkshire, on September 12, 1852, he was educated at the City of London School, and at Balliol College, Oxford. He became barrister at 24 years of age at Lincoln's Inn, and as early as 1890 became a Queen's Counsellor. His ambition, however, lay rather in the direction of the House of Commons. He was elected member of Parliament for East Fife in 1886. It was four years later that he moved the vote of want of confidence which overthrew Lord Salisbury's government, and was made Home Secretary in the new Liberal Ministry.

It was Asquith who coined the phrase as to the Government's "plowing the sand" in their endeavor to pass Liberal legislation with a hostile House of Lords. During his three years of office he confirmed the high opinion formed

of his ability. The Liberal defeat of 1895 left him out of office for eleven years.

During the years of Unionist ascendancy, Mr. Asquith divided his energies between his legal work and politics, and became identified with Lord Rosebery's attitude toward Irish Home Rule. When Mr. Balfour resigned in 1905, and Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman became Prime Minister, Mr. Asquith was appointed Chancellor of the Exchequer. He pledged himself to inaugurate a system of old-age pensions, and his advocacy of other social reforms greatly increased his popularity. On the resignation of Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman in 1908 the King appointed him Prime Minister.

PRESIDENT POINCARÉ OF FRANCE

PRESIDENT POINCARÉ, of France, is the great champion of electoral reform at home, and of the Triple Entente abroad. His first executive act as President of the Republic was to appoint as ambassador to Russia M. Delcassé, father of the Triple Entente.

France is now enjoying the reward of one of these policies of Delcassé and Poincaré. She has Russia and England as allies in the long-expected conflict with Germany.

The President of France is a bearded pale-faced, rather short and stout man who impresses friend and foe alike with his mental ability. He has the versatility of his race. According to the painter, Degas, he "is the only politician who knows anything about art."

He is a patron of the turf, an author of widely read books which won him a place in the French Academy beside his famed artist cousin, Henri. As a lawyer he stood first at the Bar, and as an educator he has been Minister of Public Instruction. While Minister of Finance, he put on the statutes laws regulating and equalizing the taxation of millions. He has been counsel of the Beaux Arts, counsel of the National Museum, president of the Philotechnique Française, and president of the Society of Friends of the University of Paris.

He is still in the prime of life and undiminished vigor, for he is only 54 years old. In this crisis it is fortunate for France that she has in the Presidency one of the few strong characters who have held that office since the last war with Germany brought about the Third Republic.

BARON CONRAD VON HÖTZENDORF

THE direction of the armies of Austria-Hungary lies in the hands of Baron Conrad Von Hötzendorf. He has the confidence of the aged Emperor, and the rank and file of the army, and is, besides possessing unique qualifications and capacity for army organization, the Kitchener of Austria-Hungary.

Political affairs in Austria brought him to the front in 1906, when he was made chief of the general staff, receiving the rank of general in 1908. Three years later he was relieved from this position to become army inspector in 1911. But in 1912 he was recalled to the post of chief of staff.

GRAND ADMIRAL VON TIRPITZ

ADMIRAL VON TIRPITZ made the German Navy. Perhaps he has not made it as effective as several generations of Englishmen have made the British navy, but there is a great deal of sound opinion to the effect that Von Tirpitz's work is the equal of any navy in the world.

His activities during the fall manœuvres of 1894 won for him the recognition of the Kaiser, who mentioned that fact in the royal message sent to the commander, Freiherr von der Goltz. Von Tirpitz's reward was promotion. He was made Chief of Staff and was given charge at Kiel. The plans for the manœuvres of the next year were drawn up by him and the Kaiser did not miss an opportunity after that to show his appreciation.

After he had become Secretary of State in 1898, Von Tirpitz began a campaign the like of which Germany had never before known. His intention was to make the naval service as strong as the military arm. A naval base was established at Kiel, the methods of the Engineering Corps were modernized, and a new set of regulations was arranged for the education of the new generation of officers. Supplementary bills were passed, through his efforts, in 1900 and 1906. He was then made a noble with a hereditary title.

This old gray German admiral joined his Government's service as a naval cadet forty years ago. German sea power consisted of a collection of obsolete frigates, euphemistically called the Prussian navy. He now directs the second

largest navy in the world. One would think that, having devoted his life to a bitter contest in naval construction with Great Britain, he would be a strong Anglophobe. Almost the reverse is the case. All his children have been educated in England, and he is a sincere admirer of the best things in British character and achievement. Perhaps more than any other one man he is responsible for the almost frantic competitive building programme of European navies during the last generation, clinging tenaciously to his "two to three" German standard against Great Britain's insistent "two to one."

KING ALBERT OF BELGIUM

THE figure of the young King of Belgium—a man 39 years of age—stands against a picturesque background in the European conflict. His voice was first heard by the world-at-large when, in the heroic defence of his little kingdom, he called upon his soldiers in a spirited proclamation to defend their country to the last drop of blood and to stand shoulder to shoulder against a common foe.

The full name of the Belgian King is Albert-Leopold-Clement-Marie-Menard. He was born in Brunswick on April 8, 1875, and is the sole surviving son of the Count of Flanders, who died in 1905. He is of a studious disposition, and bears a striking resemblance to his uncle, King Leopold II. He was married in 1900 to Elizabeth, Duchess of Bavaria, third daughter of Duke Charles of Bavaria, and was crowned King of Belgium in 1909.

He knows America well, having spent almost an entire year in 1898 in this country while still heir-presumptive. In 1910 he dispatched to Washington Baron de Beaulieu, one of the distinguished members of the Belgian diplomatic service, for the purpose of officially notifying the President of his accession to the throne, being the first European sovereign to send a special ambassador to the United States to formally announce his accession.

He resembles his late uncle in the attentiveness with which he reads the leading newspapers of Europe. Every morning the *London Times*, the *Paris Temps*, the *Berlin Kreuz Zeitung*, and the *Vienna Neue Freie Presse* are placed upon his study table. He likewise reads the scientific press, particularly those papers which pay atten-

tion to electrical subjects. His hobby is engineering. Some months before he ascended the throne he ran a locomotive from the Belgian capital to the frontier. He is now striving to make himself an authority on wireless telegraphy, and has had a complete radio-telegraphic system fitted up at his palace at Laeken for experiments. He is a hard working, modern constitutional monarch.

ARCHDUKE FRANCIS-FERDINAND

THE whole world was startled when the news was spread broadcast that the heir to the Hapsburg's imperial throne, together with hismorganatic wife, the Duchess of Hohenberg, had been assassinated at Sarajevo. When the news of the assassination of the Archduke and the Duchess was broken to the aged Emperor, Francis Joseph, he cried: "Horrible, horrible! No sorrow is spared to me."

For the last twenty years Francis Ferdinand had been the dark horse of Europe. Perhaps his divergence in many ways from popular ideas of what an Emperor ought to be may be accounted for by the fact that up to the time he was twenty-six years old he never expected to be within reach of the crown, as he was not first in the line of succession.

He was born in 1863. His mother, Maria Anunziata, was a daughter of Ferdinand II of Naples. Through the tragic death of Crown Prince Rudolph in 1889, Archduke Charles Ludwig (the Emperor's brother and Francis Ferdinand's father), was made heir to the throne. Charles Ludwig, however, on account of age, asked to be excused from the succession, thus leaving the way to the throne clear to his son.

When Ferdinand calmly announced in 1893 that he was not in love with any of the Archduchesses at the Imperial Court but with one of their companions, an obscure Bohemian countess, the Emperor was dumfounded, and the countess was promptly discharged, and the Archduke set out on a trip around the world. He attempted to return through the United States without disclosing his identity, but was recognized at Chicago and New York, where he received much attention. Eventually the Emperor gave his consent to a morganatic marriage with the Countess (Sophie Chotek) but the Archduke was compelled to take a solemn oath

that he never would attempt to place his wife or her children on the throne. The Countess, on her marriage, took rank, as Fuerstin of Hohenberg, and in 1905 was given the rank of Duchess.

Francis Ferdinand had been brought up in the army and had no particular training for statecraft, but at the time of his death he wielded a great influence in the affairs of State. In the crisis attending the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1908, and in the Balkan wars of 1912-1913, he was one of the leaders in the group of men who pulled the dual monarchy out of the fire in one of the most remarkable triumphs of modern diplomacy.

Ferdinand was made a general and re-organized the Austrian general staff with great success in 1891. He took up locomotive engineering as a hobby, and was recognized as one of the best shots in the country. The walls of his castle at Konopischt were hung with the antlers of 2,000 stags and chamois, as well as with the heads of tigers killed in India, the tusks of elephants slain in Ceylon, and the pelts of bears shot in the Rocky Mountains.

HORATIO HERBERT KITCHENER

THE eyes of all England are focused at present on Earl Kitchener, the "organizer of victory" who stands to-day in supreme command of the destinies of the British land forces, both as Secretary of War and as commander-in-chief of the Army.

Earl Kitchener is a tall man, 64 years old, with heavy gray moustache and wavy gray hair, which he wears parted in the middle. He has a sunburnt, determined-looking face, large steel-blue eyes, and square jaws.

Until the events of the moment, Kitchener has never commanded against the organized army of any Power of the first rank, but he is probably the best known military leader in Europe. He was born in County Kerry, in 1850, of English parentage. He was educated at the Royal Military Academy at Woolwich and entered the British army when twenty-one years of age, receiving a commission in the Royal Engineers. Offered a post under the Palestine Exploration Fund, he spent some years in Palestine, and was employed to make a survey of the Island of Cyprus.

When Lord Wolseley waged the campaign of

Tel-el-Kebir in 1882, Kitchener was given command of the Egyptian cavalry. Then, from 1884 to 1885, he was with the Nile Expedition. He commanded at Suakim in 1887 and he succeeded Sir Francis Grenfell as Sirdar in 1890.

Kitchener stepped into world fame and into the heart of every Englishman in 1896. It was then that he began the reconquest of the Soudan, and two years later the Soudan was conquered. Thereupon, he was promoted to the rank of major-general, received a grant of \$150,000 with the thanks of Parliament, and was raised to the peerage. Thereafter he was popularly referred to as Kitchener of Khartoum.

The days of glory for Kitchener came again in 1899, when he was sent to South Africa as chief of staff with Lord Roberts. How he finished the Boer War, how he arranged the Peace of Vereeniging, and how he came home to be made a Viscount, with the thanks of Parliament and a grant of \$250,000, are all matters of recent history. From 1902 to 1909, he was commander-in-chief in India, and after that returned to Egypt in the capacity of British agent and consul-general at Cairo, thus returning to the scene of his first triumphs.

Kitchener of Khartoum has proved his mettle in many and varied capacities. He is one of those remarkable Englishmen whose mission it is to rule countries which have come under British dominion during the extension of world-wide empire. He was recently created an earl by King George and has received many distinguishing honors.

Many stories are told of him, a characteristic one being his reply to the War Office, which sent him obsolete guns when he asked for the newest. He is reported to have sent the sarcastic reply, "I can throw stones at the enemy myself."

SIR JOHN RUSHWORTH JELlicoe

SIR JOHN RUSHWORTH JELlicoe, has recently been made Vice-Admiral Commander-in-Chief of the British Home Fleet. He is fifty-five years old and has spent forty-two years in the Navy. As a lieutenant he was present at the bombardment of Alexandria and afterward took part in the battle of Tel-el-Kebir as a member of the Naval Brigade. At the end of this war he was presented with the Khedive's Bronze Star for his gallant service.

When the ill-fated *Victoria* was rammed by the *Camperdown* and sent to the bottom of the Mediterranean Sea, Jellicoe was seriously ill with the Malta fever and confined in the hospital quarters of the ship. Sir John Tryon and more than six hundred officers and men lost their lives, but "Jack" Jellicoe escaped.

"How?" he exclaimed recently, in speaking of the incident. "I do not quite know myself."

Suffice it to state that his temperature registered at 103 shortly before the collision, and when he was fished out and landed aboard the rescuing ship it was normal, and normal it remained.

Admiral Jellicoe was sent to China in command of a naval brigade in 1898 to help subdue the Boxer Rebellion, and later he acted as Chief of Staff to Admiral Edward Seymour during the attempted relief of the Peking Legations in 1900.

Severely wounded by a bullet through his lungs at Teitsang, when he recovered the German Emperor conferred upon him the Order of the Red Eagle and presented him with swords for his great service to the world in general and the Germans in particular who were involved in the Chinese Rebellion.

Returning from China an invalid, he married Florence Gwendoline Cayzer, in 1902.

This picturesque sea-fighter served as rear-admiral in the Atlantic Fleet in 1907-8 and became Lord Commissioner of the Admiralty and Controller of the Navy in 1908-10. He became commander of the Second Squadron of the Home Fleet in 1911-12. On July 23rd last, he was appointed Vice-Admiral and Commander-in-Chief of the British Home Fleet, and to him was sent that momentous cablegram when England issued her declaration of war — "Capture the enemy or destroy them."

Admiral Jellicoe is regarded by the English as responsible more than any other officer for the marvelous progress in the naval gunnery in the English fleet. The destinies of the British Navy are now in his hands.

MARQUIS ANTONIO DI SAN GIULIANO

THE Marquis di San Giuliano controls the foreign destinies of Italy. He is credited with plunging Italy into one war and keeping her aloof from another. He brought about the war with Turkey, but is opposed to helping Germany and Austria.

The Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs belongs to an ancient Sicilian family of Norman descent, and was born in 1853. He is an aristocrat to the core. Devoting himself to national problems, and being well informed, he entered public life as a senator. At first, on account of his great fluency, he was regarded as a seeker after place and power. His first official appointment was to an inferior position of Under Secretary in the Department of Agriculture. Upon his own urgent appeal he was transferred to the foreign department — a really momentous event, as it proved for Italy. He made such an impression that when the Pelloux Cabinet came into power, in 1899, he was made Postmaster-General, a post that was entirely uncongenial to him.

But upon the Cabinet's reconstruction, he attained his goal, becoming head of the foreign office. Here he came in direct contact with the King, who for long was unable to understand the extraordinary secretiveness of his Minister. But the King's confidence was at last gained by their mutual interest in old coins, curios, ancient monuments, etc.

San Giuliano has been an extensive traveler in Soudan and Abyssinia, in Asia, and especially in the Balkan States. Through the Triple Alliance, he became the repository of the secrets of the Austrian and German Alliance, of the intrigues between Russians and the Turks, and the spy system of Austria, all which, keeping to himself, made him the mystery incarnate of Europe. Pressed to tell what he knew, he always replied: "I'll tell everything when the time comes."

As a former Ambassador to Britain he appeared everything that an Italian should be, polished and suave, impeccable in taste, original and brilliant — indeed, Machiavellian. At home he exhibited many talents, literary and artistic, which he attributed largely to the influence of his mother, a daughter of the Prince of Cassaro, a great social leader. At one time he owned the leading journal in Italy, and to that and other periodicals he contributed largely. Upon the drama of the day, he is a recognized authority, as well as on art. He is a student and a lecturer. The distinguished Italian is well remembered in America, having spent a considerable time in the United States during the Interparliamentary

Union at St. Louis in 1904, as the president of the Italian Delegation. As a result of the Italian-Turkish War, the King created him a Knight of the Order of the Annunciation, which invested him with the titular designation of cousin of the King and almost royal prerogatives.

PRIME MINISTER NIKOLA PASHITCH

NIKOLA PASHITCH, the Prime Minister of Serbia, the little kingdom around which rages the European War, is a gray-eyed man, 68 years of age, of medium height, high forehead, and long bearded face that shows virility and intellect. He was born at Zayenchar, Servia, in 1846. Son of a very good family who gave him a good education, he later on was sent to the Technical Institute in Belgrade, where he remained for four years, from 1868 to 1872.

At thirty years of age, Pashitch became a military engineer in the Servian-Turkish War in 1876. He remained there two years. After the war he appeared as a very active member of the National Deputies in the Old Radical Party. During the struggle of the Serbs he forced his way to the official leadership of the Radical Party which is now in power in Servia. That happened in the year of 1881.

Realizing that his people were not making progress, his spirit revolted, and, in 1883, he joined the Zayenchar Mutiny, but escaped to Russia while twenty-one of his confederates were sentenced, executed, and shot. It happened that at this time Pashitch was near the border of Bulgaria, and therefore he was able to escape, only to return later and pick up the struggle where he had been forced to stop.

During the amnesty of 1889 he was made the mayor of Belgrade, and it was now that the people were able to see this man play an important part in the aid of his countrymen. He became Prime Minister of Servia.

He was sent to St. Petersburg as ambassador of Servia in 1893, where he won the great admiration of noted diplomats in that capital. It was at this time that he cemented the friendship of Russia and Servia which exists so strongly to-day.

Pashitch was accused in 1899 of stirring up a mutiny. He was tried and sentenced, but fought imprisonment. The charge was finally suppressed at the intervention of Russia, where he had already gained impressive respect.

The people believed in his great personality and character, and he was made Minister of Foreign Affairs after the assassination of Alexander, King of Servia. When Peter became King of Servia he was made Prime Minister.

In Germany, Pashitch is looked upon as the creator of the Balkan Alliance.

ADMIRAL HUGO VON POHL

THE chief of the admiralty staff in Germany is a mild gentleman 59 years of age. Admiral Hugo Pohl was born in Breslau on the 25th of August, 1855. When he was only twenty-one years of age, in 1876, he became lieutenant in the Imperial German navy and three years later was made a first lieutenant. He became lieutenant-captain on the scouting cruiser *Carola* in 1887. His next commission was with the military department of the Imperial naval office, and later he became officer on the ironclad *Württemberg*.

His ability gained his steady promotion and he was made korvette-captain and leader of the central office of the Imperial naval board in 1894. Four years afterward he became frigate-captain and commander of the ironclad *Ægir*. His next ship was the cruiser *Hansa*. He became captain at sea in 1900. Within five years he was a commodore in charge of the scouting ships, with the duties of second admiral of the first squadron. It befell him to take charge of the work of setting up the new naval stations from Kiel to Sonderberg in Schleswig in 1908. He was awarded for his work in connection with that undertaking by being promoted to vice-admiral in 1909.

Admiral Pohl (up to the outbreak of the present European difficulties) is one of the few commanding German naval authorities who have been on a German ship when it exchanged the actual shots of war. The only opportunity Germany has had to try out the navy, since Admiral von Tirpitz renovated it, was at the forts at Taku, China, in 1900, while the Boxers were active.

Admiral Pohl, like his superior, Admiral von Tirpitz, is an exponent of a large navy for Germany. He would divide the fleet into two squadrons, one to be kept in the North Sea in order to protect the German coast, and the other squadron to roam the world's waters seeking prizes and doing what it can to destroy property of the enemy.

With the Kaiser he is extremely popular and wears, as a gift from his sovereign, the medal of the second class (with black) Order of the Crown. The Czar, whose ships Von Pohl must try to destroy, has bestowed on him the St. Stanislaus Order.

COUNT HELMUTH VON MOLTKE

GENERAL MOLTKE, who, as chief of staff, is credited with the disposition and direction of the German forces at the outbreak of this war, is four years older than his French antagonist, General Joffre. General von Moltke looks what he is, a typical product of German militarism, face like a mask, rigid, formal, official.

Like Admiral von Tirpitz, Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg, Furstenberg, and Von der Goltz, he is a "Kaiserman"; that is to say, he is now, and has for many years been, a favorite of the Kaiser, holding his position by a combination of favor and ability — though rumor has several times declared that his star at court had grown dim and that only the Kaiser's inability to find a suitable successor had kept him where he was. When his uncle, the famous field marshal Von Moltke, died in 1891, the present general became aide-de-camp to the Kaiser and has been chief of the general staff of the army since February, 1904. General von Moltke has not shown himself to be a great military genius. Many believe him a less able strategist than General von der Goltz. His promotion to chief of staff caused a good deal of unfavorable comment which has however disappeared with time and the evidence that Von Moltke is able to handle an extraordinary amount of work.

EMPEROR FRANCIS JOSEPH

ABROKEN down old man, eighty-four years of age, who holds down the destinies of Austria, precipitated the present war in Europe. His tragic career began sixty-six years ago, when on December 2, 1848, as a slim, pale, delicate youth of eighteen, he found himself suddenly confronted by a throne. Two weak-willed gentlemen, in turn, somewhat frightened at the responsibility of warring states within their Empire, successively laid down its crown with immense relief, and left the beardless student

only recently out of the famous Theresianum College, to assume its burden.

As to whether he, too, at that age, might have exhibited some of the wavering spirit of his father, Archduke Francis Charles, and his uncle, the Emperor Ferdinand of Austria, had it not been for his mercilessly ambitious mother, the Princess Sophia, only the words in which he greeted his new honor can give us any clue: "Oh, my youth! Thou art forever gone from me!"

Yet with those words on his lips he put that youth behind him, mounted the throne, and became Emperor of Austria, destined to go down in history as one of the commanding figures of his age.

He found his empire composed of seventeen warring kingdoms, chief of which was Hungary. For nineteen years, internal dissensions and external aggressions engaged his attention, yet in all this time only two little principalities slipped from his grasp.

Recognizing in Hungary, however, a spirit of independence that could not be quenched, he granted, in 1867, the organization of the dual monarchy of Austria-Hungary, each country retaining control of its internal affairs, but uniting in the selection of ministers of finance, war and foreign affairs, to act for both countries under one Emperor.

With inimitable diplomacy, Francis Joseph, "the Reform Emperor," as he came to be known at the time of the establishment of the dual monarchy, while thus granting constitutional government to his people, has managed, because of the warring elements which make up his two Parliaments, to retain the real reins of government in his own hands.

His people have sorrowed with him in the succession of tragedies which he has suffered: first, the execution of his brother, the Emperor Maximilian, in Mexico; then the tragic death of his son, the Crown Prince Rudolph, found slain in his hunting lodge with the Baroness Maria Vetsera; to be followed in the year of his golden jubilee by the assassination of his wife, the Empress Elizabeth; and, finally by that event which has plunged all Europe into war, the assassination of the heir-apparent, the Archduke Ferdinand, and hismorganatic wife, the Countess Sophie Chotek, while on a visit to the Bosnian capital.

For years the press and public have been await-

ing the death of this wonderful, wise old Emperor, and the loosing of the bonds which have held his varying peoples together, as the signal for a general Continental war, yet it seems that not even to Death is he willing to delegate his kingly prerogative. Years ago, the old German Emperor said of him: "Francis Joseph has three ministers of the whole monarchy, eight of Austria, ten of Hungary, and three of Croatia — in all, twenty-four — yet when anything is to be done, he has to do it himself."

SIR JOHN DENTON PINKSTONE
FRENCH

SIR JOHN FRENCH, sixty-two years of age, is one of the two foremost active generals of the British Army. He stands, with the one exception of Secretary of War Earl Kitchener, as probably the most striking military figure in England.

His eventful career has led him to India, Africa, and Canada, and always with brilliant results. In the Boer War he was the one English general who was uniformly successful. His soldiers were popularly supposed to have had no sleep. At the time of the Siege of Kimberley, he was shut up in Ladysmith with the Boer lines ever circling closer and no retreat possible for the English troops even if they had wanted it. But if Kimberley, with its great treasure of diamonds, was to be saved from the Boers, the beleaguered troops had to be relieved and Sir John was apparently the only man who could accomplish it. The Boers were allowing trains to run out of Ladysmith carrying the women and children to safety, and in one these — by squeezing under the seat of a second-class carriage — French managed to escape. Once outside the Boer lines, he made his way to the Cape, where he was put in charge of about eight thousand cavalymen. With horses dropping every mile, stopping only long enough to annihilate every Boer force sent to impede his progress, he swept through the Free State, riding both day and night until he reached Kimberley. He was just in time. Two days more would have seen its enforced surrender.

His family intended Sir John for the Church, but when he was fourteen he chose the navy instead and joined the *Britannia*. However, he left the navy for the army in 1874 and in a long series of battles he soon proved his military

skill. He commanded the 19th Hussars from 1889 to 1893, rising steadily in rank after that until, in 1907, he was made Inspector General of the Forces, and in 1913 Field Marshal.

His once fair hair is gray now, but his Irish blue eyes have not lost their sparkle, and his keenness for long tramps has kept down the extra pounds which his short, stocky figure has shown a tendency to put on.

WINSTON SPENCER CHURCHILL

THE commanding personality in the Admiralty Office in London during the present crisis is a tall, slender, clean-shaven, gentleman of scholarly bearing, a journalist and soldier, forty years of age, who came to the front in the South African war.

Winston Churchill, the First Lord of the Admiralty since 1911, is half American in his parentage. His mother was Jennie Jerome, of New York, before her marriage to the late Lord Randolph Churchill. The young statesman was born November 30th, 1874, and sent to Harrow when 14 years old.

His military training began at nineteen years of age, when he entered Sandhurst in 1893, and became lieutenant in the Fourth Hussars two years later, when he entered the army. He served with the Spanish forces in Cuba, where he won his first order, "Military Merit of the First Class," and incidentally acted as special correspondent of the *Daily Graphic*.

Churchill's first experience in actual warfare was when the Fourth Hussars were ordered to India. Here he fought on the Malakand Frontier. In 1898 he was attached as orderly to the first expedition, joining the Twenty-first Lancers to accompany Lord Kitchener up the Nile for the reconquest of Khartoum. His interesting and outspoken correspondence for the *Morning Post* attracted wide attention.

Continuing as war correspondent, he rushed off to South Africa, where he was captured by the Boers and made his adventurous escape from Pretoria prison. It was at this time that the Boers, with what Mark Twain designated as "unconscious humor," posted the following description of him: "Englishman, 25 years old, about five feet eight inches high, indifferent build, walks a little with a bend forward, pale appearance, red brownish hair, small mustache,

hardly perceptible, talks through his nose, cannot pronounce the letter 'S' properly and does not know any Dutch."

The American people first made their acquaintance with their brilliant young English cousin when he visited the United States in 1900 to lecture on the Boer War. Churchill was elected member of Parliament for Oldham, as a Conservative. He soon went over to the Liberals, and returned to the House as Under Secretary for the Colonies (1906-1908).

Upon the reconstruction of the Government under Mr. Asquith in 1908, Churchill became president of the Board of Trade (1908-1910). He was advanced to the post of Home Secretary in 1910 and he became head of the navy, as First Lord of the Admiralty, in 1911. He announced that he purposed to make British naval supremacy endure at any cost, a policy that has given the British navy a 60 per cent. advantage in dreadnoughts over Germany in the present conflict.

GENERAL PAU

GENERAL PAU is the French Commander next in rank to General Joffre. It is proof of his popularity and efficiency that, having been retired for age at sixty-seven, he had resumed active service before the outbreak of the present war as a result of a popular campaign to reinstate him. Short, thick-set, thoroughly French in manner, he is even a more complete contrast than is General Joffre to the rigid type of German Commander.

CROWN PRINCE FREDERICK WILLIAM VICTOR

THE most extraordinary figure in Europe to-day is the young Crown Prince of Germany, thirty-two years of age. It is significant that he has a profound admiration for Napoleon. He believes implicitly in rule by divine right. Several years ago his appearance at the Reichstag, to dissent from the Chancellor's proposed peaceful arrangement with France about Morocco, made him the leader of the war-seeking element in Germany, and incidentally led to considerable friction with his imperial father.

The Crown Prince is tall, slim, and impulsive. His full name is Frederick-William-Victor-August-

Ernst. The late Queen Victoria, his great grandmother, was his godmother. After completing a course at the military cadet institution at Ploen, like the Kaiser, and his grandfather, Emperor Frederick, he attended Bonn University. On the completion of his university course in the spring of 1903 he set out on his travels.

To train him for his future responsibilities he was first sent to the offices of the Potsdam provincial government for study of local administration. Then he was turned over to the Prussian Ministry of the Interior to acquaint himself with the intricate routine through which two thirds of the German people are governed. Since then the Crown Prince has studied naval administration at the Admiralty, beside acquiring some knowledge of the workings of Bismarckian diplomacy at the Foreign Office.

He married the Duchess Cecilie of Mecklenburg-Schwerin, in 1905. The Kaiser has remarked of his hotheaded son: "Well, William is no diplomat. I will admit it, but I believe the fellow has got marrow in his bones. He will turn out to be our Moltke yet."

RÉNÉ VIVIANI

RÉNÉ VIVIANI, the present Prime Minister in France, was born in Algeria. His success in French politics has been due to his interest in labor. When the office of Minister of Labor was created by the Clemenceau Government in 1906, he was the first man to fill it. Although the next Government was of an opposing faction, M. Viviani still was kept at his post. In accordance with his labor sympathies, he worked consistently against the law providing for a compulsory three-year period of service in the army, in favor of which the country recently voted.

M. Viviani is an able man, but his strong points are not particularly war and diplomacy.

BARON VON DER GOLTZ

WHEN the Bulgars and the Servians drove the Turks out of Thrace and Macedonia two years ago, the rest of Europe took the rout as a German defeat. Superficially they were right. The organization and mobilization of the Turkish army were entirely German in plan and the beaten Turks fought in German uniform with German artillery and rifles.

The correspondents who so glibly drew these conclusions very rarely modified them by additional information as to how plans and organizations, excellent in themselves, had been disregarded or inefficiently carried out. One can no more blame a German rifle for missing fire with French ammunition than one can draw conclusions about Krupp artillery served by raw recruits.

Field Marshal von der Goltz taught the Turkish army all that it ever knew about modern fighting except courage, which it is unnecessary to teach a Turk. He has also taught the German army much of what it knows of the technique of fighting, and the German army is not handicapped by Kismet nor by unmilitary politics. Baron von der Goltz out of his uniform would fit convincingly into a professor's chair at a university. He is now seventy years old, and for more than fifty years of his life has been working and writing and fighting. Being a first rate fighting man has not hindered his writing a number of historical books which are standards in and out of Germany.

PRIME MINISTER IVAN GOREMYKIN OF RUSSIA

A STRONG hand on the wheel of statecraft in Russia to-day is that of the economist and sociologist, Prime Minister Ivan Goremykin.

Goremykin was born in Petrograd in 1848. He received a good academic training in that city and graduated from a university. He became interested in his country and when twenty-one years published his first book. Later on he wrote a history of the Polish peasants, and with the success of this effort he added another volume entitled "The Land of the Russian Peasants." These efforts of study in things pertaining to his country directed the attention of his Government sufficiently to make him Chief of the Emigration Department into Siberia.

Eventually he rose to be Minister of the Interior, and in 1906, Prime Minister. The country was in a revolutionary state. Count Witte had resigned. Goremykin declared to the Duma that amnesty was impossible in Russia in the case of persons guilty of murder or other acts of violence. He also declared that the agrarian possibilities could be worked only by time. He then sub-

mitted a programme of reform: The Duma would not accept these reforms. Revolutionary disturbances recommenced. The massacre of the Jews took place and a clash came when the agrarian proposals were renewed. Goremykin was immediately replaced by Stolypin, who was later assassinated.

During the next few years Goremykin took no active part in any official position, but acted as advisory functionary to the Czar in all matters relating to economic and social questions.

Goremykin's plan for the salvation of Russia is economic. His whole wish is to distribute the people over the different territories. They call him an old-time conservative who desires things to go his way in slow, steady paces.

GENERAL PUTNIK OF SERVIA

THE commander-in-chief of the Servian Army, General Radumi Putnik, is a self-made man about sixty-five years of age, who has worked himself up through the Servian wars and revolutions until to-day he stands a conspicuous figure before the world. He was born about 1849 in a small place near Belgrade in the southern part of Austria. He is a thorough Servian despite this fact. He is a small man, of large, round head, chestnut brown eye, and a beard cut in Van Dyke fashion. His whole occupation has been as a soldier.

General Putnik gained his earliest training in a military academy which then existed in Servia. He joined the army voluntarily. Later on he went to France to study the military tactics of Napoleon. These experiences merely gave him satisfaction, as he has not succumbed to any method but his own. He is practically a self-taught man.

In the recent war between the Balkan allies he was chief of staff of the Servian Army.

As a general he strips his uniform of all its trappings and tinsel and appears in plain regimental apparel with the two straps on his shoulders as insignia of his rank. He has every opportunity to make large sums of money, but as his wants are simple he uses his funds to endow schools. During the Balkan troubles he directed his forces from a small shanty by the use of the telephone.

THE ROYAL RELATIVES OF EUROPE

BY GEORGE H. MERRITT

EUROPE at war can almost be likened to a huge family quarrel. The royal houses, especially the countries which are most vitally concerned by the war, are practically all of the same Germanic stock, and almost of one blood. There have been so many intermarriages between these houses that German blood dominates every European throne with the exception of the two small kingdoms of Servia and Montenegro.

There are several great family groups in which the custom of intermarriage is continuously carried on from generation to generation, but which very seldom extends to the families of other groups. Sometimes, as in the case of the House of Hapsburg and the Royal House of Hohenzollern or Prussia, a direct matrimonial alliance almost never occurs; there has not been a marriage between these two houses within the last two hundred years. In the south of Europe the Houses of Hapsburg, Savoy, Bavaria, Saxony, and Bourbon seem to form one combination of these family groups, while in the north the principal combination is made up of the House of Hohenzollern-Prussia, Great Britain, Denmark, Russia, and the Saxon Duchies.

Most of the houses within the groups are made up of several branches, one reigning line and cadet [younger son] lines, and, of course, marriages between these different branches are of much more frequent occurrence than between separate houses. As it is common custom for first cousins to marry, and even uncles with nieces, the entire marriage system becomes most intricate and complex. Almost every one in a family, consisting of several branches, is, through marriage, very closely connected with every other member of the family, and therefore it often becomes difficult to determine just who are the first cousins and who the second cousins, etc.

All the reigning princes of the Northern Europe are closely related in this way. Emperor William of Germany, in making war on Great Britain and Russia, is likewise at war with his cousins. King George V of Great Britain and Czar Nicholas II of Russia are first cousins through their mothers, who were daughters of the King

Christian IX, of Denmark. Everyone who has seen the pictures of these two rulers has undoubtedly noticed their family resemblance. William II of Germany is the first cousin of George V, as his mother, Victoria, was the sister of George's father, Edward VII of Great Britain. Moreover, Nicholas married another first cousin of both George and William, the Czarina's mother being another sister of King Edward VII. Finally George, William, and Nicholas are, through their fathers, great-grandsons of Charles, Duke of Mecklenburg-Strelitz, who died in 1752; and William and Nicholas are descended from King Frederick-William III, of Prussia. Other cousins of King George and Czar Nicholas, also grandsons of Christian IX of Denmark, are Christian X of Denmark, Constantine I of Greece, and Ernst August, Duke of Brunswick, who is also the son-in-law of Emperor William II.

There are in all more than forty sovereign houses of Europe, but all do not reign over independent lands or principalities. Although many of these houses possess only the title of sovereignty and the right of royal privileges, they are equal in rank to all reigning houses, and their members intermarry freely without loss of title or rank. This is a limited class, however, for below these in rank are other houses designated as "mediatised" houses, and ranked below these in turn are the non-royal houses. It is usual that if a member of a sovereign house, ranked as a royal prince, marries into a house of lower or non-royal rank, his children, in Germany and Austria, cannot succeed to his titles, but become of lower rank. Some of these non-royal titles have been bestowed to give a recognized rank to the morganatic [non-royal] wives and children of royal princes. Such, for examples, are the princes of Battenberg, or the title of Duchess of Hohenberg, bestowed upon the consort of Archduke Franz Ferdinand, heir to the Austrian throne, who with his wife was recently assassinated.

Of these sovereign houses of the first rank, many have arisen from cadet lines of older houses, where princes of cadet lines have either fallen heir to by marriage or have been elected to fill the

thrones of principalities. Most notable among these houses which have been elected to fill the thrones of different countries are the royal houses of Greece, Belgium, and Norway. Most notable among the houses which have fallen heir to thrones through marriages are the royal houses of Russia and of Great Britain.

The history of the growth of these families from cadet rank to their present importance is full of interest. The most notable development of such a cadet line to royal power is that of the House of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha. To-day princes of this house are reigning in Great Britain, Belgium, and Bulgaria, and also held the throne of Portugal until that country became a republic. Princes of the House of Oldenburg to-day reign in Denmark, Greece, Norway, and Russia. The House of Bourbon, at one time mighty in the extent of its cadet lines, ruled in France, Spain, Naples, and Parma. The princes of Hohenzollern to-day reign in Prussia and Roumania.

THE HOUSE OF HOHENZOLLERN.—Prussia: The growth of the House of Hohenzollern from its early holdings as Counts of Zollern in 1111 to its present dominance of the whole German Empire has been due to the foresight and bravery of its warlike princes. According to the law of primogeniture everywhere in force in Europe, all the landed estates and titles descend to the eldest son. Since there seems to be no reason for building new cadet lines, as there are no titles to succeed to, few of the younger sons of the royal families build up cadet lines of their own. When they do the line is not long-lived. Many of the younger sons follow a soldier's life, and many never marry. Usually only the first two sons marry early.

In Prussia, the eldest son is known as the Crown Prince; all other males of the family become Princes of Prussia. Emperor William has six sons, four of whom are married. This generation is tending toward the northward for their matrimonial alliances. There seems to be a tendency to solidify all parts of the German Empire by bringing all parts of other princely possessions into closer contact with the royal family. The marriage between the Emperor's daughter, Victoria Louise and the young prince of Cumberland, now the Duke of Brunswick, was also probably made with this end in view.

By the marriage of his sisters, William II is the brother-in-law of the hereditary Prince of Saxe-Meiningen, of Adolph, Prince of Schaumburg-Lippe, Frederick Charles, Prince of Hesse, and to King Constantine I of Greece. He is a nephew of the Grand Duchess of Baden, and counts among his other Prussian cousins the Duchess of Connaught of Great Britain.

The principal houses allied with the Prussians by marriage during the last century are Anhalt, Mecklenburg-Schwerin, Orange-Nassau, now ruling in the Netherlands in the person of Queen Wilhelmina, Hesse-Cassel, Hesse-Darmstadt, Great Britain, and Mecklenburg-Strelitz.

In every such alliance there were two or three marriages, either an intermarriage during the same generation, or a return marriage during the next generation. There were five marriages between the House of Orange-Nassau and Prussia between 1791 and 1878.

THE HOUSE OF HAPSBURG—LORRAINE: This is an immense family reigning in Austria-Hungary. There are besides the Imperial line at least three others, large and flourishing. This family, belonging to the great family group of Southern Europe, is mainly allied with the Houses of Bourbon-Sicilies, Bavaria, Bourbon-Parma, Spain, Savoy-Italy, Belgium, and Saxony. The family takes its names from its earlier possessions, the Duchy of Lorraine, which it gave up when the first of its princes, Francis-Stephen of Lorraine, married the Austrian heiress of Hapsburg, Maria Theresa, and succeeded to the empire.

The *Emperor Francis Joseph* is eighty-four years old and has reigned since he was eighteen. His wife, the Empress Elisabeth, a Duchess of Bavaria, was assassinated in 1898 at Geneva by an Italian anarchist. In 1889 his only son, the Crown Prince Rudolph, died in a mysterious and tragic way. In July, his successor and his wife were killed by an assassin. In 1867 he mourned the death of his favorite brother, who was known as Maximilian, the ill-fated Emperor of Mexico. He has been a great-grandfather for ten years.

His grand-nephew, the Archduke Charles Francis Joseph is next in line of succession. He is twenty-seven years of age, the son of the Archduke Otto, and Marie Josephine, sister of the King of Saxony. He is married to Zita, Princess of Parma.

One of the Archduchesses of Austria-Teschen,

is the Queen Mother of Spain. Her family is extremely wealthy, and her brother, the Archduke Frederick, now the main support of the aged emperor, is accounted as one of the richest princes in the world.

Alfonso XIII, King of Spain, is the only ruling connection of Emperor Francis Joseph, with the exception of King Frederick August III of Saxony who married an Austrian Archduchess. The King of Spain inherits the famous "Hapsburg lip" which is seen in so many of the male members and descendants of this family—a heavy, overhung, pendant lip.

THE SAXON HOUSES: The Saxon Royal House has given more kings and important princes to Europe throughout its history, and to-day is better represented by descendant sovereign families than any other royal line. After many early vicissitudes it divided definitely in 1640 into two branches, Saxe-Weimar and Saxe-Gotha. Saxe-Gotha again divided in 1672 into four main sub-branches, Saxe-Gotha Altenburg,—Saxe-Meiningen, Saxe-Hildburghausen, and Saxe-Coburg-Saalfeld.

THE FAMILY OF SAXE-COBURG-GOTHA: From the least important this family has come to be the greatest and largest of the Houses of Saxony and has already given birth to four lines of kings:

1. Prince Leopold in 1816 was married to Charlotte, only child of King George IV of Great Britain and heir to the British throne. But Princess Charlotte and her baby both died in 1817. Later probably because of his importance through this marriage and because of his well-known popularity, the Belgian people, when they became an independent nation in 1831, offered him that throne; he accepted and became the first King of Belgium as Leopold I, and the founder of the present line of kings of Belgium. The present *King Albert of Belgium* is his grandson.

2. In 1818 Leopold's sister, Victoria, was married to Prince Edward of Great Britain. The only child of this marriage was Queen Victoria, who succeeded to the English throne in 1837. Prince Albert of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha became the husband of the Queen in 1840, the Prince Consort of Great Britain, and the founder of the new German dynasty in England.

3. Of the children of Prince Ferdinand of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha, the eldest of his three sons

became by his marriage to Maria II, Queen of Portugal, titular King of that country as Ferdinand II, and so founded the Saxe-Coburg dynasty of Portugal.

Manuel II, ex-King of Portugal, through his grandmother, Princess Maria-Pia of Savoy, is related to the royal family in Italy, as she was a sister of King Humbert I of Italy and also of Amadeus of Aosta, who was King of Spain from 1870 to 1873. Through his wife, he is the son-in-law of William, the present royal prince of Hohenzollern, and a nephew of Ferdinand, Crown Prince of Roumania.

4. The youngest son died childless and the second son, August, became the founder of the German branch of this family. August married a Princess of Orleans and of this marriage in 1843 there were four children, three of whom are now living. The youngest son was elected Hereditary Prince of Bulgaria in 1887 and became its Czar (*Czar Ferdinand I of Bulgaria*) in 1908; he founds a new reigning dynasty, the fourth, of the Saxe-Coburg-Gothian family.

All the heads of these Saxon families—the reigning princes—are Dukes. This title in Germany and Austria is higher than that of Prince and indicates, along with the increased dignity of the title, the holding and government of landed possessions. Dukes rank between Kings and Princes; Grand Dukes are a higher class of Dukes and are Kings in every way except in actual title.

The family name of this illustrious House of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha is Wettin. So it is, therefore, correct to speak of the King of Great Britain as George Wettin, the King of Belgium as Albert Wettin, and the ex-King of Portugal as Manuel Wettin, etc.

THE ROYAL FAMILY OF GREAT BRITAIN: Although the Saxe-Coburg-Gotha dynasty was founded in Great Britain by the marriage of Prince Albert to Queen Victoria of the House of Brunswick-Lüneburg, the royal dynasty really began with the accession of Queen Victoria's oldest son to the throne as King Edward VII. King Edward had three brothers and five sisters, and two of the brothers, as has already been related fell heir in turn to the Duchy of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha. The other brother is Prince Arthur, the Duke of Connaught, and now Governor General of Canada. The oldest sister, Victoria, was the wife of Em-

peror Frederick of Germany, and the second sister was the Grand Duchess of Hesse; both are now deceased. The other sisters are still living; Helen is the wife of Prince Christian of Schleswig-Holstein, Louise is the widow of the recently deceased John Campbell, Duke of Argyll, and Beatrice is the widow of Prince Henry of Battenberg. With an already wide relationship through these marriages, and those of his brothers, Alfred, Arthur, and Leopold, King Edward further augmented the royal alliances through his marriage with Princess Alexandra of Denmark, and left to his successor, King George V, relationships with all the principal royal families of Northern Europe.

King George V, of Great Britain was born in 1865 and was the only surviving son when his father became King. He has three sisters,— Louise, the widow of Alexander Duff, Duke of Fife, who died in 1912, Victoria, who is unmarried, and *Maude, the Queen of Norway*. As a younger son he was destined for the navy, but suddenly came into prominence by the death of his elder brother in 1892, Prince Albert, Duke of Clarence. In 1893 Princess Mary of Teck, who was to have married Prince Albert, was married to Prince George, and they have one daughter, Princess Mary, and five sons,—Edward, Prince of Wales, and Princes Albert, Henry, George, and John. Queen Mary is the daughter of Francis, late Duke of Teck, and Princess Mary-Adelaide of Cambridge, the first cousin of Queen Victoria. Francis was a son of themorganatic marriage of Duke Alexander of Wurtemberg with Claudia, Countess of Rhedey, a daughter of a very old Hungarian House, and therefore the children of King George V have new blood in them brought in from the noble families of Germany, Austria, and Hungary.

Prince Arthur, Duke of Connaught and Strathern and Count of Sussex, and now Governor General of Canada, is sixty-four years old. He is married to Princess Louise-Margaret of Prussia, the daughter of Prince Frederick-Charles of Prussia and Princess Marie-Anne of Anhalt. He has three children; Margaret, the oldest, is the Crown Princess of Sweden, Prince Arthur is married to his cousin, Princess Alexandra, Duchess of Fife, and Princess Victoria-Patricia, known as the "Princess Pat," is unmarried.

King George V, is uncle by blood to Olaf, Crown Prince of Norway, and by marriage with

Queen Mary to three Princes and three Princesses of Teck. He is brother-in-law to King Haakon VII of Norway and Prince of Denmark, Duke Adolph of Teck, and Prince Alexander of Teck. He is first cousin on his father's side to Emperor William II of Germany, and his brothers and sisters, among whom, principally is the Queen of Greece; to Ernst-Louis, Grand Duke of Hesse, and his four sisters, one of whom is the wife of Prince Henry of Prussia and another is the Czarina Alice of Russia; to the Crown Princess Marie of Roumania and her three sisters, to Prince Albert of Schleswig-Holstein and his two sisters; to Crown Princess Margaret of Sweden and Prince Arthur and Princess Patricia of Connaught; to Charles-Edward, Duke of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha and his sister, Princess Alexander of Teck; and to Queen Victoria-Ena of Spain and her brothers, Princes Alexander, Leopold, and Maurice of Battenberg. On his mother's side King George is first cousin to King Christian X of Denmark, King Haakon VII of Norway, Princes Harold and Gustav of Denmark, Ingeborg, Duchess of Vestrogothia in Sweden, and Princesses Thyra and Dagmar of Denmark; to King Constantine I, of Greece and his four brothers and two sisters, who are Grand Duchesses of Russia, to Czar Nicholas II of Russia and his brother the Grand Duke Michael and his two sisters, one of whom is a Duchess of Oldenburg; to Ernst-August, Duke of Brunswick and Lüneburg, and his three sisters, Princess Marie-Louise of Baden, Alexandra, Grand Duchess of Mecklenburg-Schwerin, and Princess Olga of Cumberland; and to Princes Aage, Axel, Eric, and Viggo of Denmark, and their sister, Princess Margaret. His oldest cousin is the Emperor William II, of Germany, age fifty-five, and his youngest cousin is Princess Margaret of Denmark, age nineteen. With all these blood relations, the number of his second cousins run well up into the hundreds.

The Royal Families of the House of Holstein-Oldenburg. The kings of Denmark, Greece, and Norway, and the Emperor of Russia are all descended in direct line from the early German kings of Denmark and Norway.

THE ROYAL FAMILY OF DENMARK: King Christian IX (1818-1906) and Queen Louise had three sons and three daughters who all became famous. The eldest son succeeded his father as

King Frederick VIII, and his eldest son in turn succeeded him as *King Christian X of Denmark*. The eldest daughter became the wife of Edward, Prince of Wales, and is now the Queen-Mother of Great Britain. The second son, Prince William, was elected as King of Greece, and began his reign there in 1863, as King George I. His eldest son, Constantine, now reigns as *King Constantine I of Greece*. Constantine is married to Sophia, a sister of the Emperor of Germany. The second daughter of King Christian was the wife of the Czar Alexander III of Russia, and is, therefore, the Queen-Mother of that nation. The second son of Frederick VIII is Prince Charles, who was elected *King of Norway*, as *Haakon VII*.

THE RUSSIAN ROYAL FAMILY: There has not been a Slavic Emperor in Russia since the bloody days of strife and intrigue following the death of Peter the Great. The male line of the House of Romanoff having died out, several Empresses with their consorts fought for supremacy in Russia, and there were several which held the throne for a short time. Finally Peter, who was the son of Charles-Frederick, Duke of Holstein-Gottorp and of Anne, daughter of Peter the Great and Catherine I got possession of the throne. But only a short while did he reign; his wife, Sophia-Augusta, Princess of Anhalt-Zerbst, a woman of strong mind and steel determination, became jealous of Peter's power, and putting him out of the way, seized the government herself. As Catherine II, she was a great ruler and governed the Russians with an iron hand. Her death brought her son by Peter to the throne, and in the Czar, Paul, the new dynasty of Holstein-Oldenburg-Romanoff was founded. The present Czar, *Nicholas II of Russia*, great-great-grandson of Czar Paul thus belongs to a wholly Germanic family.

The Czar's mother is the Princess Dagmar of Denmark, and he is therefore, widely related through the Danish connections as well as his own. In the Russian royal family there are living twenty-four Grand Dukes and Princes, five of them the Czar's own first cousins. The family is mainly allied by marriage with the families or Houses of Hesse, Wurtemberg, Greece, Oldenburg, and Mecklenburg-Schwerin, although the several marriages with each one of these Houses comprise only a small part of their widespread alliances. During the last century there have been forty

marriages between the family and other European houses. Whole chapters might well be written on the extensive alliances and ramifications of this House. Beside being related, mostly in the same way as his first cousin George V of Great Britain to all of that King's cousins and kinsmen, he is even more closely allied in relationships, strong, if not entirely direct, with the Hohenzollern House of Prussia.

All of the sons and daughters of this family are Grand Dukes and Duchesses of Russia to the third generation, that is the sons and grandsons of Czars receive the Grand Ducal title, but the great-grandsons, unless in the direct royal line, become Princes of Russia; the same is true for the daughters of the family. The children are further named from their father, just as in Sweden and other northern countries. The word "vitch" means "the son of," so that the present Czar, who is Nicholas Alexandrovitch, is, interpreting correctly, Nicholas the son of Alexander. Likewise the ending "ovna" means the "daughter of." The title of the Czar is "Emperor and Autocrat of all the Russias, Czar of Moscow, Kiev, Vladimir, etc." with a string of lesser titles, which if put on a single line of type, would stretch out for several feet.

THE ROYAL FAMILY OF BELGIUM: Founded in 1831 by the election of King Leopold I to occupy the Belgian throne, the family has thus far produced three kings. Beginning with the marriage of King Leopold I to Princess Louise of Orleans, practically all of the later marriages of the family have been with the Southern group of royal houses. In this way the family is kindred to the Royal Houses of the north only in the male blood line, but is closely allied to the Houses of Hapsburg Bourbon Orleans, and Bavaria.

King Leopold I had three children. The eldest son succeeded him as King Leopold II. By the marriage of this King with Archduchess Marie Henriette of Austria he had one son who died when he was twenty-three, and three daughters, the eldest the wife of Prince Philip of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha, the second the widow of the Crown Prince Rudolph of Austria-Hungary, which brought the family very near to the Austrian royal house, and the third daughter, Clementine, married a few years ago to Prince Napoleon Bonaparte. She recently gave birth to a male heir of the Bonapartes, the only young prince of this generation.

The daughter of Leopold I is the ill-fated widow of the Emperor Maximilian of Mexico, executed there in 1867. She has long been insane and is now the inmate of a mad-house.

The second son of Leopold I was Philip the Count of Flanders, married to Princess Marie of Hohenzollern, sister of Prince Leopold of Hohenzollern and King Charles of Roumania. Of his three children, Henriette is the Duchess of Vendome—a Bourbon alliance, and Princess Josephine is the wife of Prince Charles of Hohenzollern, younger brother of Prince William of Hohenzollern and of Crown Prince Ferdinand of Roumania, and aunt by marriage of King Manuel II of Portugal. The son is *King Albert of Belgium*, who succeeded his uncle Leopold II in 1909. The Queen of Belgium is Princess Elizabeth of the Ducal House of Bavaria. Through her, King Albert is allied to the Crown Prince of Bavaria, the Grand Duchess of Luxemburg, the Duke of Parma, the late Franz Ferdinand of Austria, and the present heir-apparent, Archduke Charles Francis Joseph. The King and Queen have two sons, Leopold, thirteen years old, and Charles Theodore, two years younger. There is also a daughter, the Princess Marie-Josephine, born in 1906.

King Peter I of Servia married Princess Zorka, the daughter of Prince Nicholas of Montenegro. She died in 1890. King Peter succeeded to the throne in 1903 on the murder of his predecessor, King Alexander.

King Nicholas I of Montenegro married Milena Vucotitch. Of this marriage there are six daughters and three sons: the third daughter is *Queen Helen* or *Elena of Italy*.

THE ROYAL HOUSE OF SAVOY: The illustrious House of Savoy begins far back in history with Humbert the White-handed Count of Savoy. Through many changes in history and war after war, the little county became a Principality and then a duchy. Finally the Dukes of Savoy became kings of Sardinia in 1720, and after a heroic war of independence all the Italian states became welded under the Savoy kings of Italy in 1861.

The House of Savoy has, like the rest of the Houses of South Europe, confined nearly all of its marriage alliances with the great group of South Europe families. During the last century the majority of the marriages have been with the families of Bourbon and Hapsburg-Austria, some few with Saxony and Bavaria.

The head of the House is *Victor Emmanuel III*, born in 1869, and married to Princess Elena, daughter of King Nicholas I of Montenegro. He has one boy the Crown Prince Humbert, and three daughters. He is the son of King Humbert I who was killed by an anarchist in 1900, and of Margaret, daughter of Ferdinand, Duke of Genoa and Elizabeth, Princess of Saxony, aunt of King Frederick August III of Saxony. His uncle on his mother's side is Thomas, the present Duke of Genoa. One of his father's sisters, Clotilde, was the mother of the present Prince Napoleon Bonaparte, and the other, Marie Pia, was the wife of King Louis I of Portugal, and therefore grandmother of the present claimant, King Manuel. His uncle was Amadeus, Duke of Aosta, and from 1870 to 1873 was King of Spain. The King's first cousins through his uncle Amadeus are Emmanuel, the present Duke of Aosta, who is married to Princess Helene of Orleans, sister of the present Duke of Orleans, to Victor Emmanuel, Count of Turin, Louis, Duke of the Abruzzi, and Humbert, Count of Salemi.

THE ROYAL FAMILY OF SWEDEN: The present Royal Family of Sweden are Bernadottes, a family transplanted from France in 1760. The founder of the family, John Baptist Jules Bernadotte, who was made Prince of Pontecorvo in 1806, was chosen as his adopted son by King Charles XIII of Sweden of the Holstein-Gottorp line, and in 1810 was made Prince Royal of Sweden. He succeeded to the throne as Charles XIV John.

Gustav V, the present King, is the great-grandson of the first Bernadotte ruler. He was born in 1858 and succeeded his father, King Oscar II in 1905. His mother was Princess Sophia, daughter of William V, Duke of Nassau, and half sister of Adolph, Grand Duke of Oldenburg. His Queen is Princess Victoria of Baden, sister of the present Duke Frederick II. They have three sons, the second of whom, Prince William, Duke of Sudermannia, was recently divorced from the Grand Duchess Marie of Russia. The eldest son, Crown Prince Gustav Adolph, is married to Princess Margaret of Connaught, daughter of the Duke of Connaught in Great Britain, and is therefore a first cousin by marriage of King George V of Great Britain, Ernst Louis, Grand Duke of Hesse, and William II, Emperor of Germany.

PLACES IMPORTANT TO GERMAN STRATEGY

KIAO-CHAU: WHY JAPAN WENT TO WAR WITH GERMANY

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JAPAN'S ultimatum to Germany to withdraw her warships from the Far Eastern seas and evacuate Kiao-Chau, issued on August 16th, caused great surprise in America. Many of the comments upon Japan were severe, but the writer feels certain that they were so through lack of understanding of the Anglo-Japanese treaty and of the actual conditions which followed the declaration of war by Germany upon her European neighbors. These conditions include the activities of German cruisers, with Kiao-Chau as their base, in chasing their enemies' merchant vessels, the requisitioning of Japanese cargoes on board German merchantmen, the consequent insecurity of navigation on the Far Eastern seas to the great detriment of commerce, the feverish effort made to strengthen the German stronghold at Kiao-Chau. All these moves since the beginning of hostilities between Germany and England were, sooner or later, bound to bring the Anglo-Japanese Treaty of Alliance into play. These incidents, however, being overshadowed by the stirring news from Europe passed unnoticed by the American public.

Moreover, to comprehend fully the real significance of Japan's course, a firm and comprehensive grasp of the Far Eastern situation is necessary. The writer will here endeavor to review with a brevity made necessary by space limitations, the history of the Far East so far as it directly concerns his subject, and will examine the spirit and working of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, with the hope of making clear the grounds upon which Japan's war with Germany rests. As the writer is a subject of one of the belligerents, it might not be amiss for him, in order to avoid misunderstanding, to state at the outset that he entertains the strongest admiration for the German people, for the contributions they have made

in every domain of life to culture and civilization. Especially in science, medicine, and military art, Japan is most gratefully indebted to German instruction and example. Whatever condemnation of German methods the author may see fit to pronounce later on refers solely to the German Far Eastern policy, engineered by German bureaucracy and militarism.

The conflicting policies pursued by Japan and Germany in the Far East, which have at last resulted in the present war, had their inception at the time of China-Japan War of 1894-95. That war completely revolutionized the Far Eastern situation. From this point also dates the new alignment of the Powers most interested in the Far East, which has profoundly influenced all the subsequent developments. The exposure of China's weakness by Japan, inadvertent as it was, was the signal for European aggression in the Middle Kingdom.

When Ito and Mutsu concluded at Shimonoseki the negotiations of the Peace Treaty with Li-Hung-Chang, they felt jubilant at the thought that Japan had scored a victory in diplomacy no less brilliant than those on land and sea. The wily Chinese diplomat, on the other hand, must have been laughing in his sleeve that he had outwitted his rivals. For, no sooner had peace terms been made known than Ito, Japan's Premier at that time, was confronted by a note addressed by Russia, France, and Germany, to the Mikado, counselling him to renounce his claim to the Liaotung Peninsula. This was urged on the plea that the retention of the Peninsula by Japan would be a standing menace to the capital of China and the peace of the Orient. The note was couched in most polite terms, but its meaning was unmistakable. The chagrin of Ito knew no bounds; he remained, it is said, mute for three long days.

How Ito felt is well described by Sir Valentine Chirol: "I was in Japan then" he says "and in the course of a conversation with Prince Ito, that great statesman, usually so reticent and reserved, brought his fist down on the table and exclaimed, 'Germany we shall never forgive! Russia looks upon us as a future rival in the Far East; France is, of course her ally, and has important possessions and ancient interests in Eastern Asia—we can understand their action. But for Germany, which always professed such genuine friendship and has no special interests in these regions, to join hands with them and stab us in the back—her intervention was odious and gratuitous.'"

It took Japan, however, not many years to discover the real motive of Germany in joining the European coalition. On November 1, 1897, two German missionaries were murdered by a Chinese mob in the province of Shantung. This was immediately seized as a pretext, and on the 14th of the same month German warships entered the harbor of Kiao-Chau, landed their marines and hoisted the German flag on the fort of a friendly sovereign power. Then reparation was demanded from Peking. And remarkably drastic were its terms, namely, 200,000 taels of silver on account of the dead men; rebuilding of a chapel destroyed in the riot; reimbursement of expenses incurred by Germany in occupying Kiao-Chau; and severest penalties for the assassins and local officials. And on top of these demands, Germany required Kiao-Chau as a naval base; to be granted exclusive coal mining rights in Shantung; and also to receive railway concessions in that province. Most of these demands, exorbitant as they were, were soon acceded to by helpless China, which paid in this way the debt she owed to Germany for her service in saving the Liaotung Peninsula from Japan!

In March, 1898, the Kiao-Chau Convention was signed. By its terms Germany secured the lease of Kiao-Chau for 99 years, the right to build forts and dockyards, construct lighthouses and beacons and collect for their maintenance the dues from foreign vessels, and the complete control of administration and government in the leased district. It includes the bay and the land on both sides of the entrance, having an area of about 117 square miles. Beside, there is a neutral zone of some 32 miles, measured from any point on the shore of the bay, over which the Chinese Govern-

ment cannot issue any ordinances without the consent of Germany. The entrance to the bay is narrow, tortuous and treacherous, which, while a drawback in time of peace, will make it in time of war almost impossible for any hostile fleet to force it. Rocky, treeless hills that guard both sides of the entrance conceal many batteries. Within the harbor, therefore, the German warships are safe from attack by a hostile fleet, however formidable. Unlike Talien-Wan (Darien) whose water is deep, Kiao-Chau Bay is a wide expanse of silt-laden water. To make it a splendid naval station, Germany, therefore, planned a vast scheme of harbor construction at great cost. It is divided into an outer and inner harbor. At the time the writer visited the port in 1910, the inner harbor, with its breakwaters and great granite piers, had already been completed, but the outer harbor was still in the process of construction. Within the harbor is moored an immense floating dock, large enough to accommodate the biggest German battleship.

On the land, which is sterile and uninviting by nature, the wave of the Kaiser's magic wand has brought forth a beautiful city of Tsing-tao. It is a typical German town, built and run in the German fashion—"Pure West thrust upon pure East without compromise." Except for the presence of the large Chinese population, one would almost forget that he is in a corner of the globe so far away from the Fatherland. Its streets are lined by noble edifices; in the villa quarter a number of ornate residences attract the eye. The most conspicuous is the residence of the governor, a structure of huge dimensions. It is veritably a *schloss*. The city is, of course, provided with all modern appliances for heating, lighting, water supply and sanitation. The colony has its schools, hospitals, clubs, a race-course, and a summer resort in the vicinity of the city. In and around the city fruit culture has been encouraged, afforestation attempted on a large scale, and many industrial establishments built.

The writer can speak with no authority on the Kiao-Chau forts, for he has not visited them, but it is said that "German engineering genius at its best is shown in the fortification of Tsing-tao." Two or more lines of fortification, consisting altogether of twelve forts, guard the leased district on the land side. The inner line

is said to be about three miles from Tsing-tao and formed by two mountain ridges, leaving a narrow gap between, through which, alone, the invading army can enter. Kiao-Chau may easily prove a second Port Arthur, if not more formidable, and its storming would probably entail heavy losses.

The harbor construction and the building of Tsing-tao were at first undertaken at an estimated cost of \$40,000,000. In addition, the Reichstag has proved itself to be an exceedingly generous Godmother to the *protégé* of the Fatherland, voting annually the sum of two and one half to three million dollars for the upbuilding of Tsing-tao. Most probably Germany has spent the sum of more than \$100,000,000 for the execution of its Kiao-Chau programme.

Beside the lease of Kiao-Chau, Germany obtained by an appendix to the Kiao-Chau Convention a most valuable railway, and mining concessions in the province of Shantung. The railway from Tsing-tao to Chinanfu, the capital of the province—a "distance" of about three hundred miles—has been completed and running for many years. It has some branches to the adjacent mines. The railway has increased the business of the German port, and opened new markets for German goods. After its short life of a decade and a half, Tsing-tao now enjoys the trade of \$45,000,000 in import and export. Coal and other valuable mines are also being worked at several places in Shantung.

In short, Kiao-Chau is the centre and base of German activity in China,² politically and commercially. It is but the beginning of the vast imperial-colonial-commercial programme which Germany has doubtless formulated. The Kiao-Chau-Chinanfu Railway will make its junction at Chinanfu with the trunk line which will in the future connect Tientsin with Pu-Kou on the Yangtze-Kiang. The Tientsin-Chinanfu line is already completed thus joining Kiao-Chau with the capital of China. When the southern half of the trunk line is completed, Kiao-Chau will be in touch with the Yangtze regions and could exert a decided pressure upon North China and South China as well.

The growth of German trade in China has been phenomenal. Within the last three decades Germany increased her Far Eastern trade from practically nothing to one billion marks in value. Since 1905 Germany has increased her exports to

China 50 per cent., with a total in 1912 of \$15,750,000. "For the three years following 1873 the annual average number of German ships which entered into and cleared from the Oriental ports beyond India was only 48, aggregating about 25,000 tons burden." In 1910, 5,496 German vessels of 6,585,671 tons entered and cleared Chinese ports. In parentheses it may be noted here that Japan, envious as she is of the remarkable expansion of German trade in China, does not seize this opportunity to crush her commercial rival, in order to steal her trade. That would be piratical, entirely unjustifiable conduct. So far as commerce is carried on upon a legitimate basis without undue political influence, it should enjoy a free hand. For that is the "open door."

Turning now to the relations between England and Japan, and the spirit and terms of their Treaty of Alliance, we find that when Japan was confronted in 1895 by the strong combination of three European Powers, she found herself powerless to resist, and withdrew from the Asiatic mainland with whatever grace her self-restraint could command. She discovered, however, that she was not friendless. Great Britain had steadfastly refused to join the European coalition, and had expressed the strongest disapproval of its action. But England was not yet prepared to actively support the affronted nation. She was still satisfied with her attitude of "splendid isolation." There were not lacking prophets who urged the wisdom of joining hands with the nation which had just demonstrated its military prowess. But theirs was as the voice of one crying in the wilderness.

Meanwhile momentous developments were taking place in China. The seizure of Kiao-Chau by Germany had inaugurated an era of European aggression in the Manchu Empire. Soon the Russian eagle was flying over the fortress of Port Arthur; France had lodged herself in Kwang-Cho-Wan; England in Wei-hei-Wei. In addition, the scramble for railway, mining, and other concessions from China, with the Kiao-Chau Convention as a model, became the order of the day. Far more ominous than these seizures of small spots of land and the extortion of economic concessions, was the phrase "spheres of influence," which came into vogue. In the north, Mongolia, Manchuria, and the upper basin of the Hoang-Ho were said to belong to the Russian "sphere of in-

fluence"; in the centre, the vast and fertile regions of the Yangtze-Kiang were earmarked as the British "sphere of influence"; in the south, the province of Kwang-si, a part of Yunnan and of Kwangtung with the island of Hainan, were claimed by the French as their "sphere of influence"; the province of Shantung had the first honor of initiation in the nomenclature of "spheres of influence" as the German "sphere"; even Japan condescended to mark her "sphere of influence" in the province of Fu-Kien opposite Formosa. In short, the dismemberment of China among the great Powers seemed to be fairly under way.

These developments were watched by England and Japan with extreme anxiety. They had common grounds for fear. The maintenance of the *status quo* in China and equal opportunities for trade to all nations was of supreme importance to England, in order to preserve the predominating political and commercial influence she had hitherto enjoyed. The independence of China was vital to Japan, for its loss would mean the setting up of European kingdoms at the very door of Japan, to the constant menace of her national welfare, even her existence. For these reasons, England and Japan seemed for a time to have determined to support even single-handed China's integrity and the "open door."

It was officially declared "that it is of vital importance for the commerce and influence of Great Britain that the independence of China should be respected." It was announced through the mouth of Sir Michael Hicks-Beach, a member of the Cabinet of that time, that "the British Government is absolutely determined, at any cost, even at the risk of war, that 'the open door' in China shall not be closed." But when England saw the audacious proceedings of her rivals in despoiling China, she became a little suspicious of the wisdom of her stand, and seemed to have concluded that the position of Count von Bülow might after all be wiser. The German Chancellor had declared before the Reichstag: "Mention has been made of the partition of China. Such a partition will not be brought about by us at any rate. All we have done is to provide that, come what may, we ourselves shall not go empty-handed."

The demarkation of the British "sphere of influence" in the Yangtze regions, and the ac-

quisition of Kowloon opposite Hong Kong, are the proceedings that reflect the doubting mood of Great Britain. It was the same story with Japan, for, while she was constantly proclaiming her determination to maintain China's integrity, she took a hand in the marking of a "sphere of influence." The whole story shows the wavering attitude of England and Japan during the years prior to the Boxer outbreak. On the minds of the English and Japanese statesmen was slowly but steadily dawning the conviction that, unless



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*KIAO-CHAU, THE SCENE OF JAPAN'S INTERFERENCE

some effective means could be devised, it would become almost impossible to stem the tide of European aggression in China. England and Japan separately each experienced the difficulty of holding even its own position, still more of resisting the European combination. England had tried the experiment in the Anglo-Russian Agreement of 1899 and the Anglo-German Agreement of 1900. But England had already been dethroned in the council-board of nations at Peking and relegated to an inferior place. Whatever England proposed to the Chinese Court was almost sure to be frustrated by the counter schemes of Russia, France, and Germany. And England's loss of prestige extended from Peking to Teheran.

*Map reprinted by permission, from the *New York Evening Post War Gazetteer*

As to Japan her whole diplomatic history from the signing of the Treaty of Shimonoseki to that of the Anglo-Japanese Treaty, is the history of humiliation and the acceptance of condescension. Through diplomacy she was shorn of the best fruits of her victory over China; from Port Arthur, Wei-hei-Wei, and the Liao-tung Peninsula on which she had shed so ungrudgingly the blood of her sons, she was elbowed out; in Korea, for whose independence and regeneration Japan fought, she found her influence soon waning, and only "saved her face" by the compromise with Russia in concluding the Russo-Japanese Convention of 1896. Not only was she compelled to acquiesce in these humiliations and injustices, but she was not able to raise one protest against those transactions that snatched from China Port Arthur, Kiao-Chau, and other territories, before her very solicitous eyes that had scarcely winked since the battles of Kinchow and the Yalu.

It was in such a situation that John Hay came out with his famous circular. Its first marked effect was to stiffen the backbones of England and Japan. Credit is due the great American statesman, therefore, not for the origination of the doctrine of the "open door," but for giving a strong impetus toward its preservation.

The diplomatic experiences of England and Japan above outlined were sufficient to convince the respective governments that only a strong combination could uphold their policy, and safeguard their interests, in China. Herein are the reasons and genesis of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance concluded in 1902. The cardinal points of the treaty were the maintenance of China's integrity and the "open door" and the independence of Korea, and the safeguarding of the special interests in Eastern Asia of the contracting parties. The Alliance was intended to preserve peace in the Far East, or, if peace was broken, to restrict the area of possible hostilities. It failed to achieve the first object, but it emphatically fulfilled the second. The treaty was renewed in 1905. The principal changes in the terms of the treaty from those of 1902 were the inclusion of India among the specified regions, and the vital decision that hostilities with only one Power involved both allies. The Alliance was again renewed in 1911, when a provision was inserted that neither of the contracting parties

was obliged to go to war with a Power with whom a treaty of arbitration was in force.

There was some opposition to the renewal of the Alliance among certain sections of the British community. It was based on these grounds:

1. The Alliance has already served its purpose. The Russians' defeat on the Manchurian fields has completely dissipated the fear of their encroachment on China. The Anglo-Russian Agreement of 1907 which settled the disputes on the Anglo-Russian border, extending from the Pamir to Teheran, minimizes the Russian menace to British rule in India. The Anglo-Japanese Alliance has, therefore, lost its *raison d'être*.

2. The Japanese Alliance is decidedly unpopular among the British colonies on the Pacific,—Australia, New Zealand, Canada. Their attitude toward Japanese laborers is similar to that of the Americans on the Pacific Coast. Consequently, the antagonism of the Colonies to Japanese laborers, on the one hand, and the resentment felt by the Japanese people for the humiliation of their compatriots on the other, might place the British Government in an extremely awkward position, if the Japanese Alliance is continued.

3. If we remain allies of Japan, there is a possibility of England finding herself in the most embarrassing situation, in case the American-Japanese relation reaches a breaking point. This fear was, however, set at rest by the new arbitration treaty provision in the treaty of 1911 already referred to.

The opposition failed to shake the profound faith of the responsible statesmen of Great Britain and Japan in the wisdom of renewing the Alliance, and they put their seals to the instrument. Their motives and reasons in doing so must, therefore, be elucidated in order to make plain the aim and spirit of the treaty now in force, which, in turn, will explain more than anything else the present Far Eastern situation. Such an attempt is herein made as briefly as possible.

1. The imperial policy of Great Britain and Japan demanded the renewal of the Alliance. The late Marquis Komura, who, on Japan's side, was chiefly responsible in giving birth to the Alliance, presented the authoritative Japanese view of it. He said before the Imperial Diet, "the Anglo-Japanese Alliance is the life of Japanese diplomacy and, therefore, everything must be

done to avoid any step likely to impair it." The same was recently affirmed most forcibly in word and deed by the present Foreign Minister, Baron Kato. It was the Anglo-Japanese Alliance that gave Japan a free hand to fight Russia. It was the Alliance that prevented the intervention of European Powers after the war, and saved Japan from repeating the bitter experience of 1895. It was the Alliance that added prestige to Japan in the council of nations.

No less great have been the benefits Great Britain has secured from the Alliance. On this point, however, let Englishmen, themselves, speak for their own country. The following quotation is selected out of many as its forecast is very enlightening on the present European situation. A brilliant English journalist, after reviewing the reign of King Edward, and commenting on the significance of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance says: "In foreign affairs proper, there was not a sensitive spot on the map of which it could be truly said that British policy was prosperous or our outlook encouraging. Our relations with Russia involved increasing friction upon an extending line. . . . To this was now added the definite change, by itself epoch-making, in the traditional relations with Germany. To that state of things, if we persisted in the splendid isolation, there could be only one end—a European coalition under German leadership, and to that might have been added a Russo-Japanese arrangement at our expense in Asia. These were contingencies so real, dangers so definite and urgent, as to bring about what was nothing less than a revolution in our foreign policy. It had to be made and it was made. . . . Splendid isolation was ended by a compact. The Japanese alliance was the most remarkable and dramatic engagement into which our policy had ever entered. The compact was the solid foundation stone for the new structure of diplomacy subsequently raised. Having made one treaty of alliance we were necessarily open to other negotiations. In face of Germany our sole desire was and is to keep what we had held, but the former co-operation of this Power could no longer be relied upon. That fact, once evident, was bound to become and remain the most important consideration of our policy; the whole perspective in which other questions had been viewed, was changed. . . . The evident disappear-

ance of hostility to France, the new open mindedness with regard to Russia, gradually brought about a corresponding change of thought and feeling in each of these countries. Under King Edward's auspices the *entente cordiale* (with France) was effected; the Anglo-Russian *rapprochement* followed; and . . . this country had eluded greater perils than had threatened her for many a day, and had again secured a firmer diplomatic position than we had held for a century."

The Anglo-Japanese Alliance has thus served as the first link in the chain of subsequent understandings among the European allies now engaged in the tremendous struggle against Germany and Austro-Hungary. England's farsighted and far-reaching imperial policy has thus induced her statesmen to conclude the third Anglo-Japanese Treaty. The interests England has to safeguard, it needs no emphasis, are multifold; these impose upon her the shaping of her imperial policy, not by specific interests in certain spots, but in terms of continents and oceans. And back of all lies the supreme importance of the command of the sea.

2. Here we come to the second factor that has influenced the continuance of the Japanese Alliance. It has enabled England to withdraw her large Asiatic fleet to the home waters, liberating thus a strong naval force for use in maintaining against the pretension of Germany the supremacy of the sea. England has in a sense confided to her ally the policing of the Far Eastern waters—a fact not to be overlooked in considering Japan's quick decision to mobilize her fleet against the activities of German warships in Eastern seas.

To the above considerations we should, of course, add all the factors that have contributed to the conclusion of the first and second Anglo-Japanese Treaty.

The foregoing survey of Far Eastern history and the analysis of the aim and scope of the Anglo-Japanese Treaty, will, the writer hopes, make Japan's present action perfectly clear. To summarize, then, the grounds of Japan's war with Germany are:

1. To fulfill her treaty obligations to her ally.

Count Okuma, Japan's premier, declares that "every sense of loyalty and honor obliges Japan to coöperate with Great Britain to clear from these waters the enemies, who, in the past, the present,

and the future, menace her interest, her trade, her shipping, and her people's lives." Japan's part in the coöperative measures with her ally is, then, to capture or destroy German warships and to reduce Kiao-Chau. That its reduction is no child's play will sooner or later be fully demonstrated to the world. Great Britain at the present moment can hardly dispense with a large fleet or expeditionary force sufficient to reduce Kiao-Chau; and she sees fit to rely upon her ally's arms for the undertaking of the difficult task, while Japan whole-heartedly comes to her ally's aid in fulfilment of the obligations imposed upon her by the Anglo-Japanese Treaty. Had Japan desisted from taking such an action she would have been forever branded as a cowardly, selfish nation, and none would in future have trusted or befriended her.

2. To establish firmly China's integrity and the principle of the "open door" and to ensure Japan's own safety and a lasting peace in the Orient.

Kiao-Chau is the child conceived, begotten, and bred by the Kaiser's policy of the "mailed fist." In Tsingtao there is a rock-hewn tablet on which is inscribed in German and Chinese the story of the birth of the colony. Those who know either tongue can readily tell that the murder of two holy apostles of the gospel by a Shantung mob has led to the founding of this fortified colony, which two divisions of the Japanese army might find it hard to dislodge. In Peking, facing the Hata Mon (gate) that pierces the Tartar Wall, there stands the Kettler Arch, erected by the Chinese Government as an apology for the murder by the Boxers of the German Minister Von Kettler. In Tientsin a monument that personifies the German militarism,

erected, it is said, in honor of those who fought and died during the Boxer outbreak, guards the entrance to the German settlement, giving notice to China of the might of the Fatherland. Such a brandishing of the "mailed fist" is consoling neither to China nor to the outside world.

Kiao-Chau is the last vestige of European aggression on China begun in 1895. As long as the German stronghold remains standing to serve the purpose of German imperialism and militarism, so long the policy, which John Hay so lucidly enunciated, is in danger of subversion. For, who knows whether, when Germany is fully prepared, the present nucleus of German imperialism at Kiao-Chau might not develop into a factor whose power the world has not yet measured!

Japan has, therefore, resolved in coöperation with her ally to root out German imperialism in the Far East, in order to place on a safer and more solid foundation the principle for which England, America, and Japan have so long contended, and thus to secure lasting peace in the Orient. The pledge Japan has given to restore Kiao-Chau eventually to China is an evidence of her sincerity to stand for the maintenance of China's integrity and the "open door." If there is any danger at all, that danger, extremely remote though it be, lies with China herself, who might by some misguided act bring down upon herself her own ruin. Japan's premier has most emphatically stated that "Japan has no ulterior motive, no desire to secure more territory, no thought of depriving China or any other peoples of anything which they now possess." It goes without saying that Japan will never take any measure that might be construed as prejudicial to the interests of the United States. For America is Japan's best friend.

THE STORY OF ALSACE-LORRAINE

ALSECE-LORRAINE, the sign of France's humiliation at the hands of Germany in 1870, and but for which there might not, perhaps, have been any war in 1914, has been for nearly half a century a German imperial territory — a "Reichsland." Originally it was not French. From the time of the great Charlemagne until the peace of Westphalia, in 1648, it was one of the countships of the empire. Half a century of war followed and Strassburg became a part of France. Gradually more territory was acquired, until, by

the end of the French revolution, Mülhausen also had become French. Both Alsace and Lorraine, particularly Alsace, suffered a great deal during the war of 1870. The earlier battles of the campaign were fought there. Strassburg was besieged and taken. The surrender of Alsace and part of Lorraine was made the principal condition of peace by Bismarck. The Iron Chancellor himself would have been content with a language boundary, that is, with taking the German-speaking part and letting France keep the part where

French was the mother tongue. His generals, however, insisted that they must have Metz and its environs for strategic purposes. Therefore Alsace and Lorraine, with the exception of the districts of Belfort were taken.

The Berlin Government introduced the German parliamentary system in May 1871. Alsace and Lorraine (Elsass-Lothringen) were to be governed by the power of the German Emperor himself and the Federal Council of the Bundesrat until January 1, 1874, when the constitution of the German Empire was to be established. The campaign of Prussification was begun at once, although with indifferent success from the first. In September 1872, a vote was taken on the question as to who would consider themselves Germans and remain, or French subjects, and transfer their domicile to France. About 45,000 persons chose to leave their homes and cross the border into France. Portions of both Alsace and Lorraine continued irreconcilable, although the Germanization process was applied steadily. The German language was made compulsory in the public schools and in the courts and legislative bodies; French radical newspapers were suppressed and all the schools of learning put under German control.

The French never forgot their loss of the two provinces. Revenge for the taking of Alsace-Lorraine has been part of France's foreign policy since her defeat in 1871. It was chiefly with the

aim of some day getting these lost provinces back that the republic made her alliance with Russia.

Various changes have taken place during recent years in the political status of the *Reichsland*, as Alsace-Lorraine is known officially by the Germans, in the direction of greater autonomy. A new constitution for the two provinces was enacted in 1911. Representatives were provided for, but with no voting power. According to this constitution, which made the two provinces a state of the German federation, the German Emperor exercises sovereign power, and is represented at Strassburg by a governor (Statthalter), who is at the head of the government. There are two chambers elected by universal suffrage.

A great deal of bitterness was occasioned in a small Alsatian town called Zabern, in 1913, by the ruthless repressive action of a Prussian regiment quartered there. Military outrages upon civilians were reported, and finally the Prussian regiment was withdrawn.

Alsace and Lorraine together contain 5,600 square miles and make up an area somewhat larger than the State of Connecticut, with a population of about 2,000,000. About 85 per cent. of the people speak German as their mother tongue; the remaining 15 per cent. use French or a patois. There are some large and important towns in the provinces, including Strassburg, Mülhausen and Kolmar.

THE KIEL CANAL AND ITS SIGNIFICANCE

A GLANCE at the map of northern Europe cannot fail to impress the reader with the vital importance to Germany of the Kaiser Wilhelm, or Kiel, Canal, which connects the North Sea with the Baltic. This waterway has been of prime importance to German naval strategy ever since its construction. The naval base at Kiel on the Baltic Sea entrance, with a population of 200,000, is one of the main foci of German strategy. By means of the canal, the Kaiser's Baltic Fleet, can go to the assistance of the German High Sea Fleet in the North Sea, making the passage in less than sixteen hours. If, on the other hand, it should be necessary, all the Kaiser's ships of war in every waterway of the globe can pass through the canal two abreast into the Baltic; where with the North Sea en-

trance closed, the enemy is powerless to reach them.

While the official name of the waterway is the Kaiser Wilhelm Canal the world knows it by the shorter, more familiar name of Kiel Canal. It is in the Prussian province of Schleswig-Holstein, almost at the foot of what is known as the Jutland Peninsula. Starting near the mouth of the Elbe River across from Cuxhaven, the real port of Hamburg, the canal takes a generally north-east course about a third of the way, then it turns east, and then southeast, following most of the way the route of an older canal built in 1784, by King Christian VII of Denmark. The length of the waterway from the western end, near Brunsbüttel, to the eastern end at Wik, near the harbor of Kiel, is a little more than sixty miles.

By the summer of 1914 the work of broadening and deepening the canal was complete, and its dimensions had become approximately, depth, 30 feet, width at bottom, 70 feet, width at top, 220 feet. All modern appliances, including

the chief dock yards and naval bases of the German coast. It connects Wilhelmshafen, the base of the North Sea Fleet, with Kiel, the Baltic base, and Danzig, another base and seaport.



THE NORTH SEA, THE KIEL CANAL, AND THE BALTIC

lighting by electricity, will make the nine hours' passage of an ordinary steamer comfortable and expeditious. The canal crosses the peninsula at sea level although there are locks to neutralize the tide changes. It flows almost between

At the harbor of Kiel, which is one of the finest on the German coast, are the imperial docks and ship building yards. There are also the private yards of the Krupps and Howalds, the great German ship builders.

THE GERMAN COLONIES

WHEN the smoke of battle has cleared, whatever the outcome, there will be a new map of the world for future generations to study. The most significant changes are bound to take place, not in the map of Europe, but in the colonial possessions of the warring powers. Not the least impressive, though perhaps the least known colonial empire, belongs to Germany. England, France, even little Holland — these have great colonial possessions. But few people to-day realize that Germany by her "mailed fist" policy, combined with watchful waiting, and quickness to seize opportunities, has now built up an empire outside of Europe in extent five times as large as the whole Fatherland.

German possessions fall into three main divisions — her African colonies, her sole Asian stronghold of Kiao-Chau, and her islands in the Pacific.

Four fifths of her colonial territory lies in Africa.

On the East Coast, just south of the British territory of big game renown, is German East Africa, almost the exact size of all our Atlantic Coast States from Maine to Florida. This coastal strip Germany acquired in 1890 from the Sultan of Zanzibar by payment of a million dollars. On the west coast corresponding in area to our three Pacific coast states, lies German Southwest Africa, the only German dependency in Africa adapted to white colonization. Instead of the luxuriant tropical vegetation of the east coast, we find here conditions suited to the raising of large herds of livestock. Farther north on the west coast Germany has established herself in the Kamerun and Togoland, an area greater in extent than all of France and the British Isles. But the fact which makes this question of German colonies in Africa of extreme interest at the present time, is that in every single instance her possessions border



A PORTRAIT OF THE KAISER IN THE GERMAN EMBASSY AT ST. PETERSBURG



ONE YEAR OLD



EIGHT YEARS OLD



FOURTEEN YEARS OLD



TEN YEARS OLD

THE KAISER'S BOYHOOD



TWENTY



TWENTY TWO




IN HIS CORONATION YEAR (1888)



AFTER FOUR YEARS OF RULE



FOR TEN YEARS THE KAISER



IN SUMMER GARB AT CORFU



WITH THE DUKE OF CONNAUGHT



WITH THE KAISERIN



THE SEA LORD

WILHELM II THE VERSATILE



WITH KING GEORGE OF ENGLAND



WITH KING ALBERT OF BELGIUM

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WITH THE CZAR
THE KAISER WITH HIS FRIENDS THE ENEMY



THREE KAISERS AND THE CROWN PRINCE

THREE GENERATIONS. THE KAISER, THE CROWN PRINCE,
AND OLDEST SON

THE KAISER AND HIS SIX SONS



THE CROWN PRINCE



THE KAISER'S DAUGHTER



THE KAISER AND THE KAISERIN



OUT OF UNIFORM



IN UNDRESS UNIFORM



AS A HIGHLANDER



AS HIS ANCESTOR, FREDERICK THE GREAT
THE KAISER IN COSTUME



THE BAG



THE WITHERED ARM


DESPITE WHICH THE KAISER SHOTS, RIDES, SWIMS AND ROWS



STOLZENFELS ON THE RHINE



THE IMPERIAL PALACE IN BERLIN



THE THRONE ROOM IN BERLIN

ITALIAN PALACE IN CORFU
THE KAISER'S PALACES



"HOCH! DER KAISER"



THE KAISER WITH HIS GENERALS AT DINNER



THE KAISER AND COLONEL ROOSEVELT AT A MILITARY REVIEW



THE KAISER, HIS UNCLE, KING EDWARD VII AND KING ALPHONSO



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THE IMPERIAL GUARD PASSING IN REVIEW BEFORE EMPEROR WILLIAM

AT THE LEFT OF THE KAISER IS GENERAL LOWENFELDT, AND AT THE EXTREME RIGHT GENERAL VON BUELOW. THE LATTER WAS THE FIRST GERMAN GENERAL TO FALL



THE KAISER GREETING HIS ALLY EMPEROR FRANZ JOSEPH



DROPPING THE PILOT



THE NEW PILOT



A SERMON ON THE HOHENZOLLERN



"OUR FUTURE IS ON THE SEA"



A RECENT PICTURE



THE KAISER WITH HIS CHIEF OF STAFF GENERAL VON MOLTKE



THE KAISER IN UHLAN UNIFORM



THE KAISER IN HUNTING COSTUME

on some British territory. The whole political complexion of Africa, therefore, is certain to be profoundly changed by the war.

In the Far East, German territory is confined to a strip of land in China hardly 200 square miles in area — the Protectorate of Kiao-Chau. Here across the way from Korea on the Yellow Sea, Germany has built for herself with her coal supplies, dry-docks and forts, a formidable centre of influence in the East.

The third part of Colonial Germany consists of her possessions in the southern Pacific. Strewn along from the Indian Ocean, out across the Pacific for 8,000 miles they stretch, an area of 96,000 square miles in all, yet defended by a white population of less than 2,000. They include the hundreds of settlements known collectively as the German New Guinea Protectorate: the

Marshall and Solomon islands, the Pelan and the Marianne groups, the widely scattered Carolinas and the Bismarck Archipelago. Almost all of these island-groups, were bought from Spain in 1899. On the island of New Guinea itself, Germany holds in Kaiser Wilhelm's land, a large slice right next to that of England. Far out in mid-Pacific lie Germany's Samoan possessions: Savaii and Upolu together with several smaller islets. The rest of the group belongs to the United States, and this is the only instance where America is Germany's next door neighbor. The Samoan Islands were ceded to Germany and the United States in 1899 by treaty with Great Britain.

Such then, is Germany's colonial empire, widely scattered, embracing a total of 1,134,239 square miles of territory, with a population of 14,883,950 subjects.

THE UNITED STATES AS AFFECTED BY THE WAR

THE EFFECT ON THE UNITED STATES

BY CHARLES FREDERICK CARTER

LIKE the rain, the penalties of a great war fall alike on the just and on the unjust. Although the United States is innocent of blame for the present conflict (with all the parties to which we were, and still continue to be, on terms of impartial friendship) the Nation has already paid a heavy toll because of the war, and it will be obliged to pay an increasingly heavy one as time goes on.

First came the great demand for gold for export and an endeavor by European investors to realize on American securities at any price, that compelled the shutting down of the stock exchanges. Financial and commercial operations on a large scale were reduced to the lowest limits pending the taking of necessary precautions against total demoralization. Business everywhere felt the shock keenly.

Foreign trade was practically brought to a standstill. The sea-borne traffic of the world is carried in a fleet of approximately 31,000 vessels having an aggregate capacity of 47,000,000 gross tons, in round numbers, of which Great Britain owns 40 per cent., Germany 11 per cent., France 5 per cent., and the rest of the nations at war enough to bring the aggregate to nearly two thirds of the grand total. Barely 10 per cent. of our foreign commerce is carried in American ships, and on the north Atlantic we have but a single line of four venerable vessels. With hostile warships scouring the seas, the owners of commercial craft naturally prefer to keep their ships in some safe port. This applies not merely to the North Atlantic trade, but to the traffic with the West Indies, South America, Africa, the Far East, and Australasia. Until one side or the other gains the mastery of the sea, or until we can provide ourselves, by purchase, with a merchant marine, under the new law, the embargo on commerce must continue. Some of the finest vessels in the trans-Atlantic trade were built with the

aid of governmental subsidies on condition that they should be converted to military use in case of war. These will not be available for commerce in any case until the war is ended. The situation may at any time be further complicated by blockades, so that the acquisition of vessels of our own would not help us out altogether. The concern of the Washington Administration over this situation is evidenced by the radical relief measures which are under discussion.

The embargo on shipping and the dislocation of the exchange market caused congestion of wheat at the ports, which reacted upon the railroads and thence on the farmers in the West. The stevedores and longshoremen were the first Americans to suffer from the consequences of the war, but in a very few days the effects had spread over all the country.

A still more serious aspect of the situation is that the nations at war are our best customers. Of our total exports, amounting in 1913 to \$2,465,884,149, these warring nations took \$1,190,463,425, sending us in return goods valued at \$709,498,119. In other words, 44 per cent. of all our foreign trade is with those nations which are now at war. Practically the entire able-bodied male population in all these countries has been withdrawn from industrial pursuits, leaving only women, children, and old men to do whatever useful work is done. The women of Europe are accustomed to doing much of the drudgery, because even in time of peace all able-bodied young men are compelled to give at least three of the best years of their life to the army; but there is a limit to what the women can do. The purchasing power of these nations has already been reduced to the lowest possible figure, and it will continue at the minimum for a long period after peace has been declared. Our trade must decline because there will be fewer people with whom to trade. Some industries will doubt-

less be seriously affected, others to a lesser degree, but thousands will be thrown out of work, while the cost of living increases, and the Government, deprived of customs duties may be obliged to levy a war tax, which will make things still more uncomfortable for the American citizen who has no part in the quarrel.

Whatever the seventeen million men, who are trying to kill each other, and their families may do without, at least they must have food. It happens that although the wheat crop of the rest of the world is short about 438,000,000 bushels, or 14 per cent., that of the United States shows an increase of 148,000,000 bushels. The corn crop is 187,000,000 bushels larger than a year ago, and the oat crop is 31,000,000 bushels larger. The total increase in the three great cereals over last year is 366,000,000 bushels. This surplus we shall be able to dispose of at prices that have already advanced materially and that are pretty certain to go still higher. This is all very well for those who have grain to sell; but, unfortunately, we cannot have one price for foreign customers and another for the home market. There are more consumers than producers of cereals, so the great majority will find nothing agreeable in the increased cost of grain and flour.

There is another consideration. Though our exports of foodstuffs for the year ending June 30, 1914, totalled \$430,296,666, we imported \$475,070,689 worth. In other words, we are unable to feed ourselves, but must go out into the world's markets and make up the shortage in provisions at the same increased prices that others pay.

The tariff was taken off sugar for the benefit of the consumer. But an important part of the world's supply of sugar comes from beets grown in the countries now at war. It is uncertain whether the present crop can be harvested or not. On the prospect of a shortage sugar advanced a cent a pound to the consumer before the war was a week old. Meat, butter, eggs, cheese, and other articles of food also promptly started to climb. Steel advanced a dollar a ton. Many chemicals, drugs, and innumerable other manufactured articles come almost wholly from the war zone. The opening of hostilities promptly cut off the supply. As it is extremely uncertain when this source of supply will again be available, or when,

or to what extent, American manufacturers will be in a position to supply the demand, the consumer may confidently count on paying fancy prices for all these articles or going without them.

Germany supplied an important part of the fertilizers used on American farms. If this supply, now entirely cut off, is not forthcoming when needed, the result may be a decreased production next year which will offset any benefit the farmers affected may gain through increased prices for their crops.

In short, there is no lack of ways in which to collect from America the penalty for Europe's crime. The penalty has been passed along to the average man everywhere in the form of a prompt increase in the cost of living, with the comforting assurance that the increase is likely to go on indefinitely. In all probability there will be a temporary slowing up in all lines, which will make dollars scarcer for the average man at the same time that the purchasing power of the dollar is shrinking.

Another very serious result of the war will be to shut off the supply of foreign capital. America has always been a heavy borrower, and could continue to borrow with profit to herself. The railroads alone need billions in the next few years if they are to be developed on a scale that will allow the country to grow. But after such a titanic struggle as is now going on Europe will be hopelessly bankrupt. No matter who wins the nominal victory all the nations involved will be the real losers, and their neighbors will suffer to a lesser degree. Countless billions in capital and property will be destroyed utterly, and the best lives of the countries will be wiped out by scores of thousands. It is, obviously, impossible to make any sort of guess at the number of lives to be lost, but perhaps past experience may serve as a guide in appreciating the awful cost in blood. The Japanese death rate in the Russian-Japanese war on the battlefield, from wounds and from disease, was 79 per thousand per year. Assuming that the nominal strength of all the nations, amounting to 17,000,000 men, is actually called out, and that the war lasts one year, the death roll would total, at the Japanese rate, 1,343,000. Whatever the number of lives cut off before their time may be, the productive power and purchasing capacity of the nations will be reduced by just that much. To this must be added the

productive capacity of other scores of thousands doomed to drag out the rest of their lives as hopeless cripples or invalids, unable to take care of themselves, to say nothing of caring for others. Finally, the birth rate will be reduced by all these horrors, so that altogether the warring nations will be set back many years in the march of progress. Taking all these things into consideration, it must be conceded that our trade with Europe is not likely to be what it has been for some time to come.

All this is but the climax to a ruinous drain that had continued until the world was suffering from a famine of capital. The belligerents had been spending upward of a billion dollars a year in preparation for war, which was the best possible way to make war inevitable. This vast expenditure served no useful purpose, but, together with the earning capacity of four million men withdrawn from useful labor to serve in the armies, was as utterly lost as if it had been sunk in the depths of the ocean. Besides this, financiers had just completed the task of raising considerably more than a billion dollars to foot the bill for the wars in the Balkans, added to which England was still paying interest on a debt of more than a billion dollars incurred in the Boer War. The economic convalescence of the nations must be slow, because they were financially anemic before the war began.

Still there is a streak of silver, even in this sombre cloud. The warring millions will have to be fed and clothed somehow. At whatever sacrifice, they will have to raise money with which to buy the necessities of life, and to a large extent they will have to buy from us. They must find some means of getting provisions across the sea, if they have to send a whole fleet of battleships to convoy each freighter. Also, the rest of the world must turn to us now for the manufactured goods formerly purchased from the warring nations. A little more than half our foreign trade last year was with nations not directly concerned in the war. There is now a chance for us to obtain the bulk of the trade Europe formerly enjoyed with these nations. The prompt action of New York bankers in establishing a sort of international clearing house to offset the collapse of all ordinary foreign exchange indicates a

disposition to take advantage of the opportunity.

Indeed, some of the ablest financiers now assert that the present situation is this Nation's great opportunity if we but have the wisdom to grasp it. We can become the leader of the world in industry, commerce, and finance if we will, so these farseeing men aver. In order to do this we must economize. The rich have been economizing in recent years, but the farmer and the workingman have been growing ever more profligate. As the second step toward world leadership they say we must enact the trust bills over which Congress has been deliberating all summer. Everybody knows there are underlying evils that need to be cured, and which these bills are intended to cure. They may not be perfect measures, but at least they make a beginning and they can be improved later as experience may suggest.

One effect of the present situation will be to compel us to finance our own ventures, since we can get no capital from Europe. The bankers say we can do it.

Another effect of the war will be to cut off immigration. Naturally, no man capable of bearing arms will be allowed to leave any of the nations involved while hostilities last. Afterward they will be even more urgently needed than they are now. This will not be a serious drawback, because there is labor enough here now to meet the demand, though the restriction of cheap labor will check the wasteful development of natural resources and compel the conservation of which so much has been said, but toward which so little has been done.

Another effect will be to compel the United States to provide its own merchant marine so that we may no longer be dependent on foreign ship owners to get our products to market. The Administration has already perceived this, and has begun the task of modernizing our archaic shipping laws. Lest this remedy prove inadequate or too slow in effect, the government itself also proposes to go into the shipping business.

Another effect which will inure to our benefit is that we shall be compelled to manufacture our own cotton instead of sending so large a portion of it abroad to be manufactured.

OUR RIGHTS AND DUTIES AS A NEUTRAL

BY CHARLES CHENEY HYDE

PROFESSOR OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY

UPON the outbreak of the European war the United States finds itself placed in a new relation to each belligerent Power, and suddenly subjected to a variety of duties, and possessed of certain rights that accrue only in such abnormal times. With a merchant marine shrunk to insignificance, and with a vast export trade threatened with paralysis by the lack of neutral bottoms, we nevertheless face a situation that Washington would have rejoiced to substitute for that which confronted him in 1793, for to-day the United States as a neutral enjoys rights that were not dreamed of at the close of the eighteenth century; and those rights are in large degree codified.

To The Hague Conventions of 1907, concerning the rights and duties of neutral powers in naval war, and the rights and duties of neutral powers and persons in case of war on land, the United States is, happily, a party. It has also accepted the Declaration of London of 1909, concerning the laws of naval war. The purpose of that agreement was to make clear the law to be applied by the proposed International Prize Court, the arrangement for the establishment of which was formulated at The Hague in 1907. Though the powers have not established the Prize Court or accepted generally the Declaration of London, the United States has formally ratified both agreements. By so doing it has recorded its approval of the rules enunciated in the latter document. It cannot, therefore, complain of the conduct of any belligerent which may seek to conform to or rely upon them. Although the Parliament of Great Britain has acted adversely upon the Declaration of London, that country is, nevertheless, free to change its position and to make that arrangement the guide of its own prize courts. Deriving their law from that source, their decisions cannot be denounced by us as unjust. For these several codifications the United States has had to pay a price the extent of which is hardly yet appreciated. However useful may be the knowledge at the very commencement of hostilities of what a neutral may reasonably expect, the rules themselves are in certain respects so adverse to interests of such a state that it is only through

the grim experience of a general European war that the United States can fairly estimate how well it has conserved its vital interests in accepting as law principles that may now be relentlessly applied.

According to The Hague Conventions the United States as a government is obliged to refrain from taking any part in the war. Impartial participation does not suffice. We could not excuse the sale of arms to Germany by pleading readiness to supply likewise France or Russia. The scope of the duty of abstention is broad. The Government must not furnish a belligerent with anything that will serve to increase its fighting power, such as ammunition or other war material, or warships. Incidental to this general duty to abstain from participation, the neutral finds itself burdened with a still more onerous duty to prevent its territory and resources from being employed to strengthen the military or naval power of a belligerent. The diligence required of a neutral is measured by the "means at its disposal." Those means must be used to prevent the commission of warlike acts within its waters, or the passage of belligerent troops over its territory. The neutral is obviously not responsible for what it is powerless to prevent.

From the rules of the Treaty of Washington of 1871, which made possible the Geneva Arbitration of the so-called Alabama Claims, has been derived the well-known principle expressed in happier terms in 1907, that "a neutral Government is bound to employ the means at its disposal to prevent the fitting out or arming of any vessel within its jurisdiction which it has reason to believe is intended to cruise, or engage in hostile operations, against a Power with which that Government is at peace." The same vigilance is required of a neutral to prevent the departure from its territory of a vessel there adapted entirely or partly for warlike use, and intended to cruise or engage in hostile operations. Pursuant to this obligation the United States has already taken extraordinary precautions to prevent the departure from Atlantic ports of merchant vessels sailing under belligerent flags if equipped in such a way as to fight for their own countries, and under contract for public service in case of war.

In sharp contrast to these obligations is the express understanding that a neutral is not bound to prevent the export or transit for the use of a belligerent of anything which can be of use to an army or a fleet. Thus the United States is not required to prevent its citizens from selling or exporting arms or war material of any kind. Such transactions would, nevertheless, constitute direct participation in the war, and hence be regarded as internationally wrongful, so as to subject the participant to serious penalties in case of the capture of his property. Such conduct would also, moreover, disregard the spirit if not the letter of President Wilson's Proclamation of Neutrality of August 4th, in which it is declared that "the statutes and the treaties of the United States alike require that no person within the territory and jurisdiction of the United States shall take part, directly or indirectly, in said wars."

Whether war is waged on land or sea, neutral territory is deemed inviolable. As to this requirement The Hague Conventions are explicit. Acts of war in neutral waters are forbidden. Thus if the *Kronprinzessin Cecilie* had been captured by any enemy cruiser just as she entered Frenchman's Bay on August 4th, the United States would have had good cause to demand reparation from the government of the captor, and would also have found itself compelled to demand the release of the vessel. A prize court can not be set up on neutral territory or in neutral waters. Nor can belligerent warships make use of such waters for the purpose of increasing supplies of war material or of completing their crews, or as a base of operations against the enemy.

For numerous purposes a belligerent warship may endeavor to make use of neutral waters. The Hague Convention of 1907 indicates the scope of the privileges that such a vessel may be permitted to enjoy, and thereby enables the neutral to follow with certainty a course that shall not expose it to the charge of unneutral conduct. Let us consider a situation that might arise. A French cruiser, short of coal and provisions, and in an unseaworthy condition is pursued by the enemy, and puts into Portland harbor to escape capture and to rehabilitate herself generally. Just inside of Cushing's Island she finds herself in the unwelcome company of a German warship that made the same port a few hours earlier. The Hague Convention has marked out the gen-

eral course which the United States should follow; and by his Proclamation of Neutrality, President Wilson has indicated with precision what we would permit. Accordingly, the French ship would be allowed fuel sufficient to enable her to reach her nearest home port, or half of that amount if she were rigged to go under sail and also be propelled by steam. Although the United States could, without impropriety, if it had adopted that method of determining the amount of fuel to be supplied, allow the vessel to fill its bunkers built to carry fuel, and thereby greatly increase her efficiency, the President has announced a rule that is consistent with our previous policy and in harmony with what was, prior to 1907, generally regarded as sound practice. The latitude accorded the neutral in 1907 was not sought by the United States, was vigorously opposed by Great Britain, and was the result of a compromise to satisfy the far-reaching demands of Germany. With respect to provisions, the French ship could supply herself with garlic and Aroostook County potatoes *ad libitum*, so long as the revictualing did not exceed the so-called "peace standard."

If it were in a seaworthy condition the German cruiser would be obliged to depart within twenty-four hours after its arrival. The French vessel might, however, be allowed additional time if needed for recoaling or repairs. The latter might necessarily consume a few days. Repairs would not be permitted that would serve to do more than place the ship in a seaworthy condition, and even such repairs would not be allowed if they necessitated a long sojourn. If, as in the case of the Russian ship *Lena*, that entered San Francisco harbor in September, 1904, during the Russian-Japanese war, necessary repairs would require a stay of several weeks or months, the vessel would be promptly interned by the United States. By internment the ship the United States would be taking measures to render her incapable of putting to sea during the war.

It was declared in 1907 that the citizens of a state which is not taking part in the war are considered as neutrals. To the Americans that are now in belligerent European countries that status is precious. It enables the possessor to escape numerous burdens which the state that is engaged in war justly and of necessity imposes upon its own citizens. One cannot, however, avail himself of his neutrality if he commits acts against a

belligerent, or if he voluntarily enlists in the ranks of a party to the conflict. There are, nevertheless, services which the neutral citizen on belligerent soil may render without losing his distinctive character. Americans in Paris or Berlin might, for example, organize for the purpose of assisting in matters of police or civil administration. They might also furnish loans (if their means permitted) to one of the belligerents in whose territory they did not reside.

Neutrals on belligerent territory where martial law has been declared necessarily feel the rigor with which the government asserts its authority. It must be obvious that measures which, in seasons of peace, indicate abuse of power, in times of war lose their arbitrary aspect and, despite harsh aspects, cease to be regarded as wrongful. Thus the movement of neutrals on belligerent soil may be restrained, and they may be even temporarily prevented from leaving the country. Slight ground for suspicion that they are acting as spies justifies arrest and ample inquiry to determine the grounds for such a charge.

To the people of the United States as a whole the war presents no graver aspect than in its bearing upon our right to export and transport to the belligerent countries food, clothing, fuel, and other things known as conditional contraband. To make clear the problem now confronting us a brief explanation of the law is necessary. "Contraband" is the term employed to describe an article which is liable to capture because of its use in the prosecution of the war, and because of its hostile destination. Contraband is subject to capture on a neutral vessel and is liable to condemnation. Goods which belong to the owner of the contraband and which are on board the same vessel are also liable to condemnation. Moreover, according to the Declaration of London, the vessel carrying such articles may be confiscated if the contraband forms "by value, by weight, by volume, or by freight, more than half the cargo." Maritime states have long been aware of the importance of the distinction between articles adapted solely for use in war, such as guns and projectiles, and those susceptible of use in the pursuit of peace as well as in that of war, such as food and coal. Articles of the former class have come to be known as absolute contraband, those of the latter as conditional contraband. The purpose of the distinction is to limit

the right to capture articles of the latter kind to occasions when they are destined for an essentially hostile end, and to permit the capture of those of the former kind whenever they are bound for the territory of a state engaged in war. In order to protect neutral commerce from interference, the United States has struggled hard for recognition of the principle that what is capable of feeding and clothing, and otherwise ministering to the sustenance of the people of a belligerent state, should not be subject to capture and condemnation, unless shown to be not only capable of use in war, but also destined for that use. Though maritime states are not indisposed to accept this principle, there has been diversity of opinion respecting, first, what articles should be treated as conditional contraband, and secondly, under what circumstances articles recognized as such should be subject to capture. The Declaration of London appears to have solved the first difficulty by specifying in appropriate and careful lists certain articles as absolute, and others as conditional, contraband (and still others as not contraband at all). Thus arms of all kinds, gun-mountings, clothing, and harness of a distinctively military character, animals suitable for use in war, and armor-plate are among the articles placed in the first category. They are subject to capture if destined to territory belonging to or occupied by the enemy. This is true whether the carriage of the goods is direct, or entails transshipment or subsequent transport by land. What is decisive is the destination, not of the vessel but of the goods. Thus a consignment of uniforms, shipped from New York on an American vessel bound for Naples or any other neutral European port, would be subject to capture, even within sight of Nantucket, if it were shown that the ultimate destination of the goods was Trieste.

Articles in the second category, and described by the Declaration of London as conditional contraband, include foodstuffs, gold and silver, paper money, boots and shoes, vehicles, material for telephones and telegraph, fuel, lubricants, and harness. These articles furnish a substantial portion of the export trade of the United States.

The second difficulty already noted — concerning when conditional contraband is subject to capture — is the all-important question before the United States to-day. In more concrete and simpler form the question is: When is such

contraband to be deemed to be intended for a hostile use so as to justify its capture? The vital significance of the answer that the belligerents may give is hardly yet appreciated. Thus far popular attention in this country has been focussed on the lack of American and other neutral ships available for our foreign trade. Relying upon the assurance that "free ships make free goods," we have concerned ourselves about vehicles of transportation rather than with the safety of our produce. It is important to note what assurance the Declaration of London affords. It is there provided that conditional contraband is liable to capture if shown to be destined for the use of the armed forces of a belligerent, or for a department of its Government unless, in the latter case, circumstances show that the goods cannot in fact be used for the purposes of the war. (This exception is not, however, applicable to a con-

signment of gold or silver, or paper money.) It is further provided that a hostile destination is presumed to exist in case the goods are consigned, not only to enemy authorities, but also to a contractor in the enemy country who as a matter of common knowledge supplies articles of the same kind to the enemy. Again, a similar presumption arises if the goods are consigned to a fortified place belonging to the enemy or to another place serving as base for its forces.

In the meantime American exporters must face the fact that, if propriety of conduct is to be tested by the Declaration of London, the belligerent Powers are in a position to capture and condemn foodstuffs, coal, and other articles within the same category, with an ease that renders shadowy and dangerously vague the distinction between what is conditional and what is absolute contraband.

AMERICAN FINANCES

BY CHARLES A. CONANT

SINCE war was declared, American markets have stood up under a tempest of a character never before encountered since the creation of the modern mechanism of finance. For a few days it looked as though the entire machinery of banking and credit built up in Europe during forty years of peace had been brought to a standstill, and as if the American market would be compelled also to suspend its activities.

The New York Stock Exchange, under a torrent of orders from Europe to sell American securities held abroad, remained open until the close of business on Thursday, July 30, but was closed the next morning after a consultation between the governing board and big banking interests. In the meantime, the usual mechanism of foreign exchange had broken down, partly because shipping was threatened by the war and insurance rates for the shipment of gold had become prohibitive. Even such credits as were possessed by American banks abroad were in a state of suspense and drafts on England which should have been sold at the highest at \$4.90 to the pound sterling rose to \$5.25 and even in some cases to \$6.

The seriousness of the situation abroad was

manifested by almost every cable message which came from the great centres of finance,—London, Paris, Berlin, Amsterdam, Brussels, and Petrograd. The French and English governments promptly declared a *moratorium*, which means that the holder of documentary obligations, like bills of exchange and promissory notes, cannot enforce payment according to the terms of the obligation until the delay granted has expired. In France, the payment of specie at the Bank of France was promptly suspended; in Germany, gold was gotten only with difficulty and in trifling amounts from any of the banks; in Belgium, specie suspension occurred; and in Holland, similar action was accompanied by authority to the National Bank of the Netherlands to issue additional notes to the amount of \$200,000,000. In France, also, the limit of circulation of the Bank of France was increased at a jump from \$1,300,000,000 to \$2,300,000,000.

Even the rock-ribbed Bank of England was subjected to a run for gold in exchange for its notes which cut down its reserve by more than \$50,000,000 in less than a week and led ultimately to the suspension of the bank act of 1844, which limits the amount of notes that can be issued without gold. London has long prided herself

on being the clearing house of the world, and on being the only market where obligations were always payable promptly for their full value in gold. The very fact, however, that the London market was a clearing house for obligations from all over the European Continent and from Africa, Asia, and Latin America, which could not be collected promptly, naturally deprived her of the means of making her usual settlements and made it necessary to allow a breathing spell in order to reconstruct the machinery of exchange.

THE PREPARATION FOR A CRISIS

This breakdown in European finance took place in spite of a long period of preparation for the stress of war on the part of farsighted statesmen and bankers in Europe. The fact was clearly recognized after the Morocco crisis of 1911, which brought France and Germany nearly to the verge of war, that the European banks were inadequately equipped for a great struggle in arms. At once, the Imperial Bank set to work to strengthen its gold reserve, with entire indifference to the usual principles of political economy determining the free movement of gold. It appeared as a high bidder at the London auctions for the gold which arrived from South Africa every week; it husbanded all the gold which entered the bank in the course of ordinary operations; and it greatly expanded the issue of notes for 50 marks (\$11.90), and 20 marks (\$4.76), which had never been issued prior to 1906.

The bankers of France and Russia, witnessing this feverish activity in Germany to increase her gold resources, met her on the same ground. Within a year and a half, the three state banks of France, Germany, and Russia drew into their vaults an amount of gold equal to the entire production within that time which was available for monetary uses, exclusive of the amounts required in the arts and for exportation to India. Their total increase in gold holdings in eighteen months was about \$360,000,000, and shortly before Austria delivered her brutal ultimatum to Servia at the close of July, the gold holdings of the Bank of France had reached \$792,160,000; of the State Bank of Russia, \$819,700,000; of the Imperial Bank of Germany, \$336,000,000; and of the Bank of Austria-Hungary, \$254,400,000.

To these gold war funds, the United States contributed during the spring of the present year

up to the end of June, about \$84,000,000 in the form of gold exports. When the war clouds broke into storm, a new effort in Europe to turn other forms of wealth into gold caused gold exports from New York in three weeks of \$46,000,000, and sales of securities on the New York Stock Exchange which would probably have called for \$30,000,000 more.

The American market had remained, up to the very eve of war, comparatively indifferent to the gathering storm clouds in Europe. With a gold monetary stock in the country estimated at about \$1,700,000,000, the loss of \$100,000,000, more or less, caused little alarm. If the same situation had arisen in 1895, when the Treasury of the United States was on the brink of specie suspension, and it was necessary to make a contract with the Morgan and Rothschild houses to obtain \$65,000,000 in gold and to protect it by a monopoly of the market for exchange, the results to American finance would have been appalling. Attempt to control the exchange market by fixing high rates would have been futile against the feverish thirst for the yellow metal in Europe, which would not have been slaked nor greatly restrained by a trifling difference in the cost of getting it.

A STRONG POSITION

Fortunately, the finances of the United States were never in a stronger position to meet such a strain than in the closing days of July, 1914. Even on the stock market, liquidation had been so long going on and speculation had been so discouraging in its results, that there were only a few margined accounts to be thrown over and only moderate loans outstanding on the part of the banks to commission-house brokers. In respect to its gold equipment, the United States was stronger in some senses than even Russia and France, with the mountains of the yellow metal at the command of their central banks. The amount in gold certificates outstanding at near their maximum point on April 30, 1914, was \$1,158,997,000. These certificates represent simply deposits of gold on behalf of the owners in the custody of the Government and are only a part, although a large part, of gold resources of the country.

The Treasury could afford to look on with comparative indifference while certificates were turned into coin and the coin went abroad; for

neither of these operations affected directly the legal tender reserve in gold, fixed by the gold standard law of 1900 at the sum of \$150,000,000, nor did they affect directly the "free gold" in the Treasury cash, which stood on July 31st at a point above \$130,000,000. Under the gold standard law, United States notes are redeemable on demand from the legal tender reserve of \$150,000,000, but when so redeemed may be exchanged for gold in the general cash of the Treasury, if gold is found there. Never since the enactment of the law in 1900, has the legal tender reserve fallen below the legal limit of \$150,000,000; and this reserve was buttressed by a fund of \$130,000,000 of free gold in the Treasury.

ACTION BY THE GOVERNMENT AND THE BANKS

When it became apparent, however, that the demands of Europe for gold might be almost limitless, if she could throw upon the New York market the great mass of American securities in which she had invested, prompt and energetic action was taken by the banking interests of New York and of the Government to protect the situation. First, on Friday morning, July 31, came the closing of the Stock Exchange; at a meeting of the Clearing House Committee on Sunday August 2, it was decided to issue Clearing House certificates for use between the banks of New York in settling clearing-house balances; and on Saturday, August 1, the Hon William G. McAdoo, Secretary of the Treasury, arrived in New York and entered into earnest conferences with the banking interests, with the result that the Treasury arranged for the prompt issue of emergency bank notes to enable the banks to substitute notes for gold certificates in the circulation and thereby husband their gold and build up their reserves. These reserves had fallen from \$466,577,000 for the week of July 25th to \$444,436,000 on August 1, and fell still further, under the pressure of gold exports, to 386,589,000 on August 8.

If jealousies or distrust had existed between the big financial interests in New York and the administration at Washington, they were quickly forgotten under the pressure of the general peril. The Democratic leaders in Congress took prompt action to liberalize the Aldrich-Vreeland law of 1908, which would have expired by limitation on June 30, 1914, but for the forethought of Senator

Owen, chairman of the Senate Committee on Banking, and Chairman Carter Glass, of the House Committee, and an amendment received the approval of President Wilson on Tuesday, August 4, doing away with this limitation and extending the authorized aggregate of new note issues from \$500,000,000 to 125 per cent. of the capital and surplus of the banks, or more than \$2,000,000,000.

It was probably fortunate for the country that the organization of the new system of Federal Reserve banks had been delayed up to the breaking out of the crisis. The new system might have been very effective in protecting the situation if it had been in complete operation; but in a period of transition, which would have called for the shifting of considerable amounts of legal tender money from the old national banks to the new Federal Reserve banks, it would have proved a source of embarrassment without having any completed powers of relief. In preparing measures, however, for meeting the difficulties of the situation, the Secretary of the Treasury had the assistance of those three members of the Federal Reserve Board, who had already been confirmed by the Senate,—Hon. Charles S. Hamlin, former Assistant Secretary of the Treasury; Mr. W. P. G. Harding, an Alabama banker, familiar with the conditions for moving the cotton crop; and Dr. Adolph C. Miller, a trained political economist.

EASING THE STRAIN

These gentlemen remained in New York during the period of acute pressure for currency and superintended the issue within a week of \$46,514,980, in new notes, to New York banks alone. The peculiar value of these notes in relieving monetary strain is that they can be paid out by the banks in response to calls for currency, whether from interior banks or from individuals, and thereby permit the banks to husband their gold certificates and build up their reserves. Incidentally also they equip the banks with increased lending power without dipping into their reserves.

Sanity gradually returned to the financial markets in London as well as New York as soon as the efficiency of the steps taken in both countries began to be recognized by the financial community. The Bank of England, which lost in a week more than \$50,000,000 in gold, gained gold rapidly during the second week in August. The

rush for the redemption of bank notes in gold was brought to an end when the government authorized the bank to issue notes in excess of the legal limit and put out notes for ten shillings (\$2.44) and £1 (\$4.88), which had not before been done since the recovery from the Napoleonic wars. The discount rate of the Bank of England, which was raised on Friday, July 31, to 8 per cent., and on the next day to 10 per cent., was reduced in the following week to 6 and then to 5 per cent., and accommodation was extended as usual to solvent clients.

The deadlock in exchange with the United States was partially broken by the same firm which had saved the United States Treasury from specie suspension in 1895. It was announced on Thursday, August 6, that the government of France had deposited with the Paris office of J. P. Morgan & Company, a sum of about \$6,000,000, which was subject to drafts by the French Ambassador in Washington. By means of checks drawn upon this fund, but delivered to J. P. Morgan & Company in New York, the French Government would be able to purchase supplies in the United States and the drafts would release an equal amount of money in New York, which could be applied to obligations of French bankers and importers to bankers and exporters in New York. A clever move in the same direction was announced by the Bank of England on August 11, by which the Canadian Treasury Department was made a branch of the bank and custodian of the gold due the bank in New York. By this means the gold held on this side of the water could be counted as a part of the reserve of the bank against its note issues and deposit liabilities in England.

AMERICAN SECURITIES HELD IN EUROPE

Perhaps the most serious feature of the war panic abroad, in its effect on American finance, is the sending back of American securities held in Europe, to be unloaded on the New York Stock Exchange at any price for cash. For many years, a portion of European savings has been applied to investment in the United States, until the amount thus invested has reached, according to the computations of Sir George Paish, editor of the London *Statist*, no less a sum than \$6,000,000,000. In Canada, also, it is estimated that foreign capital is invested to the amount of more than \$3,000,000,000. The amount invested

in the United States, which is principally in the form of securities, represents nearly the entire value of the annual production of the country, and more than half the aggregate assets of the national banks.

Securities issued for railway-building and industrial enterprises represent fixed capital which is the result of the savings of years and in modern times has come to exceed many times the amount of annual production. Obviously, it would be impossible for the United States to buy back, even at low prices, the entire mass of American securities which have been placed abroad. The problem, fortunately, cannot present itself in quite so crude and appalling a form, but the necessity of taking back even one-fifth or one-tenth of this huge mass of obligations would be sufficient to cause derangement in the money market and serious declines in stock exchange prices. It was for this reason that it was necessary to close the Stock Exchange on July 31, under the torrent of frightened European selling, and it will be necessary to study the situation in this respect carefully before the American Stock Exchanges can be again opened for business.

DISTRIBUTION OF THE COSTS OF WAR

Even if the war should come to an end in a few months, the echo of its disturbing effects would be felt in the market for capital, because of the considerable loans which it would be necessary for the governments involved to offer to the public. Experience in former wars has shown that the countries which prepare to absorb new issues of their national loans do so by quietly reducing their holdings of foreign securities. In time of peace, this would not be done with the precipitation and sacrifice of values which occur under the threat of war, but the effect would probably be to depress the price of other securities and make it difficult to obtain capital for new enterprises while the costs of war were being distributed over the world's money markets.

America, therefore, whatever her temporary profits from an enhanced demand for certain products and the opening of new opportunities for her commerce and shipping, will be compelled to bear some share of the loss caused by the consumption of hundreds of millions of the world's savings in supporting contending armies and keeping them supplied with the weapons of destruction.

THE WAR AND OUR OCEAN TRADE

BY WINTHROP L. MARVIN

WITHOUT undertaking to consider the causes, the fact is that when Great Britain, Germany, France, Russia, and Austria plunged into war in the midsummer of 1914, their merchant ships and the ships of the few maritime nations remaining neutral were carrying 92 per cent. of the overseas trade of the United States, — a trade which in the latest fiscal year was valued at nearly four billions of dollars. Our principal carriers were Great Britain and Germany, and the ships of the latter's flag were at once removed from consideration, — bottled up at home or abroad by the superior naval power of the enemy.

There ensued, of course, a paralysis of export and import commerce that struck at the prosperity of every part of the nation. What happened was precisely what Washington and Jefferson had foreseen in the last years of the Eighteenth Century. Then they aroused their countrymen to vigorous measures of self-defense, and in a few years the danger was averted, — the United States became a mercantile marine power of the first rank. If the same result follows upon the present acute emergency, the loss and suffering now inevitable will not have been entirely in vain.

ONLY SIX TRANSATLANTIC STEAMSHIPS

But this looks ahead, and present conditions demand immediate attention. At the outbreak of the war, the American flag was flying over only six steamships out of the two or three hundred liners regularly engaged in the great transatlantic trade between the ports of the United States and the ports of Europe. These six steamships, which have since proved so conspicuous and useful as the favored refuge of returning American tourists, are the *St. Louis*, *St. Paul*, *New York*, and *Philadelphia*, of the American Line from New York to Cherbourg and Southampton, — 20-knot passenger, mail and express freight vessels of 11,000 and 10,000 tons, — and the *Finland* and *Kroonland*, 16-knot steamships of the Red Star Line from New York to Plymouth and Antwerp, — vessels of 12,000 tons, with excellent passenger accommodations and a considerable cargo capacity. Not one of the latest Atlantic leviathans has sailed under the Stars and Stripes. All of these six American steamships are in the service of the

International Mercantile Marine Company. The four first named are the regularly subsidized transatlantic postal fleet of the United States, and the *Finland* and *Kroonland* were built in anticipation of a later subsidy measure which was not enacted.

Occasionally an American steamer of the coastwise fleet, chartered for a particular purpose, makes a voyage to Europe, but these six steamers represent the entire shipping facilities available under the American flag in the regular transatlantic trade when the great war opened. Immediately the six ships were sought by all Americans in Europe who could secure passage by them and realized the safety that lay in the folds of their country's flag, and they have been and will continue to be sought for the same reason by the shippers of bullion and valuable cargo.

Besides these six American steamers, the war at the outset left neutral a few small steamship lines under the colors of Spain, Portugal, and Scandinavia. The Holland-America steamers have been forced to traverse a danger zone, the Belgian steamers of the Red Star line went almost immediately into the belligerent class, and a hazard of eventual participation clings to the steamship lines of Italy.

MORE SHIPS IN THE WEST INDIES

This was a grave crisis from the standpoint of ocean transportation, for the United States lost at once the dependable use of its principal ocean carriers. Not only were the regular lines affected, but the slow freighters, the wheat and cotton ships, belonged chiefly to the belligerent nation. They were held at home or at distant ports, and with almost two-thirds of the cotton crop and many millions of bushels of the huge grain crop demanding markets overseas, the United States has been involved by the war in an incalculable misfortune. For it is only in Europe, convulsed by the war, that the great bulk of our surplus cotton and grain can be disposed of, — relatively small quantities having been sent to the ports of other continents.

Though the war in its first effects crippled steamship communication on the transatlantic routes, it has had no such disastrous results on

the routes to the West Indies and the nearer ports of Atlantic South America. American shipping holds a respectable place in the trade of the Caribbean region, and about one-half of the entire commerce of that region is and long has been with the United States. A strong American steamship service, — that of the Ward Line, — connects Mexico, Cuba, and the Bahamas with New York. This is a mail-subsidized service, and so is that of the Red D Line from New York to Venezuela via Porto Rico. Our West Indian colony is under the coastwise laws and possesses communication in ships of several American lines with New York and ports of the Gulf of Mexico. The Panama Railroad Steamship Line, another American service operated by the War Department, runs from New York to Colon. The Clyde Line runs to Santo Domingo, and the Southern Pacific Line from New Orleans to Cuba, which has steamship connections also with the Florida peninsula.

Ships of the large fleet of the United Fruit Company, sailing under British and other foreign colors (because of higher American wages and severer requirements of American law) but so securely American in ownership that they are not likely to be disturbed, ply between our Atlantic and Gulf ports and Jamaica, Cuba, Central America, and the Isthmus of Panama, and the Munson Line, also with American owned ships of foreign register, is an important factor in the Cuban trade. The United Fruit Company may come completely under the American flag. The Atlas Line of German steamers has been withdrawn from the New York-West Indian service, but otherwise our West India communications have not been and presumably will not be seriously reduced.

Nor is there any hazard in the war to what is now the most important steamship service under the American flag, — the long-voyage coastwise service through the now-open Panama Canal, between the Atlantic and Pacific seaboard. Intelligent and active preparations for this trade have been made by American shipping men, and the list of available Panama coast-to-coast steamships under the American flag has been increased by new vessels and new companies. The American-Hawaiian Company has completed its great fleet of twenty-six steamships of a total dead weight capacity of nearly 300,000 tons; the Emery Company, of Boston, has appeared upon the

route, and the International Mercantile Marine Company has confirmed its purpose to offer a passenger service that will become available as soon as the war will permit. These Panama steamers are all of bona fide American ownership and register, the great present hope of our merchant marines. They are sufficient in number to provide a sailing from the Atlantic or the Pacific every business day throughout the year.

On the Pacific, one American steamship of the Great Northern Company from Puget Sound, and four or five steamships of the Pacific Mail Company from San Francisco, run to Japan, China, and the Philippines. The Oceanic Steamship Company operates a reëstablished postal subsidy line from San Francisco to Australasia. The Pacific Mail maintains a service from San Francisco to Central America and Western Mexico. Thus, in spite of the general weakness of the American merchant marine in foreign trade, there are routes upon which the Stars and Stripes still hold a place of dignity and power. There is, however, no American steamship line to the greater countries of South America, with the exception of one freight line operated by the United States Steel Corporation with chartered ships of the American-Hawaiian Company from New York to Brazil.

RIGHTS OF NEUTRAL CARRIERS

The catastrophe of the war is heaviest in the vast, rich commerce of the North Atlantic. Both the grain and the cotton crops are coming forward. Where are the ships requisite to carry them? The important service of the two great German steamship companies, the Hamburg-American and North German Lloyd, has ceased to exist. A merchant ship of a belligerent, even laden with cargo that is in itself non-contraband and even bound to a neutral port, is a lawful prize of war. Great Britain and her allies dominate the sea, and German ships and Austrian ships are for the time being eliminated from international commerce.

Ships of neutral nations can nominally trade to all ports, even ports of belligerent nations that have not been formally blockaded, but in effect the widening of the definition of contraband to include conditionally even such articles as food stuffs very seriously circumscribes all practicable war-time commerce. Petroleum, another of our

most important exports, is absolutely under the ban as contraband, and even such harmless articles as cotton or woolen cloths are liable to seizure and confiscation if of the nature of military uniforms.

The truth is that in a great world-shaking war many settled principles of international law are sure to be denied or disregarded. Each belligerent on the ocean assumes to be a law unto himself. Theoretically, until formal blockade is proclaimed, as was done by our Government in the Civil War with the ports of the Confederacy, an American ship or any other neutral ship has a right to carry a clearly non-contraband cargo to Bremen or Hamburg or Trieste. But, as a matter of fact, no American or other neutral ship will dare to do this, except as a desperate speculation. The North Sea is already filled and the Adriatic may soon be with mines, fixed or floating, those deadliest devices of twentieth century war. It is the misfortune both of Germany and of Austria that their coast lines are relatively short and readily closed by an enterprising enemy, and direct communication with their ports even under a neutral flag can doubtless be regarded as an impossibility for the present. Whether or not a blockade is proclaimed, a blockade actually exists, and Germany and Austria must be dismissed from consideration as consumers of products of the United States, — save, indeed, for what small commerce may persist through the ports of Holland, Scandinavia, and Italy, so long as these remain neutral states.

But the ports of Great Britain, except those on the northeast coast, and the ports of France ought to remain open to the neutral commerce of America. Already a large part of the service of British and French transatlantic steamship companies has been cautiously resumed, and the critical situation of crowds of American refugees in Europe is now a thing of the past.

It must be expected, however, that the British and French steamship schedules will be liable to interruption throughout the war, because of imperative demands of the home government for ships for transport or other auxiliary service. These lines cannot be depended on in war as they could be in peace. It must not be forgotten that the German navy contains some of the swiftest and most formidable cruisers in existence. One or two of these ships, slipping out of the North

Sea through the British blockade and falling on the transatlantic route, would create a panic and make insurance rates on British and French merchant ships prohibitive. This danger is liable to increase as the war continues and the situation of Germany, ringed in by foes, becomes more desperate. Americans will remember that the Confederate commerce destroyers were relatively harmless in the first year of the Civil War, and that their sharpest depredation occurred in the years 1863 and 1864,—indeed, one of these rovers, the *Shenandoah*, did her deadliest work after the war had ended.

WHAT CAN BE DONE?

Already freight rates to north European ports have doubled, and there has been an increase of 50 per cent. in the rates to countries outside of the war zone, to Africa and South America. Insurance rates also have attained excessive figures, though they are significantly low for ships flying the American flag, of unquestioned American ownership, on the American register before the war began. The United States, as the greatest and most powerful of neutrals, is in a position to command respect for its own ships and its own citizens. It is very fortunate for the country that the American navy because of the quality of its ships, guns, and personnel is a factor which no belligerent would lightly draw into the scale against it.

Our Government in this crisis should insist with firmness on full neutral rights for all its ships and cargoes. If the nation possessed a great mercantile marine, or was rapidly creating such a marine, this would be an unexampled opportunity. Undoubtedly there will be additions to our overseas tonnage from the larger vessels of the coastwise trade. Some of these have already been chartered and others are being offered by their managers. The Clyde and Mallory lines and their allied companies have signified that eighteen steamers to carry grain or cotton are at the service of the Government. The American-Hawaiian Company has other and larger steamers ready. It so happens that because of the general depression in domestic business many American coastwise vessels have been lying idle in port awaiting an improvement in trade or the opening of the Panama Canal. Seventeen such vessels have been unemployed at Boston, thirty at New York,

and more than forty at San Francisco. Some are too small for profitable overseas voyaging, but some are larger vessels carrying from 5,000 to 10,000 tons.

One factor, beyond the lack of ships, which has temporarily crippled the export trade is the breakdown of exchange. This is a financial and not a transportation difficulty and it can be remedied. Another factor of discouragement has been the heavily increased insurance rate, so high as to leave small profit to shipowners and owners of cargo. But this difficulty is being lifted with the adoption by Congress of the plan recommended by President Wilson for the Government insurance of ships of American register.

THE EMERGENCY SHIPPING MEASURE

Vigorous insistence on the rights of neutrals, the use of coastwise vessels wherever practicable, and national insurance of American vessels will be straightforward and practical methods of relief of the war congestion of our export and import trade. Congress has already at this writing passed the emergency shipping measure in the form in which it was sought by the Administration. This bill passed the House after a very brief debate. In the Senate, an unwise attempt was made to take advantage of the emergency in our overseas shipping business to force foreign-built ships into the coastwise trade, which had been reserved for more than a hundred years to American ships and American citizens. This ill-timed attempt would have destroyed the prosperity of our coastwise shipping and would soon have destroyed ship-building in America. If it had been successful it would have defeated the purpose of the emergency shipping bill, which was to provide foreign-built ships for the carrying of our overseas commerce. Such ships, if admitted to American registry, would have preferred the coast trade to the overseas trade, because of the greater security in the domestic traffic from interference by belligerents.

Fortunately, the prompt and vigorous opposition of the merchants, shipowners, and shipbuilders was heeded by the public men in Washington and the attack on the coastwise trade which would have resulted so disastrously for the country was defeated in the Senate by a vote of two to one.

Then the original emergency shipping bill, as

the House had framed and passed it was adopted. This provides for the admission to American registry of foreign-built steamships, without regard to age, owned by American citizens or by American corporations of which the president and managing directors are American citizens. Further to encourage the naturalization of foreign-built ships, the President is authorized in his discretion to suspend the requirement of existing law that the officers of American ships shall be American citizens. The President is also authorized in his discretion to suspend the requirement that foreign-built ships shall comply with American laws governing survey, inspection, and measurement.

The new law in its terms actually grants a valuable preference to foreign-built ships over existing ships on the American register. It is an unmistakably liberal proposition, — an urgent invitation to the ships of the world to seek the American colors. Indeed, American ownership may be merely nominal for it can be secured by foreign capital through the simple expedient of organizing an American corporation in which only three or four officers need be American citizens, holding the few shares of stock necessary to qualify.

Unknown to many of the people of this country, a free-ship policy had been in effect here since the enactment of the Panama Canal act of August 24, 1912. This admitted to American registry for the foreign trade any foreign-built vessel, less than five years old, owned by American citizens or an American corporation and capable of being certified after inspection as fit to carry dry and perishable cargoes. Not one ship of any kind was actually admitted to American registry under the provisions of this law. It proved an absolute failure, because no compensation was offered for the higher wages of American officers, for the higher wages of crews if shipped from American ports, for the higher cost of food and general maintenance on ships under the American flag, and for the foreign subsidies and bounties that would have to be relinquished by some foreign ships if transferred to American registry.

GOVERNMENT OWNERSHIP DANGEROUS AND INEFFECTIVE

Recognizing already that even the broader free-ship proposition will fail of adequate result,

President Wilson has brought forward a new and radical expedient, — Government ownership of steamship lines. The maximum of \$30,000,000 which the President asks Congress to appropriate for the purchase and operation of foreign-built steamships in Government lines under the American flag is only a small fraction of the amount requisite to create an adequate fleet. The proposal is a makeshift, and a perilous makeshift, for the mere introduction of it has aroused resentment abroad and provoked warning that the American nationality of ships bought from belligerents in this belated and dubious way would not be accepted for a moment. Thus both the emergency shipping measure and this later plan of Government ownership involve grave risk of international complications. Though Great Britain did not sign the London conference agreement of 1909, the following declaration is at least morally binding as the latest expression of international opinion:

The transfer of an enemy vessel to a neutral flag, effected after the opening of hostilities, is void unless it is proved that such a transfer was not made in order to evade the consequences which the enemy character of the vessel would involve.

One steamship service is now owned by the Government, — that of the Panama Railroad Steamship Company, acquired from the French with other assets of the old canal. This line, though favored in the transportation of Government supplies, has incurred heavy deficits in some years when private-owned competing lines earned reasonable dividends. It is an unfortunate precedent; the experience of the United States in ocean trade with the one line which it controls is not encouraging.

The great, unmistakable lesson of this war to the American people is that an adequate merchant marine can no more be improvised in an emergency than can an adequate fighting navy. The heavy cost of our lack of American ships will be borne throughout the war, not by the maritime States, but by the cotton-growing States of the South and the wheat and the grain-growing States of the Middle West, many of whose public men and public journals have for half a century shown themselves indifferent or hostile to every effort to create an American ocean shipping.

It was these influences, from the interior of the country, that defeated the earnest efforts of

President Roosevelt and of President Taft to secure national aid for the establishment of steamship lines to South America and across the Pacific Ocean. Both Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. Taft pointed out that the inland States needed a merchant shipping even more than the seaboard States. But inland statesmen caused the defeat of the shipping bill by narrow majorities in the House of Representatives. Their own people, their own agricultural constituents, are now paying the penalty, and, in spite of all efforts to prevent it, that penalty will have been a heavy one before this war is ended.

More than a century ago, President George Washington and Thomas Jefferson, his Secretary of State, warned their countrymen in a joint communication to Congress that dependence upon foreign nations as our sea carriers was a costly blunder, for aside from the disastrous effects upon our ship-building and seamanship which these two great Americans vividly pictured, "our products, carried in foreign bottoms, would be saddled with war freights and insurance in time of war."

Congress listened, and passed one after another laws that brought the American tonnage registered for overseas commerce up from 123,000 in 1789 to 667,000 in 1800 and to 981,000 in 1810. At the beginning of this period, American ships were carrying 23 per cent. of this country's imports and exports; and at the end of the period, they were carrying 91 per cent.

Many of the admonitions of the founders of the republic have been remembered, with profit, by subsequent generations; this, quoted above, has been forgotten. Another great world-war, as vast and terrible as the Napoleonic struggle, has found the United States as unprepared and helpless to safeguard its overseas trade as it was in the first administration of Washington. That this is so is going to prove the shame and the loss of the American people.

There are people, — thousands and tens of thousands of them, — on the continent of Europe who will go hungry in the autumn and the winter, if the war continues, because of the lack of American carriers for our abundant foodstuffs. The warring soldiers have left the harvests standing in the fields. The havoc of march and battle over these fields will be tremendous. There will be a grave shortage of food this year in Europe. Great Britain may manage to provide ships to

bring supplies for her own people, but she cannot do much more. An American merchant marine of unquestioned nationality, — not a merchant marine of suddenly "whitewashed" ships, —

would now be a boon to the world, — to the people whom its safe neutral carriage could succor, as well as to the people whose products it would deliver and whose flag it would fly.

A CHANCE FOR AMERICAN SHIPPING

BY SYLVESTER THOMPSON

MANY Americans have found one pious hope in the present European struggle: that it might stimulate the long deferred building of an American merchant marine. Apparently American enterprise has here a fairer opportunity than millions spent in subsidies could provide. The great carrying nations no longer sweep the seas. There are just about as many cargoes, however, to be carried; why should we not carry them? — carry them not only for the few months the war will probably last, but for all time? The United States apparently occupies the position of a commercial house whose chief rivals have suffered reverses that amount to a practical suspension; ordinary business sense would spur us to take over their business. Not only our business enterprise, but our position as a shipping country, should lead us to do this. The American who first glances at the figures of the world's shipping has something of a shocked surprise. He has heard so much about America's decline on the sea — about the possibility of sailing around the world and never seeing the American flag at a masthead — that he naturally regards himself as belonging to a nation of landlubbers. In fact we are the second largest shipping nation in the world: England ranks first, and Germany makes not a particularly respectable third. The actual figures are 16,541,000 tons for England, 7,886,000 for the United States and 4,593,000 for Germany. But the disturbing fact about our large shipping industry is that it limits practically all its activities to the Great Lakes and our two great coast lines. Nearly all English and German shipping goes over seas; nearly all of ours stays at home. Our shipping, therefore, helps us out little in the present crisis. Possibly a few of these lake and coast vessels might be transferred temporarily to the transatlantic lanes; for the most part, however, they have plenty of employment in their accustomed waters. Shipping them to the high seas would cause a complete

disorganization of coast and lake commerce; demoralize it as completely as the present ocean traffic is demoralized.

American maritime history discloses a series of ups and downs; accidental causes at times have built up our mercantile marine, at other times have destroyed it. We were not much of a seafaring people in colonial times; the policy of Britain always aimed at keeping this valuable business in the hands of Englishmen. But national independence swept aside all these antiquated navigation laws. The year 1790 saw the young United States with practically no mercantile marine; Englishmen were then our carriers, just the same as they are now. The first year of the century witnessed a change; we were then carrying 80 per cent. of our own products in American bottoms. By 1810 we were carrying 90 per cent.; a few years afterward we were carrying not only our own, but a considerable part of the world's. And then followed one of the most splendid periods in American commercial history. As a maritime nation America led the world; we held the position as a carrier that England does now.

What had caused the sudden rise of America as a great maritime power? This question has the utmost interest in view of the present situation. For the conditions that faced Europe in the early part of the nineteenth century strongly resemble those which face it now. It was the era of the Napoleonic wars. These struggles had one effect, practically identical with that we are witnessing to-day — the utter demoralization of European commerce. England and France were constantly preying upon each other's mercantile marine, the result being that the ships of both nations no longer felt secure upon the high seas. Both, as great maritime people, suffered a tremendous decline. Herein was America's opportunity, and splendidly she seized it. As a consequence — and here is another point that has a

present practical application — we retained this sea supremacy after the Napoleonic era closed. The years from 1830 until about 1855 represented the greatest glory of the American merchant marine. By the time the Civil War started, however, the decline had set in; by the time the war was ended, the greatness of our shipping, although the famous American clippers still sailed the seven seas, had disappeared. Authorities differ as to the cause of this change. A considerable number attribute it to the Civil War itself. The fact is, however, that our shipping had begun to decline several years before the Civil War. By 1855, as already said, its greatness was a matter of history. A new material found use in the construction of vessels — iron. When this substance supplanted wood in ship building the knell sounded for the American merchant marine. There was then practically no American iron or steel industry. England, on the other hand, had greatly developed its iron resources. There was only one way, in those days, in which we could still maintain a standing at sea: that was by purchasing the new fangled ships in Europe, mainly in England. But this the law forbade. No ship that was not constructed in the United States could fly the Stars and Stripes. However, this idea, and the many others used to explain the disappearance of American foreign shipping, are now purely academic. The one fact is that, although Americans have built up a large mercantile marine in their own waters, they have practically none on the high seas. We annually pay about \$200,000,000 to foreign nations for the transportation of our products.

It is not surprising, therefore, that many should see in the present European conflict a chance to regain our marine supremacy. We did this when Europe was convulsed with the Napoleonic struggle; why should we not repeat the performance now?

One or two considerations at once come to mind that apparently discourage such an enterprise. The Napoleonic wars, for example, lasted a long time — about fifteen years. This is long enough to permit pretty radical and permanent readjustments. It gives plenty of time for the creation of a mercantile marine, and for the establishment of new trade relations. The present large shipping interest of Germany is little more than a matter of twenty-five years; a generation

ago Germany had to go to England for her war-ships. No one believes, however, that the present conflagration will last fifteen years, or anywhere near that long; if it lasts fifteen months, most observers will be surprised. The creation of an independently constructed American marine fleet, therefore, is not likely. Before we could actually launch any new ships, the war would be ended. One fact, therefore, is at once apparent. The commerce of the world has got to use such shipping facilities as it now possesses. About 15,000 ships now furnish the world's marine transportation. These ships will contrive to do so throughout the war, and probably for some time afterward. They may change their flags or their ownership; if they are kept off the high seas, however, the business of mankind will largely stop and many millions of people will starve to death. One can imagine what would happen to the United States if all our railroads stopped running. That is precisely what is happening now, so far as maritime commerce is concerned. Forces are already at work to put an end to this paralysis; and these efforts must succeed.

An analysis of foreign shipping by nationality will simplify the situation. Take, for example, American exports last year, and the nations that carried them. We find that

60 per cent.	were shipped in British vessels
15 per cent.	were shipped in German vessels
9 per cent.	were shipped in American vessels
4 per cent.	were shipped in French vessels.

These figures bring out, as do all other similar statistics, the tremendous leadership of British foreign shipping. It not only surpasses that of any other country; it is greater than that of all the other countries combined. If the American people are going to carry most of their own commerce in this war they must get not only Great Britain's business but Great Britain's ships.

EVERYTHING DEPENDS ON SEA POWER

Before that happens, however, certain important preliminaries must be settled. From whatever point of view we survey this war, we invariably come back to the same point. It all hinges upon one thing: the control of the sea. With the English navy dominating the situation, England probably cannot lose. With the English navy

destroyed, England's surrender would come within a few weeks. And this question of sea supremacy has the most important bearing upon the question of the possible boom in American shipping. If England destroys or effectively bottles up the German fleet, there is no reason why she cannot resume the greater part of her shipping. Her vessels can carry nearly 60 per cent. of our commerce this year, as they did last. The only possible danger is an occasional capture by German cruisers. This danger is so slight, however, that it can be practically disregarded. England has nearly 10,000 vessels engaged in commerce. Where can Germany get any warships to prey upon this enormous fleet? She cannot detach them from her main squadrons. After all, the chief business of warships is to destroy the enemy, not to destroy its commerce. Every cruiser that is taken from the battle line will weaken a force already enormously outclassed.

Supposing there are a few German cruisers prowling the ocean, what will happen to them? England's fleet is so large that she can easily set aside a few warships to destroy them. If she does not do so, where are they to get their coal? Where are they to take their prizes, in case they capture them?

It is possible, again, that the English Government may press into the navy part of the merchant marine. But, with 10,000 ships, a good many can be used this way without materially decreasing its efficiency.

GERMANY'S SHIPPING OUR OPPORTUNITY

Most naval authorities believe that England and France will secure the command of the seas. At the present writing the indications are that the great German high seas fleet is bottled up. Again the English Government has assumed the insurance risk on British shipping. It practically says to the shipowner: "Go to sea with your cargo; if you lose it, the Government will reimburse you." These and other considerations apparently dispose of the idea that Americans can supersede England on the high seas as a result of this war.

If these predicted events come to pass, however, there still remains the question of German commerce. With the British fleet controlling the situation, Germany's mercantile marine, for all practical purposes, will cease to exist. Ger-

many carried 15 per cent. of our commerce last year, against England's 60 per cent. Small as this seems in comparison with her great rival, this still represents a prize well worth striving for. Herein unquestionably lies the real American opportunity. Under normal conditions the sudden wiping out of Germany's mercantile marine would mean one thing; that England would capture it. But, with a tremendous war on her hands, England is not expanding her industries in any direction. The war expenses have so strained her credit that she would have the utmost difficulty in financing any new shipping enterprises. The same statement applies to France, the only other nation that could possibly step into the breach. The opportunity, in all its aspects, therefore, seems made for the United States. Germany now has about 2,000 ships, most of them engaged in the foreign trade. The present likelihood is that most of these will stand useless at the docks during the war. They represent a very large investment; how large there are no available statistics to show. Their loss of earning power will sadly inconvenience their owners, especially if the war is continued for any period. The companies will be so badly crippled that it will take them a long time to recover, when peace returns. In many cases offers to purchase would find a ready response. The extent to which America profits from the promised stagnation in German shipping depends upon the extent to which our capitalists stand ready to purchase these vessels. Congress has already passed an emergency shipping measure. Foreign-built ships, old or new, are now entitled to American registry, provided they are owned by American citizens or by corporations with an American president and American managing directors. And the President of the United States has been empowered to suspend the legal requirements for American officers on American ships, and for the compliance, on the part of foreign-built American ships, with American regulations as to survey, inspection and measurement. There seems little likelihood that friendly nations, like England, will refuse to recognize such transfers as are contemplated, so long as they are actual and represent a permanent ownership. The Administration, in its zeal to do everything possible to improve the situation, has also asked for a maximum appropriation of \$30,000,000 to enable the

Government to purchase and operate foreign-built ships under the American flag. But this radical measure has met with strong opposition. If the present aspirations materialize, it would be the beginning of the long hoped for American mercantile fleet on the high seas. It is true that the removal of this prohibition on the purchase of American ships would take away only one disability that prevents our competing with Europe. The others are the higher cost of iron and steel and labor here and the higher cost of navigating.

The first disqualification is rapidly disappearing. If we can make steel rails and compete with England in all the markets of the world, we can do the same thing with plates for steel ships. We still pay our workmen higher wages, but we have the compensation of an increased efficiency. Only one difficulty still remains in the way of building up an American marine. Our sailors get about twice the pay of English sailors and demand a better maintenance. How that will affect the situation remains to be seen.

THE COMMISSARIAT—THE RED CROSS—THE HAGUE COURT

CARING FOR THE SOLDIER'S HEALTH

SOLDIERS who escape death on the battlefield in the great conflict now going on will have a far better chance of returning home alive than any soldiers ever had before. It must be remembered that in all previous wars the real enemy was not the one with gun in hand under the opposing flag, but disease, which mowed down troops on both sides impartially. It has taken the world a long time to grasp so obvious a fact, but the lesson has been thoroughly learned at last, and it has been applied in all civilized armies.

Sick soldiers of an earlier day received no attention whatever. If the wounded received any care it was from a comrade or from the women who followed in the wake of the army. Then the barber became the army surgeon, when there was any, to give way later to monks. Napoleon paid little or no attention to sick and wounded. In the Peninsular campaign about 60,000 French soldiers were killed in battle in Spain, and about 400,000 died of disease. In the Russian campaign of 1812, of 500,000 who crossed the Dnieper in June scarcely 20,000 returned in December. Bullets killed some, to be sure; the deadly cold claimed others; but the great majority perished of disease. The 1813 campaign after Leipzig was no less disastrous. Of an army of 100,000 that left Leipzig in October only a few fragmentary battalions followed the eagles across the Rhine in November. The total ruin of this army was due to sanitary neglect. Soldiers died of disease by thousands, scattered among the villages along the route from Germany, leaving pestilence in their wake.

In the Crimean campaign 230 out of each 1,000 British soldiers died annually of typhoid fever, dysentery, and other infectious diseases.

In the Franco-Prussian War in 1870-71, the annual death rate from disease among French troops was 140.8 per thousand; among the Germans, 24.5.

In the Boer War, lasting two years and eight

months, 5,774 British soldiers, in a force having an average strength of 208,326, were killed in battle, and 2,108 died of wounds, a total of 7,882, or about 14 per thousand a year. Disease claimed 14,210, or 25.58 per thousand a year, which was almost double the number slain by Boer bullets. The total death rate was 39 per thousand a year, and the total wastage, including invalided, missing, and prisoners, amounted to 40 per cent. of the total strength of the army annually. Nearly 3 per cent. of the total strength was constantly sick.

In the Russian-Japanese War, which lasted twenty months, the number of Japanese alone in killed and death from wounds, averaged 54 per thousand a year. Disease claimed 27,142, or 25 per thousand a year, a showing no better than that made by the Germans in the Franco-Prussian war.

The foregoing figures serve to give an idea of the magnitude, as well as of the character, of the task confronting the medical staff of the modern army. All the world seems to have realized after the Russian-Japanese War the absolute necessity of caring for the health of troops in the field. Soldiers are no longer regarded merely as "food for cannon," but as valuable property belonging to the State, which it is good business policy to care for with at least as much pains as are bestowed on other war material.

In the last ten years the medical staff of every army has been completely reorganized and brought up to date. In every language elaborate treatises have been written on the proper methods for preserving the health of troops and for taking care of the wounded with a view to returning them to the ranks as soon as possible. Text books containing "problems" are prepared for the young military surgeon who aspires to promotion, so that he may become skilled in the art of providing for large numbers of wounded under various difficult conditions, on paper at least. The most minute studies have been made of every detail in the daily life of the soldier in barracks, on the

march, in battle, and after he has been wounded.

The first department of the army with which the prospective soldier comes in contact is the medical staff, which examines all applicants for enlistment and decides whether they shall be accepted or rejected. In England, the only country now at war in which military service is voluntary, the physical examination is rigid and the percentage of rejections is high. Even in those countries in which military service is compulsory and universal the unfit are excluded from the ranks. The volunteer, or the unwilling youth who reports for his compulsory tour of military duty, who is accepted as a recruit is never thereafter free from the watchful care of the medical department until he is discharged or dies and is buried under the direction of that department.

The medical staff prescribes, or at least modifies, the exercises and setting-up drill for the raw recruit to make sure that he is not overworked; for in Europe the young recruit is likely to have been underfed. The medical department makes a point of feeding up these weaklings while it begins their physical education. Hygiene is now all-important in the military world, for the fact is recognized that it is much cheaper to keep the soldier well than to cure him after he becomes ill. Besides, the commander wants a fighting force, not a hospital population.

Thanks to vaccination, typhoid fever is becoming a negligible element in the military organization. The United States Army leads the world in the extent to which this preventive is used, and France is foremost in this regard among European nations. Owing to the great numbers in continental armies, typhoid vaccination is proportionately less used than in this country; but American military surgeons predict that if the war is prolonged all the troops will be inoculated against their deadliest foe. Vaccination against smallpox is practically universal. Besides these there are numerous infectious diseases for which vaccine therapy has, as yet, provided no remedy; and these cause the army medical officer no end of trouble. Soldiers seem prone to mumps, measles, and kindred ailments, which run through a camp or a garrison as through a boarding school.

The medical staff is consulted about the soldier's clothing, and especially about his shoes; for if these are not properly made he becomes footsore on the march. England, like the United

States, provides socks for her soldiers; but troops on the Continent, if they want such luxuries, must buy them themselves. Germany, by unanimous consent, is conceded to provide worse boots for her troops than any other nation, though improved footwear has recently been adopted.

Extraordinary care has been bestowed upon the soldier's ration. Since the work men and steam engines can do depends upon the amount and quality of fuel fed to them, the Continental soldier is nourished as carefully as a locomotive is stoked by an expert fireman. The army medical staff of each nation has made exhaustive experimental studies in order to arrive at the proper quantity of food required by the average individual to do the average day's work for a soldier. This amount is measured in calories, which is the standard heat unit used by physicists, a calorie being the amount of heat required to raise the temperature of a kilogram of water from zero to one degree Centigrade.

The Russian soldier either requires more food than other men, or else he is blessed with a more liberal government, for his daily field ration amounts to 4,929 calories. The French soldier is the next best fed, his daily field service ration providing him 3,340 calories. England ranks third with a field ration of 3,292 calories, and the Dual Alliance is at the bottom of the list, the German ration being 3,147 calories, and the Austrian only 2,620 calories, or but little more than half the Russian ration. From the military surgeon's point of view this inferiority in rations bodes no good to the Dual Alliance.

The British ration is not much different from that of the American soldier, consisting of a pound of bread and three quarters of a pound of fresh meat with bone, or seventeen ounces of preserved meat when in camp or abroad. In addition to these staples, he is allowed a messing allowance of twelve cents a day with which to purchase vegetables and the like. For service in the field, the French and Germans use to some extent tinned meats put up with vegetables and consomme. In some of their African campaigns the Germans found that contractors, with a view to economy, had filled the tins chiefly with water; so now the Government puts up its own tinned meats for army use.

Food may contain proteins and carbohydrates in the proper proportions and be in good condition

yet so unappetizing as to cause aversion, or even loathing; so the army medical officer must see that the troops have the proper condiments to season their food and that it is well cooked. For this purpose they visit the men at meal time. Only last year the sanitary chief of the French army reported that the food of the soldier had been most carefully considered and regulated with proper regard to obtaining the highest efficiency from the individual fed on a scientific diet. Since 1905, when the doctors recommended a better cooked and more varied diet, a system of instruction in cookery had been introduced in the army with gratifying results. One of the results is a death rate in time of peace of only 3.75 per thousand as compared with a fraction more than 20 for the nation, and 8 per thousand for the civilian population between the ages of 20 and 22.

The motor omnibuses, familiar to visitors to Paris, are now being used, with wire screens replacing the windows, to convey fresh meat to the French troops in the field. One of these vehicles can haul a load of two and a half tons of frozen beef imported from Argentina, or fresh killed beef from the herd, about forty miles back from the front.

To wash down his carefully measured dose of proteins and carbohydrates the English soldier is allowed twenty-two hundredths of an ounce of tea daily. On the Continent the average soldier prefers coffee. The French soldier is provided with a coffee mill; but the Germans, at least in some of their African campaigns, had to use the butts of their rifles, which proved to be a very poor substitute for a coffee mill.

From the military surgeon's point of view, water is even more important to the soldier than food. The classic example illustrating the consequences of a hard march without water is Napier's description of the march after Sauroren, when "many fell and died convulsed and frothing at the mouth, while others whose spirit and strength had never before been quelled leant on their muskets and muttered in sullen tones that they yielded for the first time."

It is an axiom among mountain climbers that "the more you drink the farther you go." The soldier is not allowed to drink whenever he pleases. On the contrary the medical staff insists that water discipline is as essential as firing discipline. They say a man is not allowed to expend a single

round of ammunition without authority, and that he should not be allowed a drop of water without specific permission while on the march. Indeed, in some native regiments in India, the water bottle is carried so its owner cannot reach it while marching. He can get a drink only when halted for that purpose.

The time for drinking and the quantity to be allowed have been carefully calculated on a scientific basis. It has been found that the evaporation of two grams of water abstracts one calorie from the body and that the average expenditure of energy per man in marching is 90 calories per mile, which is equivalent to the evaporation of 180 grams of water. In six miles the evaporation amounts to one litre, or $1\frac{3}{4}$ pints, or, say, one-fortieth of the water in the body, which is about as much as should be lost without replacing, if full vigor is to be maintained. But as it takes a march of about three fourths of a mile to raise the temperature to the evaporating point, the military surgeon calculates that the men should be halted after marching the first seven miles, when they should be allowed the contents of their water bottles, which hold one litre. After that they should be allowed one litre every six miles. In the German Army during manœuvres mounted officers, or orderlies on bicycles are sent ahead of a marching column to warn the inhabitants of villages to turn out and have water ready on both sides of the road for the troops. If possible a short halt is made while the men refresh themselves; if time presses they must snatch a drink as they pass and if they can manage it, they also fill their water bottles.

The medical staff is keenly interested in the equipment the soldier carries and the manner of its adjustment; for every pound added to his load means the expenditure of energy at the rate of 4.5 small calories a minute, and an awkwardly placed load may interfere with his breathing, or do some other mischief.

Foreign writers pay the American army the compliment of saying that it has the best selected and best managed equipment in the world. Something appears to be wrong with all other equipment and the way it is carried, according to medical writers on the subject.

Here is what every soldier must carry about with him all the time while in the field; a rifle, weighing about 9 pounds, with bayonet, cleaning

materials for keeping his gun in order, ammunition, and an entrenching tool; his clothing, including coat, trousers, puttees, boots, neckcloth, handkerchief, a change of underwear, identification disk, and first-aid dressing; food, including one reserve or emergency ration, or, in the case of the Germans and Austrians, two reserve rations, and in the case of the Russians two and a half; water bottle, mess tin, knife, fork and spoon, though the Russians carry merely a wooden spoon stuck in the boot in lieu of these refinements; accoutrements, including knapsack, belt, and braces; a great coat, and half a shelter tent, 4 x 6 feet which, upon being buttoned or hooked to another half carried by another man, forms a shelter for the two; personal necessities, including toilet articles and spare linen. In the case of the British soldier this totals 47 pounds; in the case of the Germans, 38 pounds, and the French, 44 pounds. These lighter weights are due to the fact that the French and Germans carry fewer rounds of ammunition than the British soldier, who never has less than 150 rounds. The Russian soldier has the heaviest load of all to carry, 61 pounds; or, when he sets out with four days' rations and extra ammunition, 72 pounds.

The medical department also prescribes rules for the sanitation of the camp, disposal of waste material, and sees that public as well as personal cleanliness is enforced.

Though it finds its sphere of greatest usefulness in maintaining the troops at the maximum of physical efficiency, thereby contributing directly to their fighting effectiveness, the medical department has a second important function, and that is to relieve the field force of the incubance of sick and wounded. In this work the authority of the medical director, or chief surgeon, is supreme. In time of peace the medical department has constantly under its care from 3 to 4 per cent. of the entire force; in war, more than twice this proportion. The department must provide everything required for the well-being of the men, their medical and surgical treatment, food, clothing, and transportation, from the time they fall out of the ranks till they return.

Every soldier carries, in a sealed tin box, a first-aid packet, consisting of a bandage, gauze, and adhesive plaster. If the wound is but slight and in an accessible place the soldier may apply

the dressing himself; if more severe, a comrade may apply it for him. The importance of this first-aid may be better understood when it is said that infection is the most frequent cause of death from wounds not immediately fatal. This first-aid serves the double purpose of preventing infection to a large extent and of checking hemorrhage, which ranks third in causes of death from wounds, shock being second. Military surgeons say that the great majority would recover from gun shot wounds if infection could be prevented. The fate of the wounded is in the hands of the man who applies first aid.

The wounded soldier, with or without first-aid dressing, passes back to the rear by way of dressing stations beside an ambulance in a spot that is more or less sheltered from hostile fire to the field hospital. As soon as he can stand transportation, he is passed on to the general hospital, and thence in due time to the convalescent camp to recuperate. A large proportion of the wounded require transportation by litter and ambulance to the field hospital, which is located as near the firing line as prudence will permit.

Though the medical staff of no two nations is identical, it may be said, in a general way, that equipment is provided on the theory that if the number engaged is 18,000, 20 per cent., or 3,600 will be dead on the field; 8 per cent., or 1,440, will be so severely wounded that it will be inadvisable to move them; 40 per cent., or 7,200, will be able to walk, one half of them to the station for the slightly wounded at the rear, the rest to the dressing station, and 32 per cent. will require transportation. In recent wars the mortality among the wounded collected and transported to the rear has averaged from 3 to 6 per cent. In the Manchurian campaign one third of the wounded Japanese returned to the ranks within a month.

In deciding on his arrangements for a battle, the chief surgeon bears in mind that the wounded will be distributed in "zones of losses." The usual proportion of wounded is 20 per cent. up to 1,000 yards range; from 1,000 to 400 yards range, 60 per cent; in the final rush 10 per cent; in pursuit, 10 per cent. The field hospital is not pitched till the tactical situation develops and the point where the main attack is to be made is known. Then a site is chosen beyond range of the enemy's fire, accessible to front and rear by road, yet off

the route of march of advancing troops, convenient to wood and water and, if possible, near buildings which may be used for the overflow of wounded, for, of course, casualties in battle are not limited by rule, and the facilities provided may be overwhelmed. Conditions on the battlefield are all unfavorable for clean surgical work, and it is often impossible to reach many of the wounded for hours. The results achieved by modern military surgeons under the difficulties inherent in their work seem little less than miraculous.

A pleasant fiction widely credited is that men have been studying for years to make war more humane — as if war could be humane! For example, one of these “humane” devices is the small bullet at high velocity. Stories are told of men who, after being shot through the chest or head with a modern bullet, about the diameter of an ordinary lead pencil, have walked long distances to the dressing station and have then recovered in a miraculously short time.

Military surgeons who have seen actual service tell a different tale. It is true that really slight wounds made by modern bullets heal more quickly and thoroughly than in former days. But severe wounds are no less severe and much more frequent.

The Germans use a steel-jacketed bullet with a core of lead hardened with antimony. The steel jacket frequently comes off in jagged fragments which horribly lacerate the flesh.

The French bullet, a mixture of copper and zinc, is not jacketed, but is longer and sharper than the German bullet. Bent by ricocheting, it often enters the body as a hook; sometimes it “tumbles” and enters broadside on, making a long, gaping wound. Up to a range of about eight hundred yards one horror is as bad as the other. These “humane” bullets have three general effects: up to a range of 500 yards they have an explosive effect, splintering the bone so thoroughly as to explain the frequent accusation that explosive bullets have been used; at ranges of 500 to 1,500 yards the effect is comminutive, grinding the bone to powder, and not infrequently carrying with it into the wound fragments of soiled clothing, thus causing gangrene. The third effect is contusive. A bullet fired into an empty metal vessel enters and leaves by a small hole. Fill the vessel with water, and the bullet will still enter by a small hole, but will make a large, jagged wound in leaving. The bullet has exactly

the same effect on the body or the head. In any case the bullet strikes a heavy blow as with a club.

Modern bullets are “humane” only when compared with the effects of shells, and it must be remembered that a far greater proportion of casualties are due to shells than ever before. In the Franco-Prussian War, shell wounds were 91 per thousand; in the Manchurian campaign the ratio had increased to 176 per thousand, and in the Balkan War of 1912 the proportion was 364 per thousand. The Russians in Manchuria called shrapnel “the devil’s watering-pots.” When they burst they scatter hundreds of round bullets as well as fragments of the shell itself. They are most deadly within a radius of ten to thirty yards, but even at a hundred yards the “dewdrops” are lively enough to penetrate six inches of pine. The common shell is still more terrible. The fragments, heated to a very high temperature by the explosion, burn the flesh so as to compel cries of agony that only morphine can quiet. The large shells of the navy not only cut like razors, but asphyxiate, amputate portions of the body, and crush. Altogether, the experienced military surgeon is not unduly impressed with the “humane” aspects of war.

The last service rendered to the soldier by the medical department is to see that he is promptly buried after the battle; for as he has now become rubbish, or waste matter, his disposal is properly a part of the sanitary work of the medical staff. The widow and orphans, waiting at home until anxiety deepens into dread, and dread into despair, may be able to form some estimate of the reverent care with which this last rite is performed for their loved one, “humanely” killed by modern methods, when they know that the chief surgeon, according to the standard authors, counts on a burial squad of five hundred men disposing of 140 bodies an hour, after the bodies have been collected.

Of the many disastrous absurdities for which war is responsible, this matter of caring for the soldier’s health furnishes its full share. Think of it: the soldier is trained and nourished like a race-horse, that he may be raised to the highest pitch of efficiency — before being exposed to annihilation; while the enemy’s soldier is first torn into pieces by our guns, and then carefully patched together again by our surgeons. And man is said to be a reasoning animal.

THE RED CROSS

BY ARNO DOSCH

THE women of many nations wearing the Red Cross are following the armies on to the battlefields. The work of the Red Cross is more rapid and effective than ever before. Hospital corps have trailed ammunition wagons and the wounded have often been moved to field hospitals before the first numbness of injury has given way to pain. This is modern warfare, as unbelievably humanitarian as it is barbarous.

Every European nation in the war has an efficient Red Cross of its own. In every one the Red Cross has a somewhat different standing. In Russia it stands higher than anywhere else. It is given great freedom and deserves it. At the same time it is more of a state affair than anywhere in Europe. It is supported by special taxes and is given unusual privileges at all times. The nurses of the Red Cross form a sisterhood. They are, in a measure, consecrated to the cause. The Russians have come to a better understanding of the usefulness of women nurses on the battlefield than have the people of any other nation.

At the outbreak of the Spanish War, the Russian Red Cross, which was at the time almost the only effectively organized Red Cross in the world, offered its services to both the United States and Spain. The United States declined, but Spain accepted. The United States might have done better to accept. Lack of a modern Red Cross was responsible for much suffering and loss of life in Cuba and Porto Rico. Tampa and Chickamauga might have had other stories to tell if the Russian Red Cross had been there to help. Now of course, such conditions would be impossible. Our own Red Cross has learned how to handle the situation.

The Russians divide the field work of the Red Cross into five divisions: Handling supply depots; taking the injured back from the firing line, which means an emergency transportation system; assistance to the regular surgeons; direct relief on the battlefield; and caring for the feeding stations in the rear of the army. In war time the Russian Red Cross does more than the Red Cross of any other nation. Russia began developing the Red Cross in the Crimean War. When the Russian-

Japanese War came on, the "white trains" given by wealthy nobles were particularly conspicuous. Altogether, the Red Cross took to the front 3,000 carloads of material and food. The nurses were as efficient at the front as the organization was in forwarding supplies. At the fall of Port Arthur all stray ends of that ugly business were left to them. The Red Cross really did the evacuating. When Mukden was evacuated there were many hundreds of wounded whom it was impossible to move. Surgeons and nurses remained behind with them and were given every courtesy by the conquering Japanese.

The Japanese themselves developed the Red Cross into the best possible field force in a very short time. Taking advantage of the patriotism, the women of all Japan were organized. The nurses and cooks formed one body and went to the front. Another body developed lunch and refreshment rooms, and women everywhere made bandages and helped prepare field outfits. Now the Red Cross operates hospitals throughout Japan, and one out of every forty persons in the empire belongs to the Red Cross organization.

In contrast to Russia's attitude is Germany's limitation on all volunteer nursing. It is contrary to the German character to leave matters of that kind to any chance. It is all worked out methodically by the army medical corps, and the volunteers are held in check. They are used to help expand the regular forces, but they have no such independence of action as they enjoy in Russia.

The French Red Cross has more of the liberties of the Russian. It is a question of national temperament. The French in their nursing make up for lack of drill by the enthusiasm with which they enter into the work. The volunteer French Red Cross is composed, as in the United States, of the best trained nurses in France. They have no experience in that particular service, but they understand nursing and sanitation. They are organized according to army divisions and do better work perhaps because of their freedom from red tape.

The Italian Red Cross is admittedly the best organized for war, and here again its effectiveness

is due to the lack of restraint. The Austrian Red Cross has also been giving a good account of itself for several years. Its organization is much like the Italian.

Almost every nation was represented in the Red Cross in the Balkans, but the absence of Red Cross organizations in the Balkan states themselves brought about in the first battles suffering to which only the battlefields of the Middle Ages could offer comparison. Stories that came to the outside world from the few nurses present roused the world and made the later battles less awful. The graphic account of twenty-four hours at an operating table in the rear of the Servian army, as told by the Countess Maggiolini, did more for humanitarianism in the Balkan wars than any other single influence.

The Red Cross will probably be even more conspicuous in this war than in any previous one. Where lines are so tightly drawn and the fighting is frequently in a comparatively small area, the crossing of lines and the invasion by hospital corps of hostile territory bring up fine points. It is a question how far the Red Cross may go toward relieving the suffering of the noncombatants without interfering with the brutal purpose of war. There will be charges of violation of the Red Cross, and the extent to which the Red Cross will be permitted to go will depend largely upon the humanitarianism of the individual commanders. Despite its many other activities the Red Cross is always associated with the battlefield. There it has certain coveted rights in the name of humanity, and it never yields any. If anything, it is inclined to stretch them. At its conventions war is always foremost, as there is a perennial discussion as to its rights. Part of the purpose of war is to lay waste the invaded country and make its inhabitants suffer want. The Red Cross stands for the alleviation of suffering wherever found. These two cross purposes constantly clash, and the needs of war generally win. The Red Cross can go no further than it is permitted. It can be only just so bold before it is interfered with.

Besides trying to define and enlarge its rights on the battlefields, the Red Cross conventions bring out new inventions for giving better service. The Dowager Empress of Russia contributed a fund of about \$50,000 to stimulate the inventive ability. The first prize is of 6,000 rubles, about

\$3,000, the second of 3,000 rubles, and the third 1,000 rubles. These prizes, known as the Marie Feodorovna prizes, have been won for the invention of a considerable list of handy contrivances — from stretchers which can be changed to meet almost any condition, to handy kits for the uses of nurses in war. They have been awarded for practical things, and the work of the Red Cross in the present war, as well as the work of the medical corps, will be greatly facilitated by the fact that those prizes were given.

When the Geneva Convention was held in 1864 the world had been sickened with the smell of blood. The horrors of war were uppermost in the minds of people. It was possible to gain a wide appeal for the movement. But it was found out before long that work of the Red Cross was not always to the best interests of a conquering army, and this, added to the poor handling of the Red Cross, caused a reaction. In England's various campaigns, particularly in Egypt, the Red Cross met almost violent opposition from the English army officers. It was not until army officers discovered in the Spanish War that the Red Cross could be effectively used for repairing broken men that it began to gain in standing.

From the devoted labors of scattered volunteer nurses, typified and ennobled in Clara Barton and Florence Nightingale, the immediate care of the wounded has become a part of the modern fighting machine. It was found in the last war in the Balkans that it paid as a mere matter of repairing the injured men. Unless a man was mortally wounded or required a capital operation, he was usually back in the ranks fighting in two weeks. The Red Cross had become a repair shop.

Efficiency has come in the Red Cross, as a matter of fact, only with the passing of the compassionate women like Clara Barton. She was frequently alone on battlefields in the Civil War where hundreds lay wounded. She was nothing short of the "angel of the battlefield." The same was true of Florence Nightingale in the Crimea. Those two women made names for themselves that will outlast war. But the movement languished. The American Association of the Red Cross, of which Clara Barton was president for twenty-two years, consisted chiefly of a dozen women. The American National Red Cross of to-day, incorporated in 1905, after Clara Barton's death, has 3,500 trained nurses, all with three

years' hospital training, ready to mobilize as rapidly as the army.

If the United States were to go to war the volunteer organization of the Red Cross would in fact be mobilized with the army. This was made possible by an Act of Congress two years ago authorizing the spending of the money. Much the same thing happened when the European armies mobilized. Not only the highly developed hospital corps were immediately behind the artillery, but the Red Cross came in behind as medical reserve fully as well equipped. In most of the armies, in fact, every soldier has had an emergency kit the existence of which was due to the Red Cross movement.

The Red Cross has become what it is in this country to-day largely on account of the unnecessary sickness at Chickamauga during the Spanish War. The modern sanitation campaign carried on since by army surgeons, for that matter, also had its rise in the Spanish War. The cleaning up of Havana led to the sanitation of the Canal Zone. The English learned their lesson in South Africa, although the peculiar unhealthfulness of much of India had already forced some measures of care. Both the Japanese and Russian armies were followed in the Russian-Japanese War by very good Red Cross corps. They worked together sometimes, in sorting the wounded, and, through the French Red Cross, which was also very active in Manchuria, the names of the dead were listed to be sent back to friends and families. The French Red Cross served as a news agency.

Although the International Red Cross was organized at Geneva in 1864, it is only during the past fifteen years that it has become of great importance. This was almost simultaneous with the discovery in poverty of the man who was responsible for it. Jean Henri Dunant, the Swiss author, the founder of the Red Cross, who stirred Europe with the horrors of war and brought about the international convention at Geneva, was found in an old man's home in Switzerland, in 1897. It was at this time that the Spanish War showed how the development of the Red Cross had been neglected and Dunant began to assume the position he deserved in the world. Four years later, the Nobel Peace prize, given for the first time, went to him and to Frederick Passy. His share of that was 104,000 francs, about \$20,000, which, with a small pension from the

Dowager Empress of Russia, served him until he died in 1910.

He, with his horrible description of Solferino, and Florence Nightingale and Clara Barton, with their vivid experiences, launched the international Red Cross with much more to go on than it took advantage of for many years. Clara Barton even foreshadowed the industrial activities of the American Red Cross by helping organize workshops in Paris and Strassburg to save the women left destitute by the Franco-Prussian War.

The report of the Sanitary Commission of the Civil War, which raised by voluntary subscription \$500,000, was largely responsible for the shaping of the original Red Cross emblem. The Sanitary Commission used a Greek cross surrounded by an oval band. But the red cross has long become standard throughout the world except where the red crescent is used.

Attempts have been made to protect the insignia from indiscriminate use. It is frequently abused in war for scouting purposes and non-combatants adopt it as a shield. There is nothing to prevent it. Even at catastrophes where the red cross serves merely as a convenience in facilitating progress it is usually abused. At the San Francisco fire after three days every automobile displayed the red cross and it came to mean nothing at all. As a result, those who were entitled to use the red cross changed suddenly to the use of a piece of red flannel, and the red cross insignia was not honored.

The slowness of the Red Cross movement to get under way, in fact, was due to the misuse of it. In the Franco-Prussian war it fell into disrepute. Ignorance of the rules laid down by the Geneva Convention was largely responsible. Though it had been carefully laid out just how far the Red Cross could go without being looked upon as succoring the enemy, the volunteer field workers paid no attention. There were also jealousies between the various Red Cross organizations. The Red Cross got such a bad name among military men in that one war that volunteer nursing was discouraged up to the time of the Spanish War.

There is hardly any chance that there will be any accidental complications of this kind in the present war. The Red Cross may be deliberately used to get information or to advance supplies, but the volunteer organizations are so completely

in hand now that they act under the orders of the military surgeons. The Red Cross is to the armies of the world now what the volunteers are to the regular army. It is officered by army surgeons and becomes a part of the army sanitary body.

A dispatch dated Washington, August 6th, said: "Committees of the American National Red Cross to-day were at work on plans to rush aid to the sick and wounded in the European war. Surgeon-General William C. Braisted and a party went in search of a ship to carry doctors, nurses and hospital supplies across the Atlantic, and others were receiving and disbursing funds for supplies.

"The ship will be painted white with a red cross on the funnels, and will sail under the Red Cross flag. She will also be under the treaties of Geneva and The Hague, and will be able to enter any harbor."

The American Red Cross has played a leading part in alleviating the suffering caused by every kind of catastrophe, except war, during the last ten years. Even in war it has done its part,

especially in Turkey, feeding and clothing the noncombatants when the Bulgarians made their spectacular dash at Constantinople. From the plague in Manchuria to the Triangle Building fire in New York, the American Red Cross met the emergency. But when it came to general European warfare, every army had worked out a complete Red Cross system.

The American Red Cross did not jump directly into the field in Europe because there was no place for it. It would not fit in. It could be useful only as an organization handling and forwarding supplies. But once the armies are disorganized or the initial organization is broken up by defeat, the American Red Cross, or any body of foreign nurses, could do as good work as the nurses of the country.

At present, however, the Red Cross societies of the warring nations, with the same sympathy and heroism that prompted Florence Nightingale and Clara Barton, and with modern organization and effectiveness, are caring for the sick and wounded on the stricken fields of Europe.

THE WORLD'S COURT OF ARBITRATION AT THE HAGUE

AUSTRIA'S dispute with Serbia was a judicable one, a question quite within the proper jurisdiction of The Hague Arbitration Tribunal. The general Continental war, however, has not come about over a dispute, but because of a state of mind. Although this is not the sort of discussion that could be referred to a court of arbitration, nevertheless, in the final settlement of every war, the tribunal at The Hague is so constituted that its services may be enormously valuable in bringing about peace. A little about this permanent court of arbitration at the Dutch capital is, therefore, of permanent and legitimate interest in connection with the European war of 1914.

Early in the year 1899, Czar Nicholas of Russia suggested a European conference, with the object of "a possible reduction of the excessive armaments which weigh upon all nations," to be effected by "putting a limit to the progressive development of the present armaments." It was not found practicable at the conference, which followed in July of that year, nor at the second one

in 1907, to achieve anything permanent in this direction. Nevertheless, under an act of July 29, 1899, signed and subsequently ratified by twenty-four nations, a Permanent Court of Arbitration for the Settlement of International Disputes was set up at The Hague. Thus the conference of 1899 established a permanent judicial system to be called into action whenever two or more states desired to have a dispute settled.

The second conference, June 1907, took in a number of new Powers. The court is competent, so the agreement says, for all arbitration cases, "unless the parties agree to constitute a special tribunal." When any of the powers who have agreed to the arbitration system wish to enlist the services of the court, the arbitrators called upon must be chosen from the permanent members of the court. This permanent court consists of persons "of known competency on questions of international law." Four, at the most, are selected by the signatory powers, and each appointment is for six years and may be renewed.

The first convention provided for the offer of

good offices and mediation, the establishment of a permanent court with an international office at The Hague, and the right of inquiry by commissions into disputed matters of fact. One of these conventions of inquiry did very excellent service to the world in 1904, during the Russo-Japanese war, when the Russian Baltic Fleet opened fire by mistake on some British fishing boats. The second conference, in 1907, discussed many of the problems and customs of war, including the application to naval warfare of the principles of the Geneva conference. At the second conference the newcomers included the

Republics of South and Central America and the Empire of Japan.

The membership of the court consists of representatives from the United States of America, Argentine Republic, Austria-Hungary, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, China, Columbia, Cuba, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, France, German Empire, Great Britain, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Italy, Japan, Luxemburg, Mexico, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Norway, Panama, Persia, Peru, Portugal, Roumania, Russia, Salvador, Servia, Siam, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Uruguay and Venezuela.

THE ONLOOKING WORLD

THE LAST OF THE WAR CORRESPONDENT

THE degradation, nay, the elimination of the war correspondent is the subject of a vividly written article in the *Contemporary Review*, by Francis McCullagh, well known all over the world as a member of that now disappearing profession. Present events verify Mr. McCullagh's prediction that correspondents may be allowed to write under a severe censorship from the capitals of the warring nations, "but the front they will never see again."

In Mr. McCullagh's opinion this changed state of affairs is due partly to the invention of the telegraph and other improvements in the means of communication, but primarily to the modern craze for sensation. Forbes, Kinglake, and MacGahan wrote articles which could be republished with very little alteration as serious history. To-day, however, the demand is for "flaring sensationalism which is worthless for historical purposes."

The public demand this sensationalism and enjoy the thrill which it gives them, but despise in their heart the people who provide the thrill, and when, in future wars, the thrillers are banished to a more quiet place hundreds of miles from the firing line, the public will say, "serves them right!"

Primarily, of course, says Mr. McCullagh, the public themselves are to blame.

A journalist sees a battle for a quarter of an hour, talks to a few officers, fugitives, military *attachés*, wounded people and then makes off in his motor car to cable four lines of fact and four columns of *cliches* and padding. The padding consists of descriptions of cavalry charges which never took place. It tells how the enemy's guns got the range "with miraculous accuracy," how "our" batteries were silenced by those of the enemy. It presents us with all the stock pictures of brave men, their back to the wall, grim, silent, uncomplaining; men who show the world the way to die. Rivers run with blood. Soldiers on either side throw away their arms and jump at each other's throats with naked hands. Desperate cavalymen, with the cry of "Allah-il-Allah" on their lips, charge thin brown lines of infantry. Wounded Turks stagger homeward followed by huge, sagacious vultures, which seem to have shrewdly calculated the moment at which the quarry will collapse. For eighty miles and a half "Our Own Correspondent" travels over roads littered with corpses, not ordinary, prosaic corpses, but corpses stiffened in every conceivable at-

titude of picturesque tragedy and theatrical despair. Some breathed out their souls to Allah while trying to assume the eastward position, and to pray with their faces turned toward Mecca. Some had evidently attempted to write with their own blood on the margin of a Turkish newspaper a last message to the dear ones at home. And so on, and so on. All the usual clap-trap is rammed in by the yard. The correspondent hates very often to indulge in this revel of mendacity (for it is nothing less), but the public want it. If he sends a true and restrained story, he finds it printed in small type on some obscure page, while the gory fantasies of some imaginative foreigner who "saw" the battle in the bar-room of some Sofia hotel stagger under a load of headlines next the "leader" column. If he afterward tries to set the public right, he will find that the public do not want to be set right. They will have forgotten all about the war, and have become interested in rag-time, Welsh Home Rule, or the Duke of Scrobia's divorce case. His voice will be drowned in cries of "professional jealousy," "an otherwise meritorious book marred by a disgraceful attack on a brother correspondent," etc.

His only alternative, then, is to send a thrilling story himself. All he really sees at the front are shells bursting at a distance of three or four miles, and, close at hand, a friendly battery which is firing these shells. He makes friend with the battery commandant, who is profane, pre-occupied, and quite ignorant of what is going on in other parts of the field. Besides, he does not speak any language with which the journalist is acquainted. In the night-time the battery suddenly moves backward, and he goes with it. The retreat is due to a flanking movement thirty miles off, but neither he nor the battery commandant knows anything of this.

When our correspondent reaches a safe place and begins to write his "story" his mind is very much disturbed by two or three things. In the first place his paper has, so far, spent more than a thousand pounds on him, though there were several amateurs who offered to pay their own expenses. In the second place, that fool Boffins is sure to exaggerate as usual. This last argument is of tremendous importance, but to appreciate it at its full value one must be a journalist. The result is that the old woman lying drunk by the roadside becomes transformed into a pile of gory corpses, six feet high. The story of the tipsy *attaché* goes down as if the correspondent had witnessed it himself, also the story told by the Greek widow, and a few columns of his own personal adventures, which had already befallen another correspondent (at least the other correspondent said so). The whole forms a thrilling tale with about one per cent. of truth in it. The sub-editor in Fleet Street indignantly knocks out the one per cent. of truth, expands the remainder to twice its length, and tacks on as part of the original a little gem of his own, a striking bit of descriptive stuff really paraphrased from a poem by Mrs. Hemans.

This writer accuses the average correspondent of bad faith. Many of them, he declares, have a "veritable cult of trickery and a total forgetfulness of all promises and all engagements whenever this forgetfulness gives them a chance of making what they themselves call a scoop." He cites instances of this bad faith and trickery, and then proceeds to point out how the photographer and the moving-picture man have become so objectionable to the armies of civilized nations that the correspondent will hereafter be banished. It is all again a matter of the popular craze for what is technically termed "hot stuff."

The military objection to war correspondents, beside that arising from that of their proneness to "give away to the enemy," is based on their enormous number. Forty years ago the war correspondents with an army might number half a dozen.

If a government prepares to declare war at present, it suddenly finds itself besieged by hundreds of correspondents, most of them knowing nothing about war, and some of them very shady characters indeed. In Tokio there were more than one hundred correspondents at the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese war. In Sofia there were about one hundred at the outbreak of the Balkan troubles. There were only forty in Constantinople, but with their cooks, grooms, interpreters and assistants, they were so numerous that a special train had to take to the front them and their provisions, photographic outfits, tents, stores, cooking appa-

ratus, horses, pack-animals, and fodder. The handling of such a large detachment of men necessitates the employment of special and highly educated officers. Now, in a life-and-death struggle no nation will ever consent to put up with such a loss of officers, of time, and of trains.

In the old style it is all over. But the press will be richer than ever, Mr. McCullagh believes, competition between newspapers will be keener than before.

The public will be more anxious for information from the front than any public ever was in the past, for the military precautions taken to prevent information leaking out will only whet the popular appetite for news. Newspapers will consequently send secret agents to every war, and those secret agents may possibly be able to send out far more news than the recognized correspondents are able to send out at present. Such men would have to be sent to a likely theatre of war before a conflict actually broke out. In fact, that practice is followed to some extent even now. I myself was sent to Port Arthur by an American paper six months before the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese war, and in Port Arthur I met with a secret agent of another paper. If, before the outbreak of the Balkan troubles, men had been despatched by Fleet Street, to Adrianople, Kirk Kilisse, and Lüle Burgas, they could either have left those places with the other refugees and brought to Constantinople a detailed account of the fighting, or else have sent on their news by messengers and remained behind to await developments. In a European war this would probably lead to some correspondents getting shot as spies, but there will always be journalists ready to face even that risk.

* THE SOCIALIST EXPLANATION

BY JOSHUA WANHOPE

WHEN, as the poet says, old Caspar's grand-children, playing in the sun, rolled something hard and round to that ancient peasant's feet, Caspar at once recognized it. "'Tis some poor fellow's skull," said he, "who fell in the great victory." But when the eager children wanted to know more about it, the poor old man was halted. "What they fought each for, I never could make out," he replied helplessly.

There is an enormous multitude of Caspars who don't know what the present war is about either. They will, however, die by millions for their ignorance. That is the age-long penalty. The wages of ignorance, for the workers, is death.

We Socialist working men and women must know "what it is all about." While we do not,


it will be impossible for us to stop war and keep our skulls on our shoulders.

This simple article proposes to give, only in rough outline, a fairly accurate summary of the war in Europe and "what it is all about."

THE "RACIAL CONFLICT" HUMBUG

You, reader, will be deluged with apparently learned articles in the capitalist press and magazines, informing you that it is all a matter of racial antagonisms; that people of different races cannot live quietly beside each other, and you will hear this trouble referred to innumerable times as a "great racial conflict," the final death grip of Slav and Teuton, with many other complications which will only confuse you, among them the utterly idiotic proposition that the assassina-

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PRIME MINISTER N. P. PASHITCH OF SERVIA
CHIEF OF STAFF GENERAL PUTNIK. (LEFT)



KING PETER OF SERVIA AND THE CROWN PRINCE



KAISER WILLIAM II OF GERMANY

"NO GREAT DECISION CAN ANY LONGER BE TAKEN WITHOUT GERMANY AND WITHOUT THE GERMAN EMPEROR"—EMPEROR WILLIAM'S SPEECH, JULY, 1900



THE "IRON CHANCELLOR" AND THE PRESENT GERMAN EMPEROR



GENERAL FIELD MARSHALL COLMAR BARON VON DER GOLTZ
GERMANY'S GREATEST WAR AUTHORITY, NOW MILITARY GOVERNOR OF BELGIUM



SEA LORD AND CHANCELLOR
ADMIRAL VON TIRPITZ (LEFT), AND DR VON BETHMANN-
HOLLWEG (ABOVE), IMPERIAL CHANCELLOR



GENERAL VON MOLTKE, CHIEF OF STAFF
A NEPHEW OF THE FAMOUS VON MOLTKE IN COMMAND IN 1870-71



MINISTER OF WAR, GEN-
ERAL VON FALKENHAYN



EMPEROR FRANCIS JOSEPH

A MUCH BELOVED RULER WHO HAS REIGNED 65 YEARS OVER A POLYGLOT DUAL MONARCHY WHICH MANY PEOPLE HAVE BELIEVED WOULD DISINTEGRATE UPON HIS DEATH



COUNT BERCHTOLD, THE AUSTRIAN PREMIER
WHO PLANNED WAR AGAINST SERBIA TO SUBDUCE SERB AGITATION IN HUNGARY. OTHER PICTURES: (ABOVE) COUNT VON
HOTZENDORF, HEAD OF AUSTRIAN ARMY; (BELOW) ARCHDUKE CHARLES FRANCIS, HEIR TO THE AUSTRIAN THRONE



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EMPEROR FRANCIS JOSEPH AND THE MURDERED ARCHDUKE, FRANCIS FERDINAND



THE ARREST OF THE ASSASSIN IN THE STREETS OF SARAJEVO, BOSNIA

THE ASSASSINATION WAS USED AS A CAUSE FOR WAR BY AUSTRIA



LEADERS OF FRANCE

GENERAL JOFFRE (LEFT) SUPREME COMMANDER OF THE FRENCH ARMIES; M. DELCASSÉ (UPPER) PREMIER IN 1898, THE FATHER OF THE ENTENTE CORDIALE WITH ENGLAND; PREMIER VIVIANI (LOWER)



M. RAYMOND POINCARÉ, PRESIDENT OF FRANCE

"OUR WORDS OF PEACE AND HUMANITY WILL BE ALL THE MORE LIKELY TO BE HEEDED IF WE ARE KNOWN TO BE MORE DETERMINED AND BETTER ARMED"—PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE, FEB. 20, 1913



SIR EDWARD GREY (LEFT) AND PREMIER ASQUITH

THE GUIDING SPIRITS OF THE BRITISH CABINET IN THE WAR CRISIS. SIR EDWARD GREY HAS DIRECTED ENGLAND'S FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE LAST NINE YEARS. MR. ASQUITH, PRIME MINISTER, AND FOR A TIME WAR SECRETARY



EARL KITCHENER, OF KHARTOUM (LEFT), AND SIR JOHN D. P. FRENCH

EARL KITCHENER IS GENERALLY CONSIDERED THE ABLEST ACTIVE SOLDIER IN GREAT BRITAIN. SIR JOHN D. P. FRENCH WHO WAS ONE OF THE FEW ENGLISH OFFICERS WHO GAINED DISTINCTION IN SOUTH AFRICA



THE DIRECTORS OF ENGLAND'S DESTINY AT SEA

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SIR JOHN R. JELlicoe (UPPER LEFT), IN COMMAND OF ALL THE FLEETS; SIR GEORGE CALLAGHAN (RIGHT), COMMANDING THE NORTH SEA FLEET; FIRST LORD OF THE ADMIRALTY WINSTON CHURCHILL (LOWER LEFT)



AN UNNATURAL ALLIANCE—THE CZAR AND KING GEORGE V
RULERS WITH A LONG-STANDING COLONIAL RIVALRY AND OPPOSING POLITICAL BELIEFS; AUTOCRAT AND CONSTITUTIONAL
MONARCH, DRAWN TOGETHER, BY THE KAISER'S AMBITIONS IN THE NEAR EAST AND ON THE OCEAN



THE RUSSIAN MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, M. SAZONOFF, AND (ON THE RIGHT) THE RUSSIAN AMBASSADOR TO GERMANY



GRAND DUKE NIKOLAS NIKOLAIVITCH

COMMANDER AT ST. PETERSBURG, AND, WITH GENERAL SUKHOMLINOFF, CHIEFLY RESPONSIBLE FOR THE PRESENT STATUS OF THE RUSSIAN ARMY



GENERAL SUKHOMLINOFF
THE RUSSIAN MINISTER OF WAR



THE CZAR AND PRESIDENT POINCARÉ
ON HIS VISIT TO RUSSIA IN JULY FROM WHICH HE HURRIEDLY RETURNED JUST BEFORE HOSTILITIES BEGAN



ALBERT OF BELGIUM, THE KING OF "THE COCKPIT OF EUROPE"



THE MARQUIS OF SAN GIULIANO AND VICTOR EMMANUEL III.
THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE KING WHO REFUSED TO PLUNGE ITALY INTO THE WAR STARTED BY ITS ANCIENT
ENEMY AND PRESENT ALLY, AUSTRIA

tion of a royal Austrian puppet was the direct cause of the war.

And these things are lies, though apparent truths. The racial differences of the peoples engaged are not the cause of hostilities. Their existence, however is the field, the pretext, under which infinitely more sinister forces carry on their hellish work.

But in spite of this, these racial features must be taken into account. Though they are not the underlying cause, the question cannot be considered without noting them.

Europe contains some 400,000,000 people, of whom the two great racial groups, Slavs and Teutons, roughly speaking, form somewhat more than half. They are fairly equally divided, say 100,000,000 on each side, though perhaps the Slavs slightly preponderate.

Another important part of the population is made up of the so-called Latin nations, probably 100,000,000 more altogether, France, Italy, Spain, Portugal, etc.

The remainder is formed of the British and Scandinavian peoples, who may be largely Teutonic in stock perhaps, but with a large dash of Celtic, and some 40,000,000 others scattered throughout Europe who are neither Slav nor Teuton, such as Jews, Turks, Greeks, Roumanians, Hungarians, and others.

MOST OF TEUTONS IN GERMANY

Some 85,000,000 of the Teutons are concentrated in the two countries of Germany and Austria, particularly the former.

The great bulk of the Slavs are in Russia, though Servia, Bulgaria, and Montenegro are Slavic States, many other Slavs being scattered through the Balkan regions.

The population of Servia is some 3,000,000; of Bulgaria, 4,500,000 — terribly weakened by the late war—and of Montenegro, 500,000. Roumania, the other Balkan State not Slavic contains more than 7,000,000 people.

Austria, which is not a country in the sense of being the centre of one predominant racial group, is the most mixed of all European racial communities.

In the dual monarchy of Austria-Hungary there are some 12,000,000 Germans (Teutonic). Of the remaining 38,000,000 there are 10,000,000 Magyars (Hungarians), and 3,000,000 Rouman-

ians, neither of whom are Slavs. The remaining 25,000,000 are mostly Slavic peoples, Bohemians, Moravians, Ruthenians, Slovaks, Servians, etc.

It will be seen, therefore, that Austria is merely a "geographical expression." All the European political sharps for the last two generations used to speculate how long this heterogeneous collection could hold together, and all generally predicted a European cataclysm accompanying its dissolution, and a rearrangement of the map of Europe.

IS IT A RACIAL FIGHT PURELY?

These two great groups form the fighting forces immediately involved. Why shall they fight? What is it all about? We said the real, underlying cause was not racial, that there was something else behind it. And there is.

And it is this: The mastership and domination of the world commercially; in the last analysis a fight for expansion, for more feeding ground, for markets.

The real force behind the trouble is European capitalism, divided into two warring groups for ultimate world supremacy, for mastership and exploitation.

The real power is found in the great banks, counting-houses and financial establishments of Europe. They in turn dominate the nations financially, and the great industrial corporations — big business. For years it has been stated that they, in the last resort, were the arbiters of war, they could command or prevent it. That is true, but it will not be repeated so much now. These powers hide behind the swaggering kings and kaisers and potentates who are their mouth-pieces and are now emitting heroic platitudes about drawing their swords and preserving their honor. These figures, with their personal attendance of military and diplomatic liars, are in this respect at least mere phantasmagoria. They are counseled by their "advisers," and these advisers, the statesmen, are in turn dominated by the great financial interests aforesaid. The common people are the pawns with which they play the game, and their racial differences form the main pretext on which they are "sicked" onto each other like fighting dogs. Where racial pretexts fail, others are always manufactured.

MR. MONEYBAGS IN THE GAME

The Jewish banker is a tremendous factor in this situation. If the Rothschilds and Bleichroders, the Montefiores and Hirschs have any racial feeling left, they may certainly chuckle to themselves over setting millions of "Christians" to cutting each other's throats. It is in a way, perhaps, a sort of compensation for the innumerable slaughters of their race that Gentiles have made in all ages.

But it should be remembered that if economic evolution has made the Jew the financial master of Europe, at the same time his wonderful race has produced the most powerful, intellectual, and determined revolutionaries the world has even known. If the race gave us Rothschild it also gave us Marx.

But what is the great prize sought?

It is the imperial and commercial conquest of Asia. This is the thing that has always been held behind the "Eastern Question," which, with the elimination of the Turk as a factor, has now evolved into a world question. What now happens in Europe is in fact the same thing that set the nations almost by the ears in the recent Japanese-Russian contest. And it may be noticed that Japan has allied herself with England in this crisis.

For hundreds of years Teuton and Slav have been converging on the European littoral of Turkey. Whoever possesses it controls Asia, to the exclusion of all rivals, and has a path to every Asiatic country that no fleets can stop.

GERMANY'S EXPANSION

German private capital has already built railroads through Asia Minor to Bagdad and elsewhere, and the German Kaiser has posed for years as the champion of Christendom in the "Holy Land." The Russian Slav has continually bent his steps in the same direction as a settled policy. The Russian ruling class have set up as independent Slavic States several of the Balkan peoples, with the deliberate purpose of making the path to Asia easier. What little now remains of the Turkish power can be swept out of Europe with ridiculous ease, while its power in Asia can be broken, penetrated or pushed aside by the conquerors. Poor, battered Turkey thinks of entering the mêlée on the side of Germany, evidently

in the hope of winning back from England her power in Egypt, and from Russia the Caucasus.

There is not room for the two groups, while both are dominated by capitalism and respond to the call of their economic masters, under the delusion that they are preserving racial and national integrity and answering the treacherous call of "patriotism."

There are 70,000,000 Teutons in Germany on some 210,000 square miles of land. Their financial and industrial masters must have expansion, more markets, more peoples to exploit. To the seaward they are halted by the mighty naval power of England; to the westward they come in collision with France, and to the south and south-east with the Slav races. They make common cause with the German element in Austria, which has always been the ruling class there, and both Slav and Teuton now meet in the narrow European strip, the straight pathway to Asia.

WHY STOP AT THE MEDITERRANEAN?

Foolish or misguided scribes tell us that the conflict is for the control of the Mediterranean, but they don't say what the control of the Mediterranean is desired for. They leave the impression that the conquerors merely want to pompously parade their warships there. The real fact is that the Mediterranean is the water gate of Europe to Asia, and those who secure the land gate secure both. It is imperative that they must.

But this is what brings capitalist England into the fray. The passing of the Mediterranean from her control and that of her allies means the threatening of her great Asiatic empire and the destruction of her trade and commerce by one or other of the conflicting groups. She figures it out that if there is an alternative, she chooses to back Russia, as at present she fears less what the Slav may do than she does the Teuton. She may reconsider this opinion, and may be trusted to back out of the conflict if she possibly can. She is not keen for fighting, because she has all she can handle already. The others have not, hence they are determined to have it, by war if necessary. It is the old case of Have-Not against Have. Either Teuton or Slav would strip the British capitalist in Asia with equal alacrity.

FRENCH MUST PROTECT RUSSIAN LOANS

What brings France in? Two main reasons. One financial, the other racial and national. The

great Russian national debt is held very largely in France. Hundreds of thousands of thrifty French peasants and little bourgeoisie have emptied their stockings to raise the continuous Russian loans. If the Slav goes down in the conflict, they may whistle for their money. So they range themselves alongside him.

The other reason is the hatred of Germany and the desire to reconquer Alsace-Lorraine, lost in 1870. "Revanche" has always been a popular cry in France to rally up the Caspars who otherwise don't know what it is all about. So with both pretexts as incentives to the fray, the French ruling class calls for instant mobilization and threatens Germany with invasion, if she moves against Russia.

And Belgium mobilizes also. Why? Simply because the ruling class there could foresee from previous experience that France or Germany would have no scruple whatever in making their little country the cockpit in which to slaughter each other. It's always less costly to go over on your neighbor's garden plot to have it out, when you think he isn't able to dispute your choice of it as a battleground. So Belgium mobilizes and the other little countries like Holland and Denmark also prepare. As a matter of fact, their independence is about on the same status as Cuba's. They are only independent because the bigger fellows guarantee them — against each other. And those guarantees are scattered to the winds by the present crisis.

WHAT FACTORS ARE FOR PEACE?

Now what are the factors for peace, and what chance have they of being effective?

Here is the great Roman Church. There has been a piteous whisper from the Vatican to the old Austrian dotard, Francis Joseph, not to shed blood in his old age. Not the slightest notice has been taken of it and the poor old Pope has died grieving at the decay of the Papacy's temporal power. The Roman Church is supposedly deep in the political councils of many nations, especially Catholic ones like Austria, but at this crisis it is utterly impotent. It has many times smoothed over racial antagonisms in the past, and perhaps could once have commanded war to cease, but economic determinism, that economic determinism it hates and denies, is now too strong. Its protests go unheeded, though one third of the

population of Europe apparently submits to it spiritually, as it is called. And as a matter of fact, all other forms of the religion of Jesus Christ who came to bring peace on earth are equally impotent.

The Hague Conference? Nothing doing there. Not a murmur is heard from the "thieves' kitchen." The thieves are all too busy patriotically "supporting" their respective governments.

What is the great United States of America doing? Nothing except to proclaim her neutrality. And it may not be able to keep that, for the interests of American capitalists are also bound up with commercial supremacy in the Asiatic markets. When Japan steps in, it is idle to say that capitalist interests here are unaffected. We may, probably will, preserve peace in our own midst, but though we are supposedly the greatest force for peace in the world, we can do nothing with this European hell-blast, except to proclaim that we want to stay out of it.

And lastly we come to the great Socialist movement of Europe and the peoples composing it. What can it do? No one knows as yet.

It has not succeeded in stopping the war. But while war is scourging the peoples, it will strain every effort to overthrow, by social revolution, the hideous capitalist power that engenders and hopes to profit by it.

WAR IS, AFTER ALL — WAR

For, boiled down to the last analysis, this war has no other purpose than those which preceded it; the mastership of man over his fellow; the enslavement and exploitation of peoples, so that some may continue to live on the labor of others. It is the same purpose with all, whether they mask their exploitation under the guise of democracy, like France and England, or under cover of imperial bureaucracy as in Russia and Germany. Whether the tribute is extracted by direct taxation or the more cunning and insidious methods of modern capitalism makes no difference. It is essentially the same thing and for the same purpose.

And this, again in the last analysis, is "what it is all about." Despite the humbug of the mystery of "politics from the inside," the utterances of sophisticated statesmen and politicians, the swagger and bluster of royal puppets and uniformed windbags, and the published opinions of

bankers, and of financial and military experts, it is nothing more than this: The continuance and expansion of human slavery through profit, the maintenance of capitalism, even if the world is to be strewn with the corpses of its murdered slaves.

This, we repeat, is what it is all about and why Socialists want to put an end to it. War is hell, and capitalism is the cause of war, and you can figure out for yourself what capitalism itself must be.

HOW THE UNITED STATES IS CONCERNED

On this side of the Atlantic, we, the workers, will not remain unaffected, even if "the country" keeps out of the European maelstrom. Some of our exploiters are figuring on an immediate gain by it and some on an ultimate loss. But that is of no consequence to us. They all, however, figure on a much higher cost of food and necessities of life and that means to us hunger, an ever

fiercer strife for a living; strikes, labor wars, riots and murders like Ludlow, Calumet, and West Virginia, multiplied a thousand fold. Many a poor Caspar among us, who doesn't know what it is all about, will have his skull rolled on the strike fields of the United States as literally as if he had been separated from it in the Balkans.

This is but a rough, crude, faulty, and inadequate outline, or attempted outline to show "what it is all about." And though a thousand other details and important ones, too, could be introduced, we have striven to give only the main causes and considerations. To know how to put an end to this hideous condition, we must know its causes. For those who do not know, and do not care to know, they pay for ignorance with their skulls.

If you don't want to use your heads, Capitalism can always find a use for them, in this fashion. And in the last resort that is what makes a European war possible now.

THE DOCUMENTS IN THE CASE

THE BRITISH "WHITE PAPER"

THE following is a somewhat abridged text of the British "White Paper"—the official diplomatic correspondence that immediately preceded England's declaration of war against Germany. It was first issued by the British Foreign Office on August 5th, 1914, and was published in the *New York Times* in full on August 23rd. The correspondence, mostly telegraphic, deals with the crisis produced by the Austro-Hungarian note sent to Servia on July 23rd and the subsequent invasion of Servia by the forces of Austria-Hungary.

The "White Paper" contains 159 documents, besides enclosures, and comprises more than 40,000 words.

The leading characters in this grim diplomatic drama are as follows.

SIR EDWARD GREY, British Foreign Secretary.
COUNT BENCKENDORFF, Russian Ambassador at London.
COUNT BERCHTOLD, Austrian Foreign Minister.
SIR F. BERTIE, British Ambassador at Paris.
SIR G. BUCHANAN, British Ambassador at St. Petersburg.
SIR M. DE BUNSEN, British Ambassador at Vienna.
M. JULES CAMBON, French Ambassador to Germany.
M. PAUL CAMBON, French Ambassador to England.
MR. DAYRELL MONTAGUE CRACKANTHORPE, First Secretary in British Diplomatic Service at Belgrade.
SIR E. GOSCHEN, British Ambassador at Berlin.

PRINCE LICHNOWSKY, German Ambassador to Great Britain.
COUNT MENSENDORFF, Austrian Ambassador to Great Britain.
SIR ARTHUR NICOLSON, Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs.
SIR R. RODD, British Ambassador at Rome.
SIR H. RUMBOLD, of the British Diplomatic Service.
MARQUIS DI SAN GIULIANO, Foreign Minister of Italy.
M. SAZONOF, Russian Premier.
SIR F. VILLIERS, British Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to Belgium.
M. VIVIANI, Premier of France.

TEXT OF THE "WHITE PAPER"

No. 1

SIR EDWARD GREY TO SIR E. GOSCHEN
London, Foreign Office,
July 20, 1914.

I asked the German Ambassador to-day if he had any news of what was going on in Vienna, with regard to Servia.

He said that he had not, but Austria was certainly going to take some step, and he regarded the situation as very uncomfortable.

The German Ambassador said that it would be a very desirable thing if Russia could act as a mediator with regard to Servia.

I said that I assumed that the Austrian Government would not do anything until they had first disclosed to the public their case against Servia, founded presumably upon what they had discovered at the trial.

The Ambassador said that he certainly assumed that they would act upon some case that would be made known.

I said that this would make it easier for others, such as Russia, to counsel moderation in Belgrade.

No. 2

SIR E. GOSCHEN TO SIR EDWARD GREY
Berlin, July 22, 1914.

Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs . . . insisted that question at issue was one for settlement between Servia and Austria alone, and that there should be no interference from outside in the discussions between those two countries. He had, therefore, considered it inadvisable that the Austro-Hungarian Government should be approached by the German Government on the matter.

No. 3

SIR EDWARD GREY TO SIR M. DE BUNSEN
London, Foreign Office,
July 23, 1914.

Count Mensdorff told me to-day that he would be able to-morrow morning to let me have officially the communication that he understood was being made to Servia to-day by Austria. He then explained privately what the nature of the demand would be.

I gathered that they would include proof of the complicity of some Servian officials in the plot to murder the Archduke Franz Ferdinand, and a long list of demands consequently made by Austria on Servia.

But, when Count Mensdorff told me that he supposed there would be something in the nature of a time limit, which was in effect akin to an ultimatum, I said that I regretted this very much. To begin with, a time limit might inflame opinion in Russia, and it would make it difficult, if not impossible, to give more time, even if after a few days it appeared that by giving more time there would be a prospect of securing a peaceful settlement and getting a satisfactory reply from Servia.

Count Mensdorff said that if Servia, in the interval that had elapsed since the murder of the Archduke, had voluntarily instituted an inquiry on her own territory, all this might have been avoided.

I could not help dwelling upon the awful consequences involved in the situation. . . . If as many as four Great Powers of Europe—let us say Austria, France, Russia, and Germany—were engaged in war, it seemed to me that it must involve the expenditure of so vast a sum of money and such an interference with trade

that a war would be accompanied or followed by a complete collapse of European credit and industry.

Count Mensdorff did not demur to this statement of the possible consequences of the present situation, but he said that all would depend upon Russia.

No. 4

COUNT BERCHTOLD TO COUNT MENSENDORFF

(Communicated by Count Mensdorff,
Vienna, July 24, 1914.)

The Austro-Hungarian Government felt compelled to address the following note to the Servian Government on the 23rd July, through the medium of the Austro-Hungarian Minister at Belgrade:

"On the 31st March, 1909, the Servian Minister in Vienna, on the instructions of the Servian Government, made the following declaration to the Imperial and Royal Government:

"*'Servia recognizes that the fait accompli regarding Bosnia has not affected her rights, and consequently she will conform to the decisions that the Powers may take in conformity with Article 25 of the Treaty of Berlin. In deference to the advice of the Great Powers Servia undertakes to renounce from now onward the attitude of protest and opposition which she has adopted with regard to the annexation since last Autumn. She undertakes, moreover, to modify the direction of her policy with regard to Austria-Hungary and to live in future on good neighborly terms with the latter.'*"

[The note goes on to refer to the royal tragedy of June 28th and accuses the Servian government of tolerating an anti-Austrian propaganda among the Servians leading directly to deeds of violence and hostility. It accuses Servian officers and the Narodna Odbrana society of complicity in international crime.]

The above mentioned results of the Magisterial investigation do not permit the Austro-Hungarian Government to pursue any longer the attitude of expectant forbearance which it has maintained for years in face of the machinations hatched in Belgrade, and thence propagated in the territories of the monarchy. The results, on the contrary, impose on it the duty of putting an end to the intrigues which form a perpetual menace to the tranquillity of the monarchy.

To achieve this end the Imperial and Royal Government sees itself compelled to demand from the Royal Servian Government a formal assurance that it condemns this dangerous propaganda against the monarchy.

In order to give a formal character to this undertaking the Royal Servian Government shall publish on the front page of its Official Journal of the 26th June (13th July) the following declaration:

[The required statement included an official condemnation of anti-Austrian propaganda and an order on all officials and citizens to refrain from further agitation.]

This declaration shall simultaneously be communicated to the royal army as an order of the day by His Majesty the King, and shall be published in the Official Bulletin of the army.

[The Royal Servian Government was required further to undertake: (1) To suppress anti-Austrian publications; (2) to dissolve the Narodna Odbrana and other anti-Austrian societies;

(3) to eliminate from public instruction all propaganda against Austria-Hungary; (4) to remove all military and civil officials guilty of this propaganda, on demand of the Austro-Hungarian Government; (5) to accept the collaboration in Servia of Austro-Hungarian representatives in suppressing this movement; (6) to permit Austro-Hungarian delegates to take part in proceedings against accessories to the plot of June 28th; (7) to arrest Major Voija Tankositch and Milan Ciganovitch; (8) to prevent the passage of arms and explosives across the border and to punish those who had been engaged in this traffic; (9) to furnish satisfactory explanations of the reported inflammatory utterances of Servian officials; (10) to notify the Austro-Hungarian Government at once of the execution of these measures.]

The Austro-Hungarian Government expects the reply of the Royal Government at the latest by 6 o'clock on Saturday evening, the 25th July.

I have the honor to request Your Excellency to bring the contents of this note to the knowledge of the Government to which you are accredited, accompanying your communication with the following observations:

[The note offers further accusations of anti-Austrian activities in Servia, violating agreements entered into March 31st, 1909.]

In the presence of these doings, to which Austria-Hungary has been exposed for years, the Servian Government has not thought it incumbent on it to take the slightest step. The Servian Government has thus failed in the duty imposed on it by the solemn declaration of the 31st March, 1909, and acted in opposition to the will of Europe and the undertaking given to Austria-Hungary.

[Attention is called to Austro-Hungary's benevolence toward Servia, and its patience, which became exhausted on the day of the royal murder.]

In the presence of this state of things the Imperial and Royal Government has felt compelled to take new and urgent steps at Belgrade with a view to inducing the Servian Government to stop the incendiary movement that is threatening the security and integrity of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy.

The Imperial and Royal Government is convinced that in taking this step it will find itself in full agreement with the sentiments of all civilized nations, who cannot permit regicide to become a weapon that can be employed with impunity in political strife, and the peace of Europe to be continually disturbed by movements emanating from Belgrade.

In support of the above the Imperial and Royal Government holds at the disposal of the British Government a dossier elucidating the Servian intrigues and the connection between these intrigues and the murder of the 28th June.

An identical communication has been addressed to the imperial and royal representatives accredited to the other signatory powers.

[A memorandum was enclosed, giving the specific findings of the Court of Inquiry held at

Serajevo against Gavril Princip and his accessories in the crime of June 28th.]

No. 5

SIR EDWARD GREY TO M. SIR DE BUNSEN

London, Foreign Office,

July 24, 1914.

Note addressed to Serbia, together with an explanation of the reasons leading up to it, has been communicated to me by Count Mensdorff.

In the ensuing conversation with His Excellency, I remarked that it seemed to me a matter for great regret that a time limit, and such a short one at that, had been insisted upon at this stage of the proceedings. The murder of the Archduke and some of the circumstances respecting Serbia quoted in the note aroused sympathy with Austria, as was but natural, but at the same time I had never before seen one State address to another independent State a document of so formidable a character. Demand No. 5 would be hardly consistent with the maintenance of Serbia's independent sovereignty if it were to mean, as it seemed that it might, that Austria-Hungary was to be invested with a right to appoint officials who would have authority within the frontiers of Serbia.

I added that I felt great apprehension, and that I should concern myself with the matter simply and solely from the point of view of the peace of Europe. The merits of the dispute between Austria and Serbia were not the concern of His Majesty's Government, and such comments as I had made above were not made in order to discuss those merits.

I ended by saying that doubtless we should enter into an exchange of views with other powers, and that I must await their views as to what could be done to mitigate the difficulties of the situation.

Count Mensdorff replied that the present situation might never have arisen if Serbia had held out a hand after the murder of the Archduke; Serbia had, however, shown no sign of sympathy or help, though some weeks had already elapsed since the murder; a time limit, said His Excellency, was essential, owing to the procrastination on Serbia's part. . . .

No. 6

SIR G. BUCHANAN TO SIR EDWARD GREY

St. Petersburg, July 24, 1914.

I had a telephone message this morning from Mr. Sazonof to the effect that the text of the Austrian ultimatum had just reached him. . . .

Minister for Foreign Affairs said that Austria's conduct was both provocative and immoral; she would never have taken such action unless Germany had first been consulted; some of her demands were quite impossible of acceptance. He hoped that His Majesty's Government would not fail to proclaim their solidarity with Russia and France.

The French Ambassador gave me to understand that France would fulfill all the obligations entailed by her alliance with Russia, if necessity arose, besides supporting Russia strongly in any diplomatic negotiations.

I said that I would telegraph a full report to you of what their Excellencies had just said to me. I could not, of course, speak in the name of His Majesty's Government, but personally I saw no reason to expect any declaration of solidarity from His Majesty's Government that would entail an unconditional engagement on their part to support Russia and France by force of arms. Direct British interests in Serbia were nil, and a war on behalf of that country would never be sanctioned by British public opinion. . . .

M. Sazonof said that he himself thought that Russian mobilization would at any rate have to be carried out. . . .

I said that it seemed to me that the important point was to induce Austria to extend the time limit, and that the first thing to do was to bring an influence to bear on

Austria with that end in view; French Ambassador, however, . . . did not think there was time to carry out my suggestion. Thereupon I said that it seemed to me desirable that we should know just how far Serbia was prepared to go to meet the demands formulated by Austria in her note. . . .

[M. Sazonof urged that a definite British stand would make for peace, but the British Ambassador did not commit himself.]

No. 7

SIR M. DE BUNSEN TO SIR EDWARD GREY

Vienna, July 24, 1914.

Before departing on leave of absence, I was assured by Russian Ambassador that any action taken by Austria to humiliate Serbia could not leave Russia indifferent. . . .

[He reported that Russian Chargé d'Affaires considered the Austrian demands impossible of acceptance by Serbia. The Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs replied that they were no more than would have been required by any Power.]

No. 8

MR. CRACKANTHORPE TO SIR EDWARD GREY

Belgrade, July 24, 1914.

Austrian demands are considered absolutely unacceptable by Servian Government, who earnestly trust that His Majesty's Government may see their way to induce Austrian Government to moderate them. . . .

No. 9

NOTE COMMUNICATED BY GERMAN AMBASSADOR

London, July 24, 1914.

[The note reviews the conditions leading up to the crime of June 28th, referring to the "Great Servian chauvinism." It asserts that "The Servian intrigues have been going on for many years," and that "It was only owing to the far-reaching self-restraint and moderation of the Austro-Hungarian Government" that a conflict had been avoided. It accuses Serbia of bad faith and upholds the action of the Dual Monarchy. Austria has no choice but to enforce her demands.]

. . . . The Imperial Government want to emphasize their opinion that in the present case there is only question of a matter to be settled exclusively between Austria-Hungary and Serbia, and that the great powers ought seriously to endeavor to reserve it to those two immediately concerned. The Imperial Government desire urgently the localization of the conflict, because every interference of another Power would, owing to the different treaty obligations, be followed by incalculable consequences.

No. 10

SIR EDWARD GREY TO SIR F. BERTIE

London, Foreign Office,

July 24, 1914.

. . . . I told M. Cambon that this afternoon I was to see the German Ambassador, who some days ago had asked me privately to exercise moderating influence in St. Petersburg. I would say to the Ambassador that, of course, if the presentation of this ultimatum to Serbia

did not lead to trouble between Austria and Russia, we need not concern ourselves about it; but if Russia took the view of the Austrian ultimatum, which it seemed to me that any power interested in Serbia would take, I should be quite powerless, in face of the terms of the ultimatum, to exercise any moderating influence. I would say that I thought the only chance of any mediating or moderating influence being exercised was that Germany, France, Italy, and ourselves, who had not direct interests in Serbia, should act together for the sake of peace, simultaneously in Vienna and St. Petersburg.

M. Cambon said that, if there was a chance of mediation by the four powers, he had no doubt that his Government would be glad to join in it; but he pointed out that we could not say anything in St. Petersburg till Russia had expressed some opinion or taken some action. But, when two days were over, Austria would march into Serbia, for the Servians could not possibly accept the Austrian demand. Russia would be compelled by her public opinion to take action as soon as Austria attacked Serbia, and therefore, once the Austrians had attacked Serbia, it would be too late for any mediation.

I said that I had not contemplated anything being said in St. Petersburg until after it was clear that there must be trouble between Austria and Russia. I had thought that if Austria did move into Serbia, and Russia then mobilized, it would be possible for the four powers to urge Austria to stop her advance, and Russia also to stop hers, pending mediation. But it would be essential for any chance of success for such a step that Germany should participate in it.

M. Cambon said that it would be too late after Austria had once moved against Serbia. The important thing was to gain time by mediation in Vienna. The best chance of this being accepted would be that Germany should propose it to the other Powers.

No. 11

SIR EDWARD GREY TO SIR H. RUMBOLD
London, Foreign Office,
July 24, 1914.

German Ambassador has communicated to me the view of the German Government about the Austrian demand in Serbia.

I said that if the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia did not lead to trouble between Austria and Russia, I had no concern with it. . . . I reminded the German Ambassador that some days ago he had expressed a personal hope that if need arose I would endeavor to exercise moderating influence at St. Petersburg, but now I said that, in view of the extraordinarily stiff character of the Austrian note, the shortness of the time allowed, and the wide scope of the demands upon Serbia, I felt quite helpless as far as Russia was concerned, and I did not believe any power could exercise influence alone.

The only chance I could see of mediating or moderating influence being effective, was that the four powers, Germany, Italy, France, and ourselves, should work together simultaneously at Vienna and St. Petersburg in favor of moderation in the event of the relations between Austria and Russia becoming threatening.

The immediate danger was that in a few hours Austria might march into Serbia and Russian Slav opinion demand that Russia should march to help Serbia; it would be very desirable to get Austria not to precipitate military action and so to gain more time. But none of us could influence Austria in this direction unless Germany would propose and participate in such action at Vienna.

No. 12

SIR EDWARD GREY TO MR. CRACKANTHORPE
London, Foreign Office,
July 24, 1914.

Servia ought to promise that, if it is proved that Servian officials, however subordinate they may be, were accom-

plished in murder of the Archduke at Serajevo, she will give Austria the fullest satisfaction. She certainly ought to express concern and regret. For the rest, Servian Government must reply to Austrian demands as they consider best in Servian interests.

It is impossible to say whether military action by Austria when time limit expires can be averted by anything but unconditional acceptance of her demands, but only chance appears to lie in avoiding an absolute refusal and replying favorably to as many points as the time limit allows.

No. 13

NOTE COMMUNICATED BY RUSSIAN AMBASSADOR, JULY 25

[A telegram is quoted, sent by M. Sazonof to the Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Vienna on July 24th, urging the extension of the time limit set to Servia's reply, in order that the Powers might have proper opportunity to review the case.]

A refusal to prolong the term of the ultimatum would render nugatory the proposals made by the Austro-Hungarian Government to the Powers, and would be in contradiction to the very bases of international relations.

M. Sazonof hopes that His Britannic Majesty's Government will share to the point of view set forth above, and he trusts that Sir E. Grey will see his way to furnish similar instructions to the British Ambassador at Vienna.

No. 14

SIR EDWARD GREY TO SIR F. BERTIE AND TO SIR G. BUCHANAN
London, Foreign Office,
July 25, 1914.

Austrian Ambassador has been authorized to explain to me that the step taken at Belgrade was not an ultimatum but a demarche with a time limit, and that if the Austrian demands were not complied with within the time limit the Austro-Hungarian Government would break off diplomatic relations and begin military preparations, not operations.

. . . it makes the immediate situation rather less acute.

No. 15

SIR F. BERTIE TO SIR EDWARD GREY
Paris, July 25, 1914.

I learn from the Acting Political Director that the French Government has not yet received the explanation from the Austrian Government contained in your telegram to-day. [No. 14.] They have, however, through the Servian Minister here, given similar advice to Servia as was contained in your telegram to Belgrade of yesterday. [No. 12.]

No. 16

SIR F. BERTIE TO SIR EDWARD GREY
Paris, July 25, 1914.

Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs has no suggestions to make except that moderating advice might be given at Vienna as well as at Belgrade. He hopes that the Servian Government's answer to the Austrian ultimatum will be sufficiently favorable to obviate extreme measures being taken by the Austrian Government. He says, however, that there would be a revolution in Servia if she were to accept the Austrian demands in their entirety.

No. 17

SIR G. BUCHANAN TO SIR EDWARD GREY
St. Petersburg, July 25, 1914.

[Reference to dispatches 14 and 12.]

. . . The Minister for Foreign Affairs said, as regards the former, that the explanations of the Austrian

Ambassador did not quite correspond with the information which had reached him from German quarters. As regards the latter, both His Excellency and the French Ambassador agreed that it is too late to make such a communication, as the time limit expires this evening.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs said, that Serbia was quite ready to do as you had suggested and to punish those proved to be guilty, but that no independent State could be expected to accept the political demands which had been put forward.

If Serbia should appeal to the Powers, Russia would be quite ready to stand aside and leave the question in the hands of England, France, Germany, and Italy. It was possible, in his opinion, that Serbia might propose to submit the question to arbitration.

On my expressing the earnest hope that Russia would not precipitate war by mobilizing until you had had time to use your influence in favor of peace, His Excellency assured me that Russia had no aggressive intentions, and she would take no action until it was forced on her.

His Excellency replied that Russia could not allow Austria to crush Serbia and become the predominant Power in the Balkans, and, if she feels secure of the support of France, she will face all the risks of war.

No. 18

SIR H. RUMBOLD TO SIR EDWARD GREY

Berlin, July 25, 1914.

Secretary of State . . . admitted quite freely that Austro-Hungarian Government wished to give the Servians a lesson, and that they meant to take military action. He also admitted that Servian Government could not swallow certain of the Austro-Hungarian demands.

Secretary of State said that a reassuring feature of situation was that Count Berchtold had sent for Russian representative at Vienna and had told him that Austria-Hungary had no intention of seizing Servian territory. This step should, in his opinion, exercise a calming influence at St. Petersburg. . . . He remained of opinion that crisis could be localized. . . . If the relations between Austria and Russia became threatening, he was quite ready to fall in with your suggestion as to the four Powers working in favor of moderation at Vienna and St. Petersburg.

No. 19

SIR R. RODD TO SIR EDWARD GREY

Rome, July 25, 1914.

I saw the Secretary General this morning. . . . In his opinion Austria will only be restrained by the unconditional acceptance by the Servian Government of her note. There is reliable information that Austria intends to seize the Salonica Railway.

No. 20

SIR M. DE BUNSEN TO SIR EDWARD GREY

Vienna, July 25, 1914.

Language of press this morning leaves the impression that the surrender of Serbia is neither expected nor really desired. It is officially announced that the Austrian Minister is instructed to leave Belgrade with staff of legation failing unconditional acceptance of note at 6 P. M. today.

No. 21

MR. CRACKANTHORPE TO SIR EDWARD GREY

Belgrade, July 25, 1914.

The Council of Ministers is now drawing up their reply to the Austrian note. I am informed by the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs that it will be most conciliatory and will meet the Austrian demands in as large a measure as is possible.

[A summary of the projected reply follows.
See No. 39.]

The Servian Government consider that, unless the Austrian Government want war at any cost, they cannot but be content with the full satisfaction offered in the Servian reply.

No. 22

MR. CRACKANTHORPE TO SIR EDWARD GREY

Belgrade, July 25, 1914.

In view of the proposed conciliatory terms of the Servian reply, I have up to now abstained from offering advice to the Servian Government.

No. 23

MR. CRACKANTHORPE TO SIR EDWARD GREY

Belgrade, July 25, 1914.

The Austrian Minister left at 6:30.

The Government has left for Nish, where the Skuptchina will meet on Monday.

No. 24

SIR EDWARD GREY TO SIR G. BUCHANAN

London, Foreign Office,

July 25, 1914.

You spoke quite rightly in very difficult circumstances as to the attitude of His Majesty's Government. I entirely approve what you said, as reported in your telegram of yesterday [No. 6], and I cannot promise more on behalf of the Government.

The sudden, brusque, and peremptory character of the Austrian demarche makes it almost inevitable that in a very short time both Russia and Austria will have mobilized against each other. In this event, the only chance of peace, in my opinion, is for the other four Powers to join in asking the Austrian and Russian Governments not to cross the frontier, and to give time for the four Powers acting at Vienna and St. Petersburg to try and arrange matters. If Germany will adopt this view, I feel strongly that France and ourselves should act upon it. Italy would no doubt gladly coöperate.

No. 25

SIR EDWARD GREY TO SIR H. RUMBOLD

London, Foreign Office,

July 25, 1914.

The Austrian Ambassador has been authorized to inform me that the Austrian method of procedure on expiry of the time limit would be to break off diplomatic relations and commence military preparations, but not military operations.

Apparently we should now soon be face to face with the mobilization of Austria and Russia. The only chance of peace, if this did happen, would be for Germany, France, Russia* and ourselves to keep together, and to join in asking Austria and Russia not to cross the frontier till we had had time to try and arrange matters between them.

The German Ambassador read me a telegram from the German Foreign Office saying that his Government had not known beforehand, and had had no more than other Powers to do with the stiff terms of the Austrian note to Serbia, but that once she had launched that note, Austria could not draw back. Prince Lichnowsky said, however, that if what I contemplated was mediation between Austria and Russia, Austria might be able with dignity to accept it.

I impressed upon the Ambassador that, in the event of Russian and Austrian mobilization, the participation of Germany would be essential to any diplomatic action for peace.

*This is, apparently, a misprint and should read "Italy."

No. 26

SIR EDWARD GREY TO SIR M. DE BUNSEN

London, Foreign Office,

July 25, 1914.

The Russian Ambassador has communicated to me the following telegram, which his Government have sent to the Russian Ambassador at Vienna, with instructions to communicate it to the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs:

"The delay given to Servia for a reply is so limited that the Powers are prevented from taking any steps to avert the complications which are threatening. The Russian Government trust that the Austrian Government will prolong the time limit, and as the latter have declared their willingness to inform the Powers of the data on which they have based their demands on Servia, the Russian Government hope that these particulars will be furnished in order that the Powers may examine the matter. . . ."

Since the telegram to the Russian Ambassador at Vienna was sent, it has been a relief to hear that the steps which the Austrian Government were taking were to be limited for the moment to the rupture of relations and to military preparations, and not operations. I trust, therefore, that if the Austro-Hungarian Government consider it too late to prolong the time limit, they will at any rate give time in the sense and for the reasons desired by Russia before taking any irretrievable steps.

No. 27

SIR EDWARD GREY TO SIR F. BERTIE, SIR H. RUMBOLD,
AND SIR G. BUCHANAN

London, Foreign Office,

July 25, 1914.

I have communicated to German Ambassador the forecast of the Servian reply contained in Mr. Crackanthorpe's telegram of to-day [No. 21]. I have said that, if Servian reply, when received at Vienna, corresponds to this forecast, I hope the German Government will feel able to influence the Austrian Government to take a favorable view of it.

No. 28

(Nil.)

No. 29

SIR EDWARD GREY TO SIR R. RODD

London, Foreign Office,

July 25, 1914.

The Italian Ambassador came to see me to-day. I told him in general terms what I had said to the German Ambassador this morning.

The Italian Ambassador cordially approved of this. . . .

No. 30

SIR EDWARD GREY TO MR. CRACKANTHORPE

London, Foreign Office,

July 25, 1914.

SIR: The Servian Minister called on the 23d instant and spoke to Sir A. Nicolson on the present strained relations between Servia and Austria-Hungary.

He said that his Government were most anxious and disquieted. They were perfectly ready to meet any reasonable demands of Austria-Hungary so long as such demands were kept on the "terrain juridique." . . .

Sir A. Nicolson, on being asked by M. Boschkovitch his opinion on the whole question, observed that there were no data on which to base one, though it was to be hoped that the Servian Government would endeavor to meet the Austrian demands in a conciliatory and moderate spirit.

No. 31

SIR M. DE BUNSEN TO SIR EDWARD GREY

Vienna, July 25, 1914.

Servian reply to the Austro-Hungarian demands is not considered satisfactory, and the Austro-Hungarian Minister has left Belgrade. War is thought to be imminent.

No. 32

SIR M. DE BUNSEN TO SIR EDWARD GREY

Vienna, July 26, 1914.

According to confident belief of German Ambassador Russia will keep quiet during chastisement of Servia, which Austria-Hungary is resolved to inflict, having received assurances that no Servian territory will be annexed by Austria-Hungary. . . .

[The German Ambassador in Vienna spoke optimistically of peaceful conditions in Russia and France. He believed that Servia deserved the punishment she was about to receive. He asserted that "Servian concessions were all a sham."]

No. 33

SIR H. RUMBOLD TO SIR EDWARD GREY

Berlin, July 26, 1914.

[He voiced apprehension lest the German Emperor's unexpected return to Berlin might cause speculation and excitement, and reported the German Under Secretary of State's belief that "Russia would not act if Austria did not annex territory."]

No. 34

SIR H. RUMBOLD TO SIR EDWARD GREY

Berlin, July 26, 1914.

Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs has just telephoned to me to say that German Ambassador at Vienna has been instructed to pass on to Austro-Hungarian Government your hopes that they may take a favorable view of Servian reply if it corresponds to the forecast contained in Belgrade telegram of 25th July.

Under Secretary of State considers very fact of their making this communication to Austro-Hungarian Government implies that they associate themselves to a certain extent with your hope. German Government do not see their way to going beyond this.

No. 35

SIR R. RODD TO SIR EDWARD GREY

Rome, July 26, 1914.

Minister for Foreign Affairs welcomes your proposal for a conference and will instruct Italian Ambassador to-night accordingly.

Austrian Ambassador has informed Italian Government this evening that Minister in Belgrade had been recalled but that this did not imply declaration of war.

No. 36

SIR EDWARD GREY TO SIR F. BERTIE, SIR H. RUMBOLD,
AND SIR R. RODD

London, Foreign Office,

July 26, 1914.

Would Minister for Foreign Affairs be disposed to instruct Ambassador here to join with representatives of France, Italy, and Germany, and myself to meet here in conference immediately for the purpose of discovering an issue which would prevent complications? . . . If so, when bringing the above suggestion to the notice of the Governments to which they are accredited, representatives at Belgrade, Vienna, and St. Petersburg could be authorized to request that all active military operations should be suspended pending results of conference.

No. 37

SIR EDWARD GREY TO SIR F. BERTIE
London, Foreign Office,
July 26, 1914.

It is important to know if France will agree to suggested action by the four powers if necessary.

No. 38

SIR R. RODD TO SIR EDWARD GREY
Rome, July 23, 1914.

Secretary General, whom I saw this morning at the Italian Foreign Office, took the view that the gravity of the situation lay in the conviction of the Austro-Hungarian Government that it was absolutely necessary for their prestige, after the many disillusion which the turn of events in the Balkans has occasioned, to score a definite success.

No. 39

REPLY OF SERVIAN GOVERNMENT TO AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN NOTE

(Communicated by the Servian Minister, July 27.)
Belgrade, July 12 (25), 1914.

The Royal Servian Government have received the communication of the Imperial and Royal Government of the 10th instant, and are convinced that their reply will remove any misunderstanding which may threaten to impair the good neighborly relations between the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the Kingdom of Servia. . . .

[Servia asserts that the declarations of March 18, 1909, have neither been renewed nor questioned since that time.]

Servia has several times given proofs of her pacific and moderate policy during the Balkan crisis, and it is thanks to Servia and to the sacrifice that she has made in the exclusive interest of European peace that that peace has been preserved. The Royal Government cannot be held responsible for manifestations of a private character, such as articles in the press and the peaceable work of societies. . . .

For these reasons the Royal Government have been pained and surprised at the statements according to which members of the Kingdom of Servia are supposed to have participated in the preparations for the crime committed at Serajevo; the Royal Government expected to be invited to collaborate in an investigation of all that concerns this crime, and they were ready, in order to prove the entire correctness of their attitude, to take measures against any persons concerning whom representations were made to them. Falling in, therefore, with the desire of the Imperial and Royal Government, they are prepared to hand over for trial any Servian subject, without regard to his situation or rank, of whose complicity in the crime of Serajevo proofs are forthcoming, and more especially they undertake to cause to be published on the first page of the *Journal officiel*, on the date of the 13th (26th) July, the following declaration:

[This pronouncement condemned all anti-Austrian propaganda and ordered officers to suppress it. The note then goes on to answer Austria's specific demands with ten promises. Servia undertakes: (1) To pass a law suppressing anti-Austrian publications; (2) to dissolve the Narodna Odbrana and other societies in spite of lack of evidence against them; (3) to remove anti-Austrian propaganda from public instruction; (4) to remove military officers guilty of anti-

Austrian agitation, provided the Austrian Government furnish the names and acts; (5) to permit Austrian collaboration provided it be legal and friendly; (6) to instigate inquiries, but not, however, to permit the participation of Austrian agents; (7) Voislav Tankossitch had already been arrested, but Milan Ziganovitch could not be found; (8) to reinforce measures prohibiting the illicit traffic in arms and explosives across the frontier; (9) to offer explanations of inflammatory remarks of Servian officers; (10) to inform Austria of the execution of these measures as promptly as possible.]

If the Imperial and Royal Government are not satisfied with this reply, the Servian Government, considering that it is not to the common interest to precipitate the solution of this question, are ready, as always, to accept a pacific understanding, either by referring this question to the decision of the International Tribunal of The Hague, or to the Great Powers which took part in the drawing up of the declaration made by the Servian Government on the 18th (31st) March, 1909.

No. 40

SIR M. DE BUNSEN TO SIR EDWARD GREY

Vienna, July 26, 1914.

Russian Ambassador just returned from leave thinks that Austro-Hungarian Government are determined on war, and that it is impossible for Russia to remain indifferent. He does not propose to press for more time in the sense of your telegram of the 25th instant [No. 26] (last paragraph).

When the repetition of your telegram of the 26th instant to Paris [No. 36] arrived, I had the French and Russian Ambassadors both with me. They expressed great satisfaction with its contents, which I communicated to them. They doubted, however, whether the principle of Russia being an interested party entitled to have a say in the settlement of a purely Austro-Servian dispute would be accepted by either the Austro-Hungarian or the German Government. . . .

No. 41

SIR M. DE BUNSEN TO SIR EDWARD GREY

Vienna, July 27, 1914.

I have had conversations with all my colleagues representing the Great Powers. The impression left on my mind is that the Austro-Hungarian note was so drawn up as to make war inevitable, that the Austro-Hungarian Government are fully resolved to have war with Servia; that they consider their position as a Great Power to be at stake, and that until punishment has been administered to Servia it is unlikely that they will listen to proposals of mediation. . . .

No. 42

SIR F. BERTIE TO SIR EDWARD GREY

Paris, July 27, 1914.

Your proposal as stated in your two telegrams of yesterday [Nos. 36 and 37], is accepted by the French Government. French Ambassador in London, who returns there this evening, has been instructed accordingly. Instructions have been sent to the French Ambassador at Berlin to concert with his British colleague as to the advisability of their speaking jointly to the German Government. . . .

No. 43

SIR E. GOSCHEN TO SIR EDWARD GREY

Berlin, July 27, 1914.

Secretary of State says that conference you suggest would practically amount to a court of arbitration and could not, in his opinion, be called together except at the request of Austria and Russia. He could not, therefore, fall in with your suggestion, desirous though he was to co-operate for the maintenance of peace. . . .

In the course of a short conversation Secretary of State said that as yet Austria was only partially mobilizing, but that if Russia mobilized against Germany latter would have to follow suit. . . .

No. 44

SIR G. BUCHANAN TO SIR EDWARD GREY

St. Petersburg, July 27, 1914.

Austrian Ambassador tried, in a long conversation, which he had yesterday with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, to explain away objectionable features of the recent action taken by the Austro-Hungarian Government. Minister for Foreign Affairs pointed out that, although he perfectly understood Austria's motives, the ultimatum had been so drafted that it could not possibly be accepted as a whole by the Servian Government. Although the demands were reasonable enough in some cases, others not only could not possibly be put into immediate execution, seeing that they entailed revision of existing Servian laws, but were, moreover, incompatible with Servia's dignity as an independent State. It would be useless for Russia to offer her good offices at Belgrade, in view of the fact that she was the object of such suspicion in Austria. . . .

[He repeated to the Russian minister that England believed that the cause of peace would not be advanced by her taking sides.]

. . . In these circumstances I trusted that the Russian Government would defer the mobilization ukase for as long as possible, and that troops would not be allowed to cross the frontier even when it was issued. . . .

No. 45

SIR G. BUCHANAN TO SIR EDWARD GREY

St. Petersburg, July 27, 1914.

Minister for Foreign Affairs has proposed that the modifications to be introduced into Austrian demands should be the subject of direct conversation between Vienna and St. Petersburg.

No. 46

SIR EDWARD GREY TO SIR E. GOSCHEN

London, Foreign Office,

July 27, 1914.

German Ambassador has informed me that German Government accept in principle mediation between Austria and Russia by the four Powers, reserving, of course, their right as an ally to help Austria if attacked. He has also been instructed to request me to use influence in St. Petersburg to localize the war and to keep up the peace of Europe.

I have replied that the Servian reply went further than could have been expected to meet the Austrian demands. German Secretary of State has himself said that there were some things in the Austrian note that Servia could hardly be expected to accept. I assumed that Servian reply could not have gone as far as it did unless Russia had exercised conciliatory influence at Belgrade and it was really at Vienna that moderating influence was now required. . . . Servian reply should at least be treated as a basis for discussion and pause. I said German Government should urge this at Vienna. . . .

No. 47

SIR EDWARD GREY TO SIR G. BUCHANAN

London, Foreign Office,

July 27, 1914.

See my telegram of to-day to Sir E. Goschen. [No. 37.]

I have been told by the Russian Ambassador that in German and Austrian circles impression prevails that in any event we would stand aside. His Excellency deplored the effect that such an impression must produce.

This impression ought, as I have pointed out, to be dispelled. . . .

No. 48

SIR E. GREY TO SIR M. DE BUNSEN

London, Foreign Office,

July 27, 1914.

Count Mensdorff told me by instruction to-day that the Servian Government had not accepted the demands which the Austrian Government were obliged to address to them . . . Very reluctantly, and against their wish, the Austrian Government were compelled to take more severe measures to enforce a fundamental change of the attitude of enmity pursued up to now by Servia. . . .

I said that I could not understand the construction put by the Austrian Government upon the Servian reply. . . .

Count Mensdorff admitted that on paper, the Servian reply might seem to be satisfactory; but the Servians had refused the one thing — the coöperation of Austrian officials and police — which would be a real guarantee that in practice the Servians would not carry on their subversive campaign against Austria. . . .

. . . It seemed to me that the Servian reply already involved the greatest humiliation to Servia that I had ever seen a country undergo, and it was very disappointing to me that the reply was treated by the Austrian Government as if it were as unsatisfactory as a blank negative.

No. 49

SIR EDWARD GREY TO SIR R. RODD

London, Foreign Office,

July 27, 1914.

The Italian Ambassador informed Sir A. Nicolson to-day that the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs agreed entirely with my proposal for a conference of four to be held in London.

As regards the question of asking Russia, Austria-Hungary, and Servia to suspend military operations pending the result of the conference, the Marquis di San Giuliano would recommend the suggestion warmly to the German Government, and would inquire what procedure they would propose should be followed at Vienna.

No. 50

SIR M. DE BUNSEN TO SIR EDWARD GREY

Vienna, July 28, 1914.

I have the honor to transmit to you herewith the text of the Austro-Hungarian note announcing the declaration of war against Servia.

ENCLOSURE IN NO. 50

Copy of Note Verbale, dated Vienna, July 28, 1914.

In order to bring to an end the subversive intrigues originating from Belgrade and aimed at the territorial integrity of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, the Imperial and Royal Government has delivered to the Royal Servian Government a note in which a series of demands were formulated, for the acceptance of which a delay of forty-eight hours has been granted to the Royal Government. The Royal Servian Government not having answered this note in a satisfactory manner, the Imperial and Royal Government are themselves compelled to see to the safeguarding of their rights and interests, and, with this object, to have recourse to force of arms. . . .

No. 51

SIR F. BERTIE TO EDWARD GREY

Paris, July 27, 1914.

I have the honor to transmit to you herewith copy of a memorandum from the acting Minister for Foreign Affairs as to the steps to be taken to prevent an outbreak of hostilities between Austria-Hungary and Servia.

[The enclosure is a note from M. Bienvenue-Martin, dated Paris, July 27th. It acknowledges Sir Edward Grey's proposal to join Germany and Italy in an appeal to Austria and Russia, and offers French support. M. Jules Cambon is to coöperate with the British Ambassador in Berlin and M. Paul Cambon is appointed to take part in the proposed conference. The French minister "considers, however, that the chance of Sir E. Grey's proposal being successful depends essentially on the action which the Berlin Government would be willing to take at Vienna."]

No. 52

NOTE COMMUNICATED BY FRENCH EMBASSY, JULY 28, 1914.

[A formal notification of the same purport as No. 51.]

No. 53

M. SAZONOF TO COUNT BENCKENDORFF

(Communicated by Count Benckendorff, July 28.)

St. Petersburg, July 27, 1914.

The British Ambassador came to ascertain whether we think it desirable that Great Britain should take the initiative in convoking a conference in London of the representatives of England, France, Germany, and Italy to examine the possibility of a way out of the present situation.

I replied to the Ambassador that I have begun conversations with the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador under conditions which I hope may be favorable. . . .

If direct explanations with the Vienna Cabinet were to prove impossible, I am ready to accept the British proposal, or any other proposal of a kind that would bring about a favorable solution of the conflict. . . .

No. 54

M. SAZONOF TO COUNT BENCKENDORFF

(Communicated by Count Benckendorff, July 28, 1914.)

St. Petersburg, July 15 (28), 1914.

My interviews with the German Ambassador confirm my impression that Germany is, if anything, in favor of the uncompromising attitude adopted by Austria.

The Berlin Cabinet, who could have prevented the whole of this crisis developing, appear to be exerting no influence on their ally.

The Ambassador considers that the Servian reply is insufficient. . . .

It seems to me that England is in a better position than any other power to make another attempt at Berlin to induce the German Government to take the necessary action. . . .

No. 55

SIR G. BUCHANAN TO SIR EDWARD GREY

St. Petersburg, July 27, 1914.

I saw the Minister of Foreign Affairs this afternoon and found him very conciliatory and more optimistic.

If he would, he said, use all his influence at Belgrade to induce the Servian Government to go as far as possible

in giving satisfaction to Austria, but her territorial integrity must be guaranteed and her rights as a sovereign State respected, so that she should not become Austria's vassal. . . .

His Excellency said he was perfectly ready to stand aside if the Powers accepted the proposal for a conference, but he trusted that you would keep in touch with the Russian Ambassador in the event of its taking place.

No. 56

SIR M. DE BUNSEN TO SIR EDWARD GREY

Vienna, July 27, 1914.

The Russian Ambassador had to-day a long and earnest conversation with Baron Macchio, the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. . . . He could assure him that if actual war broke out with Servia, it would be impossible to localize it. . . . He earnestly hoped that something would be done before Servia was actually invaded. Baron Macchio replied that this would now be difficult, as a skirmish had already taken place on the Danube, in which the Servians had been aggressors. The Russian Ambassador said that he would do all he could to keep the Servians quiet pending any discussions that might yet take place, and he told me that he would advise his Government to induce the Servian Government to avoid any conflict as long as possible, and to fall back before an Austrian advance. Time so gained should suffice to enable a settlement to be reached. . . .

No. 57

SIR R. RODD TO SIR EDWARD GREY

Rome, July 27, 1914.

Minister for Foreign Affairs greatly doubts whether Germany will be willing to invite Austria to suspend military action pending the conference, but he had hopes that military action may be practically deferred by the fact of the conference meeting at once. As at present informed, he sees no possibility of Austria receding from any point laid down in her note to Servia, but he believes that if Servia will even now accept it Austria will be satisfied, and if she had reason to think that such will be the advice of the Powers, Austria may defer action. Servia may be induced to accept note in its entirety on the advice of the four Powers invited to the conference, and this would enable her to say that she had yielded to Europe and not to Austria-Hungary alone. . . .

No. 58

SIR F. BERTIE TO SIR EDWARD GREY

Paris, July 28, 1914.

[Reporting the transmission of the contents of No. 46 to the French Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.]

No. 59

SIR F. BERTIE TO SIR EDWARD GREY

Paris, July 28, 1914.

[Reporting the transmission of the contents of No. 47 to the French minister.]

. . . . German Ambassador has stated that Austria would respect the integrity of Servia, but when asked whether her independence also would be respected, he gave no assurance.

No. 60

SIR E. GOSCHEN TO SIR EDWARD GREY

Berlin, July 28, 1914.

[British, French, and Italian ambassadors take up the matter of the proposed conference with the German Secretary of State.]

. . . while refusing the proposed conference, he had said to all of us that nevertheless he desired to work with us for the maintenance of general peace. We therefore deduced that if he is sincere in this wish he can only be objecting to the form of your proposal. . . .

No. 61

SIR M. DE BUNSEN TO SIR EDWARD GREY

Vienna, July 28, 1914.

Minister for Foreign Affairs declared that Austria-Hungary cannot delay warlike proceedings against Serbia and would have to decline any suggestion of negotiations on basis of Servian reply.

Prestige of Dual Monarchy was engaged, and nothing could now prevent conflict.

No. 62

SIR M. DE BUNSEN TO SIR EDWARD GREY

Vienna, July 28, 1914.

[Reports the transmission of the contents of No. 46 to the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs.]

. . . I added that you had regarded Servian reply as having gone far to meet just demands of Austria-Hungary; that you thought it constituted a fair basis of discussion during which warlike operations might remain in abeyance, and that Austrian Ambassador in Berlin was speaking in this sense. Minister for Foreign Affairs said quietly, but firmly, that no discussion could be accepted on basis of Servian note; that war would be declared to-day and that well-known pacific character of Emperor, as well as, he might add, his own, might be accepted as a guarantee that war was both just and inevitable. This was a matter that must be settled directly between the two parties immediately concerned. . . .

No. 63

SIR R. RODD TO SIR EDWARD GREY

Rome, July 28, 1914.

[Reports the communication of the substance of No. 27 to the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs.]

No. 64

SIR R. RODD TO SIR EDWARD GREY

Rome, July 28, 1914.

At the request of the Minister for Foreign Affairs, I submit the following to you:

In a long conversation this morning Servian Chargé d'Affaires had said he thought that if some explanations were given regarding mode in which Austrian agents would require to intervene under Article V. and Article VI. Servia might still accept the whole Austrian note.

As it was not to be anticipated that Austria would give such explanations to Servia, they might be given to Powers engaged in discussions, who might then advise Servia to accept without conditions. . . .

Minister impressed upon me, above all, his anxiety for the immediate beginning of the discussion. . . .

No. 65

MR. CRACKANTHORPE TO SIR EDWARD GREY

Nish, July 28, 1914.

I have urged on the Servian Government the greatest moderation pending efforts being made toward a peaceful solution.

Two Servian steamers fired on and damaged, and two Servian merchant vessels have been captured by a Hungarian monitor at Orsova.

No. 66

MR. CRACKANTHORPE TO SIR EDWARD GREY

Nish, July 28, 1914.

Telegram received here that war declared by Austria.

No. 67

SIR EDWARD GREY TO SIR E. GOSCHEN

London, Foreign Office,

July 28, 1914.

Explanation given in your telegram of the 27th July [No. 43] of what was my idea in proposing a conference is quite right. . . .

But as long as there is a prospect of a direct exchange of views between Austria and Russia, I would suspend every other suggestion. . . .

No. 68

SIR EDWARD GREY TO SIR E. GOSCHEN

London, Foreign Office,

July 28, 1914.

German Government, having accepted principle of mediation between Austria and Russia by the four Powers, if necessary, I am ready to propose that the German Secretary of State should suggest the lines on which this principle should be applied. I will, however, keep the idea in reserve until we see how the conversations between Austria and Russia progress.

No. 69

SIR EDWARD GREY TO SIR G. BUCHANAN

London, Foreign Office,

July 28, 1914.

It is most satisfactory that there is a prospect of direct exchange of views between the Russian and Austrian Governments. . . .

No. 70

TELEGRAMS COMMUNICATED BY COUNT BENCKENDORFF,

JULY 29, 1914.

(1) Telegram from M. Sazonof to Russian Ambassador at Berlin, dated July 28, 1914.

In consequence of the declaration of war by Austria against Servia, the Imperial Government will announce to-morrow (29th) the mobilization in the military circumscriptions of Odessa, Kieff, Moscow, and Kazan. Please inform German Government, confirming the absence in Russia of any aggressive intention against Germany.

The Russian Ambassador at Vienna has not been recalled from his post.

(2) Telegram to Count Benckendorff.

The Austrian declaration of war clearly puts an end to the idea of direct communications between Austria and Russia. Action by London Cabinet in order to set on foot mediation with a view to suspension of military operations of Austria against Servia is now most urgent. . . .

No. 71

SIR E. GOSCHEN TO SIR EDWARD GREY

Berlin, July 28, 1914.

Imperial Chancellor said that he wished me to tell you that he was most anxious that Germany should work together with England for maintenance of general peace.

. . . He had not been able to accept your proposal for a conference of representatives of the Great Powers, because he did not think that it would be effective. . . . You could be assured that he was doing his very best both at Vienna and St. Petersburg to get the two Governments to discuss the situation directly with each other and in a friendly way. He had great hopes that such discussions would take place and lead to a satisfactory result, but if the news were true which he had just read in the papers, that Russia had mobilized fourteen army corps in the south, he

thought situation was very serious, and he himself would be in a very difficult position. . . . I ventured to say that if Austria refused to take any notice of Servian note, which, to my mind, gave way in nearly every point demanded by Austria, and which in any case offered a basis for discussion, surely a certain portion of responsibility would rest with her. His Excellency said that he did not wish to discuss Servian note, but that Austria's standpoint, and in this he agreed, was that her quarrel with Servia was a purely Austrian concern with which Russia had nothing to do. . . .

No. 72

SIR G. BUCHANAN TO SIR EDWARD GREY

St. Petersburg, July 28, 1914.

Minister for Foreign Affairs . . . took a pessimistic view of the situation, having received the same disquieting news from Vienna as had reached his Majesty's Government. . . . His Excellency stated that if Servia were attacked, Russia would not be satisfied with any engagement which Austria might take on these two points, and that order for mobilization against Austria would be issued on the day that Austria crossed Servian frontier. . . .

No. 73

SIR M. DE BUNSEN TO SIR EDWARD GREY

Vienna, July 28, 1914.

I have received note verbale from Ministry for Foreign Affairs, stating that the Servian Government not having replied to note of 23d July [No. 4] in a satisfactory manner, Imperial and Royal Government is compelled itself to provide for protection of its rights, and to have recourse for that object to force of arms. . . .

No. 74

SIR M. DE BUNSEN TO SIR EDWARD GREY

Vienna, July 28, 1914.

I am informed by the Russian Ambassador that the Russian Government's suggestion has been declined by the Austro-Hungarian Government. The suggestion was to the effect that the means of settling the Austro-Servian conflict should be discussed directly between Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburg, who should be authorized accordingly.

The Russian Ambassador thinks that a conference in London of the less interested Powers, such as you have proposed, offers now the only prospect of preserving peace of Europe, and he is sure that the Russian Government will acquiesce willingly in your proposal. . . .

No. 75

SIR E. GOSCHEN TO SIR EDWARD GREY

Berlin, July 29, 1914.

The Imperial Chancellor told me that he regretted to state that the Austro-Hungarian Government, to whom he had at once communicated your opinion, had answered that events had marched too rapidly and that it was therefore too late to act upon your suggestion that the Servian reply might form the basis of discussion. . . .

[The German Chancellor upheld Austria for not being satisfied with the Servian reply, but had advised her to make it plain that the projected hostilities were merely to secure guarantees from Servia.]

From the fact that he had gone so far in the matter of giving advice at Vienna, His Excellency hoped that you would realize that he was sincerely doing all in his power to prevent danger of European complications. . . .

No. 76

SIR E. GOSCHEN TO SIR EDWARD GREY

Berlin, July 29, 1914.

[The German Secretary of State stated that his efforts in Vienna had only precipitated action. He was troubled by reports of military measures in Russia and France. The Under Secretary of State thought the time might be right for a discussion by the powers after Austria had entered Servia.]

. . . . Russian Ambassador returned to-day and has informed Imperial Government that Russia is mobilizing in four southern governments.

No. 77

SIR EDWARD GREY TO SIR E. GOSCHEN

London, Foreign Office,
July 29, 1914.

I much appreciate the language of Chancellor, as reported in your telegram of to-day [No. 75]. His Excellency may rely upon it that this country will continue, as heretofore, to strain effort to secure peace and to avert the calamity we all fear. If he can induce Austria to satisfy Russia and to abstain from going so far as to come into collision with her, we shall all join in deep gratitude to His Excellency for having saved the peace of Europe.

No. 78

SIR G. BUCHANAN TO SIR EDWARD GREY

St. Petersburg, July 29, 1914.

Partial mobilization was ordered to-day. . . .

[He reported a conversation with the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, in which the latter explained that the Russian mobilization was directed only against Austria, and stated that the "Austrian Government had now definitely declined direct conversation between Vienna and St. Petersburg." He was now ready to return to the conference proposal. "Any arrangement approved by France and England would be acceptable to him." He insisted that the Russian Government had done its best to maintain peace.]

. . . . His Excellency said that he would agree to anything arranged by the four Powers, provided it was acceptable to Servia; he could not, he said, be more Servian than Servia. . . .

The German Ambassador had informed His Excellency, so the latter told me, that his Government were continuing at Vienna to exert friendly influence. I fear that the German Ambassador will not help to smooth matters over, if he uses to his own Government the same language as he did to me to-day. He accused the Russian Government of endangering the peace of Europe by their mobilization, and said, when I referred to all that had been recently done by Austria, that he could not discuss such matters. . . .

No. 79

SIR M. DE BUNSEN TO SIR EDWARD GREY

Vienna, July 29, 1914.

There is at present no step which we could usefully take to stop war with Servia, to which Austro-Hungarian Government are now fully committed by the Emperor's appeal

to his people, which has been published this morning, and by the declaration of war. . . . If the Austro-Hungarian Government would convert into a binding engagement to Europe the declaration which has been made at St. Petersburg to the effect that she desires neither to destroy the independence of Servia nor to acquire Servian territory, the Italian Ambassador thinks that Russia might be induced to remain quiet. . . .

No. 80

SIR R. RODD TO SIR EDWARD GREY

Rome, July 29, 1914.

[He reports a difference of opinion as to Germany's expressed attitude toward a conference of the Powers.]

. . . He [the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs] is going to urge, in a telegram which he is sending to Berlin to-night, adherence to the idea of an exchange of views in London. He suggests that the German Secretary of State might propose a formula acceptable to his Government. Minister for Foreign Affairs is of opinion that this exchange of views would keep the door open if the direct communication between Vienna and St. Petersburg fails to have any result. . . .

No. 81

SIR EDWARD GREY TO SIR R. RODD

London, Foreign Office,

July 29, 1914.

With reference to your telegram of yesterday [No. 64].

It is impossible for me to initiate discussions with Ambassadors here, as I understand from Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs that Austria will not accept any discussion on basis of Servian note, and the inference of all I have heard from Vienna and Berlin is that Austria will not accept any form of mediation by the Powers as between Austria and Servia. Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs must therefore speak at Berlin and Vienna. . . .

No. 82

MR. BEAUMONT TO SIR EDWARD GREY

Constantinople, July 29, 1914.

[He reports a current rumor that Austria has designs on Salonica.]

No. 83

MR. CRACKANTHORPE TO SIR EDWARD GREY

Nish, July 29, 1914.

[Conveys the thanks of the Servian Prime Minister.]

No. 84

SIR EDWARD GREY TO SIR E. GOSCHEN

London, Foreign Office,

July 29, 1914.

The German Ambassador has been instructed by the German Chancellor to inform me that he is endeavoring to mediate between Vienna and St. Petersburg, and he hopes with good success. . . . I told the German Ambassador that an agreement arrived at direct between Austria and Russia would be the best possible solution. I would press no proposal as long as there was a prospect of that, but my information this morning was that the Austrian Government had declined the suggestion of the Russian Government that the Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburg should be authorized to discuss directly with the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs the means of settling the Austro-Servian conflict. . . . I urged that the German Government should suggest any method by which the influence of the four Powers could be used together to

prevent war between Austria and Russia. France agreed, Italy agreed. The whole idea of mediation or mediating influence was ready to be put into operation by any method that Germany could suggest if mine was not acceptable. In fact, mediation was ready to come into operation by any method that Germany thought possible if only Germany would "press the button" in the interests of peace.

No. 85

SIR E. GOSCHEN TO SIR EDWARD GREY

Berlin, July 29, 1914.

The Chancellor said that should Austria be attacked by Russia a European conflagration might, he feared, become inevitable, owing to Germany's obligations as Austria's ally, in spite of his continued efforts to maintain peace. He then proceeded to make the following strong bid for British neutrality.

[He offered to guarantee that Germany would not seek territorial acquisitions at the expense of France.]

I questioned His Excellency about the French colonies, and he said that he was unable to give a similar undertaking in that respect. As regards Holland, however, His Excellency said that, so long as Germany's adversaries respected the integrity and neutrality of the Netherlands, Germany was ready to give His Majesty's Government an assurance that she would do likewise. It depended upon the action of France what operations Germany might be forced to enter upon in Belgium, but when the war was over Belgian integrity would be respected if she had not sided against Germany. . . .

No. 86

SIR R. RODD TO SIR EDWARD GREY

Rome, July 29, 1914.

Minister for Foreign Affairs thinks that moment is past for any further discussions on basis of Servian note, in view of communication made to-day by Russia at Berlin regarding partial mobilization. The utmost he now hopes for is that Germany may use her influence at Vienna to prevent or moderate any further demands on Servia.

No. 87

SIR EDWARD GREY TO SIR F. BERTIE

London, Foreign Office,

July 29, 1914.

[He reports a conversation with the French Ambassador in which he asserted England's neutrality, stating that she had no concern in the Austro-Servian controversy, and that she would have to decide later what to do in case France were drawn into the struggle. He wished Germany not to count too fully on British neutrality, nor would it be fair to allow France to count too surely on England's armed support.]

M. Cambon said that I had explained the situation very clearly. He understood it to be that in a Balkan quarrel . . . we should not feel called to intervene; should other issues be raised, and Germany and France become involved, so that the question became one of the hegemony of Europe, we should then decide what fit was necessary for us to do. . . .

He anticipated a demand from Germany that France would be neutral while Germany attacked Russia. This assurance, France, of course, could not give; she was bound to help Russia if Russia was attacked.



GERMANS CLOSELY PACKED IN THE TRENCHES



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GENERAL LEMAN DEFENDER OF LIEGE



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THE WOMEN LEFT BEHIND

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TYPES OF SOLDIERS FIGHTING UNDER THE FRENCH FLAG
"TURCOS" FROM ALGERIA AND (ABOVE) MULE BATTERY



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CZAR SAMPLING SOLDIER'S FOOD



RUSSIAN ARTILLERY ON THE WAY TO THE FRONT



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IS THE WAR APPROVED IN BELGIUM AND SERVIA?
SINGING, SHOUTING CROWDS IN BRUSSELS AND BELGRADE



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RAILWAY DESTROYED BY BELGIANS



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REAPING GRAIN AND DIGGING TRENCHES IN BELGIUM



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A SORTIE OF BELGIAN CAVALRY BEFORE HAELEN



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BRUSSELS WOMEN WAITING FOR WEEKLY ALLOWANCE OF 50 TO 65 CENTIMES



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WOMEN AND CHILDREN WAITING FOR MONEY ALLOWED BY THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT



DEFENDERS OF LIÈGE

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THE FRENCH IN ACTION



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FRENCH ARMY IN CAMP



BELGIAN BATTERY ON THE MARCH

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GERMANS CARRYING WOUNDED




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AIDS TO EFFICIENT WARFARE

FRENCH WATER SUPPLY MOTORS (TOP), BRITISH MAXIM GUN (CENTRE), BELGIAN LIGHT ARTILLERY (BOTTOM)

No. 88

SIR EDWARD GREY TO SIR E. GOSCHEN

London, Foreign Office,

July 29, 1914.

I told the German Ambassador this afternoon of the information that I had received, that Russia had informed Germany respecting her mobilization. I also told him of the communication made by Count Benckendorff, that the Austrian declaration of war manifestly rendered vain any direct conversations between Russia and Austria. I said that the hope built upon those direct conversations by the German Government yesterday had disappeared to-day. To-day the German Chancellor was working in the interest of mediation in Vienna and St. Petersburg. If he succeeded, well and good. If not, it was more important than ever that Germany should take up what I had suggested to the German Ambassador this morning, and propose some method by which the four Powers should be able to work together to keep the peace of Europe. I pointed out, however, that the Russian Government, while desirous of mediation, regarded it as a condition that the military operations against Serbia should be suspended. . . .

No. 89

SIR EDWARD GREY TO SIR E. GOSCHEN

London, Foreign Office,

July 29, 1914.

After speaking to the German Ambassador this afternoon about the European situation, I said that . . . the situation was very grave. While it was restricted to the issues at present actually involved we had no thought of interfering in it. But if Germany became involved in it, and then France, the issue might be so great that it would involve all European interests; and I did not wish him to be misled by the friendly tone of our conversation — which I hoped would continue — into thinking that we should stand aside.

He said that he quite understood this, but he asked whether I meant that we should under certain circumstances intervene.

I replied that I did not wish to say that, or to use anything that was like a threat or an attempt to apply pressure by saying that, if things became worse, we should intervene. . . .

No. 90

SIR EDWARD GREY TO SIR E. GOSCHEN

London, Foreign Office,

July 29, 1914.

[A further conversation with the German Ambassador.]

. . . I said I had begun to doubt whether even a complete acceptance of the Austrian demands by Serbia would now satisfy Austria. But there appeared, from what the Marquis di San Giuliano had said, to be a method by which, if the Powers were allowed to have any say in the matter, they might bring about complete satisfaction for Austria, if only the latter would give them an opportunity. . . . The German Ambassador said the view of the German Government was that Austria could not by force be humiliated, and could not abdicate her position as a Great Power. I said I entirely agreed, but it was not a question of humiliating Austria, it was a question of how far Austria meant to push the humiliation of others. There must, of course, be some humiliation of Serbia, but Austria might press things so far as to involve the humiliation of Russia. . . .

No. 91

SIR EDWARD GREY TO SIR M. DE BUNSEN

London, Foreign Office,

July 29, 1914.

The Austrian Ambassador told me to-day he had ready a long memorandum, . . . which he said gave an ac-

count of the conduct of Serbia toward Austria, and an explanation of how necessary the Austrian action was.

I said that I did not wish to discuss the merits of the question between Austria and Serbia. The news to-day seemed to me very bad for the peace of Europe. The Powers were not allowed to help in getting satisfaction for Austria, which they might get if they were given an opportunity, and European peace was at stake.

Count Mensdorff said that the war with Serbia must proceed. Austria could not continue to be exposed to the necessity of mobilizing again and again, as she had been obliged to do in recent years. She had no idea of territorial aggrandizement, and all she wished was to make sure that her interests were safeguarded.

I said that it would be quite possible, without nominally interfering with the independence of Serbia or taking away any of her territory, to turn her into a sort of vassal State. . . .

No. 92

SIR EDWARD GREY TO SIR R. RODD

London, Foreign Office,

July 29, 1914.

The Italian Ambassador made me to-day a communication from the Marquis di San Giuliano suggesting that the German objections to the mediation of the four Powers, a mediation that was strongly favored by Italy, might be removed by some change in the form of procedure.

I said that I had already anticipated this by asking the German Government to suggest any form of procedure under which the idea of mediation between Austria and Russia, already accepted by the German Government in principle, could be applied.

No. 93

TELEGRAMS COMMUNICATED BY COUNT BENCKENDORFF,

JULY 30, 1914

(1) Russian Ambassador at Vienna to M. Sazonof.
Vienna, July 15 (28), 1914.

[The Russian Ambassador at Vienna suggests to the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs that the Russian and Austrian Governments endeavor to reach some friendly understanding regarding Serbia. Count Berchtold agreed in principle, but said that Austria could not recede "nor enter into any discussion about the terms of the Austro-Hungarian note."]

(2) M. Sazonof to Count Benckendorff

St. Petersburg, July 16 (29), 1914.

[The German Ambassador at St. Petersburg had given the Russian Foreign Minister assurances of Germany's continued efforts for peace at Vienna. The latter was inclined to be optimistic.]

. . . I said at the same time that we were quite ready to accept the proposal for a conference of the four Powers, a proposal with which, apparently, Germany was not in entire sympathy. . . .

(3) M. Sazonof to Count Benckendorff.

St. Petersburg, July 16 (29), 1914.

At the time of my interview with the German Ambassador, dealt with in my preceding telegram, I had not yet received M. Schébéko's telegram of the 15th (28th) July.

This telegram reports the refusal of the Vienna Cabinet to agree to a direct exchange of views with the Imperial Government.

From now on nothing remains for us to do but to rely entirely on the British Government to take the initiative in the steps which they may consider advisable.

No. 94

SIR M. DE BUNSEN TO SIR EDWARD GREY

Vienna, July 29, 1914.

I learn that the mobilization of Russian corps destined to carry out operations on Austrian frontier has been ordered. My informant is Russian Ambassador. Ministry for Foreign Affairs here has realized, though somewhat late in the day, that Russia will not remain indifferent in present crisis. . . . Unless mediation which German Government declared themselves ready to offer in concert with three other Great Powers not immediately interested in the Austro-Servian dispute be brought to bear forthwith, irrevocable steps may be taken in present temper of this country. . . . Russian Ambassador expressed the hope that it might still be possible to arrange matters, and explained that it was impossible for Russia to do otherwise than take an interest in the present dispute. Russia, he said, had done what she could already at Belgrade to induce Servian Government to meet principal Austrian demands in a favorable spirit; if approached in a proper manner, he thought she would probably go still further in this direction. But she was justly offended at having been completely ignored, and she could not consent to be excluded from the settlement. German Ambassador said that if proposals were put forward which opened any prospect of possible acceptances by both sides, he personally thought that Germany might consent to act as mediator in concert with the three other Powers. . . .

No. 95

SIR M. DE BUNSEN TO SIR EDWARD GREY

Vienna, July 30, 1914.

Russian Ambassador hopes that Russian mobilization will be regarded by Austria as what it is, viz., a clear intimation that Russia must be consulted regarding the fate of Servia. . . . He says that Russia must have an assurance that Servia will not be crushed. . . .

Unfortunately the German Ambassador is himself so identified with extreme anti-Russian and anti-Servian feeling prevalent in Vienna that he is unlikely to plead the cause of peace with entire sincerity. . . .

No. 96

SIR M. DE BUNSEN TO SIR EDWARD GREY

Vienna, July 30, 1914.

The Russian Ambassador gave the French Ambassador and myself this afternoon at the French Embassy, an account of his interview with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, which he said was quite friendly. The Minister for Foreign Affairs had told him that as Russia had mobilized, Austria must, of course, do the same. This, however, should not be regarded as a threat, but merely as the adoption of military precautions similar to those which had been taken across the frontier. . . .

No. 97

SIR G. BUCHANAN TO SIR EDWARD GREY

St. Petersburg, July 30, 1914.

Minister for Foreign Affairs said that German Ambassador had told him yesterday afternoon that German Government were willing to guarantee that Servian integrity would be respected by Austria. To this he had replied that this might be so, but nevertheless Servia would become an Austrian vassal. . . .

M. Sazonof told us that absolute proof was in possession of Russian Government that Germany was making military and naval preparations against Russia — more particularly in the direction of the Gulf of Finland.

German Ambassador had a second interview with Minister for Foreign Affairs at 2 A. M., when former com-

pletely broke down on seeing that war was inevitable. He appealed to M. Sazonof to make some suggestion which he could telegraph to German Government as a last hope. M. Sazonof accordingly drew up and handed to German Ambassador a formula in French, of which following is a translation:

"If Austria, recognizing that her conflict with Servia has assumed character of question of European interest, declares herself ready to eliminate from her ultimatum points which violate principle of sovereignty of Servia, Russia engages to stop all military preparations."

Preparations for general mobilization will be proceeded with if this proposal is rejected by Austria, and inevitable result will be a European war. . . .

No. 98

SIR E. GOSCHEN TO SIR EDWARD GREY

Berlin, July 30, 1914.

[The German Secretary of State asserted that he was making continued efforts at Vienna, now suggesting a conference after the occupation of Belgrade. He was much disturbed by Russia's mobilization, however.]

No. 99

SIR F. BERTIE TO SIR EDWARD GREY

Paris, July 30, 1914.

[In view of the reports regarding Germany's demand that Russia cease her mobilization, the President of France urged upon the British Ambassador the desirability of England's announcing her stand by the side of France. Such a declaration would very likely restrain Germany and prevent war.]

No. 100

SIR R. RODD TO SIR EDWARD GREY

Rome, July 30, 1914.

German Ambassador told me last night that he thought that Germany would be able to prevent Austria from making any exorbitant demands if Servia could be induced to submit, and to ask for peace early, say, as soon as the occupation of Belgrade had been accomplished. . . .

No. 101

SIR EDWARD GREY TO SIR E. GOSCHEN

London, Foreign Office,

July 30, 1914.

His Majesty's Government cannot for a moment entertain the Chancellor's proposal that they should bind themselves to neutrality on such terms.

What he asks us in effect is to engage to stand by while French colonies are taken and France is beaten so long as Germany does not take French territory as distinct from the colonies.

From the material point of view such a proposal is unacceptable, for France, without further territory in Europe being taken from her, could be so crushed as to lose her position as a Great Power, and become subordinate to German policy.

Altogether apart from that, it would be a disgrace for us to make this bargain with Germany at the expense of France, a disgrace from which the good name of this country would never recover.

The Chancellor also in effect asks us to bargain away whatever obligation or interest we have as regards the neutrality of Belgium. We could not entertain that bargain either.

[Further than this he does not commit himself, but urges that Germany and England continue to work together for the peace of Europe. He hints at the possibility, at some future time, of an Anglo-German entente.]

No. 102

SIR EDWARD GREY TO SIR E. GOSCHEN
London, Foreign Office,
July 30, 1914.

I have warned Prince Lichnowsky that Germany must not count upon our standing aside in all circumstances.

No. 103

SIR EDWARD GREY TO SIR G. BUCHANAN
London Foreign Office,
July, 30, 1914.

German Ambassador informs me that German Government would endeavor to influence Austria, after taking Belgrade and Servian territory in region of frontier, to promise not to advance further while Powers endeavored to arrange that Servia should give satisfaction sufficient to pacify Austria.

Russian Ambassador has told me of condition laid down by M. Sazonof, as quoted in your telegram of the 30th July [No. 97], and fears it cannot be modified; but if Austrian advance were stopped after occupation of Belgrade, I think Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs' formula might be changed to read that the Powers would examine how Servia could fully satisfy Austria without impairing Servian sovereign rights or independence.

It is a slender chance of preserving peace, but the only one I can suggest if Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs can come to no agreement at Berlin. You should inform Minister for Foreign Affairs.

No. 104

SIR EDWARD GREY TO SIR F. BERTIE
London, Foreign Office,
July 30, 1914.

You should inform the Minister for Foreign Affairs of my telegram to Sir G. Buchanan of to-day [No. 103], and say that I know that he has been urging Russia not to precipitate a crisis. I hope he may be able to support this last suggestion at St. Petersburg.

No. 105

SIR EDWARD GREY TO SIR F. BERTIE
London, Foreign Office,
July 30, 1914.

M. Cambon reminded me to-day of the letter I had written to him two years ago, in which we agreed that, if the peace of Europe was seriously threatened, we would discuss what we were prepared to do. I inclose for convenience of reference copies of the letter in question and of M. Cambon's reply. He said that the peace of Europe was never more seriously threatened than it was now. He did not wish to ask me to say directly, that we would intervene, but he would like me to say what we should do if certain circumstances arose. The particular hypothesis he had in mind was an aggression by Germany on France.

[There are three enclosures with No. 105. The first is a letter from Sir Edward Grey to the French Ambassador, dated November 22, 1912, in which he agreed that the danger of an attack by a third Power should serve as the basis of a conference

and a discussion as to whether the two nations should stand together for the preservation of peace. The second enclosure, M. Cambon to Sir Edward Grey, dated November 23rd, is a formal acknowledgment and agreement in this principle. The third enclosure is in the nature of evidence of the danger of attack. It is a dispatch from the French Foreign Minister to M. Cambon, dated July 31, 1914. It reports that the German army is on the French frontier and has even penetrated French territory.]

. . . but the Government wishes to make it clear to public opinion and to the British Government that in no case will France be the aggressor. . . .

[Specific information follows as to the movement of German troops.]

As you see, Germany has done it. I would add that all my information goes to show that the German preparations began on Saturday, the very day on which the Austrian note was handed in. . . .

No. 106

SIR R. RODD TO SIR EDWARD GREY

Rome, July 30, 1914.

I learned from the Minister for Foreign Affairs, who sent for me this evening, that the Austrian Government had declined to continue the direct exchange of views with the Russian Government. But he had reason to believe that Germany was now disposed to give more conciliatory advice to Austria, as she seemed convinced that we should act with France and Russia, and was most anxious to avoid issue with us.

He said he was telegraphing to the Italian Ambassador at Berlin to ask the German Government to suggest that the idea of an exchange of views between the four Powers should be resumed in any form which Austria would consider acceptable. . . .

[Two or three methods of procedure are suggested.]

No. 107

SIR E. GOSCHEN TO SIR EDWARD GREY

Berlin, July 30, 1914.

[The German Government had taken no action regarding a conference of the four Powers. The German Secretary of State thought time would be saved by direct communication with Vienna. The Chancellor stated that everything possible was being done.]

No. 108

SIR E. GOSCHEN TO SIR EDWARD GREY

Berlin, July 31, 1914.

Chancellor informs me that his efforts to preach peace and moderation at Vienna have been seriously handicapped by the Russian mobilization against Austria. He has done everything possible to attain his object at Vienna, perhaps even rather more than was altogether palatable at the Ballplatz.

[Meanwhile, Russian mobilization was forcing Germany to act.]

No. 109

SIR E. GOSCHEN TO SIR EDWARD GREY
Berlin, July 31, 1914.

[He reports the delivery of No. 101, and states that the Chancellor, being much occupied, received it without comment.]

No. 110

SIR EDWARD GREY TO SIR G. BUCHANAN
London, Foreign Office,
July 31, 1914.

I learn from the German Ambassador that, as a result of suggestions by the German Government, a conversation has taken place at Vienna between the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Russian Ambassador. The Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburg has also been instructed that he may converse with the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, and that he should give explanations about the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia, and discuss suggestions and any questions directly affecting Austro-Russian relations. . . .

The German Ambassador asked me to urge the Russian Government to show good will in the discussions and to suspend their military preparations. . . .

I informed the German Ambassador that, as regards military preparations, I did not see how Russia could be urged to suspend them unless some limit were put by Austria to the advance of her troops into Servia.

No. 111

SIR EDWARD GREY TO SIR E. GOSCHEN
London, Foreign Office,
July 31, 1914.

I hope that the conversations which are now proceeding between Austria and Russia may lead to a satisfactory result. The stumbling block hitherto has been Austrian mistrust of Servian assurances and Russian mistrust of Austrian intentions with regard to the independence and integrity of Servia. It has occurred to me that, in the event of this mistrust preventing a solution being found by Vienna and St. Petersburg, Germany might sound Vienna, and I would undertake to sound St. Petersburg, whether it would be possible for the four disinterested Powers to offer to Austria that they would undertake to see that she obtained full satisfaction of her demands on Servia, provided that they did not impair Servian sovereignty and the integrity of Servian territory. . . .

I said to German Ambassador this morning that if Germany could get any reasonable proposal put forward which made it clear that Germany and Austria were striving to preserve European peace, and that Russia and France would be unreasonable if they rejected it, I would support it at St. Petersburg and Paris, and go the length of saying that if Russia and France would not accept it His Majesty's Government would have nothing more to do with the consequences; but, otherwise, I told German Ambassador that if France became involved we should be drawn in. . . .

No. 112

SIR E. GOSCHEN TO SIR EDWARD GREY
Berlin, July 31, 1914.

[The German Chancellor reports that complete Russian mobilization is going forward and that Germany must follow suit, precautionary measures having already been taken.]

I asked him whether he could not still put pressure on the authorities at Vienna to do something in general interests to reassure Russia and to show themselves disposed to continue discussions on a friendly basis. He replied that

last night he had begged Austria to reply to your last proposal, and that he had received a reply to the effect that Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs would take wishes of the Emperor this morning in the matter.

No. 113

SIR G. BUCHANAN TO SIR EDWARD GREY
St. Petersburg, July 31, 1914.

It has been decided to issue orders for general mobilization.

This decision was taken in consequence of report received from Russian Ambassador in Vienna to the effect that Austria is determined not to yield to intervention of Powers, and that she is moving troops against Russia as well as against Servia.

Russia has also reason to believe that Germany is making active military preparations, and she cannot afford to let her get a start.

No. 114

SIR EDWARD GREY TO SIR F. BERTIE AND SIR E. GOSCHEN
London, Foreign Office,
July 31, 1914.

I still trust situation is not irretrievable, but in view of prospect of mobilization in Germany, it becomes essential to His Majesty's Government, in view of existing treaties, to ask whether French (German) Government is prepared to engage to respect neutrality of Belgium so long as no other Power violates it. . . .

No. 115

SIR EDWARD GREY TO SIR F. VILLIERS
London, Foreign Office,
July 31, 1914.

In view of existing treaties, you should inform Minister for Foreign Affairs that, in consideration of the possibility of a European war, I have asked French and German Governments whether each is prepared to respect the neutrality of Belgium provided it is violated by no other Power.

You should say that I assume that the Belgian Government will maintain to the utmost of her power her neutrality, which I desire and expect other Powers to uphold and observe. . . .

No. 116

SIR EDWARD GREY TO SIR F. BERTIE
London, Foreign Office,
July 31, 1914.

[Replying to No. 99, he believes no British treaty obligations are involved. He has repeated to the French Ambassador that England cannot consider intervention at present.]

No. 117

SIR F. BERTIE TO SIR EDWARD GREY
Paris, July 31, 1914.

At 7 o'clock this evening I was sent for by Minister for Foreign Affairs. . . .

German Ambassador had informed his Excellency that, in view of the fact that orders had been given for the total mobilization of Russian army and fleet, German Government have in an ultimatum which they have addressed to the Russian Government required that Russian forces should be demobilized.

The German Government will consider it necessary to order the total mobilization of the German Army on the Russian and French frontiers if within twelve hours the Russian Government do not give an undertaking to comply with German demand.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs asks me to communicate this to you, and inquires what, in these circumstances, will be the attitude of England. . . .

No. 118

SIR M. DE BUNSEN TO SIR EDWARD GREY

Vienna, July 31, 1914.

I am informed by Count Forgach, Under Secretary of State, that although Austria was compelled to respond to Russian mobilization, which he deplored, the Austrian Ambassador in London has received instructions to inform you that mobilization was not to be regarded as a necessarily hostile act on either side. Telegrams were being exchanged between the Emperor of Russia and the German Emperor, and conversations were proceeding between Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburg and Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. A general war might, he seriously hoped, be staved off by these efforts. On my expressing my fear that Germany would mobilize, he said that Germany must do something, in his opinion, to secure her position. As regards Russian intervention on behalf of Serbia, Austria-Hungary found it difficult to recognize such a claim. . . .

[He reports the Russian Ambassador in Vienna to be working for peace.]

No. 119

SIR EDWARD GREY TO SIR F. BERTIE

London, Foreign Office,

July 31, 1914.

[He has told M. Cambon that he has declined to say to Germany that England would remain neutral.]

I said that we had come to the conclusion in the Cabinet to-day that we could not give any pledge at the present time. Though we should have to put our policy before Parliament, we could not pledge Parliament in advance. . . . The preservation of the neutrality of Belgium might be, I would not say a decisive, but an important factor, in determining our attitude. . . .

No. 120

SIR G. BUCHANAN TO SIR EDWARD GREY

St. Petersburg, July 31, 1914.

Minister for Foreign Affairs sent for me and French Ambassador and asked us to telegraph to our respective Governments subjoined formula as best calculated to amalgamate proposal made by you in your telegram of 30th July [No. 103], with formula recorded in my telegram of 30th July [No. 97]. He trusted it would meet with your approval.

"If Austria will agree to check the advance of her troops on Servian territory; if recognizing that the dispute between Austria and Serbia has assumed a character of European interest, she will allow the Great Powers to look into the matter and determine whether Serbia could satisfy the Austro-Hungarian Government without impairing her rights as a sovereign State or her independence, Russia will undertake to maintain her waiting attitude." . . .

M. Sazonof said that undoubtedly there would be better prospect of a peaceful solution if the suggested conversation were to take place in London, where the atmosphere was far more favorable, and he therefore hoped that you would see your way to agreeing to this. . . .

No. 121

SIR E. GOSCHEN TO SIR EDWARD GREY

Berlin, July 31, 1914.

I spent an hour with Secretary of State urging him most earnestly to accept your proposal [See No. 111], and make another effort to prevent terrible catastrophe of a European war.

He expressed himself very sympathetically toward your proposal, and appreciated your continued efforts to main-

tain peace, but said it was impossible for the Imperial Government to consider any proposal until they had received an answer from Russia to their communication of to-day; this communication, which he admitted had the form of an ultimatum, being that, unless Russia could inform the Imperial Government within twelve hours that she would immediately countermand her mobilization against Germany and Austria, Germany would be obliged on her side to mobilize at once. . . .

[He insisted that Germany had not ceased to labor with Austria for peace, but that "Russia's mobilization has spoiled everything."]

No. 122

SIR E. GOSCHEN TO SIR EDWARD GREY

Berlin, July 31, 1914.

Neutrality of Belgium, referred to in your telegram of 31st July to Sir F. Bertie [No. 114].

I have seen Secretary of State, who informs me that he must consult the Emperor and the Chancellor before he could possibly answer. I gathered from what he said that he thought any reply they might give could not but disclose a certain amount of their plan of campaign in the event of war ensuing, and he was therefore very doubtful whether they would return any answer at all. . . .

It appears from what he said that German Government consider that certain hostile acts have already been committed by Belgium. As an instance of this, he alleged that a consignment of corn for Germany had been placed under an embargo already. . . .

No. 123

SIR EDWARD GREY TO SIR E. GOSCHEN

London, Foreign Office,

August 1, 1914.

I told the German Ambassador to-day that the reply [No. 122] of the German Government with regard to the neutrality of Belgium was a matter of very great regret, because the neutrality of Belgium affected feeling in this country. If Germany could see her way to give the same assurance as that which had been given by France, it would materially contribute to relieve anxiety and tension here. On the other hand, if there were a violation of the neutrality of Belgium by one combatant while the other respected it, it would be extremely difficult to restrain public feeling in this country. . . .

He asked me whether, if Germany gave a promise not to violate Belgium neutrality, we would engage to remain neutral.

I replied that I could not say that; our hands were still free, and we were considering what our attitude should be. . . .

The Ambassador pressed me as to whether I could not formulate conditions on which we would remain neutral. He even suggested that the integrity of France and her colonies might be guaranteed.

I said that I felt obliged to refuse definitely any promise to remain neutral on similar terms, and I could only say that we must keep our hands free.

No. 124

SIR F. BERTIE TO SIR EDWARD GREY

Paris, July 31, 1914.

On the receipt at 8:30 to-night of your telegram of this afternoon [No. 114], I sent a message to Minister for Foreign Affairs requesting to see him. . . .

He told me that a communication had been made to you by the German Ambassador in London of the intention of Germany to order a general mobilization of her army if Russia do not demobilize at once. He is urgently anxious as to what the attitude of England will be in the circumstances. . . .

No. 125

SIR F. BERTIE TO SIR EDWARD GREY

Paris, July 31, 1914.

Political Director has brought me the reply of the Minister of Foreign Affairs to your inquiry respecting the neutrality of Belgium. It is as follows:

French Government are resolved to respect the neutrality of Belgium, and it would only be in the event of some other Power violating that neutrality that France might find herself under the necessity, in order to assure defense of her own security, to act otherwise. This assurance has been given several times. President of the Republic spoke of it to the King of the Belgians, and the French Minister at Brussels has spontaneously renewed the assurance to the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs to-day.

No. 126

SIR F. BERTIE TO SIR EDWARD GREY

Paris, August 1, 1914.

I have had conversation with the Political Director, who states that the German Ambassador was informed that it . . . seemed strange to the French Government that in view of the fact that Russia and Austria were ready to converse, the German Government should have at that moment presented an ultimatum at St. Petersburg requiring immediate demobilization by Russia. There were no differences at issue between France and Germany, but the German Ambassador had made a menacing communication to the French Government and had requested an answer the next day, intimating that he would have to break off relations and leave Paris if the reply were not satisfactory. The Ambassador was informed that the French Government considered that this was an extraordinary proceeding. . . .

No. 127

SIR M. DE BUNSEN TO SIR EDWARD GREY

Vienna, August 1, 1914.

General mobilization of army and fleet.

No. 128

SIR F. VILLIERS TO SIR EDWARD GREY

Brussels, August 1, 1914.

. . . Belgium expects and desires that other Powers will observe and uphold her neutrality, which she intends to maintain to the utmost of her power. In so informing me, Minister for Foreign Affairs said that, in the event of the violation of the neutrality of their territory, they believed that they were in a position to defend themselves against intrusion. . . .

No. 129

MINISTER OF STATE, LUXEMBURG, TO SIR EDWARD GREY

Luxemburg, August 2, 1914.

The Luxemburg Minister of State has just received through the German Minister in Luxemburg, M. de Buch, a telegram from the Chancellor of the German Empire, Bethmann-Hollweg, to the effect that the military measures taken in Luxemburg do not constitute a hostile act against Luxemburg, but are only intended to insure against a possible attack of a French army. Full compensation will be paid to Luxemburg for any damage caused by using the railways, which are leased to the Empire.

No. 130

SIR EDWARD GREY TO SIR E. GOSCHEN

London, Foreign Office,

August 1, 1914.

We are informed that authorities at Hamburg have forcibly detained steamers belonging to the Great Central Company and other British merchant ships.

I cannot ascertain on what grounds the detention of British ships has been ordered.

You should request German Government to send im-

mediate orders that they should be allowed to proceed without delay. The effect on public opinion here will be deplorable unless this is done. . . .

No. 131

SIR EDWARD GREY TO SIR E. GOSCHEN

London, Foreign Office,

August 1, 1914.

I still believe that it might be possible to secure peace if only a little respite in time can be gained before any great Power begins war.

The Russian Government has communicated to me the readiness of Austria to discuss with Russia and the readiness of Austria to accept a basis of mediation which is not open to the objections raised in regard to the formula which Russia originally suggested.

Things ought not to be hopeless so long as Austria and Russia are ready to converse, and I hope that German Government may be able to make use of the Russian communications referred to above, in order to avoid tension. . . .

No. 132

SIR EDWARD GREY TO SIR E. GOSCHEN

London, Foreign Office,

August 1, 1914.

Following telegram from M. Sazonof to Count Benckendorff of the 31st July communicated to me to-day:

[Same formula as in No. 120.]

(Above communicated to all the Powers.)

No. 133

SIR EDWARD GREY TO SIR E. GOSCHEN

London, Foreign Office,

August 1, 1914.

M. De Etter came to-day to communicate the contents of a telegram from M. Sazonof, dated the 31st July, which are as follows:

"The Austro-Hungarian Ambassador declares the readiness of his Government to discuss the substance of the Austrian ultimatum to Servia. M. Sazonof replied by expressing his satisfaction, and said it was desirable that the discussions should take place in London with the participation of the Great Powers.

"M. Sazonof hoped that the British Government would assume the direction of these discussions. The whole of Europe would be thankful to them. It would be very important that Austria should meanwhile put a stop provisionally to her military action on Servian territory."

(The above has been communicated to the six Powers.)

No. 134

SIR F. BERTIE TO SIR EDWARD GREY

Paris, August 1, 1914.

President of the Republic has informed me that German Government were trying to saddle Russia with the responsibility; that it was only after a decree of general mobilization had been issued in Austria that the Emperor of Russia ordered a general mobilization; that, although the measures which the German Government have already taken are in effect a general mobilization, they are not so designated; that a French general mobilization will become necessary in self-defense, and that France is already forty-eight hours behind Germany as regards German military preparations; that the French troops have orders not to go nearer to the German frontier than a distance of ten kilometers so as to avoid any grounds for accusations of provocation to Germany, whereas the German troops, on the other hand, are actually on the French frontier and have made incursions on it; that, notwithstanding mobilizations, the Emperor of Russia has expressed himself ready to continue his conversations with the German Ambassador with

a view to preserving the peace; that French Government, whose wishes are markedly pacific, sincerely desire the preservation of peace and do not quite despair, even now, of its being possible to avoid war.

No. 135

SIR EDWARD GREY TO SIR G. BUCHANAN
London, Foreign Office,
August 1, 1914.

Information reaches me from a most reliable source that Austrian Government have informed German Government that, though the situation has been changed by the mobilization of Russia, they would, in full appreciation of the efforts of England for the preservation of peace, be ready to consider favorably my proposal for mediation between Austria and Servia. The understanding of this acceptance would naturally be that the Austrian military action against Servia would continue for the present, and that the British Government would urge upon Russian Government to stop the mobilization of troops directed against Austria, in which case Austria would naturally cancel those defensive military counter-measures in Galicia, which have been forced upon Austria by Russian mobilization.

You should inform Minister for Foreign Affairs and say that if, in the consideration of the acceptance of mediation by Austria, Russia can agree to stop mobilization, it appears still to be possible to preserve peace. . . .

No. 136

SIR F. BERTIE TO SIR EDWARD GREY

Paris, August 1, 1914.

Minister of War informed Military Attaché this afternoon that orders had been given at 3:40 for a general mobilization of the French Army. . . .

[Details of the German mobilization follow.]

. . . The French forces on the frontier have opposed to them eight army corps on a war footing, and an attack is expected at any moment. . . . The French troops will not attack, and the Minister of War is anxious that it should be explained that this act of mobilization is one for purely defensive purposes.

No. 137

SIR EDWARD GREY TO SIR M. DE BUNSEN
London, Foreign Office,
August 1, 1914.

I saw the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador this morning. He supplied me with the substance of a telegram which the Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs had sent to the Austrian Ambassador in Paris. In this telegram His Excellency was given instructions to assure the French Minister for Foreign Affairs that there was no intention in the minds of the Austro-Hungarian Government to impair the sovereign rights of Servia or to obtain territorial aggrandizement.

Count Mensdorff informed me of a telegram sent yesterday to the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at St. Petersburg by Count Berchtold, and gave me the substance.

[It asserted that the conversations with Russia had not been broken off by Austria and repeated that Austria did not seek territorial acquisitions from Servia.]

No. 138

SIR E. GOSCHEN TO SIR EDWARD GREY
Berlin, August 1, 1914.

I have communicated the substance of your telegram [No. 131] to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and spent a long time arguing with him that the chief dispute

was between Austria and Russia, and that Germany was only drawn in as Austria's ally. If, therefore, Austria and Russia were, as was evident, ready to discuss matters and Germany did not desire war on her own account, it seemed to me only logical that Germany should hold her hand and continue to work for a peaceful settlement. Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs said that Austria's readiness to discuss was the result of German influence at Vienna, and, had not Russia mobilized against Germany, all would have been well. But Russia, by abstaining from answering Germany's demand that she should demobilize, had caused Germany to mobilize also. . . .

The situation now was that, though the Imperial Government had allowed her several hours beyond the specified time, Russia had sent no answer. Germany had, therefore, ordered mobilization, and the German representative at St. Petersburg had been instructed within a certain time to inform the Russian Government that the Imperial Government must regard their refusal to answer as creating a state of war.

No. 139

SIR G. BUCHANAN TO SIR EDWARD GREY
St. Petersburg, Aug. 1, 1914.

[He reports diplomatic exchanges in St. Petersburg which amounted to marking time. He also reports a conversation with M. Sazonof in which the latter sought to justify Russia's position, accusing Austria of double dealing, and saying that "it was, in fact, for Russia a question of life and death." He was "completely weary with the ceaseless endeavors he had made to avoid a war." Russia had been patient, but had been forced to act.]

M. Sazonof added that the formula, of which the text is contained in my telegram of 31st July [No. 120] had been forwarded by the Russian Government to Vienna, and he would adhere to it if you could obtain its acceptance before the frontier was crossed by German troops. In no case would Russia begin hostilities first.

I now see no possibility of a general war being avoided unless the agreement of France and Germany can be obtained to keep their armies mobilized on their own sides of the frontier, as Russia has expressed her readiness to do, pending a last attempt to reach a settlement of the present crisis.

No. 140

SIR F. BERTIE TO SIR EDWARD GREY
Paris, August 1, 1914.

[He reports the French military situation as given by the Minister of War to the military attaché, offering "proof of the French endeavors to commit no provocative act."]

No. 141

SIR M. DE BUNSEN TO SIR EDWARD GREY
Vienna, August 1, 1914.

[He reports that the Russian Ambassador has informed him of Germany's ultimatum and says that "there seems to be even greater tension between Germany and Russia than between Austria and Russia."]

. . . I agree with His Excellency that the German Ambassador at Vienna desired war from the first, and that

his strong personal bias probably colored his action here. The Russian Ambassador is convinced that the German Government also desired war from the first. . . . I fear that nothing can alter the determination of Austro-Hungarian Government to proceed on their present course if they have made up their mind with the approval of Germany.

No. 142

SIR E. GOSCHEN TO SIR EDWARD GREY

Berlin, August 1, 1914.

Orders have just been issued for the general mobilization of the navy and army, the first day of mobilization to be 2nd August.

No. 143

SIR E. GOSCHEN TO SIR EDWARD GREY

Berlin, August 1, 1914.

Detention of British merchant ships at Hamburg. . . . Secretary of State, who expressed the greatest surprise and annoyance, has promised to send orders at once to allow steamers to proceed without delay.

No. 144

SIR E. GOSCHEN TO SIR EDWARD GREY

Berlin, August 2, 1914.

Secretary of State has just informed me that, owing to certain Russian troops having crossed the frontier, Germany and Russia are now in a state of war.

No. 145

SIR E. GOSCHEN TO SIR EDWARD GREY

Berlin, August 2, 1914.

Secretary of State informs me that orders were sent last night to allow British ships in Hamburg to proceed on their way. He says that this must be regarded as a special favor to His Majesty's Government, as no other foreign ships have been allowed to leave. Reason of detention was that mines were being laid and other precautions being taken.

No. 146

SIR F. VILLIERS TO SIR EDWARD GREY

Brussels, August 2, 1914.

The news that a German force has entered Grand Duchy Luxemburg has been officially confirmed to the Belgian Government.

No. 147

MINISTER OF STATE, LUXEMBURG, TO SIR EDWARD GREY

Luxemburg, Aug. 2, 1914.

[The notice of a formal protest to Germany, against the violation of neutrality is communicated to the Powers.]

No. 148

SIR EDWARD GREY TO SIR F. BERTIE

London, Foreign Office,

August 2, 1914.

After the Cabinet this morning I gave M. Cambon the following memorandum:

"I am authorized to give an assurance that, if the German fleet comes into the Channel or through the North Sea to undertake hostile operations against French coasts or shipping, the British fleet will give all the protection in its power.

"This assurance is of course subject to the policy of His Majesty's Government receiving the support of Parliament, and must not be taken as binding His Majesty's Government to take any action until the above contingency of action by the German fleet takes place."

[Sir Edward refrained from binding Great Britain to any agreement regarding war, but

offered assurances that would enable France to know how to dispose her fleet. He said that England's position regarding the violation of Belgian neutrality was being considered.]

No. 149

SIR EDWARD GREY TO SIR E. GOSCHEN

London, Foreign Office,

August 2, 1914.

I regret to learn that 100 tons of sugar was compulsorily unloaded from the British steamship *Sappho* at Hamburg and detained. Similar action appears to have been taken with regard to other British vessels loaded with sugar.

You should inform Secretary of State that, for reasons stated in my telegram of 1st August [No. 130], I most earnestly trust that the orders already sent to Hamburg to allow the clearance of British ships cover also the release of their cargoes, the detention of which cannot be justified.

No. 150

SIR E. GOSCHEN TO SIR EDWARD GREY

Berlin, August 3, 1914.

Detention of British ships at Hamburg.

No information available.

No. 151

SIR F. VILLIERS TO SIR EDWARD GREY

Brussels, August 3, 1914.

French Government have offered through their Military Attaché the support of five French Army corps to the Belgian Government. . . .

[Belgium's reply of thanks is appended.]

No. 152

SIR EDWARD GREY TO SIR F. BERTIE

London, Foreign Office,

August 3, 1914.

On the 1st instant the French Ambassador made the following communication:

"In reply to the German Government's intimation of the fact that ultimatums had been presented to France and Russia, and to the question as to what were the intentions of Italy, the Marquis di San Giuliano replied:

"The war undertaken by Austria, and the consequences which might result, had, in the words of the German Ambassador himself, an aggressive object. Both were therefore in conflict with the purely defensive character of the Triple Alliance, and in such circumstances Italy would remain neutral."

In making this communication, M. Cambon was instructed to lay stress upon the Italian declaration that the present war was not a defensive but an aggressive war, and that, for this reason, the *casus fœderis* under the terms of the Triple Alliance did not arise.

No. 153

SIR EDWARD GREY TO SIR E. GOSCHEN

London, Foreign Office,

August 4, 1914.

The King of the Belgians has made an appeal to His Majesty the King for diplomatic intervention on behalf of Belgium in the following terms:

"Remembering the numerous proofs of Your Majesty's friendship and that of your predecessor, and the friendly attitude of England in 1870, and the proof of friendship you have just given us again, I make a supreme appeal to the diplomatic intervention of Your Majesty's Government to safeguard the integrity of Belgium."

His Majesty's Government are also informed that the

German Government has delivered to the Belgian Government a note proposing friendly neutrality entailing free passage through Belgian territory, and promising to maintain the independence and integrity of the kingdom and its possessions at the conclusion of peace, threatening in case of refusal to treat Belgium as an enemy. An answer was requested within twelve hours.

We also understand that Belgium has categorically refused this as a flagrant violation of the law of nations.

His Majesty's Government are bound to protest against this violation of a treaty to which Germany is a party in common with themselves, and must request an assurance that the demand made upon Belgium will not be proceeded with, and that her neutrality will be respected by Germany. . . .

No. 154

SIR F. VILLIERS TO SIR EDWARD GREY

Brussels, August 4, 1914.

German Minister has this morning addressed note to Minister for Foreign Affairs stating that as Belgian Government have declined the well-intentioned proposals submitted to them by the Imperial Government, the latter will, deeply to their regret, be compelled to carry out, if necessary by force of arms, the measures considered indispensable in view of the French menaces.

No. 155

SIR EDWARD GREY TO SIR F. VILLIERS

London, Foreign Office,

August 4, 1914.

You should inform Belgian Government that if pressure is applied to them by Germany to induce them to depart from neutrality, His Majesty's Government expect that they will resist by any means in their power, and that His Majesty's Government will support them in offering such resistance, and that His Majesty's Government in this event are prepared to join Russia and France, if desired, in offering to the Belgian Government at once common action for the purpose of resisting use of force by Germany against them, and a guarantee to maintain their independence and integrity in future years.

No. 156

SIR EDWARD GREY TO SIR E. GOSCHEN

London, Foreign Office,

August 4, 1914.

I continue to receive numerous complaints from British firms as to the detention of their ships at Hamburg, Cux-

haven, and other German ports. This action on the part of the German authorities is totally unjustifiable. It is in direct contravention of international law and of the assurances given to Your Excellency by the Imperial Chancellor. You should demand the immediate release of all British ships if such release has not yet been given.

No. 157

GERMAN FOREIGN SECRETARY TO PRINCE LICHNOWSKY
(Communicated by German Embassy, August 4.)

Berlin, August 4, 1914.

Please dispel any mistrust that may subsist on the part of the British Government with regard to our intentions, by repeating most positively formal assurance that, even in the case of armed conflict with Belgium, Germany will, under no pretense whatever, annex Belgian territory. . . . Germany had to disregard Belgian neutrality, it being for her a question of life or death to prevent French advance.

No. 158

SIR F. VILLIERS TO SIR EDWARD GREY

Brussels, August 4, 1914.

Military Attaché has been informed at War Office that German troops have entered Belgian territory, and that Liège has been summoned to surrender by small party of Germans who, however, were repulsed.

No. 159

SIR EDWARD GREY TO SIR E. GOSCHEN

London, Foreign Office,

August 4, 1914.

We hear that Germany has addressed note to Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs stating that German Government will be compelled to carry out, if necessary by force of arms, the measures considered indispensable.

We are also informed that Belgian territory has been violated at Gemmenich.

In these circumstances, and in view of the fact that Germany declined to give the same assurance respecting Belgium as France gave last week in reply to our request made simultaneously at Berlin and Paris, we must repeat that request, and ask that a satisfactory reply to it and to my telegram of this morning [No. 153] be received here by 12 o'clock to-night. If not, you are instructed to ask for your passports, and to say that His Majesty's Government feel bound to take all steps in their power to uphold the neutrality of Belgium and the observance of a treaty to which Germany is as much a party as ourselves.

"THE GERMAN WHITE PAPER"

THIS document, which is offered here in an abridged form, was given out by the German Foreign Office on August 3rd, and appeared in the *New York Times* August 24th. It comprises some 15,000 words in the original and is not merely a collection of correspondence like the British "White Paper," but is also an official review of the causes of the war. It presents Germany's version of the crisis and includes a portion of the correspondence between the German Government and its representatives in foreign capitals. It brings the history of German negotiations down to August 2nd.

TEXT OF THE GERMAN "WHITE PAPER"

On June 28 last the successor to the Austrian throne, Archduke Franz Ferdinand, and his wife, the Duchess of Hohenberg, were assassinated by the revolver shots of a member of a Servian band of conspirators. An investigation of the crime by Austro-Hungarian officials has revealed that the plot to take the life of the Archduke was planned and promoted in Belgrade with the coöperation of official

Servian individuals, and was carried out with weapons from the Servian Government depot.

This crime was bound to open the eyes of the whole civilized world, not only with regard to the object of Servian politics as relating to the existence and integrity of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, but also with regard to the criminal means that the Pan-Servian propaganda did not

hesitate to employ in order to attain these ends. The ultimate object of these policies was to revolutionize gradually and finally to bring about a separation of the southwestern region of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy from that empire and unite it with Serbia.

The repeated and formal declarations of Serbia to Austria-Hungary to bring about good neighborly relations did not change this trend of Serbian politics in the least. For the third time in the course of the last six years, Serbia has brought Europe to the verge of a world war in this manner. She could only do this because she believed herself supported by Russia in her endeavors.

[Russia is accused of a secret alliance with the Balkan States.]

. . . It was the idea of Russian statesmen that there should be formed a new Balkan League under Russian patronage, whose activities should be directed this time not against Turkey, which had been driven from the Balkans, but against the existence of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy. . . .

[Details of Russia's alleged programme follow.]

In view of these circumstances Austria had to admit that it would not be consistent either with the dignity or self-preservation of the monarchy to look on longer at the operations on the other side of the border without taking action. . . . We were able to assure our ally most heartily of our agreement with her view of the situation and to assure her that any action that she might consider it necessary to take in order to put an end to the movement in Serbia directed against the existence of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy would receive our approval. We were fully aware in this connection that war-like moves on the part of Austria-Hungary against Serbia would bring Russia into the question and might draw us into a war in accordance with our duties as an ally. However, recognizing the vital interests of Austria-Hungary which were at stake, we could neither advise our ally to a compliance that would have been inconsistent with her dignity nor could we deny her our support in this great hour of need. We were all the more unable to do this inasmuch as our interests also were seriously threatened as a result of the continuous Serbian agitation. If Serbia, with the help of Russia and France, had been allowed to imperil the existence of the neighboring monarchy any longer, this would lead to the gradual downfall of Austria and would result in submission to Slavic sway under the Russian sceptre, thus making the position of the Germanic race in Central Europe untenable. A morally weakened Austria breaking down as the result of the advance of Russian Pan-Slavism would no longer be an ally on whom we could count and upon whom we could rely, such as we need in view of the attitude of our eastern and western neighbors, which has constantly grown more threatening. We therefore gave Austria an entirely free hand in her action against Serbia. We have taken no part in the preparations. . . .

[The story follows of the exchange of notes between Austria and Serbia and Austria's refusal to accept Serbia's reply as satisfactory.]

From the very beginning of the conflict we took the stand that this was an affair of Austria which she alone would have to bring to a decision with Serbia. We have therefore devoted our entire efforts to localizing the war and to convincing the other powers that Austria-Hungary was compelled to take justified defensive methods and appeal to arms. . . .

[Austria, the statement goes on to say, explained her case to Russia while Germany sought the aid

of France and England in an effort to localize the approaching conflict. "These efforts did not succeed in preventing Russia's interference in the Austro-Serbian disagreement."]

The Russian Government issued an official communiqué on July 24, according to which it would be impossible for Russia to remain indifferent in the Serbian-Austrian conflict. . . .

[Austria-Hungary again disclaimed any desire to acquire territory, but on the 26th the news of Russian mobilization came and was communicated by Germany to the Powers.]

. . . The same day the Imperial Ambassador at St. Petersburg was directed to make the following statement to the Russian Government:

"The military preparatory measures of Russia will compel us to take counter-action which must consist in the mobilization of the army. Mobilization, however, indicates war. Inasmuch as we know France's obligations toward Russia, this mobilization would be directed simultaneously against Russia and France. We cannot assume that Russia wishes to let loose such a European war. Inasmuch as Austria-Hungary will not impair the continuance of the Serbian Kingdom, we are of the opinion that Russia can adopt a policy of waiting. . . ."

[In spite of denials at St. Petersburg, reports of Russian mobilization on a large scale continued to arrive in Berlin.]

. . . On July 27 the first reports of preparatory measures by France arrived. The Fourteenth Corps discontinued its manoeuvres and returned to garrison duty.

In the meantime we continued to exert our most energetic influence on the Cabinets to insure the localization of the conflict.

On the 26th Sir Edward Grey had suggested that the differences between Austria-Hungary and Serbia be laid before a conference of the Ambassadors of Germany, France, and Italy, with himself presiding over the sessions. To this suggestion we replied that, while we approved his tender, we could not take part in such a conference because we could not call upon Austria to appear before a European court in her controversy with Serbia.

France agreed to Sir Edward Grey's proposal, but it was finally brought to naught because Austria, as was to be expected, held herself aloof.

[Germany, believing mediation out of the question between Austria and Serbia, continued her efforts to keep the peace between Russia and Austria and further agreed to transmit to Vienna Sir Edward Grey's proposal that the Serbian note serve as a basis for further conversations. Austria replied that it was too late, hostilities having already begun.]

. . . Unluckily all of these mediatory acts were soon overtaken by the military preparations of Russia and France. On July 29 the Russian Government officially announced in Berlin that it had mobilized four army districts. At the same time additional reports reached us of rapidly progressing military preparations by France on land and sea. On the same day the Imperial Ambassador at St. Petersburg had a conversation with the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs concerning which he reported as follows by telegraph:

"The Minister tried to persuade me to agree in behalf of my Government to a conversation of four parties to devise means of moving Austria-Hungary to give up those demands touching on the sovereignty of Servia. While I agreed to a complete transmission of the conversation, I took the stand that, since Russia had decided on the ominous step of mobilization, it was difficult for me to exchange any opinions on this subject. . . . I said an opportunity should be given the Dual Monarchy to settle her dispute with Servia alone. There would be time enough to come back to the subject of safeguarding Servian sovereignty when peace terms were to be concluded.

"I added very earnestly that at the present moment the Austro-Servian affair was secondary to the danger of a European conflagration, and I made every effort to show the Minister the greatness of this danger.

"It was impossible to change Sazonof's mind on the point that Russia could not desert Servia now."

[On the 29th the German Military Attaché at St. Petersburg reported that the Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Army had again denied that Russia was mobilizing. The same day Austria was urged to open direct conversations with M. Sazonof.]

Shoulder to shoulder with England we continued to work without cessation for mediation, and supported every suggestion in Vienna which we believed showed hope of the possibility of a peaceful settlement of the conflict. As late as the 30th we transmitted an English proposal to Vienna which established this basis of negotiation, that Austria-Hungary after succeeding in marching into Servia, should dictate her terms there. We had to assume that Russia would accept this basis.

[Meanwhile proofs of Russian mobilization measures became more convincing, and finally "Russia ordered a general mobilization."]

On the same day an exchange of telegrams took place between His Majesty the Kaiser and King and Czar Nicholas, in which His Majesty called the Czar's attention to the threatening character of the Russian mobilization and to the continuance of his own activity as mediator. [Annex 20 to 23.]

On July 31 the Czar directed the following telegram to His Majesty:

"I thank you from my heart for your mediation, which permits a gleam of hope that everything can yet be settled peaceably. It is a technical impossibility for us to halt our military preparations which became necessary through Austria's mobilization. We are far from desirous of war. So long as the negotiations continue with Austria concerning Servia, my troops will not undertake any challenging action. I solemnly pledge you my word as to that. I am trusting in the grace of God with all my might and hope for the success of your mediation in Vienna, for the welfare of our countries and for the peace of Europe.

"Yours sincerely devoted,
"NICHOLAS."

To this His Majesty the Kaiser replied:

"Upon your appeal to my friendship and your plea for my help I have undertaken a mediatory action between your Government and the Austro-Hungarian Government. While this negotiation was under way your troops were mobilized against Austria-Hungary, which is allied with me, as a consequence of which my mediation was almost made illusory, as I have already informed you. Notwithstanding this, I continued it. Now I am in receipt of reliable reports of serious preparations for war on my eastern boundary also. Responsibility for the safety of my empire

compels me to take counter defensive measures. I have carried my efforts for the maintenance of world peace to the utmost limit. It is not I that bear the responsibility for the calamity that now threatens the entire civilized world. Yet at this moment it lies in your power to stave it off. No one threatens the honor and might of Russia, which might have awaited the result of my mediation. . . . It is still possible for you to maintain the peace of Europe if Russia will decide to put a stop to the military measures that threaten Germany and Austria-Hungary."

Even before this telegram reached its destination the mobilization of the entire Russian fighting force, which had been ordered in the forenoon of the same day, openly directed against us, was in full swing. The Czar's telegram however, was sent at 2 o'clock in the afternoon.

[On July 31st Germany sent an ultimatum to Russia, stating that she would be forced to mobilize her army if Russia did not cease mobilization within twelve hours, "and so advise Germany."]

At the same time the Imperial Ambassador at Paris was directed to request an explanation from the French Government within eighteen hours as to whether, in the case of a Russo-German war, France would remain neutral. . . .

. . . After the expiration of the time limit set for Russia without the receipt of an answer to our inquiry, His Majesty the Emperor and King ordered the mobilization of the entire German Army and the Imperial Navy at 5 P. M. on Aug. 1. In the meantime the Imperial Ambassador at St. Petersburg had been instructed to hand a declaration of war to the Russian Government in case no favorable reply was issued before the expiration of the time limit. However, before a report regarding the execution of this order arrived, Russian troops crossed our border and advanced on German territory, namely, as early as the afternoon of Aug. 1.

By this move Russia began the war against us.

In the meantime the Imperial Ambassador at Paris put the question that he had been ordered to present before the French Cabinet at 7 P. M. on July 31.

To this the French Prime Minister made an ambiguous and unsatisfactory reply at 1 o'clock in the afternoon of Aug. 1. . . . A few hours later, at 5 in the afternoon the complete mobilization of the entire French Army and Navy was ordered.

On the morning of the following day France opened hostilities.

THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN NOTE TO SERVIA
(From the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*, July 25, 1914)
Berlin, July 24.

The Austro-Hungarian Minister at Belgrade at 6 o'clock last night handed to the Servian Government a verbal note with the demands of the Austro-Hungarian Government. In the note the answer is requested by 6 P. M., July 25.

[The note which follows is the same as that given in No. 4 of the English "White Paper" (q. v.), with some slight variations in translation.]

[There follows an article from the *Fremdenblatt* reviewing the Austro-Servian situation, commenting on the note, accusing the Servians of continued bad faith and trouble breeding, asserting Austria's desire to avoid war, and hoping that Servia will accept the terms of the note. Reference is made to other newspapers in Vienna which expressed similar hopes.]

AUSTRIA-HUNGARY AND THE SERVIAN NOTE
(From the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*, July 29, 1914.)
Vienna, July 27.

The note of the Royal Servian Government of July 25, 1914, reads as follows:

[There follows the text of the Servian note, substantially as given in No. 39 of the British "White Paper" (q. v.), interspersed with the comments of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. Exception is taken to the opening paragraphs of the Servian reply on the ground that Serbia had failed to keep her pledge of March 18, 1909, by promptly and decisively suppressing all anti-Austrian propaganda. Austria accuses Serbia of not officially inspecting her private press. Serbia's pronouncement against anti-Austrian propaganda is condemned as insincere. As to Serbia's ten pledges, Austria comments as follows: (1) Serbia's plan to suppress anti-Austrian publications is dilatory, evasive, and unsatisfactory; (2) the plan to dissolve propagandist societies only partially answers the demand; (3) the promise to eliminate propaganda from education is incomplete and lacking in evidences of good faith; (4) the provision for the trial of offending officers does not satisfy Austria; (5) Serbia's acceptance of the collaboration of Austrian agents is so vague as to offer insurmountable difficulties; (6) Serbia's reply to the Austrian policing proposition is tantamount to a refusal; (7) Serbia's statement that Ciganovic could not be found is not believed; (8) and (9) not enough details offered to indicate Serbia's good faith.]

ANNEX 1A
FROM THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN MATERIAL

Vienna, July 27.

The "dossier" mentioned in the Austro-Hungarian circular note to the foreign Embassies concerning the Servian dispute is made public to-day.

[The memorial reviews the history of the anti-Austrian movement in Serbia, and accuses the Narodna Odbrana of being the central organization in the movement. The activities of this society, both before and after 1909, are outlined, including the distribution of propagandist literature. "Appearing in the disguise of a culture association," its main object was to preach war against Austria-Hungary. An attempt, moreover, was discovered to affiliate with secret societies in the Dual Monarchy. Agitation was conducted in the schools where teachers were trained. A direct connection is established between the ac-

tivities of the Narodna and the attack on the Crown Prince and his consort. Not only this, but the official programme of the Servian Government is held to be anti-Servian.]

ANNEX 1B
THE CHANCELLOR OF THE GERMAN EMPIRE TO THE IMPERIAL AMBASSADORS IN PARIS, LONDON,
ST. PETERSBURG

Berlin, July 23, 1914.

The statements of the Austro-Hungarian Government as to the conditions under which the attempt on the life of the Austrian Crown Prince and his wife occurred make clear the aims of the Pan-Servian propaganda, and the means which it employs to accomplish its ends. . . .

[The dispatch goes into the details of the pan-Servian movement and places the responsibility on the Servian Government. Austria's now uncompromising attitude is held to be justifiable.]

. . . Unless the Austro-Hungarian Government wishes definitely to give up all claim to its position as a great Power, there is nothing for it to do but back up its demands on the Servian Government by strong pressure and, if necessary, by recourse to military measures, in which case the choice of means must be left to it.

I ask Your Excellency to express yourself in the above terms to the representative of (Mr. Viviani) (Sir Edward Grey) (Mr. Sazonof) and to lay particular stress on the view that the above question is one, the settlement of which devolves solely upon Austria-Hungary and Serbia, and one which the powers should earnestly strive to confine to the two countries concerned. We strongly desire that the dispute be localized, since any intervention of another power, on account of the various alliance obligations, would bring consequences impossible to measure.

ANNEX 2
THE IMPERIAL CHANCELLOR TO THE CONFEDERATED
GOVERNMENTS OF GERMANY

Confidential!

Kindly make the following announcement to the Government to which you are accredited:

In view of the facts which the Austro-Hungarian Government has made known in its note to the Servian Government, the last doubt must disappear that the plot to which the Austro-Hungarian Crown Prince and his wife were victims was hatched in Serbia, with the connivance, at least, of officials of the Servian Government.

[The communication goes on to lay the blame for present difficulties on "pan-Servian Chauvinism" and Servian bad faith. Austria is credited with great forbearance. Serbia's answer to Austrian demands shows that it does not intend to change its policies. An attempt is made to place on Russia the onus for any extension of trouble, since Russia is mistaken in her attitude in support of Serbia.]

The attitude of the Imperial German Government in this matter is clearly outlined. The agitation conducted by the Pan-Slavs against Austria-Hungary has, as its principal aim, the dissolution or weakening of the Triple Alliance by means of the destruction of the Danube Empire, and, as a result, the complete isolation of the German Empire. Our closest interests, therefore, summon us to the

side of Austria-Hungary. The duty to save Europe if possible from a general war demands also that we support the efforts to localize the trouble, in accordance with the policy which we have successfully followed for the last forty-four years in the interests of the preservation of the peace of Europe. But if, contrary to hope, the trouble should spread owing to the intervention of Russia, then, true to our duty as an ally, we should have to support the neighboring monarchy with the entire might of the German Empire. . . .

ANNEX 3

TELEGRAM FROM THE IMPERIAL GERMAN AMBASSADOR
IN VIENNA TO THE IMPERIAL GERMAN
CHANCELLOR

July 24, 1914.

Count Berchtold to-day summoned the Russian Chargé d'Affaires in order to explain to him in detail and in friendly terms the position of Austria regarding Serbia. . . . He said that Austria-Hungary would demand no territory, that the step was merely a definitive measure against Servian machinations; that Austria-Hungary felt herself obliged to exact guarantees for the future friendly behavior of Serbia toward the monarchy; that he had no intention of bringing about a shifting of the balance of power in the Balkans. . . .

ANNEX 4

TELEGRAM OF THE IMPERIAL GERMAN AMBASSADOR IN
ST. PETERSBURG TO THE IMPERIAL GERMAN
CHANCELLOR

July 24, 1914.

A long talk with Sasanow; the Minister made wild complaints against Austria-Hungary, and was much excited. What he said most definitely was this: that Russia could not possibly permit the Servian-Austrian dispute to be confined to the parties concerned.

ANNEX 5

THE IMPERIAL GERMAN AMBASSADOR IN ST. PETERSBURG
TO THE IMPERIAL GERMAN CHANCELLOR
(Telegram)

July 26, 1914.

The Austro-Hungarian Ambassador had a long interview to-day with Sasanow. The assurance of the Ambassador that Austria-Hungary was planning no conquests and simply wished to secure quiet at last on her boundaries visibly calmed the Minister.

ANNEX 6

TELEGRAM OF THE IMPERIAL GERMAN AMBASSADOR IN
ST. PETERSBURG TO THE IMPERIAL GERMAN
CHANCELLOR

July 25, 1914.

To-day the drilling of the troops in the Krasnoe camp was suddenly interrupted and the regiments are to return at once to their garrison posts. The manœuvres have been given up. The military pupils were promoted to officers to-day instead of in the Autumn. Great excitement reigns in general headquarters as to Austria's proceedings. I have the idea that all preparations have been made for mobilization against Austria.

ANNEX 7

TELEGRAM OF THE IMPERIAL GERMAN AMBASSADOR IN
ST. PETERSBURG TO THE IMPERIAL GERMAN
CHANCELLOR

July 26, 1914.

The Military Attaché requests the transmission of the following report to the General Staff:

I consider it certain that mobilization has been ordered for Kieff and Odessa. It is doubtful whether this is the case at Warsaw and Moscow, and elsewhere it has probably not been ordered.

ANNEX 8

TELEGRAM OF THE HEAD OF THE IMPERIAL GERMAN
CONSULATE IN KOVNO TO THE IMPERIAL
GERMAN CHANCELLOR

July 27, 1914.

State of war declared in Kovno.

ANNEX 9

TELEGRAM OF THE IMPERIAL GERMAN ENVOY IN BERNE
TO THE IMPERIAL GERMAN CHANCELLOR

July 27, 1914.

Have learned reliably that Fourteenth French Corps stopped manœuvres.

ANNEX 10

TELEGRAM OF THE IMPERIAL GERMAN CHANCELLOR TO
THE IMPERIAL GERMAN AMBASSADOR IN
LONDON

July 26, 1914.

Austria-Hungary has declared officially and solemnly in St. Petersburg that she contemplates no acquisition of territory in Serbia, and that she will not endanger the continuance of the kingdom, but wishes only to secure quiet. According to report reaching here, Russia is about to summon several bodies of reservists immediately, which would be equivalent to mobilization against us. If this news is corroborated, we shall be forced against our will to take measures to meet it. To-day our efforts are still directed toward localizing the trouble and maintaining the peace in Europe. For this reason we ask that the strongest possible pressure be brought to bear in St. Petersburg for achieving this end.

ANNEX 10A

TELEGRAM OF THE IMPERIAL GERMAN CHANCELLOR TO
THE IMPERIAL GERMAN AMBASSADOR IN
PARIS

July 26, 1914.

After Austria-Hungary officially declared to Russia that she contemplated no acquisition of territory and would not tamper with the continuance of the Servian kingdom, the decision of the question as to whether there is to be a European war lies with Russia alone, who has to bear the full responsibility. We trust that France, with whom we know we are agreed in the desire to maintain peace in Europe, will use her influence in St. Petersburg in a quieting manner.

ANNEX 10B

TELEGRAM OF THE IMPERIAL GERMAN CHANCELLOR TO
THE IMPERIAL GERMAN AMBASSADOR IN
ST. PETERSBURG

July 26, 1914.

[Similar to 10A]

. . . We still trust that Russia will take no steps that may seriously endanger European peace.

ANNEX 11

TELEGRAM OF THE IMPERIAL GERMAN AMBASSADOR IN
ST. PETERSBURG TO THE IMPERIAL GERMAN
CHANCELLOR

July 27, 1914.

Military Attaché reports concerning talk with Minister of War:

"The Minister of War gave me his word of honor that as yet no mobilization order had gone forth, that for the time being merely preparatory measures were being taken, that not one reservist had been summoned nor a single horse requisitioned. He said that if Austria should cross the Servian frontier, the military districts in the direction of Austria — Kieff, Odessa, Moscow, Kazan — would be mobilized, that those on the German front — Warsaw, Vilna, St. Petersburg — would not be under any circumstances. . . . I told the Minister that we appreciated

the friendly attitude toward ourselves but would look upon the mobilization against Austria alone as very menacing.

ANNEX 12

TELEGRAM OF THE IMPERIAL GERMAN CHANCELLOR TO
THE IMPERIAL GERMAN AMBASSADOR IN
LONDON

July 27, 1914.

Nothing is known here as yet as to a suggestion of Sir Edward Grey to hold a four-sided conference in London. It is impossible for us to bring our ally before a European court in its difference with Servia. Our mediatory activity must confine itself to the danger of a Russian-Austrian conflict.

ANNEX 13

TELEGRAM OF THE IMPERIAL GERMAN CHANCELLOR TO
THE IMPERIAL GERMAN AMBASSADOR IN
LONDON

July 25, 1914.

The distinction made by Sir Edward Grey between the Austro-Servian and Austro-Russian conflict is quite correct. We wish as little as England to mix in the first, and, first and last, we take the ground that this question must be localized by the abstention of all the Powers from intervention in it. It is therefore our earnest hope that Russia will refrain from any active intervention. If an Austro-Russian dispute should arise, we are ready, with the reservation of our known duties as allies, to coöperate with the other great Powers in mediation between Russia and Austria.

ANNEX 14

TELEGRAM OF THE IMPERIAL GERMAN CHANCELLOR TO
THE IMPERIAL GERMAN AMBASSADOR IN
ST. PETERSBURG

July 28, 1914.

We are endeavoring continually to cause Vienna to make clear in St. Petersburg the purpose and scope of the Austrian action regarding Servia in an indisputable and, it is to be hoped, satisfying manner to Russia. The declaration of war made in the meantime makes no difference in this connection.

ANNEX 15

TELEGRAM OF THE IMPERIAL GERMAN CHANCELLOR TO
THE IMPERIAL GERMAN AMBASSADOR IN
LONDON

July 27, 1914.

We have started the efforts toward mediation in Vienna immediately, in the way desired by Sir Edward Grey. Moreover, we have communicated to Count Berchtold the wish of Mr. Sasanow for a direct talk with Vienna.

ANNEX 16

TELEGRAM OF THE IMPERIAL GERMAN AMBASSADOR IN
VIENNA TO THE IMPERIAL GERMAN
CHANCELLOR

July 28, 1914.

Count Berchtold requests me to express to your Excellency his deep gratitude for communicating to him the English mediation plan. He remarks, however, concerning it, that, after the opening of hostilities by Servia and the declaration of war made in the meantime, he must look upon England's step as belated.

ANNEX 17

TELEGRAM OF THE IMPERIAL GERMAN CHANCELLOR TO
THE IMPERIAL GERMAN AMBASSADOR
IN PARIS

July 29, 1914.

Reports to us of French preparations for war increase from hour to hour. I request that you talk on this matter

with the French Government and make it clear to them that such measures would lead to precautionary measures on our part. We should be obliged to proclaim the danger of war, and even if this should not mean calling in reserves and mobilization, it would, nevertheless, increase the tension. . . .

ANNEX 18

TELEGRAM OF THE GERMAN MILITARY ENVOY IN ST.
PETERSBURG TO HIS MAJESTY THE KAISER

July 30, 1914.

Yesterday Prince Troubetzki told me, after he had caused Your Majesty's telegram to Emperor Nicholas to be delivered at once: "God be praised that a telegram from your Emperor has come." He told me a little while ago that the telegram had made a deep impression on the Emperor, but since mobilization against Austria had already been ordered, and Sasonow had doubtless convinced His Majesty that it was no longer possible to recede, His Majesty unfortunately could do nothing to alter matters. . . .

ANNEX 19

TELEGRAM OF THE IMPERIAL GERMAN CHANCELLOR
TO THE IMPERIAL GERMAN AMBASSADOR
IN ROME

July 31, 1914.

We negotiated continually with a view to reconciliation between Russia and Austria-Hungary, both through direct exchange of telegrams from His Majesty the Kaiser to His Majesty the Czar, as well as in our relations with Sir Edward Grey. But all our efforts are made much more difficult, if not impossible of realization, by Russia's mobilization. . . .

ANNEX 20

I. HIS MAJESTY TO THE CZAR

July 28, 10:45 P. M.

With the greatest disquietude I hear of the impression which Austria-Hungary's action against Servia is making in your empire. The unscrupulous agitation which has gone on for years in Servia has led to the revolting crime of which Archduke Francis Ferdinand was the victim. The spirit which allowed the Servians to murder their own King and his wife still rules in that land. Undoubtedly you will agree with me that we two, you and I as well as all sovereigns, have a common interest in insisting that all those morally responsible for this terrible murder shall suffer deserved punishment.

On the other hand I by no means overlook how difficult it is for you and your Government to resist the tide of popular opinion. Remembering the heartfelt friendship which has bound us closely for a long time, I am therefore exerting all my influence to endeavor to make Austria-Hungary come to an open and satisfying understanding with Russia. I earnestly hope that you will help me in my efforts to set aside all obstacles that may yet arise.

Your very sincere and devoted friend and cousin.

(Signed.) WILHELM.

ANNEX 21

II. THE CZAR TO HIS MAJESTY

Peterhof Palace, July 29, 1 P. M.

In this serious moment I ask you urgently to help me. A disgraceful war has been declared on a weak nation; the indignation at this, which I fully share, is immense in Russia. I foresee that soon I can no longer withstand the pressure that is being brought to bear upon me, and that I shall be forced to adopt measures which will lead to war. In order to prevent such a calamity as a European war I ask you, in the name of our old friendship, to do all that is possible to you to prevent your ally from going too far.

(Signed) NICHOLAS.

ANNEX 22

III. HIS MAJESTY TO THE CZAR

I have received your telegram and share your wish for the maintenance of peace. Nevertheless — as I said to you in my first telegram — I cannot consider Austria-Hungary's action "disgraceful war." Austria-Hungary knows by experience that Serbia's promises, when they are merely on paper, are quite unreliable. According to my opinion, Austria-Hungary's action is to be looked upon as an attempt to secure full guarantees that Serbia's promises shall also be turned into deeds. I am confirmed in this view by the statement of the Austrian Cabinet that Austria-Hungary contemplates no acquisition of territory at the expense of Serbia. I think, therefore, that it is quite possible for Russia to remain in the rôle of a spectator toward the Austrian-Servian war, without dragging Europe into the most terrible war that it has ever seen. I think that a direct understanding between your Government and Vienna is possible and desirable, an understanding which — as I already telegraphed you — my Government is endeavoring to help with all its power. Naturally, military measures by Russia, which Austria-Hungary might take as threatening, would hasten a calamity that we both wish to avoid, and would undermine my position as mediator,

(Signed) WILHELM.

ANNEX 23

IV. HIS MAJESTY TO THE CZAR

July 30, 1 A. M.

My Ambassador has been instructed to call your Government's attention to the dangers and serious consequences of mobilization. Austria-Hungary mobilized only against Serbia, and at that she mobilized only a part of her army. If Russia, as appears from what you and your Government say, is mobilizing against Austria-Hungary, the position of mediator, which you intrusted to me in a friendly manner and which I accepted at your urgent request, is jeopardized if not rendered untenable. The whole weight of the decision now rests on your shoulders; they must bear the responsibility for war or peace.

(Signed) WILHELM.

ANNEX 23A

THE CZAR TO HIS MAJESTY

Peterhof, July 30, 1914, 1:20 P. M.

I thank you from my heart for your prompt answer. I am sending Tatisheff this evening with instructions. The military measures now being taken were decided upon five days ago for defensive purposes against Austria's preparations. I hope with all my heart that these measures will not influence in any way your position as mediator, which I highly esteem. We need your strong pressure on Austria in order that an understanding may be brought about with us.

NICHOLAS.

ANNEX 24

TELEGRAM OF THE IMPERIAL GERMAN CHANCELLOR
TO THE IMPERIAL GERMAN AMBASSADOR IN
ST. PETERSBURG

July 31, 1914.

In spite of still pending mediatory negotiations, and although we ourselves have up to the present moment taken no measures for mobilization, Russia has mobilized her entire army and navy; in other words, mobilized against us also. By these Russian measures we have been obliged, for the safeguarding of the empire, to announce that danger

of war threatens us, which does not yet mean mobilization. Mobilization, however, must follow unless Russia ceases within twelve hours all warlike measures against us and Austria-Hungary and gives us definite assurance thereof. Kindly communicate this at once to Mr. Sazonof. . . .

ANNEX 25

TELEGRAM OF THE IMPERIAL GERMAN CHANCELLOR
TO THE IMPERIAL GERMAN AMBASSADOR
IN PARIS

July 31, 1914.

[Notice is given of the sending of the ultimatum contained in Annex 24, and its substance repeated.]

. . . Kindly ask the French Government whether it will remain neutral in a Russian-German war. Answer must come within eighteen hours. Wire at once hour that inquiry is made. Act with the greatest possible dispatch.

ANNEX 26

TELEGRAM OF THE IMPERIAL GERMAN CHANCELLOR
TO THE IMPERIAL GERMAN AMBASSADOR
IN ST. PETERSBURG

Important!

Aug. 1, 1914.

In case the Russian Government gives no satisfactory answer to our demand, will Your Excellency, at 5 o'clock this afternoon (Central European time), kindly hand to it the following declaration:

The Imperial Government has endeavored from the beginning of the crisis to bring it to a peaceful solution. In accordance with a wish expressed to him by His Majesty, the Emperor of Russia, His Majesty the Emperor of Germany, in coöperation with England, applied himself to the accomplishment of a mediating rôle toward the Cabinets of Vienna and St. Petersburg, when Russia, without awaiting the outcome, proceeded to mobilize her entire land and naval forces.

Following this threatening measure, occasioned by no military preparation on the part of Germany, the German Empire found itself confronted by a serious and imminent peril. If the Imperial Government had failed to meet this peril, it would have jeopardized the safety and even the existence of Germany. Consequently, the German Government was obliged to address the Government of the Emperor of all the Russias and insist upon the cessation of all these military measures. Russia having refused to accede to this demand, and having manifested by this refusal that her acts were directed against Germany, I have the honor, by order of my Government, to make known to Your Excellency the following:

His Majesty, the Emperor, my august Sovereign, in the name of the Empire, takes up the defiance, and considers himself in a state of war against Russia. . . .

Kindly ask for your passports and hand over protection and business to the American Embassy.

ANNEX 27

TELEGRAM OF THE IMPERIAL GERMAN AMBASSADOR
IN PARIS TO THE IMPERIAL GERMAN CHAN-
CELLOR

Aug. 1, 1:05 P. M.

To my repeated inquiry as to whether France, in case of a German-Russian war, would remain neutral, the Premier declared that France would do that which might be required of her by her interests.

A NEW BRITISH "WHITE PAPER"

ON SEPTEMBER 16, a second official "White Paper" was issued in London. This is intended to show that Austria and Servia were still in a fair way of adjusting their difficulties, when Germany's declarations of war against Russia and France precipitated the general catastrophe.

Sir Maurice de Bunsen, then British Ambassador at Vienna, sets forth the situation in a despatch, dated September 1, to Sir Edward Grey. He states that on August 1 Russia and Austria had almost come to terms, as Austria had consented to submit to mediation those points in her Servian note which seemed incompatible with Servian independence. Russia was satisfied with this, provided Austria would refrain from actually invading Servian territory. The Russian Ambassador in Vienna, M. Schébéko, was working hard for peace.

[Sir Maurice proceeds:]

He was holding most conciliatory language to Count Berchtold, the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister, and he informed me that the latter, as well as Count Forgach, had responded in the same spirit. Certainly it was too much for Russia to expect that Austria would hold back her armies, but this matter could probably have been settled by negotiation, and M. Schébéko repeatedly said he was prepared to accept any reasonable compromise.

Austria, in fact, had finally yielded, and that she herself had at this point good hopes of a peaceful issue is shown by a communication made to you [Sir Edward Grey] on Aug. 1 by Count Mensdorff (Austrian Ambassador in London) to the effect that Austria had neither "banged the door on compromise" nor cut off conversations.

Unfortunately these conversations at St. Petersburg and Vienna were cut short by the transfer of the dispute to the more dangerous grounds of a direct conflict between Germany and Russia. Germany intervened on July 31 by means of her double ultimatums to St. Petersburg and Paris. The ultimatums were of a kind to which only one answer was possible and Germany declared war on Russia on Aug. 1 and on France on Aug. 3.

A few days' delay might in all probability have saved Europe from one of the greatest calamities in history.

[Sir Maurice states that neither the French, the Russian, nor the Italian Ambassador at Vienna had the least intimation in advance as to the harsh conditions of Austria's note to Servia.]

As for myself, no indication was given me by Count Berchtold of the impending storm, and it was from a private source that I received on July 15 a forecast of what was about to happen.

[The note was published in the newspapers of Vienna on July 24th. The Austrian people regarded it as an ultimatum, and had no wish or expectation that Servia would accept its terms. A false report that she had done so, unconditionally, caused great disappointment, which gave way to joyful demonstrations when it was learned that Servia's reply had been rejected and the Austrian Minister at Belgrade had ceased to communicate with the Servian Government.]

[Says Sir Maurice:]

Now the floodgates were opened and the entire people and press clamored impatiently for the immediate and

condign punishment of the hated Servian race. The country certainly believed that it had before it only the alternative of subduing Servia or of submitting sooner or later to mutilation at her hands. But a peaceful solution should first have been attempted. Few seemed to reflect that the forcible intervention of a great Power in the Balkans must inevitably call other great Powers into the field.

The conviction had been expressed to me by the German Ambassador on July 24 that Russia would stand aside. This feeling, which was also held at the Ballplatz, influenced, no doubt, the course of events, and it is deplorable that no effort should have been made to secure by means of diplomatic negotiations the acquiescence of Russia and Europe as a whole in some peaceful compromise of the Servian question by which Austrian fears of Servian aggressions and intrigue might have been removed for the future.

Instead of adopting this course the Austro-Hungarian Government resolved upon war. The inevitable consequence ensued. Russia replied to a partial Austrian mobilization and declaration of war against Servia by a partial Russian mobilization against Austria.

Austria met this move by completing her own mobilization, and Russia again responded with results which have passed into history.

[On July 28 Sir Maurice urged upon Count Berchtold that Sir Edward Grey's plan of mediation be accepted. The Count replied that he realized the potentialities of the issue, but that matters had already gone too far, as Austria on that very day was declaring war on Servia. He maintained that Russia would have no reason to intervene, as Austria had declared her intention of respecting Servia's territorial integrity.]

[Sir Maurice proceeds:]

The German Government claims to have persevered to the end in an endeavor to support at Vienna your successive proposals in the interest of peace. Herr von Tschirschky (the German Ambassador) abstained from inviting my coöperation or that of the French and Russian Ambassadors in carrying out his instructions to that effect, and I had no means of knowing what response he was receiving from the Austro-Hungarian Government.

I was, however, kept fully informed by M. Schébéko, the Russian Ambassador, of his own direct negotiations with Count Berchtold.

M. Schébéko endeavored on July 28 to persuade the Austro-Hungarian Government to furnish Count Szapary with full powers to continue at St. Petersburg the hopeful



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Photograph by Paul Thompson

FRENCH FIELD TELEGRAPH (TOP) AND ENGLISH FIELD TELEPHONE IN OPERATION



BELGIAN ARMORED AUTOMOBILES

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
FRENCH AUTOMOBILE ARTILLERY TRAIN

Photograph by Brown Bros.




TRANSPORTING ARTILLERY ACROSS A STREAM

Photograph by Brown Bros.




ENGLISH (TOP) FRENCH AND GERMAN DIRIGIBLES

Photographs by Paul Thompson



ARMORED BIPLANE WITH RAPID-FIRE GUN

Photograph by Brown Bros.



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BOMB DROPPING APPARATUS ATTACHED TO AEROPLANE



Photograph by Brown Bros.

FAST, ARMORED MONOPLANE WITH RAPID-FIRING GUN ATOP



BELGRADE, SERVIA



NAMUR, BELGIUM

Photograph by Bain News Service



CITY OF ANTWERP

Photograph by Bain News Service



KING ALBERT OF BELGIUM
HIS FORMER CAPITAL, BRUSSELS



COUNT OKUMA
PREMIER



COUNT OKA
MINISTER OF WAR



VICE ADMIRAL KUROI
COMMANDING HOME FLEET



JAPANESE CRUISER "KONGO"



KIAO-CHAU, GERMAN POSSESSION IN CHINA

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SERBIAN SOLDIERS; THE FINISHED PRODUCT




Photograph by American Press Association

THE STUFF THE SERBIAN ARMY IS MADE OF



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SERBIANS IN THE TRENCHES



A MODERN ARMORED TRAIN, USED BY THE FRENCH ARMY



Photographed by James F. J. Archibald

THE FRENCH CAVALRY AND FIELD ARTILLERY ARE PROBABLY THE BEST IN EUROPE



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FRENCH INFANTRY ON THE MARCH

FRENCH INFANTRYMEN ARE CREDITED WITH BEING ABLE TO MARCH FARTHER THAN OTHER EUROPEAN SOLDIERS



GERMAN INFANTRY ON THE MARCH



GERMAN UHLANS ON PARADE



GERMAN INFANTRY WITH THEIR CAMP KITCHEN



FRENCH BATTALIONS OF THE AIR

THE PRESENT WAR IS THE FIRST VITAL TEST OF AIRCRAFT. THE FRENCH, OF ALL THE NATIONS, HAVE THE LARGEST AND BEST EQUIPMENT OF AEROPLANES



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RUSSIAN COSSACKS AND INFANTRY, ENCAMPED AND MARCHING

THE RUSSIAN SOLDIER DOES NOT THINK FOR HIMSELF AND THE MANCHURIAN CAMPAIGN SHOWED THAT HIS OFFICERS DO NOT DO ENOUGH THINKING FOR HIM. DESPITE THIS HE HAS SHOWN THAT HE WILL STAND A TREMENDOUS PERCENTAGE OF LOSS WITHOUT BREAKING




A RUSSIAN ADVANCE

Photographed by James F. J. Archibald



RUSSIAN ARTILLERY IN ACTION




WHY THE FIRST GERMAN ATTACK ON THIS RELIEF MAP, ON WHICH THE LOWLANDS APPEAR IN WHITE, SHOWS GRAPHICALLY THAT THE EASIEST WAY FROM BRUSSELS ALMOST DIRECTLY SOUTH TOWARD PARIS. IT EXPLAINS ALSO



FRANCE WAS MADE THROUGH BELGIUM

FOR THE GERMANS TO STRIKE THE FIRST BLOW WAS BY A MARCH DUE WEST FROM COLOGNE TO BRUSSELS AND THE COMPARATIVE SLOWNESS OF OPERATIONS OF THE GERMAN CENTRE AND LEFT



SERVIAN ARTILLERY

Photograph by American Press Association



SERVIA'S BATTLE-SEASONED VETERANS

SERVIANS IN CAMP AFTER THE BATTLE OF MONASTIR, FOUGHT DURING THE BALKAN WAR

conversations which had there been taking place between the latter and M. Sazonoff (Foreign Minister). Count Berchtold refused at the time, but two days later (July 30) consented. In the meantime Russia had partially mobilized against Austria.

He received M. Schébéko again in a perfectly friendly manner and gave his consent to the continuance of the conversations at St. Petersburg.

The dispatch goes on to say that thenceforward the situation between Russia and Germany

became worse than that between Russia and Austria, till Germany finally declared war.

Sir Maurice concludes his dispatch by describing the Ambassadors' departure from Vienna. As the French Ambassador left the city, the Chief Burgomaster was announcing to the crowd that a revolution was in progress at Paris and that President Poincaré had already been assassinated!

"HOW THE FRANCO-GERMAN CONFLICT COULD HAVE BEEN AVOIDED"

SOME ROYAL TELEGRAMS

We give below in full the text of the official pamphlet with the above title recently issued in English from the German Government printing office in Berlin. — *The Editors.*

Note Preceding the Correspondence.

"The following documents refer to the exchange of views between Germany and England immediately before the war broke out. It will be perceived from these documents that Germany was prepared to spare France in case England should remain neutral and would guarantee the neutrality of France."

Telegram of His Royal Highness Prince Henry of Prussia to H. M. the King of England of July 30th, 1914.

Am here since yesterday; have informed William of what you kindly told me at Buckingham Palace last Sunday, who gratefully received your message.

William, much preoccupied, is trying his utmost to fulfill Nicky's appeal to him to work for maintenance of peace and is in constant telegraphic communication with Nicky, who to-day confirms news that military measures have been ordered by him equal to mobilization, measures which have been taken already five days ago.

We are furthermore informed that France is making military preparations, whereas we have taken no measures, but may be forced to do so any moment, should our neighbors continue, which then would mean a European war.

If you really and earnestly wish to prevent this terrible disaster, may I suggest your using your influence on France and also Russia to keep neutral, which seems to me would be most useful.

This I consider a very good, perhaps the only chance, to maintain the peace of Europe.

I may add that now more than ever Germany and England should lend each other mutual help to prevent a terrible catastrophe, which otherwise seems unavoidable.

Believe me that William is most sincere in his endeavors to maintain peace, but that the military preparations of his two neighbors may at last force him to follow their example for the safety of his own country, which otherwise would remain defenseless.

I have informed William of my telegram to you, and hope you will receive my informations in the same spirit of friendship which suggested them.

[Signed]

HENRY.

Telegram of H. M. the King of England to Prince Henry of Prussia of July 30th, 1914.

Thanks for your telegram. So pleased to hear of William's efforts to concert with Nicky to maintain peace.

Indeed I am earnestly desirous that such an irreparable disaster as a European war should be averted. My Government is doing its utmost, suggesting to Russia and France to suspend further military preparations if Austria will consent to be satisfied with occupation of Belgrade and neighboring Servian territory as a hostage for satisfactory settlement of her demands, other countries meanwhile suspending their war preparations. Trust William will use his great influence to induce Austria to accept this proposal, thus proving that Germany and England are working together to prevent what would be an international catastrophe. Pray assure William I am doing and shall continue to do all that lies in my power to preserve peace of Europe.

[Signed]

GEORGE.

Telegram of His Majesty the Emperor to H. M. the King of England of July 31st, 1914.

Many thanks for your kind telegram. Your proposals coincide with my ideas and with the statements I got this night from Vienna which I have had forwarded to London. I just received news from Chancellor that official notification has just reached him that this night Nicky has ordered the mobilization of his whole army and fleet. He has not even awaited the results of the mediation I am working at and left Me without any news. I am off for Berlin to take measures for insuring safety of My eastern frontier, where strong Russian troops are already posted.

[Signed]

WILLY.

Telegram of the King of England to His Majesty the Emperor of August 1st, 1914.

Many thanks for Your telegram last night. I sent an urgent telegram to Nicky expressing My readiness to do everything in My power to assist in reopening conversations between powers concerned.

[Signed]

GEORGIE.

Telegram of the German Ambassador in London to the Chancellor of August 1st, 1914.

Sir E. Grey just asked me by telephone whether I believed to be in a position to declare that we would not attack France in a war between Germany and Russia in case France should remain neutral. I declared I believed to be able to give such an undertaking.

[Signed]

LICHNOWSKY.

Telegram of His Majesty the Emperor to H. M. the King of England of August 1st, 1914.

I just received the communication from Your Government offering French neutrality under guarantee of Great Britain. Added to this offer was the inquiry whether

under these conditions Germany would refrain from attacking France. On technical grounds My mobilization, which had already been proclaimed this afternoon, must proceed against two fronts east and west as prepared; this cannot be countermanded because, I am sorry, Your telegram came so late. But if France offers Me neutrality which must be guaranteed by the British fleet and army I shall of course refrain from attacking France and employ My troops elsewhere. I hope that France will not become nervous. The troops on My frontier are in the act of being stopped by telegraph and telephone from crossing into France.

Telegram of the Chancellor to the German Ambassador in London of August 1st, 1914.

Germany is ready to accept British proposal in case England guarantees with all her forces absolute neutrality of France in Russo-German conflict. German mobilization has been ordered to-day on account of Russian challenge before English proposal was known here. It is therefore now impossible to make any change in strategical distribution of troops ordered to the French frontier. But we guarantee that our troops will not cross the French frontier before 7 P. M. on Monday the 3rd inst, in case England will pledge herself meanwhile.

[Signed] BETHMANN-HOLLWEG.

Telegram of H. M. the King of England to His Majesty the Emperor of August 1st, 1914.

In answer to your telegram just received, I think there must be some misunderstanding as to a suggestion that

passed in friendly conversation between Prince Lichnowsky and Sir Edward Grey this afternoon when they were discussing how actual fighting between German and French armies might be avoided while there is still a chance of some agreement between Austria and Russia. Sir Edward Grey will arrange to see Prince Lichnowsky early to-morrow morning to ascertain whether there is a misunderstanding on his part.

[Signed]

GEORGE.

Telegram of the German Ambassador in London to the Chancellor of August 2nd, 1914.

Sir E. Grey's suggestions were prompted by a desire to make it possible for England to keep permanent neutrality, but as they were not based on a previous understanding with France and made without knowledge of our mobilization, they have been abandoned as absolutely hopeless.

[Signed]

LICHNOWSKY.

Note Following the Correspondence.

"The essence of Germany's declarations is contained in Emperor William's telegram to the King of England of August 1st, 1914. Even if there existed a misunderstanding as to an English proposal, the Kaiser's offer furnished England the opportunity to prove her pacific disposition and to prevent the Franco-German war."

MISCELLANEOUS VIEWS

*PROBABLE CAUSES OF THE WAR

BY DR. CHARLES W. ELIOT

President Emeritus of Harvard University

THE American people without distinction of party are highly content with the action of their National Administration on all the grave problems presented to the Government by the sudden outbreak of long-prepared war in Europe—a war which already involves five great States and two small ones. They heartily approve of the action of the Administration on mediation, neutrality, aid to Americans in Europe, discouragement of speculation in foods, and, with the exception of extreme protectionists, admission to American registry of foreign-built ships; although the legislation on the last subject, which has already passed Congress, is manifestly inadequate.

Our people cannot see that the war will necessarily be short, and they cannot imagine how it can last long. They realize that history gives no example of such a general interruption of trade and all other international intercourse as has already taken place, or of such a stoppage of the production and distribution of the necessities of life as this war threatens. They shudder at the floods of human woe which are about to overwhelm Europe.

Hence, thinking Americans cannot help reflecting on the causes of this monstrous outbreak of primitive savagery—part of them come down from the Seventeenth and Eighteenth centuries and part developed in the Nineteenth—and wondering what good for mankind, if any, can possibly come out of the present cataclysm.

The whole people of the United States, without regard to racial origin, are of one mind in hoping that mankind may gain out of this prodigious physical combat, which uses for purposes of destruction and death all the new forces of Nineteenth-Century applied science, some new liberties, and new securities in the pursuit of happiness; but at this moment they can cherish only a remote hope of such an issue. The military force which Austria-Hungary and Germany

are now using on a prodigious scale, and with long-studied skill, can only be met by similar military force, and this resisting force is summoned more slowly than that of Austria-Hungary and Germany; although the ultimate battalions will be heavier. In this portentous physical contest the American people have no part; their geographical position, their historical development, and their political ideals combine to make them for the present mere spectators; although their interests—commercial, industrial, and political—are deeply involved. For the moment, the best thing our Government can do is to utilize all existing neutrality rights, and, if possible, to strengthen or develop those rights, for out of this war ought to come more neutral States in Europe, and greater security for neutralized territory.

The chances of getting some gains for mankind out of this gigantic struggle will be somewhat increased if the American people, and all other neutral peoples, arrive through public discussion at some clear understanding of the causes and the possible and desirable issues of the war, and the sooner this public discussion begins, and the more thoroughly it is pursued, the sounder will probably be the tendencies of public sentiment outside of the contending nations, and the conclusions which the peace negotiations will ultimately reach.

When one begins, however, to reflect on the probable causes of the sudden lapse of the most civilized parts of Europe into worse than primitive savagery, he comes at once on two old and widespread evils in Europe from which America has been exempt for at least 150 years. The first is secret diplomacy with power to make issues and determine events, and the second is autocratic national executives who can swing the whole physical force of the nation to this side or that without consulting the people or their representatives.

*Reprinted, by permission, from *The New York Times* of September 6th.

The actual catastrophe proves that secret negotiations, like those habitually conducted on behalf of the "concert of Europe," and alliances between selected nations, the terms of which are secret, or at any rate not publicly stated, cannot avert in the long run outrageous war, but can only produce postponements of war, or short truces. Free institutions, like those of the United States, take the public into confidence, because all important movements of the Government must rest on popular desires, needs, and volitions. Autocratic institutions have no such necessity for publicity. This Government secrecy as to motives, plans, and purposes must often be maintained by disregarding truth, fair dealing, and honorable obligations, in order that, when the appeal to force comes, one Government may secure the advantage of taking the other by surprise. Duplicity during peace and the breaking of treaties during war come to be regarded as obvious military necessities.

The second great evil, under which certain large nations of Europe—notably Russia, Germany, and Austria-Hungary—have long suffered and still suffer, is the permanent national executive, independent of popular control through representative bodies, holding strong views about rights of birth and religious sanctions of its authority, and really controlling the national forces through some small council and a strong bureaucracy. So long as executives of this sort endure, so long will civilization be liable to such explosions as have taken place this August, though not always on so vast a scale.

Americans now see these things more clearly than European lovers of liberty, because Americans are detached from the actual conflicts by the Atlantic, and because Americans have had no real contact with the feudal or the imperial system for nearly 300 years. Pilgrim and Puritan, Covenanter and Quaker, Lutheran, and Catholic alike left the feudal system and autocratic government behind them when they crossed the Atlantic. Americans, therefore, cannot help hoping that two results of the present war will be: (1) The abolition of secret diplomacy and secret understandings, and the substitution therefor of treaties publicly discussed and sanctioned, and (2) The creation of national executives—Emperors, Sultans, Kings, or Presidents—which cannot use the national forces in fight until a thoroughly informed

national assembly, acting with deliberation, has agreed to that use.

The American student of history since the middle of the Seventeenth Century sees clearly two strong though apparently opposite tendencies in Europe: First, the tendency to the creation and maintenance of small States such as those which the Peace of Westphalia (1648) recognized and for two centuries secured in a fairly independent existence, and, secondly, a tendency from the middle of the Nineteenth Century toward larger national units, created by combining several kindred States under one executive. This second tendency was illustrated strongly in the case of both Germany and Italy, although the Prussian domination in Germany has no parallel in Italy. Somewhat earlier in the Nineteenth Century the doctrine of the neutralization of the territories of small States was established as firmly as solemn treaties could do it. The larger national units had a more or less federative quality, the components yielding some of their functions to a central power, but retaining numerous independent functions. This tendency to limited unification is one which Americans easily understand and appreciate. We believe in the federative principle, and must therefore hope that out of the present European horror will come a new development of that principle, and new security for small States which are capable of guaranteeing to their citizens "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness"—a security which no citizen of any European country seems to-day to possess.

Some of the underlying causes of the horrible catastrophe the American people are now watching from afar are commercial and economic. Imperial Germany's desire for colonies in other continents—such as Great Britain and France secured earlier as a result of keen commercial ambitions—is intense. Prussia's seizure of Schleswig in 1864-5 had the commercial motive; and it is with visions of ports on the North Sea that Germany justifies her present occupation of Belgium. The Russians have for generations desired to extend their national territory southward to the *Ægean* and the Bosphorus, and eastward to good harbors on the Pacific. Later they pushed into Mongolia and Manchuria, but were resisted successfully by Japan. Austria-Hungary has long been seeking ports on the Adriatic, and lately seized without warrant Herzegovina and

Bosnia to promote her approach toward the Ægean, and is now trying to seize Servia with the same ends in view. With similar motives Italy lately descended on Tripoli, without any excuse except this intense desire for colonies—profitable or unprofitable. On the other hand, the American people, looking to the future as well as to the past, object to acquisitions of new territory by force of arms; and since the Twentieth Century opened they have twice illustrated in their own practice—first in Cuba, and then in Mexico—this democratic objection. They believe that extensions of national territory should be brought about only with the indubitable consent of the majority of the people most nearly concerned. They believe also that commerce should always be a means of promoting good-will, and not ill-will, among men, and that all legitimate and useful extensions of the commerce of a manufacturing and commercial nation may be procured through the policy of the “open door”—which means nothing more than that all nations should be allowed to compete on equal terms for the trade of any foreign people, whether backward or advanced in civilization. No American Administration has accepted a “concession” of land in China. They also believe that peaceable extensions of territory and trade will afford adequate relief from the economic pressure on a population too large for the territory it occupies, and that there is no need of forcible seizure of territory to secure relief. It is inevitable, therefore, that the American people should hope that one outcome of the present war should be—no enlargement of a national territory by force or without the free consent of the population to be annexed, and no colonization except by peaceable commercial and industrial methods.

One of the most interesting and far-reaching effects of the present outbreak of savagery is likely to be the conviction it carries to the minds of thinking people that the whole process of competitive armaments, the enlistment of the entire male population in national armies, and the incessant planning of campaigns against neighbors, is not a trustworthy method for preserving peace. It now appears that the military preparations of the last fifty years in Europe have resulted in the most terrific war of all time, and that a fierce ultimate outbreak is the only probable result of the system. For the future of civilization this is

a lesson of high value. It teaches that if modern civilization is to be preserved, national executives—whether imperial or republican—must not have at their disposal immense armaments and drilled armies held ready in the leash; that armaments must be limited, an international Supreme Court established, national armies changed to the Swiss form, and an international force adequate to deal with any nation that may suddenly become lawless agreed upon by treaty and held always in readiness. The occasional use of force will continue to be necessary even in the civilized world; but it must be made not an aggressive, but a protective, force and used as such—just as protective force has to be used sometimes in families, schools, cities, and commonwealths.

At present, Americans do not close their eyes to the plain fact that the brute force which Germany and Austria-Hungary are now using, can only be overcome by brute force of the same sort in larger measures. It is only when negotiations for peace begin that the great lesson of the futility of huge preparations for fighting to preserve peace can be given effect. Is it too much to expect that the whole civilized world will take to heart the lessons of this terrible catastrophe and coöperate to prevent the recurrence of such losses and woes? Should Germany and Austria-Hungary succeed in their present undertakings, the whole civilized world would be obliged to bear continuously, and to an ever-increasing amount, the burdens of great armaments, and would live in constant fear of sudden invasion, now here, now there—a terrible fear, against which neither treaties nor professions of peaceable intentions would offer the least security.

It must be admitted, however, that the whole military organization, which has long been compulsory on the nations of continental Europe, is inconsistent in the highest degree with American ideals of individual liberty and social progress. Democracies can fight with ardor, and sometimes with success, when the whole people is moved by a common sentiment or passion; but the structure and discipline of a modern army like that of Germany, Austria-Hungary, or Russia has a despotic or autocratic quality which is inconsistent with the fundamental principles of democratic society. To make war in countries like France, Great Britain, and the United States requires the widespread, simultaneous stirring of the passions of

the people on behalf of their own ideals. This stirring requires publicity before and after the declaration of war and public discussion; and the delays which discussion causes are securities for peace. Out of the present struggle should come a check on militarism—a strong revulsion against the use of force as means of settling international disputes.

It must also be admitted that it is impossible for the American people to sympathize with the tone of the imperial and royal addresses which, in summoning the people to war, use such phrases as "My monarchy," "My loyal people," or "My loyal subjects;" for there is implied in such phrases a dynastic or personal ownership of peoples which shocks the average American. Americans inevitably think that the right way for a ruler to begin an exhortation to the people he rules is President Wilson's way—"My fellow countrymen."

It follows from the very existence of these American instincts and hopes that, although the people of the United States mean to maintain faithfully a legal neutrality, they are not, and can not be, neutral or indifferent as to the ultimate outcome of this titanic struggle. It already seems to them that England, France, and Russia are fighting for freedom and civilization. It does not follow that thinking Americans will forget the immense services which Germany has rendered to civilization during the last hundred years, or desire that her power to serve letters, science, art, and education should be in the least abridged in the outcome of this war upon which she has entered so rashly and selfishly, and in so barbarous a spirit. Most educated Americans hope and believe that by defeating the German

barbarousness the Allies will only promote the noble German civilization.

The presence of Russia in the combination against Germany and Austria-Hungary seems to the average American an abnormal phenomenon; because Russia is itself a military monarchy with marked territorial ambitions; and its civilization is at a more elementary stage than that of France or England; but he resists present apprehension on this score by recalling that Russia submitted to the "Concert of Europe" when her victorious armies were within seventeen miles of Constantinople, that she emancipated her serfs, proposed The Hague Conferences, initiated the "Duma," and has lately offered—perhaps as war measures only—autonomy to her Poles and equal rights of citizenship to her Jews. He also cannot help believing that a nation which has produced such a literature as Russia has produced during the last fifty years must hold within its multitudinous population a large minority which is seething with high aspirations and a fine idealism.

For the clarification of the public mind on the issues involved, it is important that the limits of American neutrality should be discussed and understood. The action of the Government must be neutral in the best sense; but American sympathies and hopes cannot possibly be neutral, for the whole history and present state of American liberty forbids. For the present, thinking Americans can only try to appreciate the scope and real issues of this formidable convulsion, and so be ready to seize every opportunity that may present itself to further the cause of human freedom, and of peace at last.

Asticou, Me., Sept. 1, 1914.

THE EUROPEAN DÉBÂCLE

BY HERMAN RIDDER

of the *New Yorker Staats-Zeitung*.

THE present European débâcle is but another exemplification of the great principle which has underlaid all of the major conflicts of history—the inexorable necessity for a people to expand, or to decay. In this sense, the peaceful expansion of the various countries of Europe during the last half century paved the way, smooth and direct, for the cosmic tragedy which we are now witnessing across the oceans.

With the expansive forces of economic need and race-sense constantly working within the fixed limit of a certain geographical territory, conflicts of interests and eventually the conflict of nations was inevitable.

The rise of Germany subsequent to the consummation of the Empire has been remarkable. Her commercial expansion has been not simply irresistibly steady; it has been prophetically rapid.

It was not to be expected that France and, more especially, Great Britain could regard the unremitting inroads thus made into fields which up to this time they had regarded as their own, with equanimity.

The story of British diplomacy during the last years coincident with Germany's tremendous cutting down of Great Britain's commercial supremacy is punctuated with every conceivable form of possible interference with her rival's legitimate lines of trade extension. It was all done under the cover of that shibboleth "the status quo," but, like other fabrics stretched to cover too much, the "status quo" became at last transparent. When that point was reached, war was already in sight. There was not one field beyond her own borders in which Germany was unopposed not simply by the commercial competition of her powerful rival but by all the diplomatic forces that could be brought to bear against her. Germany knew this, and Great Britain knew that she knew it and that the hour of reckoning could not be long postponed. When her chain of allies had been completed, Great Britain sought only for the conventional pretext.

The ends of the earth, it would seem, had been searched by British diplomacy for its purposes. When the Russian advance toward India had been for the time being stayed on the fields of Manchuria, Russia, washed clean of a century of suspicion, was hailed in an hour the ally of England. The cry "Pan-Germanism" was all that she required to bring her forward against Germany, as the standard-bearers of "Pan-Slavism." The memory of "perfidious Albion" was wiped out by Edward VII, when he offered France the assistance of British arms in the movement toward the "revanche." Japan, whose friendship had been sought in the first instance against Russia, was still an ally. It would seem as if Great Britain might have rested content with these achievements, but apparently not one stone was to be left unturned to make the isolation of Germany and Austria complete. By raising the hopes of the Irredentists of Italy, the bonds of the Triple Alliance were loosened and their one ally withdrawn from them. By a violation of the spirit of Belgian neutrality the French advance to Berlin was to be smoothed.

While all this was going on Germany was silent but not asleep. She was not blind to the activ-

ities of her enemies, but she was impotent to forestall them.

It was not a difficult feat to provoke the war, once the Allies were prepared for it. Out of the Balkan War had come conditions which Russia interpreted as propitious to the fulfillment of her long retarded ambitions for a port on the south and the erection of an all-embracing Slavic Empire. Working through the Pan-Slavic movement in Servia she created in that country a state of affairs which no self-respecting nation could tolerate on its borders. When Austria protested to Servia, Russia began the mobilization against her of the vast army which had been whipped into shape for just this contingency. As Austria's ally, Germany was compelled to go to her assistance in a struggle in which the meaning of the eventual success of Russia was evident to every German mind.

Germany did not want the war. During a quarter of a century her industries and commerce have developed under an emperor who had shown himself a sincere and forceful advocate of peace. It is the limit of the illogical to assert that a sovereign who had worked so consistently for the economic uplift of his people should from motives of personal ambition impose upon that same people all the burdens and horrors incident to modern warfare on a large scale. That all the achievements of the last twenty-five years must be lost in a few days tells its own story. Successful in the end or not Germany must make terrible sacrifices and stand tremendous losses.

To picture the Emperor of Germany as a blood-thirsty war-lord is the most arrant nonsense. The telegrams that were exchanged between the Emperor and the Czar show only too clearly the extent to which the former was willing to go to preserve the peace of Europe. The limits of Germany's honor and national integrity alone restrained him.

To assume that the Emperor declared war in the present instance against the will of the German people is equally absurd. The Germans are a military nation. Their position in relation to the other nations of Europe has made them such. They are soldiers to a man and the problems of Germany are known to every German subject. When Russia began to mobilize, it meant war and every German knew and expected war. Had Germany been under a republican form of govern-

ment hostilities would have been declared just the same.

This is not, on the part of Germany a war of conquest. It is not a Napoleonic war to satisfy the personal ambitions of an emperor. It is a defensive war, with Germany's national life at stake.

It is difficult to forecast the outcome of what is already proving to be the greatest conflict in the history of civilized nations. There is no more reason to assume as yet that Germany will emerge from it completely triumphant than there is to assert as a foregone conclusion that the allied armies will destroy the German and Austrian combinations. The great machine which in turn crushed Denmark in 1864, Austria in 1866, and France in 1870 is again under way, and it only remains to be seen whether the modern engines of destruction can stop the massed attack of the most wonderful infantry that has ever marched on a field of battle.

Out of it all will come—what?

In the event of a German triumph, we may look confidently forward to the steady advancement and increase of those arts and sciences which have

given German civilization a foremost place in Europe and have done so much for the other peoples of the earth. In the event of a German defeat, I can see only disaster.

The temporary supremacy of Great Britain upon the seas and in commerce, will pass with the fruition of the seeds which she herself has sown. The Asiatic has been aroused, and the coming struggle between the East and the West has been hastened by unnumbered years. The Slavic advance against Germany will be accomplished, but in so far as it spells only Russia, it will also be temporary. When the hordes of China and Japan directed from Tokyo, and the uncounted millions of India, are turned against Europe and our own beloved land, the real meaning of the forces now at work for the destruction of Germany will be felt. Swallowed up in the general movement of Asia westward, Russia will be but a tool in the hands of her still more eastern conquerors.

When that day comes, we shall turn back to the Month of August, in the Year of Our Lord and Saviour Nineteen Hundred and Fourteen, and read the first chapter of the cataclysm.

*A VISION OF ARMAGEDDON

BY H. G. WELLS

AT LAST the intolerable tension is over. Europe is at war. The monstrous vanity that was begotten by the easy victories of 1870-71 has challenged the world. Germany prepares to reap the harvest that Bismarck sowed. That trampling, drilling foolery in the heart of Europe that has arrested civilization and darkened the hopes of mankind for forty years—German imperialism and German militarism—has struck its inevitable blow.

The victory of Germany will mean the permanent enthronement of the war god over all human affairs. The defeat of Germany may open the way to disarmament and peace throughout the earth. To those who love peace there can be no other hope in the present conflict than her defeat, the utter discrediting of the German legend—ending it for good and all—of blood and iron, the superstition of Krupp, flag-wagging, Teutonic Kiplingism, and all that criminal sham efficiency that centres in Berlin.

*Reprinted by permission from the *New York Times*.

Never was a war so righteous as is the war against Germany now; never any State in the world so clamored for punishment; but be it remembered that Europe's quarrel is with Germany as a State, not with the German people, with the system, not with the race.

The older tradition of Germany is a pacific, civilizing tradition. The temperament of the mass of the German people is kindly, sane, amiable. Disaster to the German army, if it is unaccompanied by such a memorable wrong as dismemberment or intolerable indignity, will mean the restoration of the greatest people of Europe to the fellowship of the western nations.

The rôle of England in the huge struggle is as plain as daylight. We have to fight if only on account of the Luxemburg outrage. We have to fight. If we do not fight England will cease to be a country to be proud of and we shall have a dirt bath to escape from.

But it is inconceivable that we should not fight, and, having fought, then in the hour of victory

it will be for us to save the liberated Germans from vindictive treatment, to secure for this great people their right to a place in the sun as one united German-speaking State.

First, we have to save ourselves and Europe, and then we have to stand between the Germans on the one hand, and Cossack revenge on the other.

For my part, I do not doubt that Germany and Austria are doomed to defeat in this war. It may not be a catastrophic defeat, though even that is possible, but it will be a defeat. There is no destiny in the stars and every sign is false if this is not so.

They have provoked an overwhelming combination of enemies. They have underrated France. They are hampered by bad social and military traditions. The German is not naturally a good soldier. He is orderly and obedient, but not nimble or quickwitted. Hence his sole considerable military achievement is his not very lengthy march to Paris in 1871.

The conditions of modern warfare have been almost completely revolutionized and in a direction that subordinates massed fighting and unintelligent men to the rapid initiative of individualized soldiers.

On the other hand, since those years of disaster, the Frenchman has learned the lesson of humility. He is prepared now sombrely for a similar struggle. His is the gravity that precedes astonishing victories. In the air, in the open field, with guns and machines, it is doubtful if any one fully realizes the superiority of his quality to the German.

This sudden attack may take him aback for a week or so, though I doubt even that; but in the end, I think, he will hold his own even without us, and with us I venture to prophesy within three months from now his tri-color will be over the Rhine, and, even suppose his line gets broken by the first rush, even then I do not see how the Germans are to get to Paris or anywhere near Paris.

I do not see how, against the strength of modern offensive and the stinging power of an intelligent enemy in retreat, of which we had a little foretaste in South Africa, the exploit of Sedan can be repeated.

A retiring German army, on the other hand, will be far less formidable than a retiring French army, because there is less devil in it, because it is made up of men taught to obey in masses, be-

cause its intelligence is concentrated in old, autocratic officers; because it is dismayed when it breaks ranks.

The German Army is everything the conscriptionists dreamt of making our people. It is, in fact, an army about twenty years behind the requirements of contemporary conditions.

ISSUE WITH RUSSIA MORE DOUBTFUL

On the eastern frontier the issue is more doubtful because of the uncertainty of Russian things. The peculiar military strength of Russia, the strength she was never able to display in Manchuria, lies in her vast resources of mounted men.

A set invasion of Prussia may be a matter of many weeks, but the raiding possibilities in Eastern Germany are enormous.

It is difficult to guess how far a Russian attack will be directed by intelligence, how far Russia will have to blunder very disastrously, indeed, before she can be put upon the defensive.

A Russian raid is far more likely to threaten Berlin than a German to reach Paris.

Meanwhile there is a struggle on sea. In that I am prepared for some rude shocks. The Germans have devoted an amount of energy to the creation of an aggressive navy that would have been spent more wisely in consolidating their European position. It is probably a thoroughly good navy, and, ship for ship, the equal of our own, but the same lack of invention, the same relative uncreativity that kept the German behind the Frenchman in things aerial made him follow our lead in naval matters, and if we erred, and I believe we have erred, in overrating the importance of big battleships the German has at least very obligingly fallen in with our error.

The safest and most effective place for the German fleet at the present time is the Baltic Canal. Unless I underrate the powers of the waterplane there is no safe harbor for it. If it goes into port anywhere that port can be mined and bottled up. Ships can be destroyed at leisure by aerial bombs, so that if they are on this side of the Kiel Canal they must keep at sea and fight, if we let them, before their coal runs short, a battle in the open sea.

NAVAL FIGHT AGAINST ODDS

In that case their only chance will be to fight against odds, with every prospect of a smashing,

albeit we shall certainly have to pay for victory in ships and men. In the Baltic we shall, notably get at them without the participation of Denmark, and their ships may have considerable use against Russia, but in the end even there the mine, aeroplane, and destroyer should do this work.

So I reckon that Germany will be held in the east and that the west will get her fleet practically destroyed.

We ought also to be able to sweep her shipping off the seas and lower her flag forever in Africa, Asia, and the Pacific. All the probabilities seem to me to point to that.

There is no reason why Italy should not stick to her present neutrality. There is considerable inducement at hand for both Denmark and Japan to join in directly they are convinced of the failure of the first big rush on the part of Germany.

All those issues will be more or less definitely decided within the next two or three months.

By that time, I believe, German imperialism will be shattered, and it may be possible to anticipate the end of the armaments phase of European history.

France, Italy, England, and all the smaller Powers of Europe are now pacific countries. Russia, after a huge war, will be too exhausted for further adventure. Shattered Germany will be revolutionary. Germany will be as sick of the uniforms and imperialism idea as France was in 1871, as disillusioned about predominance as Bulgaria is to-day.

The way will be open at last for all these Western Powers to organize a peace.

That is why I, with my declared horror of war, did not sign any of these "stop the war" appeals.

Declarations that have appeared in the last few days are that every sword is drawn against Germany. Now is the sword drawn for peace.

London, Aug. 4.

*GIVE GERMANY FAIR PLAY

BY HUGO MÜNSTERBERG

THE European war broke into the calm of our summer quick and unexpected, but still quicker and still more unexpected by any lover of fair play was the vehement turn of the American press for the Slavs and against the Germans. Whatever Germany or Austria did was seen through the spectacles of the enemy. Their motives appeared tainted, their actions against the rules of the game; they had no just cause and no morals, they were not worthy of American sympathy. Of course, some pretext can be found for every partiality, and it is not difficult to foresee how this game can be played on. If Germany's enemies are defeated the American nation must be with them because it is always with the weakest, always with the under dog; but if they are victorious the American nation will be with them, too, because it loves a spirited fighter, and a triumphant power. Yet it is just Germany which dares a spirited fight and which is the weaker, forced to fight against heavy odds.

HOW THE NEWS HELPS

The naked news which the cable brings helps on this cruel game. The average American reader

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has no idea how much anti-German feeling is infused into the so-called facts which are sent over the ocean. He sees that the news is dated from Vienna or Berlin and he does not know that most of the American correspondents on the continent for many years have been enthusiastic Englishmen, who serve first of all their home papers. And even the few American journalists on the spot devote most of their energies to London papers and receive from there the daily advice and the daily prejudice of English rivalry.

But does the news at least find fair play when it arrives? What the French or the English government proclaims stands gloriously on the first page; what the German government replies is hidden somewhere in a corner of the fifth. When England interprets German action in Luxemburg as the violation of agreements it is told in inch-large letters; when Germany proves that it had the right it comes out in the smallest print. When Germany goes through Belgium, America shares the indignation of England, to which it serves as a welcome pretext. But that France went through Belgium and Holland first is kept secret in most American papers. This means playing the reporter's game with loaded dice.

THE POWERS OF KINGS

Yet, even the kind of news which is dumped on us does not justify the editorial temper with which especially the New York papers appeal to our sense of superiority over mediæval Germany. Typical is the way in which the decisions and deeds of emperors are always treated as if they were purely personal autocratic caprices without inner contact with the national life. This better than anything whips up the democratic spirit of the new world. Who stops to consider that in the hour of war, and even of danger before the war, the American President has more personal power than any emperor except the Czar, and even he would be swept away if he obstructed the will of the people? Children like to fancy that kings run about with golden crowns on their heads and with purple cloaks.

It is hardly less childlike to imagine that a proclamation like that of the Emperor Franz Josef was written by him personally, and to construe it as if he made war on Servia because he wanted to take personal vengeance for the murder of his heir. Even the distant spectator ought to have seen that the whole tremendous pressure of the Austrian nation was necessary to force the old emperor into a war which he resisted with all the instincts of a man who has suffered much and who wants at last his peace and rest.

Is it really possible to doubt that Emperor William desired nothing but honorable peace with all the world? For twenty-five years he has been the most efficient power for European peace. He has done more for it than all the European peace societies together, and, however often the world seemed at the verge of war, his versatile mind averted the danger. He knew too well, and the whole German people knew too well, that the incomparable cultural and industrial growth of the nation since the foundation of the young empire would be horribly threatened by the risks of war. Can any sane man really believe the slander that all was a long-prepared game which Austria was to start, and in which Germany would wilfully force the furies of war into the Russian realm?

EVERY EFFORT IN VAIN

No, this time every effort was in vain, and all good will for peace was doomed because the issue between the onrushing Slavic world and the German world had grown to an overpowering

force. The struggle between the two civilizations was imminent, and where such a historic world conflict arises the will of individuals is crushed until they serve the will of the nations. The Slavs of the southeast, the Servians, had defeated their oppressors, the Turks. It was inevitable that their new strength should push them to ambitious plans. It was necessary that they should aim toward a new great Slavic empire which would border the sea and embrace Austria's Slavic possessions. That had to mean the end of Austria, the crumbling of its historic power. Such an inner, passionate conflict, such an issue of existence, must lead to explosions.

SLAV AGAINST GERMAN

Servians kill the archduke. That was Austria's opportunity for an effort to crush the power which aimed toward its downfall. But it was no less historically necessary that the largest Slavic nation, the Russians, should feel that Servia's cause was their own. Russia knew well that while it had recovered from the wounds of the Japanese war the Slavic strength was still unequal to that of the German nations, but it knew also that it could rely on France's latent longing to revenge itself for Alsace and on England's grumbling jealousy of the great German rival in the world's markets. At last the chances seemed splendid to strike the long delayed blow of the Slavic world against the German. The Czar was unable to resist the gigantic pressure of the hour; his Government mobilized against both Austria and Germany.

WHY BLAME THE KAISER?

Is there really any sense in blaming the German emperor for actually declaring war, when the Russian hostile preparation was evident, before its slow mobilization was completed and before Germany by such loss of time had been brought to certain destruction? Four times he urged the Czar to abstain from the moving of the Russian troops to the frontier; most unwillingly he undertook to urge Austria to new negotiations. But the world contrast of the two civilizations was too deep; Russia could not forego its unique chances, and so it continued passionately its armaments, trusting that the French guns would start of themselves.

The German emperor would have shamefully neglected his duties if he had quietly waited until

the Russian armies were brought together from the far East. He had to strike as soon as the war was certain. He therefore had to go through the formality of declaring war, but it was Russia which made the war, and it was part of Russia's war making that it forced Germany to declare the war first. America undertook without such a deep inner conflict a punitive expedition against Mexico, not unlike that of Austria against Servia. If at that time Japan had declared that it could not tolerate such hostility to Mexico and had sent all its warships toward California, would the President have genially waited until the Japanese cruisers entered the Golden Gate, instead of putting an ultimatum to the Mikado saying that unless the ships stopped it would mean war?

NEITHER COULD HELP IT

In this historic situation neither Russia nor Germany could really act otherwise. The great conflict of civilizations was necessarily stronger than the mere wishes of peaceful individuals. But if it is such a gigantic conflict of Slavic and Germanic culture, the sympathies of the progressive American nation ought not to be so wilfully misled and ought not to be whipped into the camp of the Cossacks. Americans ought not to rejoice when the uncultured hordes of the East march over the frontier and aim toward the most eastern German city, toward Königsberg, the town of Immanuel Kant.

If this war means such an inevitable conflict of the Slavic and the Germanic world, at least it ought to be clear to every one who can think historically that it belongs to the type of war for which the world as yet knows no substitute, the one type of war which in spite of the terrible losses is ultimately moral. Surely no comment on this fight of the nations is more absurd than the frivolous cry that this is an immoral war. Every war for commercial ends or for personal glory or for mere aggrandizement or for revenge, may be called immoral, and thus the feelings with which Frenchmen and Englishmen join the Slavic forces might justly be accused. But both Slavs and

Germans stand here on moral ground, as both are willing to sacrifice labor and life for the conservation of their national culture and very existence. Since the days of Napoleon Germany has never gone into a war which was more justified by the conscience of history.

THE FLIGHT OF ITALY

To be sure, there is no lack of elements in this war which do hurt the moral feeling. In victory or defeat Germans will hardly forget the flight of Italy which, under the flimsiest subterfuges, has deserted its allies in the hour of need. And immoral above all is the effort of the world to strangle the spirit of Germany by the mere number of enemies. That truly is no fair, no moral fight, when Germany and Austria are not to stand against Russia and Servia alone, which together have a population equal to that of the two opponents, but are also attacked from behind by France and England, by Japan and perhaps Roumania and last, but not least, by the misled public opinion of America.

And this answers at once the pointed question which many American papers have discussed since the war began, the question whether the whole system is not fundamentally wrong, whether the armaments which were planned to protect the countries and to keep the balance and harmony have not thrown them into a destructive war, and whether it would not have been better to rely on international arbitration throughout the world. The grouping of this war shows why Germany would have trampled on her own sacred rights if she had laid the armor away and had relied on the judgment of the other nations. Would she have had the slightest chance for a fair judgment if political jealousy, economic rivalry, the vanity of revenge, and the aversion of a lower culture had been combined against her in an unholy alliance? The jury would have been packed, prejudices would have swept the court room. No; unless the Cossacks with their pogroms were to crush the culture of Germany she had simply no resort left but to trust in her sword and in her prayer.

ANNOTATED LIST OF HELPFUL BOOKS

WAR MANUALS

THE WORLD'S WORK WAR MANUAL of the Great Conflict of 1914, with 100 illustrations, maps, and a complete

reference index. Edited by Arthur W. Page. Doubleday, Page & Co. 25 cents (paper), 50 cents (cloth), \$1.00 (leather).

WAR GAZETTEER, compiled by Charles McD. Puckette

and Carrington Weems. *N. Y. Evening Post*. 15 cents, paper.

TRIPLE ALLIANCE

THE MEMOIRS OF FRANCESCO CRISPI. Edited by Thomas Palamenghi-Crispi. 3 vols. Doran. \$10.50.

The third volume,—particularly timely just now,—contains a history of the negotiations at the Congress of Berlin.

THE BORDERLAND OF CZAR AND KAISER. By Poultney Bigelow. Harper. \$2.

A stimulating and entertaining account of travels in eastern Europe along the Austro-Russian and Russo-German frontiers.

POLAND OF TO-DAY AND YESTERDAY. By Nevin O. Winter. Boston: L. C. Page. 487 pp., ill. \$3.

A review of the history of the land and people, past and present, outlining the causes which resulted in the partition, and a survey of social, political, and economic conditions of to-day, with relation to the three partitioning powers, Germany, Russia, and Austria.

TRIPLE ENTENTE

THIRTY YEARS: ANGLO-FRENCH REMINISCENCES, 1876-1906. By Sir Thomas Barclay. [Houghton, Mifflin. \$3.50. A stimulating account of the Entente Cordiale from within, by one of those who contributed largely to establish the now famous *rapprochement* between England and France.

ENGLAND AND THE ORLEANS MONARCHY. By Major John Hall. Dutton. \$4.

A piece of diplomatic history detailing the creation of Belgium as a neutral state by the Five Powers, and the establishment of the Entente Cordiale between France and England.

COMMON SENSE IN FOREIGN POLICY. By Sir Harry Johnston. Dutton. \$1.25.

An account of the problems faced in shaping Great Britain's policy toward France, Germany, Austria-Hungary, Russia, the East, and America.

ENGLAND

IMPRESSIONS OF BRITISH LIFE AND CHARACTER. By Meherban Narayanrao Bahasaheb. Macmillan. 240 pp., ill. \$2.25.

The Hindu chief gives a series of sketches and impressions from the standpoint of the traveler, of British life and character compared with people and habits of India.

ENGLAND INVADIED. By Edward Ford and Gordon Home. Macmillan. 371 pp., ill. \$2.

A serious and well-founded forecast of what would happen in case a German army landed on the English coast.

A HISTORY OF ENGLAND AND GREATER BRITAIN. By Arthur Lyon Cross. Macmillan. 1,165 pp. \$2.50.

This excellent history of England from Roman days to the middle of the present year, and covering more than 1,100 pages, appears very opportunely at the present time.

THE DAY OF THE SAXON. By General Homer Lea. Harper. 249 pp. \$1.80.

This is a brilliant analysis of the part played by Saxon civilization in the world's history and a tribute to its great achievements.

THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH PATRIOTISM. By Esme Wingfield-Stratford. Lane. 2 vols. 1,286 pp. \$7.50.

A review of the great fervid moments of British history from the defeat of the Spanish Armada to the Battle of Trafalgar.

THE BRITANNIC QUESTION. By Richard Jebb. Longmans, Green. 262 pp. 35 cents.

How to effect a closer and permanent union between the self-governing states of the British Empire is the text of Dr. Jebb's monograph.

THE PASSING OF EMPIRE. By H. Fielding-Hall. Macmillan. 307 pp. \$2.50.

This discussion of India and its relation to the British Empire is of particular significance now when sedition is rife in Hindustan, and the shadow of the Russian bear persists, despite the fact that Russia happens to be the ally of England in the present conflict.

SOCIAL FORCES IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA. By H. G. Wells. Harpers. 415 pp. \$2.

According to Mr. Wells himself this gives "a fairly complete view of all my opinions."

WHEN WILLIAM CAME. By H. H. Munroe. Lane. 322 pp. \$1.25.

A vivid and appealing, although imaginative story of what would happen to England if the Germans conquered her and began to alter the processes of government to the Hohenzollern pattern.

ENGLAND AND THE ENGLISH. By Price Collier. Scribner. \$1.50.

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HOW FRANCE IS GOVERNED. By Raymond Poincaré McBride, Nast. 376 pp. \$2.25.

The President of the French Republic in this volume gives us discussions of elementary civics as applied to French political life, tracing the history of the administrative machinery of the French Government, national and local.

FRANCE UNDER THE REPUBLIC. By Jean Charlemagne Bracq. Scribner. 376 pp. \$1.50.

An attempt to gauge the great political experiment of France during the last four decades, and to make an inventory of the constructive and reformatory work of the Republic.

SOURCE PROBLEMS OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. By Fred Morrow Fling and Helen Dresser Fling. Harpers. 338 pp. \$1.10.

A summary of documentary and other evidence.

FRANCE FROM BEHIND THE VEIL. By Paul Vassili. Funk & Wagnalls. 396 pp., ill. \$3.75.

A chronicle of the social and political life of France for half a century beginning with the reign of Napoleon III and closing with the Paris of "the day before yesterday."

GERMANY

GERMAN SEA-POWER. By Archibald S. Hurd and Henry Castle. Scribner. \$3.25.

A book which may be said to ask the question "Will Anglo-Saxon or German civilization predominate in the world?" According to the authors, neither the United States nor Great Britain has thoroughly understood the causes for the present naval and economic growth of the German Empire, and in explanation they take the ground that Germany has a maritime history and possesses maritime instincts of which her naval development is an outcome.

HISTORY OF THE GERMAN STRUGGLE FOR LIBERTY. By Poultney Bigelow. Harper. 4 vols. \$10.50.

An account of the heroic moral and spiritual, as well as physical warfare which the German people waged to obtain the degree of liberty that they now possess.

GERMANY AND THE GERMANS FROM AN AMERICAN POINT OF VIEW. By Price Collier. Scribner. 602 pp. \$1.50.

One of the best discussions of the German people and their character and problems which has appeared in recent years. An unusually intimate knowledge fitted Mr. Collier for the task. A significant sentence at the end of the chapter on Frederick to Bismarck is, "We shall have war when the German Kaiser touches a button and gives an order, and the German people will have no more to say in the matter than you and I."

GERMANY AND THE NEXT WAR. By F. Bernhardi. Longmans, Green. \$3.

This is a candid expression of the German purpose to predominate and created a great sensation in Germany when published, going through many editions in a short time. General Bernhardi does not merely produce a book in praise of war; he deliberately advocates not only preparation for war, but also war itself. He writes from the standpoint of one who thinks that aspirations for peace threaten to poison the soil upon which the German people live.

GERMANY OF TO-DAY. By Charles Tower. Holt. 256 pp. 50 cents.

A concise account written without any non-essentials.

GERMANY AND THE GERMAN EMPEROR. By G. H. Peris. Holt. 520 pp. \$3.

A useful summary of the characteristics and achievements of William of Germany.

MEN AROUND THE KAISER. By Frederick W. Wile. Lippincott. 279 pp., ill. \$1.75.

A fascinating, illuminating picture of those earnest, efficient personalities in war, government, finance, industry, art, and diplomacy, who have made the German Empire what it is.

IMPERIAL GERMANY. By Prince Bernhard von Bülow. Dodd, Mead. 342 pp. \$3.

A story of the historical development of the German Empire, by the Ex-Chancellor, with a discussion of how the Germans built a great naval power, why they have expanded colonially, and what Socialism means to them.

THE GERMAN EMPEROR AND THE PEACE OF THE WORLD. By Alfred H. Fried. Doran. \$2.

A Nobel Prize essay of immediate timeliness.

WILLIAM OF GERMANY. By Stanley Shaw. Macmillan. 395 pp. \$2.50.

A sketch, by an Englishman, and for English readers, of the German Emperor.

THE KAISER — a manual of information. Doubleday, Page. 1914. \$1.00.

A CHARACTER SKETCH OF GERMANY. Compiled and edited by M. Blakemore Evans and Elisabeth Merhaut. Heath. 237 pp., ill. \$1.

A picture of modern imperial Germany by means of a series of readings in German by eminent German authors.

GERMANY. By A. W. Holland. Macmillan. 312 pp., ill. \$2.

A new recounting of the story of Germany's nationhood, and how it came to be, from prehistoric times to the saber rattling of Zabern, written in clear, interesting style, is the volume "Germany," in The Making of the Nation series. This volume is by A. W. Holland, of Oxford, author of "Germany to the Present Day."

GERMANY AND ITS EVOLUTION IN MODERN TIMES. By Henri Lichtenberger. Holt. 440 pp. \$2.50.

A book to be recommended unconditionally for its comprehensiveness, insight, and impartiality.

MONARCHICAL SOCIALISM IN GERMANY. By Elmer Roberts. Scribners. 200 pp., ill. \$1.25.

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PAN-GERMANISM. By Roland G. Usher. Houghton, Mifflin. \$1.75.

Professor Usher, beginning with the great international movement, Pan-Germanism, considers the grounds for the existing jealousies between England and Germany, the relation of Russia, France, and Austria to the affair, the effects of the Balkan War upon the balance of power, and discusses with brilliance the relation of the United States to these new conditions in European diplomacy.

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AUSTRIA: HER PEOPLE AND THEIR HOME LANDS. By James Baker. Lane. 310 pp., ill. \$6.50.

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HUNGARY: ITS HISTORY AND REVOLUTIONS. Macmillan. \$1.

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ITALY'S WAR FOR A DESERT. By Francis McCullagh. Chicago: F. G. Browne & Company. 410 pp., ill. \$2.75.

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HELLAS AND THE BALKAN WARS. By D. J. Cassavetti. Dodd, Mead. 368 pp., ill. \$3.

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HISTORY OF RUSSIA. By Vasilii Osipovich Kluchevsky. Dutton. 3 vols. \$2.50.

Not a simple narrative of political or international happenings, but a remarkable study of Russian social, economic, and international history based upon years of personal research in the available historical sources of the subject.

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By a widely known traveler and scientific observer well acquainted with Russia.

ECONOMIC HISTORY OF RUSSIA. By James Mavor. Dutton. 2 vols. \$10.

Russian history has been thoroughly rewritten within twenty years. It is a survey the importance of which can scarcely be overestimated.

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"Sensational and disgusting, because it is an account of the sensational and disgusting thing called war." There is an introduction by Rudyard Kipling.

THE PASSING OF WAR. By William Leighton Grane. Macmillan. 302 pp. \$1.

In this volume, which Mr. Grane calls "a study in things which make for peace," the text is given in a sentence of the late King Edward VII. of Great Britain: "I am convinced that as civilization advances, the influence of Christian teaching will tend increasingly to inculcate the love of peace."

WAR AND WASTE. By David Starr Jordan. Doubleday, Page. 296 pp. \$1.25.

Dr. Jordan is one of the best known and most courageous advocates of disarmament and general peace. He has for years been devoting his energies and time to convincing the world that war does not pay. This is a graphic and keen presentation of the economic loss occasioned by war.

THE HUMAN SLAUGHTER HOUSE. By Wilhelm Lamzus. Stokes. 115 pp. 50 cents.

An extraordinarily keen analysis of the atrocities of war. All the deceptive glamor is stripped from battle and its horrors laid bare with shuddering, yet fascinating, strokes.

THE BALKAN WARS 1912-1913. By Jacob Gould Schurman. Princeton University Press. 140 pp. \$1.

A compact history, illuminatingly written, of the two Balkan Wars of 1912-13, has been given by Dr. Jacob Gould Schurman, president of Cornell University. This little volume is one of "The Stafford Little Lectures."

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An up-to-date, comprehensive history of the British navy, with figures and statistics particularly with regard to its development during the past twenty years.

THE CRIMSON FIST. By O. H. Neland. Boston: Badger; 208 pp. \$1.25.

A brilliant indictment of war. The author "convicts" the home, the school, the church, the press, and government of molding the character of the individual "to a spirit of aggressive patriotism, and thus to love for war."

ARMS AND INDUSTRY. By Norman Angell. Putnam. 248 pp. \$1.25.

This companion volume to Mr. Angell's now famous book "The Great Illusion," concerns itself chiefly with the relations and interrelations between modern states. While it treats chiefly of the moral and material factors of international politics, it also discusses credit, military force, and diplomacy.

THE WORLD SET FREE. By H. G. Wells. Dutton. 229 pp. \$1.35.

An elaboration of Mr. Wells's creed which has for its goal the end of war and the realization of a real parliament of the world. It crackles with Mr. Wells's best style.

THE WINE PRESS. By Alfred Noyes. Stokes. 49 pp. 60 cents.

A powerful argument in verse against war, with an epilogue that loftily visions the dawn of peace.

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THE TRADE OF THE WORLD. By James Davenport Whelpley. Century. 436 pp., ill. \$2.

A comprehensive and stimulating account of the forces and facts that make up the activities of the great trading nations.

INTERNATIONAL LAW

A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY IN THE INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT OF EUROPE. By David Jayne Hill. Longmans, Green. Vol. III. 706 pp. \$6.

While not treating directly of the present conflict, or the causes that led up to it, Dr. Hill analyzes the forces that have guided the destinies of Europe for nearly two centuries.

THE ESSENTIALS OF INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC LAW. By Amos S. Hershey. Macmillan. \$3.

In the preface Dr. Hershey states that "the work aims to furnish the teacher and student with an up-to-date text adapted to the needs of the classroom, and also to present the specialist as well as the general public with a scientific treatment of the subject."

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SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY IN EUROPE. By Samuel P. Orth. Holt. 350 pp. \$1.35.

A very brilliant and stimulating account of the progress of Socialism and social democracy throughout the continent. SOCIAL PROGRESS IN CONTEMPORARY EUROPE. By Frederic Austin Ogg. Macmillan. 384 pp. \$1.50.

An exhaustive and well-balanced account of the social advance of European peoples for a century.

THE PROBLEM OF EMPIRE GOVERNMENT. By C. E. T. Stuart-Linton. Longmans, Green. \$1.25.

This contains several chapters on imperial defence, written nearly two years ago, prophesying the turbulent status of European governments now observed.

THE INFLUENCE OF MONARCHS. By Frederick A. Woods. Macmillan. 422 pp. \$2.

"Only very rarely has a nation progressed in its political and economic aspects save under leadership of a strong sovereign." This is the text of the author.

LE PROBLÈME MONDIAL. By Albert Torres. Rio de Janeiro: National Library. 212 pp.

A study of the motives that guide nations in their relations one with the other, an especially interesting chapter being that on the Monroe Doctrine, by this Brazilian writer.

TRAVEL AND POLITICS IN ARMENIA. By Noel Buxton and the Rev. Harold Buxton. Macmillan. 274 pp., ill. \$1.50.

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
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